Containment Building Flashcards
What makes up the containment pressure boundary?
The following elements that form the Design Basis Accident (DBA) Containment Pressure Boundary.
- Reinforced Concrete Foundation Mat
- Post-Tensioned Concrete Containment Wall & Dome
- Containment Steel Liner
- Personnel Airlocks (Normal & Emergency)
- Equipment Hatch
- Mechanical Pipe Penetrations
- Electrical Penetrations
- Fuel Transfer Tube
What is the design bases of containment?
The total energy contained in the water of the PCS is released into the containment.
Energy Sources
- NSSS Stored Heat
- Reactor Core Decay Heat
- Metal-Water Reactions
- Hydrogen Combustion
What is the designed leakage limit of containment?
Allow a leak rate of NO MORE than 0.1 weight-percent/day at a design pressure of 55 psig and a design temperature of 283°F.
What are containment pressure and temperature design limits?
Pressure - 55 psig
Temperature - 283°F.
What is containment adminstrative temperature limit?
For MODEs 1, 2, 3 and 4 Containment Temperature administrative limit is ≤ 135.96°F on PPC pt. TE-1815 or 130°F if TI-1815
What is the containment tech spec temperature limit?
TS 3.6.5 limit is 140°F
This temperature is the maximum Containment Average Air Temperature prior to a DBA or Main Steam Line Break (which can cause higher temperature/pressure under certain conditions) to prevent exceeding the design pressure with the resultant Containment Peak Pressure.
What is the containment administrative pressure limit?
Containment Pressure administrative limits for MODEs 1 and 2 < .85 psig, for MODEs 3 and 4 <1.35 psig.
- C-03 Indications
- Containment Building Pressure PI-1805 (1812)
- 0 – 100 psia
- Containment Building Pressure PI-1805 (1812)
- C-13 Indications
- Containment Pressure PIA-1814/1815
- 0 – 5 psig
- Containment Pressure PIA-1814/1815
What is the containment pressure tesch spec limit?
TS 3.6.4 limit for MODEs 1 and 2 ≤ 1.0 psig MODEs 3 and 4 ≤ 1.5 psig.
Pressure limits ensure that in the event of an accident, the maximum Design Pressure of the Containment (55 psig.) is not exceeded
During normal operations, how is containment vented?
Containment pressure is maintained by venting to the stack via CWRT T-64D to Radwaste Exhauster V-14A/B plenum or the VGCH
How is containment humidity controlled?
During normal plant operation, Containment Humidity Control is a function of Containment Temperature Control.
As Containment Temperature rises, Containment Humidity will rise. Conversely, if Containment Temperature lowers, Containment Humidity will lower.
An increase in Containment Humidity is an indication of a release of water vapor. A 10% change in humidity would result in approximate 150 gallons of primary water leakage, independent of leak rate.
How are Containment Isolation Devices (Valves) classified?
Active (automatic) and Passive
*
Define active containment isolation devices (valves).
Check valves, or other automatic valves designed to close without operator action following an accident, are considered active devices.
To be Operable
- Valves must have isolation stroke times within limits
- Valves must be able to actuate upon receipt of a CHP or CHR signal.
- Valves must pass a periodic leakage rate test.
Define passive containment isolation devices (valves).
Manual valves and de-activated automatic valves secured in their CLOSED position, blind flanges, and closed systems are considered passive devices.
To be Operable
- Must be closed and locked (manual valves).
- Valves must pass a period leakage rate test
Personnel and emergency hatches as well as the equipment hatch are considered passive devices.
Why do most penetrations have two isolation features in series?
So that no single credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in a loss of isolation or leakage that exceeds limits assumed in the safety analysis.
- Penetrations that contain only one isolation device are either normally closed during operation or are in service during accident conditions.
What signals isolate containment?
Containment High Pressure (CHP) signal
Containment High Radiation (CHR) signal
Not all containment isolation valves are actuated by both signals
What events result in a release of radioactive material within containment?
- Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
- Main Steam Line Break (MSLB)
- Control rod ejection accident.
Safety analysis assumes that CIVs are either CLOSED or function to close within the required isolation time following event initiation.
Assumes that the purge exhaust and air room supply valves are closed at event initiation.
What specific plant parameters that will cause an automatic containment isolation?
Containment High Pressure, initiates ≥ 3.7 psig ≤ 4.3 psig
Containment High Radiation of 10 R/hr on RIA-1805, 1806, 1807, 1808
Refueling Monitors RIA-2316 and RIA 2317
- Placed in service by placing the Cutout Switches for RIA-2316 & 2317 in the “IN” position using the key switches on panel C‑11A rear.
