Medications and Behavior > Criminal Procedure Exam 2 > Flashcards
Criminal Procedure Exam 2 Flashcards
seizure
Taking of a person into custody
Arrest
The taking of a person into custody against his or her will for the purpose of criminal prosecution or interrogation.
Actual seizure
The taking of a person into custody with the use of hands, force, or firearms
Constructive seizure
Occurs without any physical touching, grabbing, holding, or use of force when the individual peacefully submits to the officer’s will and control
Arrest warrant
A writ issued by a duly authorized person that instructs a law enforcement officer to bring the person to a magistrate or judge in connection with an offense with which he or she has been changed.
Bench warrants
Issued when a person does not appear for a hearing
Telephonic warrants
Issued after a telephonic communication between the issuing judge and the officer
John Doe warrants
Issued when the person to be arrested is well described in the warrant, but not identified by name.
Neutral and detached magistrate
An issuing officer who is not unalterably aligned with the police or prosecutor’s position in the case
Citation
A writ from a court ordering a person to appear in court at a specified time.
Capias
The general name for several types of writs that require an officer to take a defendant into custody
Exigent circumstances
Emergency circumstances that make obtaining a warrant impractical, useless dangerous, or unnecessary, and that justify warrantless arrests or entries into homes or premises
Protective sweeps
The police look at rooms or places in the house other than where the arrest takes place
Blanket exception
Exception that apply to a certain type of case regardless of circumstances
Myth v Reality
Police may enter a dwelling without knocking anytime they suspect drugs are inside.
Myth
Myth v. Reality
Police must knock and announce unless they have reasonable suspicion that he drugs inside the house will be destroyed, based on the circumstances when they seek to enter dwelling
Fact
Citizen’s arrest
An arrest made by a citizen or nonlaw enforcement personnel without a warrant
Posse comitatus
The common law authority of a police officer to compel a person to assist in keeping the peace or arresting a felon
Nondeadly force
Force, that when used, is not likely to result in serious bodily injury or death
Deadly force
FOrce that, when used, poses a high risk of death or serious injury to its human target
Reasonable force
force that a prudent and cautious person would use if exposed to similar circumstances
Punitive force
Force that is used to punish rather than to accomplish lawful results
Myth v. Reality
Police may shoot a fleeing felon if it is the only way to prevent the felon from escaping
Myth
Myth v. Reality
Police may use deadly only if he or she has probable cause to believe the suspect poses, a serious threat to the officer or others or has committed a serious crime.
Fact
Use-of-force continuum
Description of an escalating serious of actions an officer may appropriately use, from no force to deadly force
Right to privacy
the right to be let alone. not specifically mentioned in the constitution
Myth v. Reality
There is no constitutional right to privacy because privacy is never mentioned in the Constitution
Myth
Myth v. Reality
The Supreme has repeatedly held that there exists a right to privacy, even though it is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, based on the general purpose of the Bill of Rights
Fact
Reasonable expectation of privacy
Exists when a person exhibits an actual expectation of privacy, and the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable
Search
The exploration or examination of an individual’s home, premises, or person to discover things or items that may be used by the government as evidence in a criminal proceeding
Seizure
The exercise of dominion or control by the government over a person or thing because of a violation of law
Fishing expedition
A search for additional evidence conducted after all the evidence named in the search warrant has been discovered
Search warrant
A written order, issued by a magistrate, directing a peace officer to search for property connected with a crime and bring it before the court
Anticipatory search warrant
A warrant obtained based on probable cause and on an expectation that seizeable items will be found at a certain place
Neutral and detached magistrate
A magistrate who is not aligned with the government
Apparent authority principle
Appears to have authority but in reality does not.
Myth v Reality
Once a person gives consent to search, they cannot revoke that consent and stop the search
Myth
Myth v Fact
Consent to search may be revoked at any time including during the search
Fact
Chimel rule
A rule that allows police officers after an arrest to a search the arrestee’s area of immediate control
Exigent circumstances
Some kind of an emergency that makes getting a search warrant impractical, useless, dangerous, or unnecessary
Special needs exceptions
An exception to the requirements of a warrant and probable cause under the Fourth Amendment; it allows warrantless searches and searches on less-than-probable cause in cases where there are needs to be et other than those of law enforcement, such as the supervision of high school students, probationers, and parolees
Administrative searches
Searches conducted by government investigators to determine whether there are violations of government rules and regulations
Contemporaneous search
The search must occur at the time as, or very close in time and place to, the arrest
Myth v. Reality
A passenger in a vehicle may not be ordered out of the vehicle by a police officer during a traffic stop unless the officer has probable cause to believe the passenger has committed a crime.
Myth
Myth v. Reality
The Supreme Court has held that the police may order the driver and any passengers out of a vehicle during a routine traffic stop as a matter of course
Reality
Pretextual stop
A valid stop that is used as a pretext to search a vehicle
Myth v. Reality
Police must have probable cause to believe a crime has occurred in order to put up a sobriety checkpoint or roadblock
Myth
Myth v. Reality
The Supreme Court has held that police may put up a sobriety checkpoint or roadblock without probable cause, because the roadblock serves a compelling state interest and is a limited intrusion on privacy
Reality
Sobriety check points
A form of roadblock in which the police stop every vehicle for the purpose of controlling drunk driving
Vehicle inventory
The police list the personal effects and properties they find in the vehicle
Vehicle impoundment
Takes place when the police take control of a vehicle for law enforcement reasons
Plain view doctrine
Items that are within the sight f an officer wo is legally in the place from which the view is made may properly seized without a warrant as long as such items are immediately recognizable as as subject to seizure
Myth v Reality
A police officer may seize contraband anytime he or she sees it
Myth
Myth v. Reality
A police officer may seize contraband only if he or she is lawfully present where the contraband is located.
Fact
Inadvertence
The officer must have no prior knowledge that the evidence was present in the place; the discovery must be purely accidental
Open view
Applies to instances when the officer is out in open space but sees an item within an enclosed area
plain touch doctrine
If an officer touches or feels something that is immediately identifiable as sizeable, the object can be seized as long as such knowledge amounts to probable cause
Plain odor doctrine
If an officer smells something that is immediately recongnizable as seizable, that object can be seized as long as that knowledge amounts to probable cause
Open field doctrine
Items in open fields are not protected by the Fourth Amendment and can be taken by an officer without a warrant or probable cause
Curtilage
The area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home, and the privacies of life.
Myth v. Reality
Police cannot lawfully seize contraband in the open field if they are trespassing on private property when they discover the contraband
Myth
Myth v. Reality
Police may seize contraband in the open field even if they are trespassing when they discover it, as the Fourth Amendment does not apply to open fields.
