Criminal Law Exam 2 Flashcards
1
Q
Defense
A
Either a failure of proof by the prosecution or a defendant’s statement of a reason why the prosecutor has no valid case against him or her.
2
Q
Failure of proof
A
A defense in which either the defense counsel makes a motion for judgement of acquittal or the defendant introduces evidence that shows that the prosecution’s case is lacking.
3
Q
True defense
A
A defense that, if proved, results in the acquittal of a defendant, even though the prosecutor has proved the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
4
Q
Burden of proof.
A
The onus of producing evidence and also of persuading the jury with the required level of proof, which in a criminal case is beyond a reasonable doubt.
5
Q
Affirmative defense
A
A defense in which the defendant admits to the existence of all of the necessary legal elements for criminal liability, but offers one or more legally recognized reasons why he or she should nonetheless be acquitted.
6
Q
justification
A
A defense that, because of the circumstances, renders criminal conduct lawful and therefore exempts the actor from criminal sanctions.
7
Q
Excuse
A
A defense in which the criminal actor has committed an unjustified crime, but there is a reason for not holding him or her personally accountable for it.
8
Q
Self-defense
A
The justified use of reasonable force by one who is not an aggressor, when the actor reasonably believed it was necessary to defend against what he or she reasonably perceived to be an unlawful and imminent physical attack.
9
Q
Aggressor
A
One who first employs hostile force, either by threatening or striking another, which justifies like response.
10
Q
Deadly force
A
Force likely or intended to cause death or great bodily harm.
11
Q
Necessity
A
A defense in which a person, faced with a choice between tow courses of action, chooses the lesser of evils, as long as the harm produced is less than the harm that would have occurred without the action.
12
Q
Consent
A
A defense, in certain circumstances, in which the victim agrees to the actor’s conduct. The consent negates an element of the offense or precludes infliction of the harm to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
13
Q
Duress
A
A defense that arises when a person commits an unlawful act because of a threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or another, unless the actor intentionally kills an innocent third person.
14
Q
Intoxication
A
A disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body
15
Q
Voluntary intoxication
A
A person’s self-willed act to introduce substances into the body that the person knows or should know are likely to have intoxicating effects.
16
Q
Involuntarty intoxication
A
Intoxication that occurs when the actor does not consume drugs or alcohol voluntarily or if the actor is not to blame for becoming intoxicated because for example, he or she has an unanticipated reaction to drugs or alcohol
17
Q
Insanity
A
A defense in which the law recognizes that the accused was suffering from mental disease when the crime occurred, and thus may be relieved of criminal responsibility
18
Q
Incompetancy
A
An accused person’s inability to rationally consult with an attorney or to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or her
19
Q
Bifurcated trial
A
The division of a criminal trial into two parts, the first part leading to a verdict of guilty or not guilty, and the second relating to another issue, such as the sanity of the accused )or penalty phase of a death penalty case)
20
Q
M’Naghten test
A
The rule used to establish an insanity defense. Under this rule, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the offense, the accused was laboring under such a mental illness as not to know the nature and quality of what he or she was doing or, it he or she did know it, did not know it was wrong.
21
Q
Irresistible impulse test
A
A test for insanity that permits a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity if the fact finder concludes that the accused had a mental disease that kept him or her from controlling his or her conduct.
22
Q
MPC test
A
A test for insanity that provides that provides that a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if he or she is found to lack substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law
23
Q
Federal test
A
The federal statutory definition of insanity, which provides that a person is excused by reason of insanity if he or she proves by clear and convincing evidence that at the time of the offense, as a result of a severe mental disease r defect, he or she was unable to appreciate the nature and quality of his or her act, or the wrongfulness of his or her conduct.
24
Q
Diminished capacity
A
A term used to describe two circumstances in which a mental condition short of insanity will lead to an acquittal or lessened charges; 1) where the accused raises the condition as a failure of proof defense, and 2) a true partial defense, whereby the crime of murder can be mitigated to manslaughter
25
Punishment
When an agent of the government, using authority granted by virtue of a legal criminal conviction, intentionally inflicts pain, loss of liberty, or some other unpleasant consequence on the person who has been convicted.
26
retributive justification
A justification for punishment based on the theory that a wrongdoer deserves punishment for punishment's sake
27
Utilitarian justification
A justification for punishment based on the theory that a social practice is desirable if it promotes the greatest good for the largest number of people.
