Criminal Procedure Final Court cases Flashcards
Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
Rule: If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.
Facts: Miranda was arrested at his home and brought to a special interrogation room where he signed a confession which contained a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made voluntarily with full knowledge of his legal rights and with the understanding that any statement he made might be used against him. He was not informed of his right to remain silent or his right to have counsel present. At his trial in an Arizona state court, the confession was admitted in evidence and he was convicted of kidnapping and rape. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the lower court’s decision. The case was elevated by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.
ISSUE:
Is the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination violated when a suspect is interrogated in custody without being informed of his right to remain silent and to have counsel present? YES
Conclusion: As a constitutional prerequisite to the admissibility of statements made under custodial interrogation, the suspect must, in the absence of a clear, intelligent waiver of the constitutional rights involved, be warned prior to questioning that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. Evidence obtained as a result of interrogation cannot be used against a defendant at trial unless the prosecution demonstrated the warnings were given, and knowingly and intelligently waived. The confession of Miranda which was obtained without having appraised him of his rights to remain silent and counsel violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and cannot be admitted into evidence against him.
Edwards v. Arizona (1981)
Rule: When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. An accused, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
FACTS:
After being arrested on a state criminal charge, and after being informed of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, petitioner Edwards was questioned by the police on Jan. 19, 1976, until he said that he wanted an attorney. Questioning then ceased, but on Jan. 20 police officers came to the jail and, after stating that they wanted to talk to him and again informing him of his Miranda rights, obtained his confession when he said that he was willing to talk. At trial in Arizona state court, the trial court ultimately denied Edwards’ motion to suppress his confession, finding the statement to be voluntary. Edwards was convicted, and he appealed. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that during the Jan. 20 meeting Edwards waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel when he voluntarily gave his statement after again being informed of his rights. Edwards filed a petition for certiorari, which was granted.
ISSUE:
Did the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments require suppression of a post-arrest confession, which was obtained after Edwards had invoked his right to consult counsel before further interrogation? YES
Conclusion: The Supreme Court of the United States held that the use of Edwards’ confession against him violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in that he had asserted his right to counsel and his right to remain silent, and the police, without furnishing him with counsel, returned and secured a confession. The Court averred that Edwards did not validly waive his right to counsel, where there was no finding that he understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it. Moreover, the Court opined that having requested counsel, Edwards was not subject to further interrogation until counsel had been made available to him, unless Edwards himself initiated further communication with the police. Hence, the Court reversed the state supreme court’s judgment.
Berkermer v. Mccarty (1984)
- officer stopped car weaving in road
- individual admitted to drinking/smoking MJ
- man was arrested and no Miranda given
- conviction overturned even though routine stops are not a custody and Miranda is not needed until arrest
Rule: The safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest. If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop is subjected to treatment that renders him in custody, he will be entitled to the protections prescribed by Miranda. However, the initial stop of a vehicle by an officer does not amount to being in custody.
FACTS:
An officer observed a vehicle swerving in and out of lanes on the highway and initiated a traffic stop. The officer asked if the driver had been using intoxicants, to which the driver replied in the affirmative. The driver was arrested, asked again about the use of intoxicants, and again answered in the affirmative. The driver was never advised of his constitutional rights, and he was convicted of driving under the influence. He appealed, asserting that the incriminating statements were not admissible as he had not been informed of his constitutional rights prior to interrogation. The Court vacated the driver’s conviction.
ISSUE:
Is roadside questioning of a motorist stopped pursuant to a routine traffic stop considered a custodial interrogation when the motorist is not yet arrested or placed into custody? NO
CONCLUSION:
The initial stop of the driver’s vehicle, by itself, did not render the driver in custody. Therefore, at that point in time, the driver was not entitled to a recitation of constitutional rights. However, after the driver was arrested, any statements made were inadmissible against him without a reading of his constitutional rights. Because it could not be determined which statements were relied upon in convicting the driver, the conviction was properly vacated.
