MAO FINAL

Question 1

Economic conditions in which Mao emerged?

Answer 1

Defeat in Opium Wars (1839-1842) and First Sino Japanese War (1894-1895)

• Forced to sign ‘unequal treaties’
• Gave foreign powers control over trade
• Had a ‘Scorched Earth’ policy —> (1938: GMD flooded the Yellow River, causing 32% of land in the 20 affected counties to be flooded/ruined)
• induced hyperinflation (1937-45: prices rose by 600,000%)
• 1946, Chinese industries operated at 20% capacity
• 1830-1850: Unemployment increased by 17% + China lost 68% of their steel from 1821-1856

Question 2

What perspectives are there on the economic conditions that allowed Mao to gain power?

Answer 2

PA: Lynch –> The economic suffering of the peasants made it possible for Mao to “win them over”

PB: Sih –> the Nanjing decade was the “golden decade” in which many economic problems were solved

Question 3

What evidence is used to support Lih’s claim that the Nanjing decade was very succesful?

(Economic factors were not the main reason for the emergence of Mao)

Answer 3

Nanjing Decade (1927-37)

• the GMD government made significant economic reform/advances
• financial institutions (eg. Central Bank of China) AND a new currency based on printed notes were created

→ infrastructure (eg. roads/railways/airports) was developed

• 18,000 km of road in 1927 to over 50,000 km in 1937

Question 4

How did Social Divisions lead to the emergence of Mao?

Answer 4

Strong divide between peasants and landlords

• 10% of the population owned lands and rented it out to 70% of the peasants
• Peasants had to give up 50-80% of their crop as rent
• 1900: **80% **of people lived in poverty
• Landlords could raise or evict peasants without notice
• 47% of government revenue was spent on the military budget
• Up to 90% of children faced malnutrition

-

Question 5

How did the GMD fail and allow Mao to gain power (economically)

Answer 5

R2: GMD mismanaged economy during Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) tho

→ utilized a ‘Scorched Earth’ policy
(1938: NRA flooded the Yellow River, causing 32% of land in the 20 affected counties to be flooded/ruined)

→ after losing key cities the GMD printed money

→ induced hyperinflation (1937-45: prices rose by 600,000%)

→ other economic policies (higher taxes / borrowing from US / nationalization of banks) were very unpopular

Question 6

Perpectives to the attitude that Class Divisions allowed Mao to emerge?

Answer 6

PA: Selden - division between the “landless” and the “elite” was vast (these classes became “polarized”)

PB: Lynch - treatment of CCP similarly “harsh” in many ways they did not reform

Question 7

Evidence for Social Divisions causing the emergence of Mao?

Answer 7

During the Yan’an Period, the CCP enacted many authoritarian policies

→ if ‘liberated’ villages refused to
agree to the CCP’s demands, all their crops/livestock were confiscated and harsh taxes were forced upon them

→ ‘revolutionary committees’ were also supposed methods of giving political representation to peasants

BUT

they had no real power (each committee had a CCP member who could veto decisions they disagreed with).

Question 8

What impact did Foreign Influence have on the emergence of Mao?

Answer 8

Second Sino-Japanese War (1937)

• GMD failed to prevent human atrocities being commited (300,000 killed)
• GMD used a ‘scortched Earth’ policy –> Destroy anything useful to the Japanese

–> (1938: NRA flooding the Yellow River) –> Lead to 500K deaths

• behaviour of the GMD towards the people was horrible -
• 1937, GMD troops under the command of General Zhang Zizhong executed 800 civilians in retaliation for an attack by Japanese troops,
• CCP popularity was greatly strengthened by the Second Sino-Japanese War
• → CCP was able to expand into northern areas which the GMD could not defend
• (1945: CCP controlled land occupied by 90 million ppl)
• → the CCP carried out land + education reforms in the territory they took over (winning them popular support)

→ CCP troops strictly adhered to the ‘Eight Rules of Conduct’ (in contrast to the behavior of the GMD troops).