28
Rehabilitative justification
A justification for punishment based on the theory that if an offender is reformed, the offender will not commit any more crimes
29
Incapacitation
The removal of restriction of freedom of those who have violated criminal laws, usuallly by imprisonment
30
Three-strikes laws
Laws that impose sentences of 25 years to life for those who have been convicted of certain serious offenses three times
31
zero tolerance
Laws that impose maximum penalties for certain crimes, such as particular sex offenses; also known as one strike laws
32
Vengeance
The imposition of punishment in the context of an eye for an eye or a tooth for a tooth usually associated with retribution, though the utilitarian may see a benefit in vengeance.
33
Indeterminate sentencing
A sentencing system in which the trial judge has great discretion and correctional authorities have the power to release a prisoner before completion of the maximum sentence imposed by the judge if, in the view of those authorities, rehabilitative goals have been achieved.
34
Determinate sentencing
A sentencing system that abolishes parole boards and creates presumptive sentencing ranges for various classes of offenses, there by limiting trial judges discretion; such a system typically has sentencing guidelines for judges to follow.
35
Sentencing guidelines
A set of standards for sentencing, set by a commission legislatively established for that purpose, that judges in a determinate sentencing system must or may follow.
36
Mandatory sentencing
Law by which the state's legislature fixes either the exact penalty for the crime or a minimum number of years that the defendant must serve
37
habitual-felon laws
Laws that provide for enhanced sentencing of repeat offenders.
38
Probation
The suspension of a sentence of incarceration, allowing the offender to return to the community with conditions under the supervision of a probation officer
39
Parole
The release of an offender from incarceration prior to the expiration of the full term of incarceration, to carry out the rest of the sentence with conditions under the supervision of a corrections officer.
40
Restorative justice
A process through which all the parties with a stake in a particular offense come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its implications for the future.
41
Proportionality
The constitutional principle that the punishment should fit the crime, expressed in the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause.
42
Homicide
The killing of one person by another
43
Criminal homicide
Any act that causes the death of another person with criminal intent and without lawful justification or excuse
44
Malice aforethought
Under modern law, any one of four mental states that reveal the intent to 1) kill 2) inflict grievous bodily injury 3) show extreme reckless disregard for human life 4) commit a felony that results in another's death.
45
Born-alive rule
The common law rule defining the beginning of life, for purposes of criminal homicide, as the birth of a live child
46
Feticide
The unlawful killing of a fetus
47
Premeditation and deliberation
The mental state that raises second-degree murder to first-degree murder in jurisdictions that classify murder into two or more levels. It implies a cold-blooded killing.
48
Corpus delicti
The required proof that a crime has been committed. In homicide cases, this usually means the corpse of the victim
49
Murder
The killing of another with the mental element or malice aforethought.
50
Manslaughter
The killing of another without the mental element of malice aforethought
51
Year and a day rule
The causation rule that requires that, in order to classify a killing as a homicide, the victim must die within a year and a day after the act causing death occurred.
52
Malice
A state of mind connoting an abandoned and malignant heart. It is not limited to the specific intent to kill, since even a wanton or reckless state of mind may constitute malice.
53
Felony murder rule
The rule that when the accused kills in the course of committing a felony, the mens rea for murder is present in the intent to commit the felony, and therefore murder has been committed.
54
Inherently dangerous felonies
Felonies involving conduct that is inherently dangerous to human life, such as rape, arson, and armed robbery
55
Capital murder
A charge of murder with the maximum punishment of death, often called murder in the first degree.
56
Voluntary manslaughter
An intentional, unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought
57
Mitigation
The reduction, or lessening, of a penalty or punishment imposed by law
58
Adequate provocation
When the acts or conduct of the person killed would be sufficient to cause a person of reasonable, ordinary temperament to lose self-control
59
Imperfect self-defense
A partial defense that reduces a murder charge to voluntary manslaughter, where the claim of self-defense fails because it is not objectively reasonable but is honestly believed by the accused.
60
Involuntary manslaughter
A criminal homicide that encompasses a killing done without intent to kill, and without such indifference to human life as to constitute implied malice, as a result of criminally negligent conduct on the part of the defendant.