Arizona v. Fulminante (1991)
Rule: The admission of an involuntary confession is a “trial error,” similar in both degree and kind to the erroneous admission of other types of evidence. The evidentiary impact of an involuntary confession, and its effect upon the composition of the record, is indistinguishable from that of a confession obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment, of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, or of a prosecutor’s improper comment on a defendant’s silence at trial in violation of the Fifth Amendment. When reviewing the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession, an appellate court, as it does with the admission of other forms of improperly admitted evidence, simply reviews the remainder of the evidence against the defendant to determine whether the admission of the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
FACTS:
After respondent Fulminante’s 11-year-old stepdaughter was murdered in Arizona, he left the State, was convicted of an unrelated federal crime, and was incarcerated in a federal prison in New York. There he was befriended by Anthony Sarivola, a fellow inmate who was a paid informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and was masquerading as an organized crime figure. Sarivola told Fulminante that he knew Fulminante was getting tough treatment from other inmates because of a rumor that he was a child murderer, and offered him protection in exchange for the truth. Fulminante admitted that he had killed the girl and provided details about the crime. After Fulminante was released from prison, he also confessed to Sarivola’s wife, whom he had never met before. Subsequently, he was indicted in Arizona for first-degree murder. The trial court denied his motion to suppress the confession to Sarivola, rejecting his contention that it was coerced and thus barred by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. He was convicted and sentenced to death. The State Supreme Court held that the confession was coerced and that the Court’s precedent precluded the use of harmless-error analysis in such a case. It remanded the case for a new trial without the use of the confession. The government appealed.
ISSUE:
Should the confession be barred from admission because of coercion? YES
CONCLUSION:
The judgment barring defendant’s confession was affirmed by the Court. The Court held that the confession was coerced and that the state failed to meet its burden of establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the admission of the confession was harmless error. There was a credible threat of physical violence to defendant unless he confessed. Admission of a coerced confession did not automatically require reversal of a conviction but was subject to harmless error analysis because it involved a trial error that could be assessed in the context of other evidence. Admission of defendant’s confession was not harmless error because it was unlikely that he would have been prosecuted at all absent the confession, the admission of the confession led to the admission of other evidence prejudicial to defendant, and the confession influenced the sentencing phase of the trial.
Dickerson v. United States (2000)
- Tried to overturn Miranda
- Miranda is required by the constitution
- It is not court made rule. Congress cannot overrule
Rule: Miranda, being a constitutional decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress.
FACTS:
Petitioner was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm in the course of committing a crime of violence. Before trial, petitioner moved to suppress a statement he had made at a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office, on the grounds that he had not received “Miranda warnings” before being interrogated. The district court granted his motion to suppress. The court of appeals reversed the suppression order, holding that 18 U.S.C.S. § 3501, which made admissibility turn solely on whether the statement was made voluntarily, had been satisfied. Petitioner appealed.
ISSUE:
Could Congress, by statute, have the final say on an admissibility question? NO
CONCLUSION:
On appeal, the court reversed, finding that Miranda was a constitutional decision of the court, and therefore could not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress. Further, following the principles of stare decisis, the court declined to overrule Miranda itself. The court held that Miranda and its progeny governed the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.
Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)
- charged in Florida with felony breaking and entering
- state law says may only be appointed in capital cases
- Does 6th give right to attorney in all felony cases?
- Yes, It is consistent with constitution
Rule: The Sixth Amendment provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. The court construes this to mean that in federal courts counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is competently and intelligently waived.
FACTS:
The inmate’s charged offense was a felony under Florida law. He appeared in state court without funds and without a lawyer and asked the court to appoint counsel for him. The state court refused because only a defendant in a capital offense was entitled to appointed counsel. The inmate was convicted. He challenged his conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial court’s refusal to appoint counsel for him denied him rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court err in refusing to appoint a counsel for the Wainwright? YES
CONCLUSION:
The Court held (1) the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions, (2) the court had construed the Sixth Amendment to require federal courts to provide counsel for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right was competently and intelligently waived, (3) the court looked to the fundamental nature of the Bill of Rights guarantees to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment made them obligatory on the states, (4) the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is one of the fundamental and essential rights made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and (5) Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), was overruled.