Question 9

Perspectives to the idea that Foreign influences allowed Mao to gain power?

Answer 9

PA: Fairbank → without the Second Sino-Japanese War, the GMD would have likely remained in power

PB: Lynch → GMD failures and CCP successes in the CCW were more significant in the rise to power of Mao.

Question 10

Evidence in support of Fairbank’s claim that foreign influence was important to the rise to the power of emergence of Mao?

Answer 10

GMD strength was further weakened by their actions prior to and during the Chinese Civil War (1946-49)

→ despite calls from Chinese students and the US to form a coalition government, GMD opted instead for war

→ GMD army was larger + better equipped BUT mainly made up of conscripts with poor training and morale
(desertion rates were up to 70% per year) → military leaders were chosen based on loyalty rather than ability

Question 11

GMD failures and CCP successes were more important to the rise of Mao because?

Answer 11

CCP strength/popularity improved during the Chinese Civil War
→ Mao reorganized the communist forces
into the ‘People’s Liberation Army’ and placed it under unified command

→ despite having ¼ of the troops of
the GMD forces, the PLA was very successful (mainly due to high troop morale + strong military leadership)

→
CCP popularity increased (1945-48: membership 1,200,000 to 3,000,000) due to land reform + discipline.

Question 12

How did the Weaknesses of the GMD lead to the emergence of MAO?

Answer 12

the Xinhai Revolution (1911) led by Sun Yat Sen succeeded in ending the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911)
→ the Republic of China was created in its place

→ this had a National Assembly and a President (Sun Yat Sen)

→ pressure from military led to Yuan Shikai taking his spot as President

→ Yuan undermined the government
by declaring himself emperor tho (1915)

→ Yuan soon abdicated and died (first attempt at government failed).

E2: the subsequent period known as the Warlord Era (1916-28) was characterized by regional warlordism

→ these warlords exploited the peasants in their region by extracting high taxes and imposing their own laws

→ during this time there was no centralized political
system

→ this period ended with the Northern Expedition

→ the GMD then established a centralized government based in Nanjing (next decade was relatively stable).

Question 13

Perspectives on the idea that Political instability caused the emergence of Mao?

Answer 13

PA: Roy → under GMD rule, China was at least nominally unified and strong central authority did exist.

PB: Fenby → “in reality, the [nationalist] government was a lot weaker than it appeared” during this decade

Question 14

Was there relative political stability in the GMD (YES?)

Answer 14

he Nanjing Decade (1928-37) did bring relative political stability (especially compared to Warlord Era)

→
BUT many provinces were still ruled by warlords

AND the GMD became increasingly self-interested + corrupt

AND government lacked popular support (1927: GMD purged members interested in social + political reform)

AND they turned against their promise of establishing parliamentary democracy

→ political system still weak.

Question 15

How did Mao use Ideology to establish his authoritarian state?

Answer 15

Ideology captured support

• Initally followed Marxism-Leninism
• Mao did not fully follow this but used it in specific situations
• Argued that peasants would lead the industrial revolution (80%) not industrial workers (4%)
• Argued for ‘two stage revolution’ –> first stage would tolerate necessary elements of the bourgeoisie
• incorporated nationalism (‘On New Democracy’ (1940) defined the Chinese revolution as a national one).

Question 16

Perspectives as to whether ideology helped Mao to establish power?

Answer 16

PA: Moise → Mao’s ideology was vital as it was adapted to China’s situation and attracted popular support.

PB: Fenby → Mao’s ideology was a facade and he merely “pretended” that policy was determined by the ppl.

Question 17

Evidence to suggest that Mao did not really act in line with his ideology (in reference to the idea that Mao used ideology to emerge to power)?