- T.S. Bases 3.3.6 states monitors typically set 25mr/hr above background
- Currently at 80 mr/hr above background
CHP left channel equipment and relay power supplies.
2/4 logic using Pressure Switches 1801, 1802A, 1803, 1804A.
- ‘A’ switches have two contacts that close > 4 psig
- Others have 1 switch at 3.4 and 1 switch at 4
- Seal in circuit requires containment pressure on 3 of 4 channels < 3 psig to reset.
Power Supply Y-10
CHP right channel equipment and relay power supplies.
2/4 logic using Pressure Switches 1801A, 1802, 1803A, 1804.
- ‘A’ switches have two contacts that close > 4 psig
- Others have 1 switch at 3.4 and 1 switch at 4
- Seal in circuit requires containment pressure on 3 of 4 channels < 3 psig to reset.
Power Supply Y-40
How does a test of CHP occurr and what happens?
Depressing Test Push Button on C-13 for channel being tested
- CHPL-CS (Left Channel
- CHPR-CS (Right Channel)
Depressing the test button causes:
- 5-second delay via TDPU relay
- A block of the automatic opening of spray valves CV-3001 and CV-3002.
- The spray valve test light on the SIS sequencer alarm panel lights. (Panel C-13)
- Initiation of one channel of Containment High Pressure logic (and same side channel of SIAS)
- NO equipment actuation!
What valves on C-13 isolate with a left channel CHP?
- CV-1101, Containment Vent Header
- CV-1808, Containment Purge Exhaust
- CV-1814, Air Room Supply
- CV-1808, Containment Purge Exhaust
- CV-1064, CWRT Vent
- CV-1044 CWRT Outlet
- CV-1038, CWRT Recirc
- CV-1002, PSDT Outlet
- CV-0911, CCW Return
- CV-1103, Containment Sump Drain
- CV-0770, S/G ‘B’ Bottom Blowdown
- CV-0771, S/G ‘A’ Bottom Blowdown
- CV-1910, Primary System Sample Isol
What valves on C-13 isolate with a right channel CHP?
- CV-1807, Containment Purge Exhaust
- CV-1813, Air Room Supply
- CV-1805, Containment Purge Exhaust
- CV-1102, Containment Vent Header
- CV-1104, Containment Sump Drain
- CV-0940, CCW Return
- CV-1007, PSDT Outlet
- CV-1038, CWRT Recirc
- CV-1045, CWRT Outlet
- CV-1065, CWRT Vent
- CV-0767, S/G ‘A’ Bottom Blowdown
- CV-0768, S/G ‘B’ Bottom Blowdown
- CV-1911, Primary System Sample Isol
What valves on C-13 isolate with a left or right channel CHP?
- CV-0738, S/G ‘B’ Surface Blowdown
- CV-0739, S/G ‘A’ Surface Blowdown
- CV-0910. CCW to Containment
- CV-0939, Shield Cooling Surge Tank Fill
- CV-1004, CWRT Inlet Isol
- CV-1037, CWRT Recirc Isol
- CV-1358, Nitrogen to Containment
What valves on C-02 isolate with a CHP?
CV-2083, Controlled Bleed Off Containment Isol - left channel
CV-2099 Controlled Bleed Off Containment Isol - right channel
CV-1055, Quench Tank Spray Valve - common
What valves on C-01 isolate with a CHP?
- CV-0510, S/G ‘A’ MSIV - common
- CV-0501, S/G ‘B’ MSIV - common
- CV-0701, S/G ‘A’ Main Feed Reg Valve - left channel
- CV-0703, S/G ‘B’ Main Feed Reg Valve - right channel
- CV-0735, S/G ‘A’ Bypass Feed Red Valve - left channel
- CV-0734, S/G ‘B’ Bypass Feed Red Valve - right channel
Only isolate on CHP
What valves on C-11A isolate with CHP?
Left or Right Channel
- SV-2412A, Hydrogen Mon Right Channel
- SV-2412B, Hydrogen Mon Right Channel
- SV-2414A, Hydrogen Mon Right Channel
- SV-2414B, Hydrogen Mon Right Channel
- SV-2413A, Hydrogen Mon Left Channel
- SV-2413B, Hydrogen Mon Left Channel
- SV-2415A, Hydrogen Mon Left Channel
- SV-2415B, Hydrogen Mon Left Channel
How does SIAS and CHP interact with P-54A/B/C spray pumps?
SIAS places spray pumps in STANDBY, CHP actuates spray pumps.
IF CHP is reset, but not SIAS and another CHP occurs, the spray pumps will not automatically start.
How do you reset CHP?
Left Channel reset - resets left channel only
Right Channel reset - resets right channel only
Valves that do not automatically reposition following a CHP Reset must be taken to the “CLOSE” position before they can be reopened.