Reality
Abandonment
The giving up of a thing or item without limitation as to any particular person or purpose
Extended border searches
Searches made inside the U.S. border
Factory surveys
Surprise visits to factories by officials to determine if employees are illegal aliens
Lineup
A police identification procedure where the suspect is shown to a victim or witness for purpose of identification
Kirby rule
A person who has not been formally charged with an offense is not entitled to a lawyer during a lineup
Wade-Gilberts rule
After being formally charged with a crime, a suspect in a lineup or other confrontation is entitled to have a lawyer present
Myth v. Reality
A suspect in a lineup cannot be required to speak, because of the privilege against self-incrimination
Myth
Myth v. Reality
The privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to lineups when a suspect is not required to speak his guilt by providing testimonial evidence
Reality
Show up
One-on-one confrontation between a suspect and a witness to crime
Photographic identification
A form of suspect identification where a victim or witness is shown photographs to try to identify the suspect
Myth v. Reality
An eyewitness identification by a witness is more reliable than other methods of identifying a suspect
Myth
Myth v. Reality
Scientific studies have demonstrated that eyewitness identifications are often incorrect.
Fact
DNA testing
Compares a suspect’s DNA with DNA recovered during the investigation
Frye doctrine
for scientific evidence to be admissible at trial, the procedures used must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field to which they belong
Daubert doctrine
Allows the admission in court of expert testimony pertaining to scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issues.
Brain fingerprinting
Assesses a suspects response to stimuli in the form of words or pictures presented on a computer monitor
Facial recognition technology
A way of identifying suspects by comparing drivers license photos with pictures of convicts in a high-tech analysis of chin widths and nose sizes
Payton v. New York
Rule: he seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity. 4th issue
Facts: In two separate cases, officers entered homes without warrants on “routine arrests” and found evidence in “plain view” that was admitted as part of prosecution.
Issue: Were the warrantless entries valid? NO
Conclusion: 4th and 14th amendments prohibit police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into home for routine felony arrests. Entering the home without exigent circumstances even with PC and under authority is invasion of sanctity.
Tennessee v. Garner (1985)
Rule: Use of deadly force to prevent escape of all felony suspects under whatever the circumstances is constitutionally unreasonable. Harm from not apprehending does not justify deadly force to apprehend.
Facts: Appellee brought suit against police department for violation of son’s constitutional rights when he was shot dead by an officer when fleeing the scene of a burglary and was told to stop. Under Tennessee statues officer was allowed to shoot but court of appeals reversed saying it violated 4th.
Issue: Is a statute authorizing a police officer to use all necessary means in effecting an arrest unconstitutional? YES
Conclusion: Apprehension is a seizure for the purpose of the constitution. Deadly force is a type of seizure (the most serious) and is only permitted under certain circumstances. 4th amendment allows deadly force to apprehend felons when there is PC that individual is dangerous to public or officer. This was not.
Wilson V. Arkansas (1995)
Rule: The common-law knock and announce principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment
Facts: Wilson made narcotics sales to informant and officers applied for a search warrant. When at Wilson’s home, they found the door open and identified themselves as police as they unlocked the screen door and entered the residence. Wilson was flushing marijuana and both Wilson and Jacobs were arrested anc charged. Wilson filed a motion to suppress evidence saying search was invalid bc officers failed to knock and announce b4 entering. State court said there is nothing in the 4ths requiring officers to knock and announce b4 executing a search warrant.
Issue: Was the failure of the police to knock and announce” before they entered Wilson’s home a violation of the Fourth Amendment? YES
Conclusion: The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the common-law knock and announce principle formed a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.
Although the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable, the content of this term may be guided by the meaning ascribed to it by the framers of the Amendment. An examination of the common law of search and seizure leaves no doubt that the reasonableness of a search of a dwelling may depend in part on whether law enforcement officers announced their presence and authority prior to entering.
Atwater v. city of lago vista (2001)
Rule:The standard of PC applies to all arrests, without the need to “balance” the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations. If an officer has PC to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.
Facts: Petitioner was driving a pickup truck without wearing a seatbelt with her 3-year-old son and 5-year-old daughter, who were also unsecured by seatbelts in the front seat. The respondent police officer pulled her over and consequently arrested her. Thereafter, petitioner sued the arresting officer, the city, and the city’s chief of police for violating her right to be free from unreasonable seizures.
Issue: Did the arrest amount to a violation of unlawful seizure NO
Conclusion: The Court determined that the Fourth Amendment does not limit police officers’ authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses. In the case at bar, the respondent officer had probable cause to believe that petitioner arrestee had committed a crime in his presence; therefore, respondent officer was authorized to make a custodial arrest without balancing costs and benefits or determining whether or not the arrest was in some sense necessary. The Court rejected petitioners’ argument that peace officers’ authority to make warrantless arrests for misdemeanors was restricted at common law to instances of breach of the peace.
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart (2006)
Rule: It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.
Law enforcement officers may make a warrantless entry onto private property to fight a fire and investigate its cause, to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, or to engage in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect. Warrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his person unless the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Facts: Officers responded to call about a loud party. When arriving they observed drunk juveniles in the backyard and an altercation in the kitchen of the home. 4 adults were attempting to restrain a juvenile and the juvenile broke free and struck one of the adults. Defendants tried to suppress evidence claiming warrantless entry and violation of 4th.
Issue: Are police officers allowed to enter a private property without a warrant if they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that someone is injured or in immediate danger? YES
Conclusion: The Court held that it did not matter whether the officers entered the kitchen to arrest defendants and gather evidence against them or to assist the injured and prevent further violence. The court also held that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help and that the violence in the kitchen was just beginning. Nothing required them to wait until someone was “unconscious” or “semi-conscious” or worse before entering.
Katz v. United States (1967)
Rule: 4th amendment requires adherence to judicial processes when conducting searches. those conducted outside judicial process or approval by judge or magistrate are unreasonable. There are few exceptions.
Facts: Petitioner, Katz, was convicted under an indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information by telephone across state lines. The evidence of petitioner’s end of the conversations was introduced at the trial and obtained and overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the telephone booth from which the calls were made. Katz appealed that he evidence entered at trial violated his Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation since there was “no physical entrance into the area occupied by” petitioner.
Issue: Did the Government’s eavesdropping activities violate the petitioner’s right against unreasonable search and seizure? YES
Conclusion: The Court held that the Government’s eavesdropping activities violated the privacy upon which petitioner justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a “search and seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Court further held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items but extends as well to the recording of oral statements. The Court also opined that because the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places, its reach cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. Following these, the Court overturned the Court of Appeals’ ruling.
Chimel v. California (1969)
Rule: When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that could be used in order to resist arrest or effect escape. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must be governed by a like rule. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control.”
Facts: Police came to petitioner’s home with an arrest warrant to arrest him for an alleged burglary. When petitioner returned from work, police arrested him. Police then asked for permission to “look around.” Even though petitioner objected, the officers conducted a search. They looked through the entire house and had petitioner’s wife open drawers and physically remove contents of the drawers so they could view items. Police seized a number of coins and medals, among other things, that respondent State later used to convict petitioner of burglary.
Issue: Was the warrantless search by the police lawful. NO
Conclusion: The court held that the search was “unreasonable.” It found that there was no justification for searching any room other than that in which the arrest occurred. Even searching through desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas of the room where the arrest occurred was not appropriate. Extending the search to the entire house was not proper, and the court overturned the conviction.
Maryland v. Garrison (1987)
Rule: The validity of a search warrant must be assessed on the basis of the information that the requesting officers disclose, or have a duty to discover and to disclose, to the issuing magistrate; the constitutionality of the officers’ conduct must be judged in light of the information available to them at the time they request the warrant; those items of evidence that emerge after the warrant is issued have no bearing on whether a warrant was validly issued.