61
Negligent homicide
A criminal homicide committed by a person who has neglected to exercise the degree of care that an ordinary person would have exercised under the same circumstances
62
Vehicular manslaughter
A criminal homicide in which the perpetrator caused a death while operating a motor vehicle, either by gross negligence or while under the influence of alcohol or other drugs.
63
Battery
A misdemeanor consisting of the unlawful application of force that actually and intentionally causes the touching of another person aginast his or her will
64
Aggravated battery
A battery accompanied by an intent to kill or rape - thus, usually a specific intent crime. A felony in many states
65
Assault
A misdemeanor consisting of either an attempted battery or an intentional frightening of another person
66
Conditional assault
An assault in which the actor threatens harm only under certain conditions, such as the failure of the victim to act in a certain way demanded by the actor
67
Aggravated assault
Assault with intent to kill, rob, or rape, or assault with specified deadly weapons. A felony in most states
68
Mayhem
The felony assault with intent to maim
69
Robbery
The taking of property by the use of force or fear, where the property is taken either from the person of the victim or in his or her immediate presence.
70
Armed robbery
Robbery accomplished by means of a dangerous or deadly weapon; often classified as robbery in the first degree or aggravated robbery.
71
Rape
A felony defined as the carnal knowledge of a women forcibly and against her will
72
Statutory rape
A form of rape involving sexual intercourse between an adult and a child, usually between the ages of 13 and 17
73
Spousal rape
Nonconsensual sex between a women and her husband, ex-husband, or partner
74
Rape trauma syndrome
A condition observed in some rape victims in which the victim develops phobias and physical problems as a result of having been raped.
75
Child molestation
Any sexual conduct by an adult with a child
76
Megan's law
A statute that has been enacted in all 50 states that requires community notification by authorities when a convicted sex offender is released from prison
77
Criminal abortion
The artificially induced expulsion of a fetus by illegal means, such as spousal abuse.
78
viability
The point at which a fetus can reasonably live outside its mother's womb, with or without artificial support.
79
Child abuse
An intentional or neglectful physical or emotional injury imposed on a child, including sexual molestation.
80
Battered child syndrome
A clinical condition suffered by young children who have been the victims of prolonged serious physical abuse.
81
Spousal abuse
Long-term physical abuse by the victim's spouse or partner
82
Battered woman syndrome
A defense in many jurisdictions in which the victim of abuse eventually snaps and kills the abuser.
83
Elder abuse
The abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation of elderly persons
84
False imprisonment
Knowingly and unlawfully restraining a person so as to substantially interfere with his or her liberty
85
Shopkeeper's rule
An exception to false imprisonment laws that gives a shopkeeper the right to restrain a person if the shopkeeper possesses a reasonable belief that the customer has not paid a bill or has shoplifted an item
86
kidnapping
A felony defined as taking or carrying away a person without consent, by force or fraud, without lawful excuse, and often with a demand for ransom
87
Common law arson
The malicious and willful burning of another's house.
88
Curtilage
The land immediately surrounding and associated with the home, including such structures as a barn, outhouse, or milk house.
89
Willfulness
The voluntary, intentional nature of a crime; required as a separate element of arson.
90
Modern arson
The malicious, willful burning of, or attempted burning of, one's own or another person's property
91
Common law burglary
Breaking and entering, in the nighttime, of the mansion or dwelling house or curtilage of another, with the intent to commit a felony.
92
Modern burglary
Entering, whether in the daytime or at night, of any building, structure, or vehicle, with the intent to commit any criminal offense.
93
Inner door
A door inside a building that does not lead directly to the house.
94
Constructive entry
An entry effected by using an instrumentality such as another person, an animal, or a physical object
95
Nighttime
At common law, the period between sunset and sunrise when there is not enough daylight to discern a man's face
96
Sleep test
Whether the dwelling is used regularly as a place to sleep determines whether a dwelling is occupied.
97
Breaking and entering
Unlawful forced entry; similar to burglary, but without the specific intent to commit a theft or felony inside the structure
98
Simple burglary
The unauthorized entering of any dwelling, vehicle, watercraft, or other structure, movable or immovable, with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein.
99
Aggravated burglary
Simple burglary with the added elements of entering an inhabited dwelling, or any structure or vehicle, while armed with a dangerous weapon, or by committing a battery after or upon the entry
100
Burglar's tools
Tools and instruments that are designed adapted or commonly used to commit burglaries
101
Motor vehicle
A vehicle proceeding on land by means of its own power plant and free of rails, tracks or overhead wires.