What valves re-position on resetting CHP?
CCW supply and return containment isolation valves CV-0910, CV-0911 and CV-0940.
- In in auto they will open. If closed more than 10 minutes, thermal shock to PCP seals.
Feedwater isolation valves CV-0701, CV-0703, CV-0734 and CV-0735. Open
Containment spray valves CV-3001 and CV-3002 will go to the position that their selector switch is in. Switch normal position is close.
- No flow for spray pumps if operating
How is CHR actuated?
Any combination of the RIA-1805, 1806, 1807 or 1808 in a 2 out of 4 coincidence will result in a Left and Right Channel Actuation
- Containment High Rad Alarm will occur due to a 1 out of 4 High Rad sensed by RIA‑1805, 1806, 1807 or 1808.
What are power supplies to CHR relays?
Right Channel - Y-40
Lef Channel - Y-10
What equipment actuations occurr on CHR?
All automatic containment isolation valves close except:
- CCW Containment Supply and Returns CV‑0910, CV-0911, CV-0940
- Main Steam Isolations CV-0501, CV-0510
- Main Feedwater Isolations CV-0701, CV‑0703, CV-0734, CV-0735
How does CHR impact the safeguard rooms sump pumps?
Causes the AUTO start feature of the ES Sump Pumps to be disabled.
- Pumps can still be operated in manual.
- Prevents highly radioactive waste from ESS Rooms being transferred to the Dirty Waste Drain Tank and possibly beyond during an accident.
Right Channel – ESS Pumps P-73A, P-72A
Left Channel – ESS Pumps P-73B, P-72B
How does CHR impact ventilation?
Right or Left Channel trips Air Room Purge Fan V-46.
Control Room HVAC in EMERGENCY MODE.
- Right Channel - B Train
- Left Channel - A Train
How is CHR reset?
Left Channel reset - resets left channel only
Right Channel reset - resets right channel only
- Valves do not automatically reposition following a CHR Reset.
- Must be taken to the “CLOSE” position before they can be reopened.
How is a CHR actuated during refueling?
Two containment monitors RIA-2316 and RIA‑2317.
- Current setting - Alarm at 80mR above background
Refueling CHR is armed by placing the key switch for each monitor to the IN position on the back of C-11.
Logic is 1 out of 1 for Left Channel and Right Channel
What containment building indications are on C-03?
Containment Building Pressure PI-1805 (1812)
- 0 – 100 psia
What containment building indications are on C-13?
- Containment Pressure PIA-1814/1815
- 0 – 5 psig
- Reactor Cavity Temp/Humidity TI-1812 / HI-1812
- 0 – 400°F / 0 – 100%
- S/G Compartment A Temp/Humidity TI-1813 / HI-1813
- 0 – 400°F / 0 – 100%
- S/G Compartment B Temp/Humidity TI-1814 / HI-1814
- 0 – 400°F / 0 – 100%
- Containment Dome Temperature/Humidity TI-1815 / HI-1815
- 0 – 400°F / 0 – 100%
- Containment Building Recorders LPIR-0383 (0382)
- Pressure – PT-1812 (1805A) – RED
- 0 – 200 psia
- Sump Level – LT-0383 (0382) – BLUE
- 585’ 11” – 590’ 6” – BLUE
- Water Level (Bldg Level) – LT-0446A (0446B)
- 590’ 4” – 597’10” – GREEN
- Containment Sump Level LIA-0359
- 0% – 100%
- Pressure – PT-1812 (1805A) – RED
What containment building indications are on C-11?
On the Back of C-11
- Containment Radiation Monitors - RIA‑1805, 1806, 1807, 1808
* 1 x 10-2 to 1 x 104 R/hr - Containment Refueling Radiation Monitors – RIA‑2316/2317
* 1 to 1 x 107 mR/hr
What containment building controls and indications are on remote panels?