Facts: Officers had a search warrant for the 3rd floor appartment and did not realize there were two apartments. Officers found marjuana and paraphernalia and Garrison was charged. defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.
Issue: Was the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure violated when the officers execute a search warrant in an apartment that was not occupied by the person named in the warrant? NO
Conclusion: The Court held that execution of a valid search warrant by police officers was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even though the apartment they search was not the one occupied by the person named in the warrant. The scope of a lawful search was defined by the object of the search and the places in which there was probable cause to believe that it may be found. The Court further ruled that the objective facts available to the officers suggested no distinction between defendant’s apartment and the third-floor premises specified in the search warrant. GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
Georgia v. Randolph (2006)
Rule: To the Fourth Amendment rule ordinarily prohibiting the warrantless entry of a person’s house as unreasonable per se, one jealously and carefully drawn exception recognizes the validity of searches with the voluntary consent of an individual possessing authority. That person might be the householder against whom evidence is sought or a fellow occupant who shares common authority over property, when the suspect is absent, and the exception for consent extends even to entries and searches with the permission of a co-occupant whom the police reasonably, but erroneously, believe to possess shared authority as an occupant.
Facts: Officers were called for domestic dispute and defendant’s wife told officers that defendant was a cocaine user and evidence was in the house. When asked for permission to search house, wife gave consent and defendant refused. Officers searched and found evidence of drug use. The Court noted that disputed permission was no match for the central value of the Fourth Amendment
Issue: Whether such an evidentiary seizure is lawful with the permission of one occupant when the other, who later seeks to suppress the evidence, is present at the scene and expressly refuses to consent? NO
Conclusion:
The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless entry and search of a premises when the police obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, common authority over the property, and no present co-tenant objects. The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness in such cases is the great significance given to widely shared social expectations, which are influenced by property law but not controlled by its rules. Thus, Matlock not only holds that a solitary co-inhabitant may sometimes consent to a search of shared premises, but also stands for the proposition that the reasonableness of such a search is in significant part a function of commonly held understandings about the authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other’s interests.
In the circumstances here at issue, a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry renders warrantless entry and search unreasonable and invalid as to him. Thus, here, respondent’s refusal is clear, and nothing in the record justifies the search on grounds independent of his wife’s consent.
Safford Unified School District v. Redding (2009)
Rule: The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the school setting requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search. The public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause. The Court has thus applied a standard of reasonable suspicion to determine the legality of a school administrator’s search of a student, and has held that a school search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.
Facts: After escorting 13-year-old Savana Redding from her middle school classroom to his office, Assistant Principal Wilson showed her a day planner containing knives and other contraband. She admitted owning the planner, but said that she had lent it to her friend Marissa and that the contraband was not hers. He then produced four prescription-strength, and one over-the-counter, pain relief pills, all of which are banned under school rules without advance permission. She denied knowledge of them, but Wilson said that he had a report that she was giving pills to fellow students. She denied it and agreed to let him search her belongings. He and Helen Romero, an administrative assistant, searched Savana’s backpack, finding nothing. Wilson then had Romero take Savana to the school nurse’s office to search her clothes for pills. After Romero and the nurse, Peggy Schwallier, had Savana remove her outer clothing, they told her to pull her bra out and shake it, and to pull out the elastic on her underpants, thus exposing her breasts and pelvic area to some degree. No pills were found. Savana’s mother filed suit against petitioner school district (Safford), Wilson, Romero, and Schwallier, alleging that the strip search violated Savana’s Fourth Amendment rights. Claiming qualified immunity, the individuals (hereinafter petitioners) moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted the motion, finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, and the en banc Ninth Circuit reversed. Following the protocol for evaluating qualified immunity claims, the court held that the strip search was unjustified under the Fourth Amendment test for searches of children by school officials. It then applied the test for qualified immunity. Finding that Savana’s right was clearly established at the time of the search, it reversed the summary judgment as to Wilson, but affirmed as to Schwallier and Romero because they were not independent decisionmakers.
Issue: Whether a 13-year-old student’s Fourth Amendment right was violated when she was subjected to a search of her bra and underpants by school officials acting on reasonable suspicion that she had brought forbidden prescription and over-the-counter drugs to school. YES
Conclusion: The indignity of the search does not, of course, outlaw it, but it does implicate the rule of reasonableness that the search as actually conducted be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. The scope will be permissible, that is, when it is “not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” Here, the content of the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion. Wilson knew beforehand that the pills were prescription-strength ibuprofen and over-the-counter naproxen, common pain relievers equivalent to two Advil, or one Aleve.4 He must have been aware of the nature and limited threat of the specific drugs he was searching for, and while just about anything can be taken in quantities that will do real harm, Wilson had no reason to suspect that large amounts of the drugs were being passed around, or that individual students were receiving great numbers of pills. In sum, what was missing from the suspected facts that pointed to Savana was any indication of danger to the students from the power of the drugs or their quantity, and any reason to suppose that Savana was carrying pills in her underwear. We think that the combination of these deficiencies was fatal to finding the search reasonable. Thus, because there were no reasons to suspect the drugs presented a danger or were concealed in her underwear, the Court here held that the search did violate the Constitution, but since there is reason to question the clarity with which the right was established, the official who ordered the unconstitutional search is entitled to qualified immunity from liability.
Carrol v. United States (1925)
Rule: Where the facts and circumstances within police officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that intoxicating liquor is being transported in the automobile which the officers stop and search, the officers are justified in conducting the search.
Facts: Cronenwett and Scully, federal prohibition agents, where in an operation where they met three men to buy three cases of whiskey, including defendants George Carroll and John Kiro. The three men said they had to go to the east end of Grand Rapids, Michigan, to get the liquor and that they would be back in 30-45 minutes. They returned in an automobile known as an Oldsmobile Roadster but without the whiskey. Two months later, Cronenwett and other agents were patrolling the road leading from Detroit to Grand Rapids, looking for violations of the Prohibition Act. The officers were not anticipating that defendants would be coming through on the highway at that particular time, but when they met them there they believed they were carrying liquor. They stopped the car and searched it. They found behind 68 bottles of liquor hidden in the car seats. Defendants were arrested and later convicted in federal district court for transporting intoxicating spirituous liquor in a vehicle, in violation of § 26 of the National Prohibition Act. Defendants sought a writ of error, asserting that the warrantless search of the vehicle violated U.S. Const. amend. IV and that the liquor discovered as a result of the search should not have been admitted into evidence.
Issue: Was the warrantless search and seizure valid? YES
Conclusion: The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court found that the main purpose of § 26 of the National Prohibition Act was seizure and forfeiture, and that the right to search and the validity of the seizure were not dependent on the right to arrest, but were dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing liquor agents had for their belief that the contents of defendant’s automobile were illegal. The evidence showed that the agents had ample reason to believe defendants’ vehicle contained illegal liquor because defendants were known to transport liquor in that vehicle, were recognized by the agents, and were on a route known for illegal liquor traffic. Those circumstances provided sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle.
New York v. Belton (1981)
Rule: When a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. The police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach. Such a container may, of course, be searched whether it is open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.