102
Katko v. Briney 1971
Rule: A possessor of land has no privilege to use force intended or likely to cause death or serious harm against another whom the possessor sees about to enter his premises or meddle with his chattel, unless the intrusion threatens death or serious bodily harm to the occupiers or users of the premises
Facts: Husband and wife trespass. Second time owner put out dangerous traps. Husband was shot in leg and appealed to court for injury
Issue/Answer: Can an owner protect personal property in an unoccupied boarded-up farmhouse against trespassers and thieves by a spring gun capable of inflicting death or serious injury? NO
Conclusion:
The Court held that the law has always placed a higher value upon human safety than upon mere rights in property. It is the accepted rule that there is no privilege to use any force calculated to cause death or serious bodily injury to repel the threat to land or chattels, unless there is also such a threat to the defendant's personal safety as to justify self-defense. The possessor may of course take some steps to repel a trespass but only that amount which is reasonably necessary to effect the repulse
103
Tennessee v. Garner (1985)
Rule: The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.
Facts: Father brought suit against city and police department for violation of 4th amendment rights. Trial court dismissed due to Tennessee statute allowing officers to use all necessary means when suspect flees or resists. Court of appeals reversed. State intervened.
Issue/Answer: Is a statute authorizing a police officer to use all necessary means in effecting an arrest unconstitutional? Yes
Conclusion: The apprehension of a suspect is a seizure for the purposes of the Constitution and the use of deadly force to achieve a seizure is only permitted under certain circumstances. The Fourth Amendment allows the use of deadly force to apprehend felons who the police have probable cause to believe are dangerous to them or to the public. The shooting of appellee's son, who was a suspect in a burglary, was not an acceptable use of deadly force.
104
Regina v. Dudley and Stephens (1884)
Facts: Dudley/Stephens lost at sea with two other men. The men killed parker the youngest and ate him. Four days later they were rescued and charged with murder.
Issue: Whether the killing of Parker was murder considering the circumstances of this case. Yes,
Holding: The necessity of hunger does not justify larceny, let alone murder. Stephens and Dudley chose the weakest and youngest to kill and it was not more necessary to kill him than any of the other grown men.
Stephens and Dudley were tempted to kill Parker but temptation itself is not an excuse for murdering him. Their unfortunate circumstances also do not lend leniency to the legal definition of murder.
105
United States v. Holmes (1842)
Rule: it is not necessity to throw 14 people overboard unless the people you chuck are determined by lot or not necessary crew members.
Facts: The defendant and crew threw 14 FREAKING PEOPLE OVERBOARD in order to "LIGHTEN THE LOAD
106
Weems v. United States (1910)
Rule: It is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.
Facts: Petitioner Weems was convicted of falsifying a public and official document while he served as a disbursement officer in the Philippine Islands and sentenced to a term of 15 years imprisonment. When his conviction and sentence were affirmed, he filed an application for a writ of error, asserting that his sentence was cruel and unusual within the meaning of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
Issue: Was petitioner’s sentence cruel and unusual within the meaning of the Philippine Bill of Rights? YES
Conclusion: Because the provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments contained in the Philippine Bill of Rights was taken from the U.S. Const. amend. VIII, the Court gave it the same interpretation. The Court agreed that the petitioner's punishment was improper because it was not proportionate to his offense, and thus the petitioner's sentence violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.
107
People v. Goetz (1984)
Rule: The jury must first determine whether the defendant had the requisite beliefs under the law, that is, whether he believed deadly force was necessary to avert the imminent use of deadly force or the commission of one of the felonies enumerated therein. If the People do not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not have such beliefs, then the jury must also consider whether these beliefs were reasonable. The jury would have to determine, in light of all the "circumstances" if a reasonable person could have had these beliefs.
Facts: A Grand Jury indicted defendant on attempted murder, assault, and criminal possession of a weapon for having shot and wounded four youths on a subway train after one or two of the youths approached him and asked for money. Although he was certain that none of the youths had a gun, he had a fear, based on prior experiences, of being "maimed."
Issue: Does the belief that a person is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, as an element of self-defense, depend solely on the defendant's state of mind? NO
Conclusion: The reviewing court held that although N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15, and its predecessors, never required that an actor's belief as to the intention of another person to inflict serious injury be correct in order for the use of deadly force to be justified, the provisions had uniformly required that the belief comport with an objective notion of reasonableness.