Brady v. Maryland (1963)
- found guilty of murder
- Brady said he participated in robbery but not killing
- both men received death penalty
-Boblit confessed to murder but prosecutor did not share with Brady’s attorney
-this violated due process of 14th - Led to Brady rule
Rule: The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
FACTS:
In separate trials in a Maryland state court, where the jury was the judge of both the law and the facts but the court passed on the admissibility of the evidence, petitioner Brady and a companion, Boblit, were convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. At his trial, Brady admitted participating in the crime but claimed that Boblit did the actual killing. In his summation to the jury, Brady’s counsel conceded that Brady was guilty of murder in the first degree and asked only that the jury return that verdict “without capital punishment.” Prior to the trial, Brady’s counsel had requested the prosecution to allow him to examine Boblit’s extrajudicial statements. Several of these were shown to him. However, one in which Boblit admitted to the actual killing was withheld by the prosecution, and it did not come to Brady’s notice until after he had been tried, convicted and sentenced and after his conviction had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. In a post-conviction proceeding, the appellate court held that suppression of the evidence by the prosecutor denied Brady due process of law, and it remanded the case for a new trial of the question of punishment, but not the question of guilt, since it was of the opinion that nothing in the suppressed confession could have reduced Brady’s offense below murder in the first degree. Brady was granted a writ of certiorari.
ISSUE:
Did the suppression of evidence by the State violate Brady’s rights under the Due Process Clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV? Yes.
CONCLUSION:
The Supreme Court of the United States held that suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violated the Due Process Clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, where the evidence was material to guilt or punishment, regardless of the State’s good or bad faith. The suppression of evidence violated Brady’s due process rights and required a retrial on the sentence. The Court further ruled that when the state appellate court restricted Brady’s new trial to the question of punishment, it did not deny him due process or equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, since the suppressed evidence was admissible only on the issue of punishment.
Batson v. Kentucky (1986)
- prosecutor used peremptory challenge to dismiss 4 black individuals
-led to all white jury - Batson was convicted
- did the exclusion violate 6 and 14 right to equal protection
- Yes, you can’t dismiss based on race alone
Rule: Defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial. A defendant must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire. The defendant is entitled to rely on the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits discrimination. Finally, the defendant must show that these facts raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude veniremen, raising an inference of purposeful discrimination.
FACTS:
During the criminal trial in a Kentucky state court of petitioner, a black man, the judge conducted voir dire examination of the jury venire and excused certain jurors for cause. The prosecutor then used his peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the venire, and a jury composed only of white persons was selected. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury on the ground that the prosecutor’s removal of the black veniremen violated petitioner’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community, and under the Fourteenth Amendment to equal protection of the laws. Without expressly ruling on petitioner’s request for a hearing, the trial judge denied the motion, and the jury ultimately convicted petitioner. Affirming the conviction, the Kentucky Supreme Court observed that recently, in another case, it had relied on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, and had held that a defendant alleging lack of a fair cross section must demonstrate systematic exclusion of a group of jurors from the venire.
ISSUE:
Did the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude the four blacks from the jury violate Batson’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair jury trial and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws? Yes.
CONCLUSION:
The Court found that the prosecutor’s actions violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Relying heavily on precedents set in Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) and Swain v. Alabama (1965), Justice Powell held that racial discrimination in the selection of jurors not only deprives the accused of important rights during a trial, but also is devastating to the community at large because it “undermines public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.” Without identifying a “neutral” reason why the four blacks should have been excluded from the jury, the prosecutor’s actions were in violation of the Constitution.
Lockhart v. Mccree (1986)
- dismissed juror who state that he would not be able to give death penalty
- Does the Constitution prohibit removal of prospective jurors whose opinion is so strong it could impair ability to do sentencing
- No this does not violate 6th or 14th
Rule: The Constitution does not prohibit the states from “death qualifying” juries in capital cases.
FACTS:
In a criminal prosecution in an Arkansas state court for capital felony murder, the trial judge at voir dire removed for cause, over the defendant’s objection, those prospective jurors who stated that they could not under any circumstances vote for the imposition of the death penalty. The jury convicted the defendant of capital felony murder but rejected the state’s request for the death penalty, instead setting the punishment at life imprisonment without parole. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the defendant’s petition for state post-conviction relief was denied. The defendant then filed a federal habeas corpus petition raising the claim that “death qualification” or the removal for cause of the so-called “Witherspoon-excludable” prospective jurors violated his right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution, to have his guilt or innocence determined by an impartial jury selected from a representative cross section of the community. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted habeas corpus relief, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, finding that there was substantial evidentiary support for the District Court’s conclusion that the removal for cause of “Witherspoon-excludables” resulted in conviction-prone juries, affirmed on the ground that such removal for cause violated the defendant’s constitutional right to a jury selected from a fair cross section of the community. The Arkansas Department of Corrections sought review.