Facts: Defendant was a passenger in an automobile that sped by a police officer at a fast rate. Upon stopping the car, the officer smelled marijuana smoke and saw an envelope on the car’s floor that was marked with a name for marijuana. The officer therefore required the occupants to get out of the vehicle and proceeded to search them. He opened the envelope and found that it contained marijuana. He also searched defendant’s jacket in the vehicle and found cocaine. In defendant’s subsequent drug prosecution, the trial court denied his motion to suppress the items seized in the search of the vehicle. However, the New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the search of the jacket was not incident to defendant’s arrest. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Was there a lawful search of a car without a warrant after the occupants were separated from the vehicle and under arrest? YES
Conclusion: The Court reversed the judgment of the state court and held that items seized in the warrantless search of a passenger compartment of a vehicle, incident to a lawful custodial arrest, were lawfully seized during the exigencies of the situation and such seizure did not violate the safeguards of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the constitution. A policeman who has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of the automobile and may examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment, the term “container” denoting any object capable of holding another object and including closed or opened glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like, and (2) the search of the jacket was a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest and did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, it not being questioned that the jacket’s owner was the subject of a lawful custodial arrest on a charge of possessing marijuana, the search following immediately upon that arrest, and the jacket being located inside the passenger compartment of the car in which the owner had been a passenger just before he was arrested.
United States v. Ross (1982)
Rule: A warrantless search of an automobile stopped by police officers who have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband is not unreasonable within the meaning of U.S. Const. amend XIV.
Facts: Police officers, acting on information from an informant who previously had proved reliable, drove to a location specified by the informant and discovered a particular automobile which the informant had alleged contained narcotics in the trunk. After a brief period had elapsed, the officers, after noting that the automobile’s driver matched a description provided by the informant, stopped the car and opened its trunk. A closed paper bag was discovered that contained a white powder subsequently determined to be heroin. After a police officer drove the auto to headquarters, he thoroughly searched the car without obtaining a warrant, finding a zippered pouch containing $3200 in cash. The driver was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute after the United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied his motion to suppress the heroin and currency. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the police should not have opened either container without first obtaining a warrant and rejecting the contention that it was reasonable for the police to open both the paper bag and pouch because they were entitled to conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehicle.
Issue: Was the warrantless search of the vehicle unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, notwithstanding the fact that the police officers had probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband? NO
Conclusion: On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that police officers who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have probable cause to believe that contraband was concealed somewhere within may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, including compartments and containers within the vehicle whose contents were not in plain view. According to the Court, the scope of a warrantless search of an automobile was defined by the object of the search, and the places in which there was probable cause to believe it would be found. The Court averred that probable cause justifying the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle justified the search its contents that could have concealed the object of the search.
Arizona v. Gant (2009)
Rule: An officer is permitted to conduct a vehicle search when an arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Other established exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search when safety or evidentiary concerns demand. For instance, an officer is permitted to search a vehicle’s passenger compartment when he has reasonable suspicion that an individual, whether or not the arrestee, is “dangerous” and might access the vehicle to gain immediate control of weapons. If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found is authorized. Searches for evidence relevant to offenses other than the offense of arrest are authorized, and the scope of the search authorized is broader. Finally, there may be still other circumstances in which safety or evidentiary interests would justify a search. These exceptions together ensure that officers may search a vehicle when genuine safety or evidentiary concerns encountered during the arrest of a vehicle’s recent occupant justify a search.
Facts: After respondent was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the back of a patrol car, police officers searched his car and discovered cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. The trial court denied respondent’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his car. The case was appealed to Supreme Court of the United States. The Court determined that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement did not justify the search.
Issue: Did the search violate the Fourth Amendment right of the defendant against unreasonable searches and seizures? YES
Conclusion: According to the Supreme Court, the vehicle of the respondent may be searched after the arrest for a suspended license only if the court believes that the arrestee may access the vehicle at the time of arrest or the latter contains evidence of the crime he was being arrested for.
United States v. Jones (2012)
Rule: The United States Supreme has said that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and has found a violation in attachment of an eavesdropping device to a public telephone booth. The Court’s later cases have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in the Katz case, which said that a violation occurs when government officers violate a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”
Facts: The Government obtained a search warrant permitting it to install a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device on a vehicle registered to respondent Jones’s wife. The warrant authorized installation in the District of Columbia and within 10 days, but agents installed the device on the 11th day and in Maryland. The Government then tracked the vehicle’s movements for 28 days. It subsequently secured an indictment of Jones and others on drug trafficking conspiracy charges. The District Court suppressed the GPS data obtained while the vehicle was parked at Jones’s residence, but held the remaining data admissible because Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy when the vehicle was on public streets. Jones was convicted. The D. C. Circuit reversed, concluding that admission of the evidence obtained by warrantless use of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment. A jury returned a guilty verdict. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction and denied the Government’s petition for rehearing en banc. Certiorari was granted.
Issue: Does the attachment of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets constitute a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment? YES
Conclusion: Affirming, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Government’s installation of the GPS device on defendant’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constituted a “search.” Under the common-law trespassory test, the Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information. Such a physical intrusion would have been considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted. Defendant possessed the vehicle at the time the Government trespassorily inserted the information-gathering device. The Government forfeited its alternative argument that officers had reasonable suspicion and probable cause.
Hester v. United States (1924)
Rule: The special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” is not extended to the open fields.
Facts: Hester was convicted by a district court of concealing distilled spirits. Hester argued on appeal that the district court had erred in refusing to exclude the testimony of two witnesses and to direct a verdict for him. Hester further argued that the district court had violated his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.
Issue: Did the examination of the jug which took place on land belonging to Hester’s father violate Hester’s Fourth Amendment rights? NO
Conclusion: The Court found that the witnesses were revenue officers who had picked up a jug of moonshine that Hester had discarded while running. Hester argued that the evidence was inadmissible because the officers did not have a warrant for search or arrest. The Court stated, in affirming Hester’s conviction, that there was no seizure of the jug because the officers examined the contents of the jug after it had been abandoned. The fact that the examination of the jug took place on land belonging to Hester’s father did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment did not extend to the open fields. ABANDONMENT
United States v. Ramsey (1977)
Rule: Border searches, from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, have been considered to be “reasonable” by the single fact that the person or item in question had entered into our country from outside. There has never been any additional requirement that the reasonableness of a border search depended on the existence of probable cause. This longstanding recognition that searches at our borders without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless “reasonable” has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment itself.
Facts: At a post office in New York City where incoming international airmail was taken for sorting and customs inspection, a United States customs official observed eight bulky envelopes mailed to addresses in the Washington, D.C., area from Thailand, a country known by the customs officer to be a source of narcotics. After feeling the envelopes and finding that they weighed much more than the normal weight of airmail letters, the official, acting without a warrant, opened the envelopes and discovered that they contained heroin. Subsequently, defendant Charles W. Ramsey and three others, all of whom were found to be connected with some of the heroin, were prosecuted for narcotics offenses in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. At trial, the court denied defendants’ motion to suppress the heroin. Defendants were found guilty, and they appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the convictions, holding that the Fourth Amendment forbade the opening of international mail without probable cause and a search warrant. The United States was granted a writ of certiorari.