Answer 17

During the Yan’an Period, the CCP enacted many authoritarian policies

→ if ‘liberated’ villages refused to
agree to the CCP’s demands, all their crops/livestock were confiscated and harsh taxes were forced upon them

→ ‘revolutionary committees’ were also supposed methods of giving political representation to peasants

BUT

they had no real power (each committee had a CCP member who could veto decisions they disagreed with).

Question 18

Evidence towards the claim that Mao’s actions were in line with his ideology?

Answer 18

most policies undertaken by Mao aligned with his ideology

→ local peasant associations were created and
regularly consulted by CCP leaders

→ land reform policies (ie. seizure of land and reallocation to peasants)

→ provision of peasant literacy and health programmes

→ the application of CCP ideology through these policies
(+ nationalism during S-J War) won the CCP support (1937-45: membership rose from 40,000 to 1,000,000).

Question 19

How did Mao use propoganda to come to power?

Answer 19

: 1934: CCP forced to abandon their base in Jiangxi and set out for Yan’an → ‘Long March’ (13,000 km long)

→ despite the loss of life (only 5,000 of the original 90,000 marchers survived) it was a propaganda success

→ Mao: “the LM has sown many seeds in eleven provinces, which will sprout… and yield a crop in the future”

→ became the subject of propaganda (dramatized version used as proof of the resilience/strength of the CCP).

Red Army was also used as a form of indirect propaganda → Mao instructed Red Army soldiers to spread
communist ideology in the villages they liberated

→ the behavior of Red Army soldiers was also regulated

→‘Six Principles of the Red Army’ included rules such as “pay for all things broken, even if only a chopstick”

→previous imperial/warlord armies had mistreated civilians (Red Army conduct thus improved image of CCP).

Question 20

Perspectives to the idea that it was Propoganda that allowed Mao to come to power?

Answer 20

PA: Lynch → Long March / Red Army served as indirect propaganda (promoted the spread of communism).

PB: Selden → it was the ability of the CCP to respond to problems facing peasants that won them support.

Question 21

Evidence towards the claim that Propoganda was very helpful in helping Mao to come to power?

Answer 21

: Mao won support from policies that were popular with peasants (who made up the majority of population)

→ land reform (ie. seizure of land + reallocation to peasants)
→ provision of basic medical services in hospitals

→ provision of education targeted towards basic literacy

→ abolition of usury (exorbitant interest on loans)

→ these policies directly improved the lives of peasants (therefore less need for persuasion through propaganda).

Question 22

Evidence towards the claim that Propoganda did not help Mao to establish power?

Answer 22

Mao nonetheless used direct propaganda to an extent

→ Mao wrote the book ‘On New Democracy’ (1940)
to define his ideology and characterize the revolution as a national one (thus gaining a wider support base)

→ Liu Shaoqi wrote the book ‘How to be a Good Communist’ (1939) to promote the adoption of communist ideas

→ posters were used to celebrate CCP successes (eg. LM) and build opposition against the GMD and Japan.

Question 23

How did Mao as a leader help establish power?

Answer 23

E1: Mao was an early member of the CCP (joined in 1921 when it only had 50 members) → organized rallies
and activist groups in his home province of Hunan → 1924: elected to Central Committee of the CCP and GMD

→ 1926: made political organizer of the Central Committee

→ 1943: elected Chairman of Central Committee

→ Mao increasingly became seen as the figurehead of the movement (portrayed in propaganda as the leader).
E2: Mao himself was responsible for the ideological success of the CCP

→ Mao defied orthodox communists
by forming his own ideology based on China’s unique situation (eg. peasants instead of industrial workers)

→ Mao was also responsible for the military success of
the CCP

→ against advice from military advisors he chose
the northern route for the LM + pressed on with three campaigns in 1948-49 (all of which were successful).

Question 24

Perspectives towards the claim that Mao was the reason for he came to power?

Answer 24

PA: Lynch → “it is difficult to see how the Chinese Communists… could have survived [without Mao]”.

PB: Chang/Halliday → Mao had no genuine sympathy for peasants and failed to work alongside them.