ISSUE:
Did the removal for cause of “Witherspoon-excludables” violate the defendant’s constitutional right to a jury selected from a fair cross section of the community? No.
CONCLUSION:
The Court held that the Federal Constitution did not prohibit the removal for cause, prior to the guilt phase of the defendant’s bifurcated capital trial, of prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty was so strong that it would have prevented or substantially impaired the performance of their duties as jurors at the sentencing phase of the trial, in that the “death-qualification” of the jury did not violate the requirement of the Sixth Amendment that a jury must represent a fair cross section of the community, because the requirement did not apply to the selection of a petit jury, and because, even if it applied, the prospective jurors so excluded at voir dire did not constitute the distinctive group that, under the fair cross-section requirement, may not be systematically excluded from juries. Moreover, the Court held that the removal for cause did not violate the defendant’s right under the Sixth Amendment to an impartial jury, because the individual jurors who served at his trial were concededly impartial, and because the removal of the prospective jurors did not slant the jury toward conviction but, on the other hand, served the state’s proper interest in obtaining a single jury that could impartially decide all of the issues in his case.
J.E.B. v. Alabama (1994)
- You can’t bar jurors based on sex
Weems v. United States (1910)
- sentenced 15 yrs of hard labor and wearing chains for falsifying official documents
- Courts decided it was cruel and unusually bc grossly disproportional
Rule: It is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.
FACTS:
Petitioner Weems was convicted of falsifying a public and official document while he served as a disbursement officer in the Philippine Islands and sentenced to a term of 15 years imprisonment, civil interdiction under article 42 of the Spanish Penal Code, C.P. art. 42, life surveillance under C.P. art. 43, and perpetual absolute disqualification. When his conviction and sentence were affirmed, he filed an application for a writ of error, asserting that his sentence was cruel and unusual within the meaning of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
ISSUE:
Was petitioner’s sentence cruel and unusual within the meaning of the Philippine Bill of Rights? Yes.
CONCLUSION:
Because the provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments contained in the Philippine Bill of Rights was taken from the U.S. Const. amend. VIII, the Court gave it the same interpretation. The Court agreed that the petitioner’s punishment was improper because it was not proportionate to his offense, and thus the petitioner’s sentence violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.
Gregg v. Georgia (1976)
- IS the death sentenced a violation of 8th and 14th?
- It is not
- must be with due process and not used flippantly
Rule: Public perceptions of standards of decency with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A penalty also must accord with “the dignity of man,” which is the basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment. This means, at least, that the punishment not be “excessive.” When a form of punishment in the abstract rather than in the particular is under consideration, the inquiry into “excessiveness” has two aspects. First, the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.
FACTS:
The U.S. Supreme Court held in in the case of Furman v. Georgia that the imposition of the death sentence under Georgia (and Texas) statutes constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because under such statutes the juries had untrammeled discretion to impose or withhold the death penalty. The Georgia legislature amended its statutory scheme imposed new guidelines and limited the class of offenders that may be subject to capital punishment. The new scheme also required at least one of ten aggravating circumstances specified in the statutes to be proven beyond reasonable doubt before death may be imposed. The defendant was convicted of two counts of armed robbery and two counts of murder. Based on the new scheme, the jury, after the penalty hearing in the bifurcated procedure, returned a sentence of death on each count, finding as statutory aggravating conditions that the murder offenses were committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of the two other capital felonies of armed robbery of the murder victims, and that the defendant committed the murders for the purpose of receiving money and an automobile of one of the victims. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the imposition of the death sentences for murder, although but vacated the death sentences imposed for armed robbery since death penalty had rarely been imposed for that offense and the jury had improperly considered the murders as aggravating circumstances for the robberies after having considered the robberies as aggravating circumstances for the murders.