Issue: Was the custom officer’s act of opening the envelopes, without a warrant, violative of the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights? NO
Conclusion: The Supreme Court of the United States held that the customs official’s opening of the letters did not violate the Fourth Amendment, but fell within the border search exception to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, whereby a search at a United States border was considered reasonable under the Amendment, notwithstanding the absence of probable cause or a warrant. The Court held that 19 U.S.C.S. § 482 expressly authorized searches of the mails entering United States borders, and that such searches were not confined to packages as opposed to letters. The Court held that the § 482 “reasonable cause” standard was less stringent than the Fourth Amendment “probable cause” standard, and was satisfied where the officer, based on experience, became suspicious of a number of similar looking letters originating from Thailand that contained more than letter paper. The Court held that a border search was an exception to the warrant requirement and was not based upon the existence of “exigent circumstances.” The Court noted that the Congress that proposed the Bill of Rights also enacted the first customs statute authorizing such searches.
Oliver v. United States (1984)
Rule: The open fields doctrine is consistent with respect for “reasonable expectations of privacy.” The common law has distinguished “open fields” from the “curtilage,” the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home. The distinction implies that only the curtilage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home. At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life and therefore has been considered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private. Conversely, the common law implies that no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields.
Facts: Two actions were consolidated on writs of certiorari. In the first case, acting on reports that marihuana was being raised on petitioner Ray E. Oliver’s farm, narcotics agents of the Kentucky State Police went to the farm to investigate. Arriving at the farm, they drove past Oliver’s house to a locked gate with a “No Trespassing” sign, but with a footpath around one side. The agents then walked around the gate and along the road and found a field of marihuana over a mile from Oliver’s house. Oliver was arrested and indicted for manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of a federal statute. At trial in federal district court, Oliver’s motion to suppress the evidence of the marihuana field was granted, the district court holding that that the field was private and that it was not an “open” field that invited casual intrusion. On appeal, the appellate court reversed, holding that the open fields doctrine was applicable, which permitted police officers to enter and search a field without a warrant. Oliver was granted a writ of certiorari.
In the second case, after receiving a tip that marihuana was being grown in the woods behind respondent Richard Thornton’s residence, police officers entered the woods by a path between the residence and a neighboring house, and followed a path through the woods until they reached two marihuana patches fenced with chicken wire and having “No Trespassing” signs. Later, the officers, upon determining that the patches were on Thornton’s property, obtained a search warrant and seized the marihuana. Thornton’s was then arrested and indicted. At trial in Maine state court, the trial court granted Thornton’s motion to suppress the fruits of the second search, holding that the initial warrantless search was unreasonable, that the “No Trespassing” signs and secluded location of the marihuana patches evinced a reasonable expectation of privacy, and that the open fields doctrine did not apply. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed. The State was granted a writ of certiorari.
Issue: Did the open fields doctrine permit police officers to enter and search marijuana fields without a warrant where the fields were secluded and contained no-trespassing signs? YES
Conclusion: The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision in Oliver’s case and reversed and remanded the decision in Thornton’s case. The Court held that the open fields doctrine applied in both cases and, as such, the discovery or seizure of the marihuana in question was valid. Because the Court found that there was no reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields, the officers’ actions in entering such open fields without a warrant or probable cause did not violate the Constitution. Because privacy for outdoor activities conducted in fields only extended to the area immediately surrounding the home, the Court affirmed the validity of the open fields doctrine.
United States v. Dunn (1987)
Rule: Curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. It is not the case that combining these factors produces a finely tuned formula that, when mechanically applied, yields a correct answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration, whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s umbrella of Fourth Amendment protection.
Facts: In 1980, Drug Enforcement Administration agents, having discovered that one Carpenter had bought large quantities of chemicals and equipment used to make controlled substances, placed tracking “beepers” in some of the equipment and one of the chemical containers, which, when transported in Carpenter’s truck, led the agents to defendant Ronald Dale Dunn’s ranch. Aerial photographs of the ranch showed the truck backed up to a barn behind the ranch house. The ranch was completely encircled by a perimeter fence, and contained several interior barbed wire fences, including one around the house approximately 50 yards from the barn, and a wooden fence enclosing the front of the barn, which had an open overhang and locked, waist-high gates. Without a warrant, officers crossed the perimeter fence, several of the barbed wire fences, and the wooden fence in front of the barn. They were led there by the smell of chemicals, and, while there, could hear a motor running inside. They did not enter the barn but stopped at the locked gate and shined a flashlight inside, observing what they took to be a drug laboratory. They then left the ranch, but entered it twice the next day to confirm the laboratory’s presence. They obtained a search warrant and executed it, arresting Dunn and seizing chemicals and equipment, as well as bags of amphetamines they discovered in the house. At trial in federal district court, Dunn filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. The district court denied the motion, and thereafter Dunn and Carpenter were convicted of conspiracy to manufacture controlled substances and related offenses. On Dunn’s appeal, the appellate court reversed his conviction finding that the evidence should have been suppressed because it was seized pursuant to the unlawful warrantless entry. The appellate court also found that the barn was within the protective ambit of the Fourth Amendment because it was within the curtilage of the residence. The United States was granted a writ of certiorari.
Issue: Was Dunn’s conviction proper? YES
Conclusion: The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the appellate court’s judgment. The Court ruled that barn and the area around it was outside the protected curtilage of Dunn’s ranch house, so that the warrantless observation of the barn and surrounding area did not constitute a search of the curtilage in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court observed that the barn was located a substantial distance away from the ranch house; it did not lie within the area that was enclosed by a fence which surrounded the ranch house; the officers possessed objective data which indicated that the barn was not being used for intimate activities of the home, and; Dunn did little to protect the barn area from observation by those standing in the open fields. Even assuming that Dunn had an expectation of privacy in the barn, which was independent of the curtilage doctrine, the Fourth Amendment was not violated, the Court ruled, because the officers never entered the barn or any other structure on the premises, and merely stood, outside the curtilage of the house and in the open fields upon which the barn was constructed, and peered into the barn’s open front.
Horton v. California (1990)
Rule: Two conditions must be satisfied to justify a warrantless seizure under the plain view exception to the search warrant requirement. First, not only must the item be in plain view, its incriminating character must also be immediately apparent. Second, not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen, but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself.
Facts: A police officer investigating an armed robbery determined that there was probable cause to search the accused’s home for the property stolen in the robbery and for the weapons used by the robbers. The warrant authorizing the search of the accused’s home, however, authorized a search for only the stolen property. The officer searched the accused’s home pursuant to the warrant but found no stolen property. In the course of the search, the officer discovered the robbery weapons in plain view and seized the weapons and several other items. The officer testified that while he was searching for the stolen property, he also was interested in finding other evidence connecting the accused to the crime. At the accused’s trial in a California state court, the court refused to suppress the items found in the accused’s home, and the accused was convicted after a jury trial. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the decision while the California Supreme Court denied the accused’s petition for review.