Question 25

Evidence towards the claim that Mao was not the main reason that Mao came to power?

Answer 25

R1: it has been suggested that the impact of Mao’s leadership has been exaggerated
→ there is evidence that Mao was not the initial leader of the Long March and that he was not even selected to take part in it at first

→ Mao also claimed that his policies would be “imposed from below” (in alignment with the will of the people)
BUT then undermined this by only awarding the ‘revolutionary committees’ nominal power (could be vetoed).

R2: leaders other than Mao were also vital

→ Zhu De + Lin Biao (credited for the success of guerilla warfare
during the Second Sino-Japanese War)

→ Liu Shaoqi (focused on party organization and theoretical affairs)

→ Peng Dehuai (defended the Jiangxi Soviet AND helped Mao defeat internal opposition at Zunyi Conference)

→ Mao’s leadership was also challenged by Wang Ming and Li Lisan (neither gained enough support though).

Question 26

How did Mao use force to come to power?

Answer 26

Mao supported the use of violence to achieve the revolution (“all power grows out of the barrel of a gun”)

→ whilst Mao was popular among peasants, he ultimately rose to power due to victory in the CCW (1946-49)

→ consecutive successful campaigns from 1947 onwards and military tactics of Lin Biao ensured CCP victory
(1947-49: GMD achieved no major victories)

→ 6,000,000 combatant deaths (majority were GMD troops).

E2: Mao also used force against internal opposition →

1930: Mao ordered the torture/interrogation/execution
of 4,000 Red Army soliders who he believed supported his political rivals within the CCP (‘Futian Incident)

→ the ‘Rectification Campaigns’ (1942) encouraged CCP members to confess to crimes that went against Mao
(such individuals were then stripped of possessions/posts or executed; 10,000 deaths from these campaigns).

Question 27

Perspectives to the attitude that force was the main way that Mao come to power?

Answer 27

PA: Lynch → “Mao unashamedly condoned the use of terror” in achieving his revolution (he depended on it).

PB: Fitzgerald → the CCP won popular support through honest government, policies and discipline, not force.

Question 28

Evidence towards the claim that Mao did not just use violence tp estan;osj [pwer

Answer 28

: Mao did win the support of the peasant class through his attractive social, political and economic reforms
→ land reform (ie. seizure of land + reallocation to peasants)

→ provision of basic medical services in hospitals

→ provision of education targeted towards basic literacy

→ abolition of usury (exorbitant interest on loans)

→these policies directly improved the lives of peasants (therefore less need for coercion through violent means)

Question 29

Evidence towards the claim that Mao undeniably used violence alone to establish power?

Answer 29

Mao’s policies still necessitated the use of force (ie. land was confiscated from landlords though violence)

→ Mao also used terror against peasants/villages if they did not conform to his demands after being ‘liberated’
(all their crops/livestock were confiscated + harsh taxes were forced upon them)

→ the popularity Mao earned
also does not change the fact that he came to power via military victory (NOT a peaceful/electoral pathway).

Question 30

How did Mao maintain power legally?

Answer 30

Made it seem as if there was a democracy

Sep 1949: Chinese people’s political consultative conference –> created the ‘common programme’

–> allowed 8 parties to function

–> Democratic centralism

–> some democratic elements but allegaince to the CCP was mandatory

Sep 1954 –> replaced the common programme with 1954 constitution

established the
‘National People’s Congress’ (1200-3000 members) as the highest organ of legislature

→ ‘below’ NPC was
Central Committee (100-200 members), then Politburo (20 members), then Standing Committee (5 members)

→ in reality though the hierarchy was reversed (the NPC merely ‘rubber-stamped’ decisions of the Politburo).

Question 31

Perspectives on the idea that Legal methods were used to maintain power?

Answer 31

PA: Lynch → legal frameworks created an illusion of democracy whilst ensuring real power lay with Mao.

PB: Dikotter → Mao consolidated his power primarily through “terror and violence” rather than legal methods.