ISSUE:
Did a statutory scheme to apply the death penalty that considers a defendant and his crime with particularity violate the Constitution? NO
CONCLUSION:
The Court held that the punishment of death did not invariably violate the United States Constitution; that the death penalty was not a form of punishment that could never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it; and that the concerns that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner were met by a carefully drafted statute that ensured that the sentencing authority was given adequate information and guidance. With regard to the Georgia statute, the Court held that the statutory system under which defendant was sentenced, which focused the jury’s attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant and provided a method for review, did not violate the Constitution.
Roper v. Simmons (2005)
- simmons (17) sentenced to death in 1993
- many appeals rejected
- does an execution of minor violate 8th?
- Yes, standard decency has evolved and this violates 8th
Rule: A majority of states have rejected the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18, and the Supreme Court of the United States holds this is required by the Eighth Amendment.
FACTS:
At age 17, respondent Simmons planned and committed a capital murder. After he had turned 18, he was sentenced to death. His direct appeal and subsequent petitions for state and federal postconviction relief were rejected. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335, 122 S. Ct. 2242, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited the execution of a mentally retarded person. Simmons filed a new petition for state postconviction relief, arguing that Atkins’ reasoning established that the Constitution prohibited the execution of a juvenile who was under 18 when he committed his crime. The Supreme Court of Missouri agreed and set aside Simmons’ death sentence in favor of life imprisonment without eligibility for release. It held that, although Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 106 L. Ed. 2d 306, 109 S. Ct. 2969, rejected the proposition that the Constitution barred capital punishment for juvenile offenders younger than 18, a national consensus has developed against the execution of those offenders since Stanford.
ISSUE:
Does the Eight Amendment forbid the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18? Yes.
CONCLUSION:
The Supreme Court of the United States began with a review of objective indicia of consensus on juvenile capital punishment, as expressed by the enactments of legislatures that had addressed the question. Thirty states had prohibited the juvenile death penalty: 12 that had rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that had maintained it but, by express provision or judicial interpretation, excluded juveniles from its reach. The Court noted that even in the 20 states without a formal prohibition on executing juveniles, the practice was infrequent. The Court held that this provided sufficient evidence that American society viewed juveniles as categorically less culpable than the average criminal and went on to provide three reasons: (1) the lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility were found in youth more often than in adults and were more understandable among the young; (2) juveniles were more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure; and (3) the character of a juvenile was not as well formed as that of an adult. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18.
Wolff v. McDonnell (1974)
- prisoners rights
Rule: Written notice of the charges must be given to the disciplinary-action defendant inmate in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense. At least a brief period of time after the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be allowed to the inmate to prepare for the appearance before the adjustment committee. There also must be a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action.
FACTS:
Robert O. McDonnell, on behalf of himself and other inmates at a Nebraska prison, filed a complaint for damages and injunctive relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in which he alleged that disciplinary proceedings at the prison violated due process; that the inmate legal assistance program did not meet constitutional standards; and that the regulations governing inmates’ mail were unconstitutionally restrictive. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted partial relief. Though rejecting McDonnell’s procedural due process claim, the court held that the prison’s policy of inspecting all attorney-prisoner mail was improper but that restrictions on inmate legal assistance were not constitutionally defective. The Court of Appeals reversed with respect to the due process claim, holding that the procedural requirements outlined in the intervening decisions in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, should be generally followed in prison disciplinary hearings, but leaving the specific requirements (including the circumstances in which counsel might be required) to be determined by the District Court on remand. The Court of Appeals further held that Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, forbade restoration of good-time credits in a § 1983 suit but ordered expunged from prison records misconduct determinations reached in proceedings that had not comported with due process.
The Court of Appeals generally affirmed the District Court’s judgment respecting correspondence with attorneys, but added some additional prescriptions and ordered further proceedings to determine whether the State was meeting its burden under Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, to provide legal assistance to prisoners, a duty found to extend to civil rights cases as well as habeas corpus proceedings.