108
United States v. John Hinckley, Jr. (1981)
Facts: On March 30, 1981, John W. Hinckley, Jr., shot President Ronald Reagan, attempting to assassinate him. His defense attorneys did not dispute that he had planned and committed the attack. His attorneys instead argued that he was acting according to the impulses of a diseased or impaired mind. Controlled by his pathological obsession with the movie, Taxi Driver, starring Jodie Foster.
Holding: The most plausible interpretation of the district court's opinion in this case is that its de novo review of the evidence did not rely on the Hospital Review Board's decision to refuse Hinckley a conditional release. Even if the district court did rely to some extent on the Review Board's decision, however, we find that the court properly protected the deliberations of the Review Board under the deliberative process privilege. The decision of the district court is accordingly Affirmed
109
Ewing v. California (2003)
Rule: The Eighth Amendment proportionality principle applies to noncapital sentences. Four principles of proportionality review -- the primacy of the legislature, the variety of legitimate penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the requirement that proportionality review be guided by objective factors -- inform the final one: The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportionate" to the crime. Comparative analysis within and between jurisdictions is not mandated.
Facts: Petitioner was convicted of felony grand theft for stealing nearly $ 1,200 worth of merchandise after previously having been convicted of serious felonies including robbery and three residential burglaries. The trial judge decided not to reduce the felony grand theft conviction, a "wobbler" under California law, to a misdemeanor to avoid a three strikes sentence. The appellate court affirmed petitioner's sentence under California's three strikes law. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of the United States to determine whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited the State of California from sentencing a repeat felon to a prison term of 25 years to life under the three strikes law.
Issue: Does the Eight Amendment prohibit the State of California from sentencing a repeat felon to a prison term of 25 years to life under the three strikes law? NO
Conclusion: The Court determined that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit California from making a judgment that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating criminals who have already been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime. The Court determined that petitioner's sentence of 25 years to life in prison, imposed for the offense of felony grand theft under the three strikes law, was not grossly disproportionate and therefore did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Petitioner's sentence reflected a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that offenders who have committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit felonies must be incapacitated.
110
Keeler v. Superior Court (1970)
Rule: California courts construe a penal statute as favorably to the defendant as its language and the circumstances of its application may reasonably permit; just as in the case of a question of fact, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute.
Facts: Petitioner accosted his wife after finding out she was pregnant with another man's child. He began to beat her in the abdomen. As a result, the fetus was stillborn. Petitioner was charged with several crimes including the murder of the baby. On denial of his motion to set aside the information for lack of probable cause, he petitioned for a writ of prohibition to prevent the superior court from proceeding with the prosecution on the murder charge.
Issue: Whether the killing of an unborn but viable fetus constitutes murder. NO
Conclusion: The court issued the writ and held that an unborn but viable fetus was not a human being within meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 187. It is the policy of the state to construe a penal statute as favorably to the defendant as its language and the circumstances of its application may reasonably permit. The court declared that it would exceed its judicial and constitutional limits if it were it to declare an unborn fetus to be within the murder statute. Furthermore, assuming the court could adopt such a rule, it could only apply it prospectively. Applying the new rule to petitioner would have violated petitioner's right to due process.
111
Blakely v. Washington (2004)
Rule: Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Facts: Petitioner pled guilty to kidnapping his estranged wife. Pursuant to state law, the trial court imposed an "exceptional" sentence of 90 months after making a judicial determination that he acted with “deliberate cruelty.” Petitioner was sentenced higher than standard range. Petitioner appealed, arguing the sentencing procedure violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. The State Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Washington Supreme Court denied discretionary review. Certiorari was granted.
Issue: Can a reason offered to justify an exceptional sentence be considered if it takes into account only factors used in computing the standard range sentence for the offense? NO
Conclusion: The judge in the case could not have imposed the exceptional 90-month sentence solely on the basis of the facts admitted in the guilty plea. Those facts alone were insufficient because a reason offered to justify an exceptional sentence could be considered only if it took into account factors other than those which were used in computing the standard range sentence for the offense, which in this case included the elements of second-degree kidnapping and the use of a firearm. Had the judge imposed the 90-month sentence solely on the basis of the plea, he would have been reversed; the jury's verdict alone did not authorize the sentence. The judge acquired that authority only upon finding some additional fact. Because the State's sentencing procedure did not comply with the Sixth Amendment, petitioner's sentence was invalid. The judgment of the Washington Court of Appeals was REVERSED, and the case was REMANDED for further proceedings.