Question 32

Criticisms to the idea that Mao maintained power legally?

Answer 32

R1: Mao consistently used terror (ie. non-legal means) to eliminate threats to his power throughout his regime

→ Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries (1950-53) involved over 2,000,000 executions (mainly GMD)

→ ‘laogai’ system was cruel + vast (1949-76: over 10,000 ‘laogai’ built; over 10 million imprisoned each year)

→ line between terror and legal methods was blurry (eg. the court system was unfair/severe in its sentencing).
R2: other legal methods were used to instill control over the people

→ all belonged to a danwei (work unit)

Question 33

Counters to maintain the claim that the legal system allowed Mao to maintain power?

Answer 33

R2: other legal methods were used to instill control over the people

→ all belonged to a danwei (work unit)
which gave the CCP control over the personal lives of individuals (eg. granted permission to work or marry)

→ anyone wanting to migrate to a different region needed a certificate from the hukou (household registration)

→ a dangan (record) containing private information was compiled for all people (contents withheld from them).

Question 34

How did Mao use force to maintain power?

Answer 34

Used force to kill the opps within the CCP

Three anti campaigns (1951) –> 5% of the party officials being purged

Politicans he ‘opped –> (1954: Gao Gang + Rao Shushi; 1959: Peng Dehuai; 1966: Deng Xiaoping + Liu Shaoqi)

Campaign against external threats:

• 1 million landlords killed 1950s
• 2 million executions to counter GMD revolutionaries (1950-53)
• Laogai (10k built and 10 million being imprisoned each year)
  (1949 - 1976)

Question 35

Perspectives on the idea that Mao used force to maintain power?

Answer 35

PA: Dikotter → “terror/violence were the foundations of the regime… [and] became routine tool[s] of control.”

PB: Todd/Waller → Mao never used a “highly centralised security apparatus” (like that used in Nazi Germany).

Question 36

Criticisms against the idea that force was needed to maintain power?

Answer 36

• much of the terror comitted by normal ‘citizens’
• the reliance on force was also reduced somewhat by the
• Popularity of Mao → social policies had success
  (1949-76: literacy rates rose from 15% to 70% AND life expectancy rose from 40 to 62)

→ communism itself was popular due to its ‘mass line’ principle

Mao also used non-violent punishments (1951: 6,500 intellectuals were forced to take courses on ideology)

→ Hundred Flowers Campaign (1957) involved an attempt at tolerating opposition (this was abandoned tho).

Question 37

How did Mao use charismatic leadership to maintain power?

Answer 37

• CCP built a “cult like personality”
• All households had to have a picture of Mao
• “Little Red Book” (1964-8) –> 750 million copies sold
• Posters used to glorify him

Question 38

Perspectives to the idea that charsimatic leadership allowed Mao to maintain power?

Answer 38

PA: Fenby → Mao’s “immense cult of personality” gave him complete control over the Chinese population.

PB: Spence → Mao’s talents were “unexceptional” and he was often “divorced from any true reality check”.

Question 39

Criticisms to the idea that it was Mao as a leader that helped him to maintain power?

Answer 39

the ‘Great Leap Forward’ (1958-62) was initiated by Mao to stimulate industrialisation + collectivisation

→ it was a total failure and resulted in a famine that killed 20-50 million people

→ Mao’s response was to resign
and allow Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping to deal with the crisis

→ the immense criticism Mao received during
the Hundred Flowers Campaign (1957) proves he did not have full popular support even prior to this disaster

Question 40

Counters to the idea that Mao actually maintained power by being a good leader?

Answer 40

relentless propaganda (eg. the loudspeaker system reached into almost every village in rural China) AND
insistence on ‘Maoism’ always being correct meant that even after the failed GLF, Mao received little criticism

→ Mao successfully seized power again AND ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ was written into the constitution in 1969

→ foreign observers noted that the population experienced genuine grief after his death (showing popularity).