Issue: Did the “plain view” doctrine authorize the seizure of the items not listed in the search warrant, even if the discovery of the items was not inadvertent? YES
Conclusion: The Court held that, though inadvertence was a characteristic of most legitimate plain view seizures, it was not a necessary condition, so that the items seized from petitioner’s home were discovered during a lawful search authorized by a valid warrant. The Court further posited that when the weapons were discovered, it was immediately apparent to the police officer that they constituted incriminating evidence. The officer had probable cause, not only to obtain a warrant to search for the stolen property, but also to believe that the weapons and handguns had been used in the crime he was investigating. Thus, the Court concluded that the search was authorized by the warrant, and the seizure was authorized by the plain view doctrine. The scope of the search was not enlarged in the slightest by the omission of any reference to the weapons in the warrant.
United States v. Wade (1967)
Rule: The proper test to be applied for the exclusion of witnesses’ in-court identification, where an accused’s counsel was not present at a lineup identification, is whether, granting the establishment of the primary illegality, the identification evidence has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.
Facts: After defendant Wade had been indicted and arrested for robbery of a federally insured bank, an FBI agent arranged to have two bank employees observe a lineup of the accused and five or six other prisoners without notice to Wade’s counsel. To mimic the bank robber, those in the lineup were required to wear strips of tape on their faces and to say, “Put the money in the bag,” like the robber. The bank employees identified Wade as the robber. At Wade’s trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, both employees identified Wade on direct examination. The pretrial lineup identification was then elicited from them on cross-examination. Defense counsel’s motion to strike the courtroom identifications was denied, and Wade was convicted. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial, excluding the courtroom identifications on the ground that holding the lineup in the absence of Wade’s counsel violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Certiorari was granted.
Issue: Was Wade denied of the right to counsel? YES
Conclusion: The Supreme Court of the United States remanded the action to the court of appeals to enter a new judgment vacating respondent’s conviction, until a hearing could determine whether the in-court identifications had independent origins. The post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the proceedings, so Wade was entitled to have his attorney present. Based on the record, the Court could not determine whether the courtroom identifications should be excluded. Evidence had to be presented as to whether the in-court identifications were based on personal observations or the lineup.
Gilbert v. California (1967)
Rule: A post-indictment pretrial lineup at which an accused is exhibited to identifying witnesses is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution. Police conduct of such a lineup without notice to and in the absence of his counsel denies the accused his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and calls in question the admissibility at trial of the in-court identifications of the accused by witnesses who attended the lineup.
Facts: In investigating certain robberies in which a robber used a handwritten note demanding that money be handed over to him, police took handwriting exemplars from defendant Jesse James Gilbert, seized photographs during a warrantless search of his apartment, and required him to participate in a police lineup conducted without notice to his counsel 16 days after indictment and after appointment of counsel. At his trial in California state court, the court admitted in evidence: (1) the handwriting exemplars; (2) an accomplice’s pretrial statement implicating Gilbert; (3) the photographs; (4) in-court identifications of Gilbert by witnesses who had observed him at the lineup, and; (5) testimony by witnesses both at the guilt phase and at the penalty stage of the prosecution that they had identified him at the lineup. He was convicted of armed robbery and murder, and he was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California affirmed. Gilbert was granted a writ of certiorari.
Issue: Was Gilbert denied his Sixth Amendment right when he was convicted of armed robbery and murder based, in part, upon a lineup and in-court identifications? YES
Conclusion: The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the state supreme court’s judgment and conviction and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The Court ruled, inter alia, Gilbert was denied his constitutional right to counsel at the police lineup, thereby rendering inadmissible the witnesses’ testimony that they had identified Gilbert at the lineup. The unconstitutional line-up also rendered inadmissible the in-court identifications by witnesses who observed Gilbert at the lineup, since the testimony was admitted without first determining that the in-court identifications were not tainted by the illegal lineup, but were of independent origin. The Court remanded the matter to provide the State with an opportunity to establish that the in-court identifications had an independent source.
Kirby v. Illinois (1972)
Rule: A person’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. This is not to say that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to counsel only at the trial itself. The right attaches at the time of arraignment, and it exists also at the time of a preliminary hearing.
Facts: Defendant had been arrested in connection with an unrelated criminal offense and was taken to the police station. The victim of a robbery was at the police station and identified defendant as the robber. At the time of the identification, no lawyer was present, defendant had not asked for legal assistance, and defendant had not been advised of any right to the presence of counsel. After the identification, defendant was indicted for the robbery and was arrested. At trial, the victim testified as to the police station identification and also made an in-court identification of defendant. Defendant was convicted of robbery, and the state appellate court affirmed, holding that the constitutional rule requiring the exclusion of evidence derived from out-of-court identification procedures conducted in the absence of counsel did not apply to preindictment identifications. The Court granted certiorari.
Issue: Did the constitutional right to counsel apply to pre-indictment identifications? NO
Conclusion: The Court held that the constitutional right to counsel did not attach until judicial criminal proceedings were initiated, and that the exclusionary rule relating to out-of-court identifications in the absence of counsel did not apply to identification testimony based upon a police station show-up which took place before the accused had been indicted or otherwise formally charged with any criminal offense. According to the Court, because defendant was identified before he was arrested on the robbery charge, the pre-indictment identification was admissible, even though counsel was not present.
Neil v. Biggers (1972)
Rule: The factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.
Facts: Following a jury trial in a Tennessee state court, defendant was convicted of rape. The evidence against him included testimony concerning his identification by the rape victim at a pretrial police station showup. The victim had spent considerable time with her assailant, had given the police a description of him, and testified at the trial that she had “no doubt” about her identification of the accused and that there was something about his face “I don’t think I could ever forget.” After the conviction was affirmed by the Tennessee Supreme Court, and after the Tennessee Supreme Court’s judgment was affirmed by an equally divided United States Supreme Court, defendant instituted habeas corpus proceedings. The State of Tennessee argued that defendant’s claims were barred because they had already been adjudicated by the U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari. The District Court, granting a writ of habeas corpus, held that defendant’s federal constitutional claims were not barred by the affirmance by an equally divided Supreme Court, and that the showup identification procedure was so suggestive as to violate due process. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issue: Does the federal habeas corpus statute bar claims when a judgment of a state court lacks absence of a majority position in the Court? NO
Conclusion: On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case. The Court unanimously held that although the federal habeas corpus statute would preclude relitigation of issues “actually adjudicated by the Supreme Court” in a prior criminal proceeding, the Supreme Court’s affirmance by an equally divided court did not constitute such an actual adjudication as to fall within the bar; the Court further held that although the station-house showup procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, it was not so suggestive as to violate due process. Rather, given that the victim of the rape spent a considerable period of time with her assailant and that her description to the police was more than ordinarily thorough, there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification such that the evidence of the identification did not have to be excluded. Thus, the District Court’s conclusions on the critical facts were unsupported by the record and clearly erroneous.
Dauberty v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993)
Rule: Under Daubert, courts must engage in a difficult, two-part analysis. First, a court must determine nothing less than whether the experts’ testimony reflects scientific knowledge, whether their findings are derived by the scientific method, and whether their work product amounts to good science. Second, a court must ensure that the proposed expert testimony is relevant to the task at hand, i.e., that it logically advances a material aspect of the proposing party’s case. The United States Supreme Court refers to this second prong of the analysis as the “fit” requirement.