ISSUE:
Was the inmates’ interest in prison disciplinary procedures protected by the Fourteenth Amendment? Yes
CONCLUSION:
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed that part of the appellate judgment, finding that the disciplinary procedures violated due process. The Court held that the inmates’ interest in disciplinary procedures was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment because the right to good time and its deprivation as a sanction was provided by state statute. Due process required provision of advance written notice of the claimed violation, a written statement of the evidence relied upon, and the reasons for the disciplinary action. The inmate had to be allowed to call witnesses and present evidence when to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or goals. Cross-examination and counsel were not constitutionally required. The prison’s acceptance of a rule whereby the inmate was present when mail from attorneys was inspected was all that the constitution required. Finally, the Court agreed with the appellate court that the capacity of the inmate legal adviser had to be assessed in light of the demand for assistance in civil rights actions as well as in habeas corpus proceedings because both actions served to protect basic constitutional rights.
Baze v. Reese (2009)
- Is the lethal injection a violation of 8th?
- does not violate 8th amendment
Rule: Capital punishment is constitutional. It necessarily follows that there must be a means of carrying it out. Some risk of pain is inherent in any method of execution–no matter how humane–if only from the prospect of error in following the required procedure. It is clear, then, that the Constitution does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions.
FACTS:
Lethal injection was used for capital punishment by the Federal Government and 36 States, at least 30 of which, including Kentucky, use the same combination of three drugs: the first, sodium thiopental, was inducing unconsciousness when given in the specified amounts and was thereby ensuring that the prisoner would not experience any pain associated with the paralysis and cardiac arrest caused by the second and third drugs, pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. Among other things, Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol reserved the responsibility for inserting the intravenous (IV) catheters into the prisoner to qualified personnel having at least one year’s professional experience, leaving it to others to mix the drugs and load them into syringes; specified that the warden and deputy warden will remain in the execution chamber to observe the prisoner and watch for any IV problems while the execution team administered the drugs from another room; and mandated that if, as determined by the warden and deputy, the prisoner was not unconscious within 60 seconds after the sodium thiopental’s delivery, a new dose will be given at a secondary injection site before the second and third drugs were administered. Petitioners Ralph Baze and Thomas Bowling, convicted murderers sentenced to death in Kentucky state court, filed suit asserting that the Commonwealth’s lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.” The state trial court ruled that there was minimal risk of various of petitioners’ claims of improper administration of the protocol, and upheld it as constitutional. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the protocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment because it did not create a substantial risk of wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, torture, or lingering death. In this current petition, petitioners contended that the lethal injection protocol was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments, because of the risk that the protocol’s terms might not be properly followed, resulting in significant pain.
ISSUE:
Did Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments? No.
CONCLUSION:
The Court upheld capital punishment as constitutional. It held that because some risk of pain is inherent in even the most humane execution method, if only from the prospect of error in following the required procedure, the Constitution does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment, an execution method must present a “substantial” or “objectively intolerable” risk of serious harm. A State’s refusal to adopt proffered alternative procedures may violate the Eighth Amendment only where the alternative procedure would be feasible, readily implemented, and in fact would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. In the case at bar, the Court held that petitioners did not carry their burden of showing that the risk of pain from maladministration of a concededly humane lethal injection protocol, and the failure to adopt untried and untested alternatives, constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Court noted that Kentucky had put in place certain safeguards in its lethal injection protocol, and the risks of administering an inadequate sodium thiopental dose identified by petitioners were not so substantial or imminent as to amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Moreover, Kentucky’s failure to adopt petitioners’ proposed alternatives did not demonstrate that the state execution procedure was cruel and unusual. The Court averred that Kentucky’s continued use of the three-drug protocol could not be viewed as posing an “objectively intolerable risk” when no other State had adopted the one-drug method and petitioners proffered no study showing that it was an equally effective manner of imposing a death sentence.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982)
Rule: Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
FACTS:
Petitioners, Presidential senior aides and advisors, sought review of the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that denied petitioners’ immunity defense in a motion for summary judgment in an action by respondent for civil damages for petitioners’ alleged conspiracy to violate respondent’s constitutional and statutory rights. Respondent brought an action against petitioners for civil damages for petitioners’ alleged conspiracy to violate respondent’s constitutional and statutory rights. Respondent averred that petitioners entered into the conspiracy in their capacities as senior presidential aides. Petitioners unsuccessfully asserted an immunity defense. At issue was the scope of the immunity available to senior aides and advisors of the President of the United States in a suit for damages based on their official acts. On review, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the cause.