112
Commonwealth v. Fettes (2005)
Rule: The defendant was convicted of a single count of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon on a person sixty years or older, that weapon being his dog, an eight month old pit bull terrier. We conclude that the evidence, while not overwhelming, was sufficient to sustain the conviction, and therefore we affirm.
Facts: he victim, sixty-six years old at the time of the incident, went to collect rent at an apartment building she owned. As she approached the building, she saw a man, later identified as the defendant, coming down a staircase from inside. The man had a dog with him, on a leash that was wrapped around the defendant's hand, "very tightly by his side." The defendant and the victim stopped several feet from each other. At this point, the dog was standing by the defendant, calm and well-behaved. The victim asked the defendant if he lived in the apartment, to which the defendant responded he did not. The victim, who admitted to being "upset," then accused the defendant of allowing his dog to leave droppings around the yard and on the apartment's flat roof. The defendant became agitated, and stated that his dog was not responsible. The victim heard the defendant say "a short phrase" "in a stern voice" to the dog, and she saw the defendant partially release or unravel the leash (though he still held it). The dog immediately lunged at the victim and bit her hand. The victim fled, as did the defendant with the dog. The wound required stitches and eventually became infected, requiring antibiotics. The victim received tetanus and rabies shots, and was left with nerve damage.
Holding: A dangerous weapon is `any instrument or instrumentality so constructed or so used as to be likely to produce death or great bodily harm. There can be little doubt that a dog . . . used for the purpose of intimidation or attack falls within this definition."
113
People v. Stamp (1969)
Rule: The felony-murder doctrine is not limited to those deaths, which are foreseeable. Rather a felon is held strictly liable for all killings committed by him or his accomplices in the course of the felony. As long as the homicide is the direct causal result of the robbery the felony-murder rule applies whether or not the death was a natural or probable consequence of the robbery.
Facts: Defendants entered a building, ordered the employees to lie on the floor, robbed the building, and fled. The owner of the building was badly shaken up by the robbery. When the police arrived, the owner of the building told the police he did not feel well and had a pain in his chest. The owner then collapsed on the floor and was pronounced dead. The coroner's report listed the cause of death as heart attack. Defendants were found guilty of first-degree robbery and first-degree murder. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment against defendants.
Issue: Should the felony-murder doctrine have been applied to the case at bar? YES
Conclusion: The court held that because the homicide was a direct causal result of the robbery, the felony-murder rule applied whether or not the death was a natural or probable cause of the robbery.
114
People v. Kimes and Kimes (2000)
1) exception to corpus delicti
2) Kimes and mother killed 82 yr old millionaire
3) Incriminating evidence such as notebooks, fingerprints, and other things were found.
115
Law v. State (1974)
Facts: Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for killing a police officer who he believed to be a burglar. Appellant argued that he was prejudiced by jury instructions given regarding the second-degree murder charge.
Rule: The right to defend one’s house is not absolute but subject to the standards of a reasonable, prudent and cautious person.
Issue: Whether Appellant case was prejudiced by the instructions given to the jury regarding murder in the second degree. NO
Holding: Most jurisdictions have taken the view that if an assault on a dwelling and an attempted forcible entry are made under circumstances which would create a reasonable apprehension that it is the design of the assailant to commit a felony or to inflict injury on the inhabitants and this danger is imminent, the lawful occupant may take the life of the intruder. The killing must be necessary to prevent the commission of the felony, if other methods would prevent the commission, a homicide is not justified, and all other means must be exhausted. The right to defend one’s home is not absolute but subject to the standards of a reasonable, prudent and cautious person.
Discussion The Court ruled that the use of deadly force would be severely limited to violent felonies and would not involve an analysis of the subjective state of mind of the actor.