Facts: Plaintiffs, Daubert and Schuller (two minors), suffered limb reduction birth defects. They sued defendant Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, alleging that the birth defects were caused by their mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin, an FDA-approved drug manufactured by defendant that was prescribed for morning sickness. Plaintiffs’ case involved a difficult causation issue because scientific knowledge had not advanced enough to explain precisely whether and how Bendectin interfered with limb development. Plaintiffs relied on statistical evidence and proffered experts’ opinions that did not reflect the consensus of the scientific community.
ISsue: Is there sufficiently compelling proof that a product causes birth defects if the general scientific community, including the FDA, has stated that the product does not cause such defects? NO
COnclusion: The court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant. Plaintiffs proffered expert testimony that was inadmissible as a matter of law under the Daubert standard. The court applied the two-part Daubert standard. In the first part of the inquiry, the court found that none of plaintiffs’ experts based their testimony on preexisting or independent research, published their work in scientific journals, or adequately explained their methodology. The court concluded that the proffered scientific testimony was not derived by scientific method. In the second prong of inquiry, the court concluded that plaintiffs’ proffered expert testimony was insufficient to establish causation as a matter of law.
Mark Kuklinski v. People
- applied for NYPD
-during application he became a subject of investigation - He would supply alcohol and have sexual encounters with minors
- Suspect signed away Miranda rights
- Kuklinski was arrested and charged
- tried to claim that he was denied without a hearing and that the investigator lured him in for a job under false pretense and charges should be dropped because there was no harm
Berkemer v. McCarty (1984)
Rule:The safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest. If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop is subjected to treatment that renders him in custody, he will be entitled to the protections prescribed by Miranda. However, the initial stop of a vehicle by an officer does not amount to being in custody.
FACTS:An officer observed a vehicle swerving in and out of lanes on the highway and initiated a traffic stop. The officer asked if the driver had been using intoxicants, to which the driver replied in the affirmative. The driver was arrested, asked again about the use of intoxicants, and again answered in the affirmative. The driver was never advised of his constitutional rights, and he was convicted of driving under the influence. He appealed, asserting that the incriminating statements were not admissible as he had not been informed of his constitutional rights prior to interrogation. The Court vacated the driver’s conviction.
ISSUE:Is roadside questioning of a motorist stopped pursuant to a routine traffic stop considered a custodial interrogation when the motorist is not yet arrested or placed into custody? NO
CONCLUSION:
The initial stop of the driver’s vehicle, by itself, did not render the driver in custody. Therefore, at that point in time, the driver was not entitled to a recitation of constitutional rights. However, after the driver was arrested, any statements made were inadmissible against him without a reading of his constitutional rights. Because it could not be determined which statements were relied upon in convicting the driver, the conviction was properly vacated.
Graham v. Connor 1989
Rule: Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. The test of reasonableness is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application, however, its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight
Facts: A diabetic filed a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 action against respondent law enforcement officers to recover damages for injuries he sustained when physical force was used against him during an investigatory stop, while he was on his way to obtain orange juice to counteract the onset of an insulin reaction. The appellate court endorsed the four-factor test applied by the trial court. The diabetic argued that it was error to require him to prove that the excessive force used against him was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.
ISSUE:
Did the appellate court err in using the substantive due process standard in analyzing diabetic’s claims? YES
CONCLUSION:
The Court vacated the judgment, holding that the diabetic’s claims should have been analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard. The proper Fourth Amendment inquiry was one of objective reasonableness under the circumstances, and subjective concepts like malice and sadism had no proper place in that inquiry.
Virginia v. Moore
Rule:When an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally reasonable.
FACTS:
Rather than issuing the summons required by Virginia law, police arrested respondent Moore for the misdemeanor of driving on a suspended license. A search incident to the arrest yielded crack cocaine, and Moore was tried on drug charges. The trial court declined to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. Moore was convicted. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the arresting officers should have issued a citation under state law, and the Fourth Amendment does not permit search incident to citation.
ISSUE:
Did the police violate the Fourth Amendment because the arresting officers should have issued a citation under state law, and the Fourth Amendment does not permit search incident to citation? NO
CONCLUSION:
The Court held that the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they made an arrest that was based on probable cause but prohibited by state law, or when they performed a search incident to the arrest. The Court noted that its decisions counseled against changing the calculus that the arrest was constitutionally reasonable because there was probable cause to believe defendant committed the minor crime in the officer’s presence. The Court had treated additional protections exclusively as matters of state law. Virginia chose to protect individual privacy and dignity more than the Fourth Amendment required, but it also chose not to attach to violations of its arrest rules the potent remedies that federal courts had applied to Fourth Amendment violations. while Virginia chose a more restrictive search and seizure policy, that did not render less restrictive options unconstitutional. Linking Fourth Amendment protections to state law would have meant losing a bright-line constitutional standard as well as causing that protection to vary from place to place and from time to time. Because the arrest was constitutional, the search incident to the arrest was also constitutional.
Illinois v. McArther 2001
Rule: There are exceptions to the warrant requirement. When faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the United States Supreme Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable.
FACTS:
Police officers, with probable cause to believe that respondent McArthur had hidden marijuana in his home, prevented him from entering the home unaccompanied by an officer for about two hours while they obtained a search warrant. Once they did so, the officers found drug paraphernalia and marijuana, and arrested McArthur. He was subsequently charged with misdemeanor possession of those items. He moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was the “fruit” of an unlawful police seizure, namely, the refusal to let him reenter his home unaccompanied. The Illinois trial court granted the motion, and the State Appellate Court affirmed.
ISSUE:
Was the restraint on McArthur from entering his home unaccompanied by an officer for about two hours while the police obtained a search warrant lawful? YES
Conclusion The United States Supreme Court found that the warrantless seizure was not per se unreasonable, since it involved exigent circumstances, and the restraint at issue was tailored, avoiding significant intrusion into the home itself. Consequently, the court balanced the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable. The court concluded that the restriction at issue was reasonable, and hence lawful. Police had probable cause to believe defendant’s home contained unlawful drugs, and had good reason to fear that, unless restrained, defendant would destroy the drugs before they could return with a warrant. Also, police made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy, and they imposed the restraint for a limited period of time, two hours. Given the nature of the intrusion and the law enforcement interest at stake, the brief seizure of the premises was permissible. Moreover, the court found significant support in its case law, and was not persuaded by the countervailing considerations raised by the parties and lower courts.
Lange v. California
Rule: The flight of a suspected misdemeanant does not always justify a warrantless entry into a home. An officer must consider all the circumstances in a pursuit case to determine whether there is a law enforcement emergency. On many occasions, the officer will have good reason to enter—to prevent imminent harms of violence, destruction of evidence, or escape from the home. But when the officer has time to get a warrant, he must do so—even though the misdemeanant fled.