none
Tech Spec 3.3.3, Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Instrumentation
In Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4:
LCO 3.3.3 Four CHR and four CHP(Left and Right train (4 each)) bistables and associated instrument channels shall be OPERABLE
Tech Spec 3.3.4, Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Logic and Manual Initiation
In Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4:
LCO 3.3.4 Two ESF Manual Initiation and two ESF Actuation Logic channels and associated bypass removal channels shall be OPERABLE for each ESF Function specified in Table 3.3.4-1
- LCO 3.3.4.A – One or more Functions with one Manual Initiation, Bypass Removal, or Actuation Logic channel inoperable
- Restore channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours
- LCO 3.3.4.C – One or more Functions with two Manual Initiation, or Actuation Logic channels inoperable for CHP or CHR
- Be in MODE 3 within 6 hours
Tech Spec 3.3.6, Refueling Containment High Radiation (CHR) Instrumentation
During CORE ALTERATIONS:
LCO 3.3.6 Two Refueling CHR Automatic Actuation Function channels and two CHR Manual Actuation channels shall be OPERABLE
- LCO 3.3.6.A – One or more Functions with one channel inoperable
- A.1 Place the affected channel in trip within 4 hours
OR
* A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS within 4 hours
AND
* Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assembles within containment * LCO 3.3.6.B – One or more Functions with two channels inoperable * B.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS Immediately
AND
- B.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment Immediately
Tech Spec 3.3.7, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation
During Modes 1, 2 and 3:
LCO 3.3.7 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.7-1 shall be OPERABLE
- LCO 3.3.7.A – One or more Functions with one required channel inoperable
- A.1 Restore required channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days
Requires Containment Floor Water Level (wide range), Containment Pressure (wide range), Containment Isolation Valve Position, and Containment Area Radiation (high range), post accident monitoring instrumentation to be operable.
LCO 3.6.1 Containment Operability
During Modes 1,2,3 and 4:
LCO 3.6.1 Containment shall be OPERABLE
- A.1 Restore containment to OPERABLE status within 1 hour
1. Containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting total leakage from the structure (includes penetrations) - Satisfactory Leakage Rate Test results are a requirement for the establishment of Containment OPERABILITY
1. Isolation devices for Containment penetrations are a part of the Containment Leak Tight Barrier. To maintain this Leak Tight Boundary - All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
- Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Automatic Containment Isolation System; or
- Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LCO 3.6.3.
- Each Airlock is OPERABLE, except as provided in LCO 3.6.2
- The Equipment Hatch is properly closed and sealed.
Tech Spec 3.6.2, Containment Airlocks
During MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4;
Two containment air locks shall be OPERABLE
- NOTES:
- Separate Condition entry is allowed for each lock
- Entry and exit is permissible through a “locked” door to perform repairs on the affected air lock components
- Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, “Containment,” when leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.
≤ than 1 hour TS action
- LCO 3.6.2.A – One or more containment air locks with one containment air lock door inoperable
- A.1 Verify the OPERABLE door is closed in the affected air lock within 1 hour
AND
- A.2 Lock the OPERABLE door closed in the affected air lock within 24 hours
AND
- A.3 Verify the OPERABLE door is locked closed in the affected air lock once per 31 days
- LCO 3.6.2.B – One or more containment air locks with containment air lock interlock mechanism inoperable
- B.1 Verify the OPERABLE door is closed in the affected air lock within 1 hour
AND
- B.2 Lock the OPERABLE door closed in the affected air lock within 24 hours
AND
- B.3 Verify the OPERABLE door is locked closed in the affected air lock once per 31 days
- LCO 3.6.2 C – One or more containment air locks inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B
- C.1 Initiate action to evaluate overall containment leakage rate per LCO 3.6.1 Immediately
AND
- C.2 Verify a door is closed in the affected air lock within 1 hour
AND
- C.3 Restore air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hour
Tech Spec 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves
During Modes 1, 2 3 and 4:
LCO 3.6.3 – Each containment Isolation valve shall be OPERABLE
NOTES:
- Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path
- Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for system(s) made inoperable by containment isolation valves
- Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, “Containment,” when leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria
≤ than 1 hour TS action
LCO 3.6.3 D – One or more purge exhaust or air room supply valves not locked
- D.1 Lock closed the affected valves within 1 hour
Tech Spec 3.6.4, Containment Pressure
During Modes 1,2,3 and 4;
LCO 3.6.4 – Containment pressure shall be ≤ 1.0 psig in MODES 1 and 2 and ≤ 1.5 in MODES 3 and 4
≤ than 1 hour TS action
LCO 3.6.4.A – Containment pressure not within limit
- A.1 Restore containment pressure to within limit within 1 hour
Tech Spec 3.6.5, Containment Average Air Temperature
During Modes 1,2,3 and 4;
LCO 3.6.5 – Containment average air temperature shall be ≤ 140°F
Tech Spec 3.9 - Refueling Operations - Containment Penetrations
During CORE ALTERATIONS
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment
LCO 3.9.3 – (Containment Penetrations) The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:
- The equipment hatch closed and held in place by four bolts
- One door in the personnel air lock closed
- One door in the emergency air lock closed; and
- Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere either:
- Closed by a manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or
- Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Refueling Containment High Radiation Initiation signal
≤ than 1 hour TS action
LCO 3.9.3.A – One or more containment penetrations not in required status
A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS Immediately
AND
A.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment Immediately