116
Commonwealth v. Malone (1946)
Rule: At common law, the grand criterion which distinguishes murder from other killing was malice on the part of the killer and this malice is not necessarily malevolent to the deceased particularly but any evil design in general; the dictate of a wicked, depraved and malignant heart
Facts: Defendant James J. Malone was found guilty of murder in the second degree in an action brought by the Commonwealth for the death of his friend while playing the game of Russian roulette. Malone declared that he had no intention of harming his friend. The trial court denied Malone's motion for a new trial was refused, and he was sentenced to 5 to years in prison. Malone appealed, alleging that the facts did not justify a conviction of any form of homicide due to lack of motive.
Issue: Did the lack of motive exculpate Malone from the charge of murder in the second degree? NO
Conclusion: The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court's judgment, and the record was remitted to the trial court so that the sentence imposed could be carried out. The court held that the fact that there was no motive for the homicide did not exculpate Malone. The killing was murder with malice because of the reckless disregard for the consequences of a game of Russian roulette. Malice in the sense of a wicked disposition was evidenced by the intentional doing of an uncalled-for act in callous disregard of its likely harmful effects on others.
117
Montana v. Egelhoff (1996)
Rule: Preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the states than it is of the federal government, and the court should not lightly construe the constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual states. Among other things, it is normally within the power of the state to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out, and its decision in this regard is not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, unless it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.
Facts: The defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide after police found him drunk in a vehicle next to his gun, with the two victims, each dead of gunshot wounds. Defendant was charged with two counts of deliberate homicide, which was defined under Montana law as purposely or knowingly causing the death of another human being. individual's defense was that his extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing the murders and accounted for his inability to recall the events of the night that the murders were committed. Pursuant to a Montana statute, the jury was instructed that it could not consider voluntary intoxication in determining the existence of the requisite mental state. The jury found the individual guilty on both counts. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana, reversing, expressed the view that (1) the individual had a right, under the due process clause of the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, to present and have considered by the jury all relevant evidence of the offense charged, The state supreme court was under the impression that the evidence of the individual's voluntary intoxication was relevant to the issue on whether the individual acted knowingly and purposely, and since the Montana statute prevented the jury from considering that evidence with regard to such issue, the individual had been denied due process in that Montana had been relieved of part of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.
Issue: Does a state statute preventing jury consideration of evidence per se violate the due process clause? NO
Conclusion: the Montana statute did not violate the due process clause. The Court asserted that the defendant did not uphold his burden of showing that the rule allowing consideration of intoxication on the question of intent was a fundamental principle under U.S. Const. amend. XIV, because it was too new and had not received sufficiently uniform and permanent allegiance, and displaced a lengthy and justified common law tradition. The Court noted the validity of the statute in deterring irresponsible behavior while drunk and upheld the principle that the introduction of relevant evidence was subject to limitation by the state for a "valid" reason.
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Psalm 106:3
Blessed are those who act justly, who always do what is right.
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Proverbs 4:23
Above all else, guard your heart, for everything you do flows from it.
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Titus 2:11-12
For the grace of God has appeared that offers salvation to al people. It teaches us to say "No" to ungodliness and worldly passions, and to live self-controlled, upright and godly lives in this present age.
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Romans 13:1-5
Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently, whoever rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves. For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and you will be commended. For the one in authority is God’s servant for your good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for rulers do not bear the sword for no reason. They are God’s servants, agents of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also as a matter of conscience.
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People v. Unger
1) Defendant fled prison after rape and life threatened
2) Convicted of escape, reversed due to it being a viable excuse.
3) Jury was given wrong instructions by trial court.
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State v. Cameron
1) man killed step mother did not try to hide crime
2) Claimed insanity and that he was messiah and step mother was agent of Satan.
3) Courts ruled and instructed jury that he could not be considered insane bc he new right and wrong
4) overturned because he was suffering from a disease at the time of act.
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People v Evens
1) man used con to get women to room
2) intimidated her into sex
3) court ruled that she was not raped due to ambiguousness but man was predatory
125
State v Kelley
1) battered woman syndrom case
2) woman killed husband and claimed self defense
3) upper court allowed evidence of specialy person
126
Lockyere v. Andrada
1) did not violate unreasonable punishment
127
People v. Young
1) man saw two men struggling with young boy
2)thought they were assaulting him and used force enough to injure someone
3) men turned out to be plain clothed officers
4) Justification in defens- of others even though wrong
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People v. Capallos
Man set up gun to shoot when gone
boy got shot in face
convicted because employing deadly mechanical devices in defense of property is not allowed.