ISSUE:
Are petitioners absolutely immune from suit? No.
CONCLUSION:
In performing discretionary functions, petitioners were generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have had knowledge. The court found that petitioners were entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages. The court held that petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity that would be defeated if they knew or reasonably should have known that the action violated respondent’s constitutional rights or if the action was taken with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of respondent’s constitutional rights.
Groh v. Ramirez (2004)
Rule: Because the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion stands at the very core of the Fourth Amendment, judicial precedent firmly establishes the basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Thus, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless entry to search for weapons or contraband is unconstitutional even when a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found within. The agent led a team of federal and local law enforcement officers in a search of the house, but found no illegal weapons or explosives.
FACTS:
A United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agent prepared and signed an application for a warrant to search a family’s Montana house. The application, which stated that the search was for specified weapons, explosives, and records, was supported by the agent’s detailed affidavit setting forth his basis for believing that such items were in the house. The agent presented these documents, along with a warrant form completed by the agent, to a Federal Magistrate Judge, who then signed the warrant form. The warrant, rather than identifying any of the items that the agent intended to seize, (1) in the portion calling for a description of the “person or property,” described only the house; and (2) did not incorporate by reference the itemized list in the application; but (3) recited that the Magistrate was satisfied that the affidavit established probable cause to believe that contraband was concealed in the house, and sufficient grounds existed for issuance of the warrant. The family, against whom no charges were filed, sued the agent and the other officers raising claims that included violation of the Federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment.
ISSUE:
(a) Did the search warrant violate the Fourth Amendment? (b) Was the federal agent entitled to qualified immunity, given that a magistrate, relying on an affidavit that particularly described the items in question, found probable cause to conduct the search?
ANSWER:
(a) No (b) No
CONCLUSION:
(a) The warrant was plainly invalid as it provided no description of the type of evidence sought. The fact that the application adequately described the things to be seized did not save the warrant from its facial invalidity because the warrant did not incorporate other documents by reference and neither the affidavit nor the application accompanied the warrant. The magistrate’s authorization of the search did not render it constitutional because the warrant’s obvious deficiency required the court to consider the search warrantless and presumptively unreasonable.; (b) The federal agent was not entitled to qualified immunity because no reasonable officer could have believed that a warrant that plainly did not comply with the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirements was valid nor been unaware of the basic rule that, absent consent or exigency, a warrantless search was presumptively unconstitutional.
Brosseau v. Haugen (2004)
- resisting arrest/ fleeing
- shot in back of head
- Court said not a 4th violation
Rule: Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted. Qualified immunity operates to protect officers from the sometimes hazy border between excessive and acceptable force. Because the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct. If the law at that time did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct would violate the Constitution, the officer should not be subject to liability or, indeed, even the burdens of litigation.
FACTS:
On February 21, 1999, Officer Rochelle Brosseau, a member of the Puyallup, Washington, Police Department, shot Kenneth Haugen in the back as he was attempting to flee from law-enforcement authorities in a motor vehicle. Haugen subsequently filed an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Haugen, which included a claim under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 against Brosseau, alleging that the shooting had constituted excessive force in violation of Haugen’s federal constitutional rights. The District Court granted summary judgment to Brosseau, finding that the police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in reversing in pertinent part and in ordering a remand, expressed the view that summary judgment should not have been granted to Brosseau with respect to the § 1983 claim, for, when the evidence was construed in the light most favorable to Haugen, the officer’s alleged use of deadly force had violated the Constitution’s Fourth Amendment; and then-clearly-established law, as set forth in a 1985 Supreme Court case, Tennessee v. Garner, that had discussed the use of deadly force. The United States Supreme Court granted the police officer’s petition for the writ of certiorari requesting review.
ISSUE:
Was a police officer, who shot plaintiff in the back while he was fleeing, entitled to qualified immunity from a plaintiff’s civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983? Yes.
CONCLUSION:
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court, and held that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity from the individual’s § 1983 claim. According to the Court, even if the material facts were construed in a light most favorable to the individual—and regardless of whether the officer’s alleged conduct had violated the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights—the cases decided as of that time did not clearly establish that the officer’s alleged conduct had violated the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.