FACTS:
This case arose from a police officer’s warrantless entry into petitioner Arthur Lange’s garage. Lange drove by a California highway patrol officer while playing loud music and honking his horn. The officer began to follow Lange and soon after turned on his overhead lights to signal that Lange should pull over. Rather than stopping, Lange drove a short distance to his driveway and entered his attached garage. The officer followed Lange into the garage. He questioned Lange and, after observing signs of intoxication, put him through field sobriety tests. A later blood test showed that Lange’s blood-alcohol content was three times the legal limit. The State charged Lange with the misdemeanor of driving under the influence. Lange moved to suppress the evidence obtained after the officer entered his garage, arguing that the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment. The Superior Court denied Lange’s motion, and its appellate division affirmed. The California Court of Appeal also affirmed. It concluded that Lange’s failure to pull over when the officer flashed his lights created probable cause to arrest Lange for the misdemeanor of failing to comply with a police signal. And it stated that Lange could not defeat an arrest begun in a public place by retreating into his home. The pursuit of a suspected misdemeanant, the court held, is always permissible under the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. The California Supreme Court denied review.
ISSUE:
Did the need to pursue Lange trigger categorical rule allowing warrantless home entry? NO
CONCLUSION:
The court held that the denial of Lange’s suppression motion was not warranted because the need to pursue a misdemeanant did not trigger a categorical rule allowing home entry without a warrant. Under the Fourth Amendment, the exigencies arising from a misdemeanant’s flight had to be assessed by evaluating the totality of the circumstances to determine if there was an emergency, and when the nature of the crime, the nature of the flight, and the surrounding facts did not present an exigency, officers had to respect the sanctity of the home and obtain a warrant.
Scott v. Harris (2007)
Rule: A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.
FACTS:
A deputy police officer terminated a high-speed pursuit of the driver’s car by applying his push bumper to the rear of the vehicle, causing it to leave the road and crash. The driver was rendered quadriplegic. The driver filed suit for the use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure. The district court denied the summary judgment motion, which was based on qualified immunity. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the interlocutory appeal taking the driver’s view of the facts as a given. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court of the United States.
ISSUE:
Should the deputy be liable to the driver? NO
CONCLUSION:
The Supreme Court found that a videotape capturing the events in question quite clearly contradicted the version of the story told by the driver and adopted by the court of appeals. The court of appeals should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape. The deputy did not contest that his decision to terminate the car chase by ramming his bumper into the driver’s vehicle constituted a “seizure.” A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatened the lives of innocent bystanders did not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it placed the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death. The car chase that the driver initiated posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others. The deputy’s attempt to terminate the chase by forcing the driver off the road was reasonable, and the deputy was entitled to summary judgment.
Chew v. Gates 1994
Rule: In determining reasonableness, the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s U.S. Const. amend. IV interests must be balanced against the countervailing government interests at stake. To assess the gravity of a particular intrusion on U.S. Const. amend. IV rights, the factfinder must evaluate the type and amount of force inflicted. In weighing the governmental interests involved the following should be taken into account: the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. The relevant inquiry is, moreover, an objective one - good intentions will not redeem an otherwise unreasonable use of force, nor will evil intentions transform an objectively reasonable use of force into a constitutional violation. Because questions of reasonableness are not well-suited to precise legal determination, the propriety of a particular use of force is generally an issue for the jury.
FACTS:
A police officer stopped Thane Carl Chew for a traffic violation, and Chew ran from the scene and hid. The officer later discovered that there were outstanding felony warrants against Chew. The officer sent a police dog to find and hold Chew, and the dog seriously injured Chew. Chew filed an action under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 against the officer, defendant police department officials, and defendant municipality. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant officials and defendant municipality. Chew appealed.
ISSUE:
Was there sufficient evidence to establish that the use of police dogs to find and apprehend suspects was deadly force or unreasonable force? NO
CONCLUSION:
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant officials, holding that they had qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that the use of dogs to find and apprehend suspects was deadly force or unreasonable force. The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant municipality because there were issues of material fact as to whether the officer’s use of the police dog was reasonable and as to whether defendant municipality’s policy on the use of police dogs caused Chew’s injuries.
Alex West
- Driving boat while drunk and 3 illegal drugs in blood
- manslaugher case/hit another boat and ran
- 8 yr old was killed, mom injured but survived
- blood evidence NOT admitted bc of wrong date on warrant
- Still convicted of manslaughter
Illinois v. Rodriguez
- woman called police looking beat
- had key , led officers to apt.
- officers functioned on good faith
- apparent authority doctrine
- allowed if police reasonably believe individual has authority to give consent.
Schneckloth v. Bustamante
- officer pulled over car based on traffic violation.
- officer asked to search car, man said yes
- officer found stolen checks
- objected on right to be told right to refuse
- court ruled that subject’s knowledge of the right to refuse a search is not necessary for consent
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
- officer pulled over car based on traffic violation
- officer asked to search car, man said yes
- officer found stolen checks
- objected on right to be told right to refuse
- Court ruled that subject’s knowledge of the right to reuse a search is not necessary for consent.
United States v. Matlock 1974
- Matlock was arrested for bank robbery
- A woman gave officers permission to search house including Matlock’s rented room
- She lived in room with Matlock
- Third party with control over a space can consent to a search
- Common authority mutual use of property searched by persons generally having joint access/control over the property
2 Prongs for involuntary pat down
1) RS there is weapon
2) RS they pose a threat
Warden v. Hayden 1967
- Robber robbed and fled/taxi drivers were attracted and followed
- Witnesses gave description/officers got consent with arrival to house
- Mom gives consent/weapons/clothes found
- 4th circuit said yo can’t use clothes (evidentiary value)
- Supreme said 4th amendment does not give distinction . clothes count
Mitchell v. Wisconsin 2019
- Suspect found undressed/ use lurring words/ alcohol 3x over legal limit
- took to hospital for blood test/ suspect passed out/ still took blood
- blood test was considered constitutional/ considered exigent circumstances
- general rule; warrant is not needed for blood test from unconscious driver.
New Jersey v. I.L.O. 1985
- is a warrant needed to search a student believed to be violating the law
- School officials searched purse/ found cigs and marijuana/ charged
- courts found search reasonable
Veronia School District v. Action 1995
- high school athletes can be drug tested
Independent School district No. 92 of pottawatonia County v. Earls 2002
- ## middle/high school students participating in extra curricular activity can be drug tested
United States v. Ross 1982
- Acting on tip that Ross was selling drugs
- pulled him over, opened trunk, found heroin
- After taken to station, car searched again and found money
- officers searched w/out warrants
- Did officers violate 4th
- Court says NO, bc of PC but officers COULD have gotten a warrant
California v. Carney
Motor homes are vehicles for 4th amendment purposes and can be searched
Texas v. Brown
- shining flashlight into cars interior is not considered a search
Coolidge v. New Hampshire 1971
- evidence in plain view/ focuses on word inadvertent ( discovery of evidence must be)
- purely accidental no prior knowledge
Kyllo v. United states 2001
- does thermal imaging devices to see heat emanating from a private home violate 4th
- Yes, bc officers used device not available to public and found something that would not have been found otherwise
- it is unreasonable w/out a warrant
United states v. Russel
plain touch as well
United States v. Lovell
Plain smell/ expectation of privacy
What are the 7 exceptions for search and seizures
1) searches with consent
2) searches incident to lawful arrest
3) exigent circumstances
4) stop/frisk
5) motor vehicles
6) special needs
7) administrative searches and inspections
