Evaluate the reasons for the emergence of Mao and Hitler Flashcards
Introduction:
Argument: The use of terror and coercion was the most dominant method in both states because it led to the removal of opponents.
Propoganda
Selden and O’Shaughnessy –> Prop shaped public perception allowing them to cultivate popular support.
O’Shaughnessy –> Hitler’s propaganda to shape public opinion was integral to his rise to power
- Joseph Goebbels’s manipulation of media including the daily newspaper ‘People’s Observer’ from 1923
- The 1932 ‘Hitler over Germany’ campaign won him popular support allowing him to come to power.
- Selden - Mao’s ‘The Long March’ indirect propaganda –> promoted the spread of communism with Mao himself
–> Mao: march saw him ‘sow many seeds in eleven provinces, which will sprout and yield a crop in the future’.
–> The Red Army –> ‘Six Principles of the Red Army’
- Included rules such as “pay for all things broken, even a chopstick”, winning over peasant support.
- BOTH - significant evidence that the dissemination of propaganda saw the parties gain popular support, shaping the basis for their emergence to power.
Perspectives of Propoganda?
However, this view is limited as Mao rather won support through policies with the literacy rate in China in the 1930s less than 20%.
These included land reform, the provision of education, and the abolition of usury at the Ya’nan Soviet, thus improving the peasant’s lives.
Similarly, Noakes argues that the German propaganda machine was weak with only 240,000 copies of Mein Kampf sold from 1925-32 and only 8,000 copies of the People’s observer in circulation in 1923.
Nonetheless, the 1932 ‘Hitler over Germany’ campaign saw Hitler’s vote rise from 18.2% in the September 1930 elections to 37.3% in July 1932.
Thus, while propaganda was limited in China, it allowed Hitler to capitalise on the failings of the Weimar government and garner the popular support required for the emergence of his new state.
Ideology
Moise and Holborn instead argue that it was the appealing ideology of the parties that shaped the rise to power.
Moise cites that Mao’s ideology was vital as it was adapted to China’s situation and attracted popular support. Mao didn’t adopt Marxist-Leninism but rather applied its principals to China’s specific situation where he argued that the peasantry (80%) would lead the revolution as opposed to the proletariat (4%). This would attract popular support from the peasantry who saw themselves as part of a nationwide revolution.
Similarly, Holborn notes that Hitler’s ideology appealed to the public with extremist anti-Communism, racialism, anti-Semitism and even the early adoption of socialist ideas such as the nationalisation of businesses and the abolition of unearned income appealing to a widespread support base.
Thus, whilst both ideologies vastly differed from one another, they successfully appealed to the general population at the time, thus allowing the regimes to gain popular support and establish their state.
Perspectives Ideology
Nazism was inconsistent, with socialist ideas in the ’25 point-programme’ abandoned and Kershaw arguing that Mein Kampf was ‘incoherent’.
Thus, it was rather propaganda that was integral as it shaped this ideology and promoted the cult of personality of Hitler. Nuremberg Rallies in 1923/25/27 and Goebbels’s campaign in 1932 saw the widespread dissemination of ideals.
Mao also was inconsistent and even enacted authoritarian policies during the Ya’nan period; if ‘liberated villages’ would refuse to his demands, he would burn their crops and harsh taxes were imposed. Similarly, he would adopt a ‘two-stage revolution’ where he would tolerate elements of the bourgeoisie.
Nonetheless, it was such flexibility that allowed both leaders to capitalise and gain popular support. However, we must consider that it was propaganda that propagated this ideology and thus was to a greater extent more significant.
Force and Terror
Lynch and Hite argue, albeit with differing effect, that the use of force was crucial to the establishment of the Third Reich and the CCP.
Hite argues that the use of force “played a major role” in Hitler’s success; in 1921, he founded the Sturmabteilung (SA) to protect Nazi speakers/members whilst disrupt opponents and in turn this provided indirect propaganda, showing the Nazis could offer discipline. Similarly, the 1923 Munich Putsch saw Hitler attempt to take control of Germany via a violent uprising supported by General Ludendorff and 2,000 Nazis. Although it failed and Hitler was jailed, his trial received widespread publicity, allowing him to spread his ideology.
The utility of force and terror was echoed by Lynch who notes that whilst Mao was popular among the peasants, he ultimately rose to power during the Chinese Civil War from 1946-49 where pushed the GMD led by Chiang Kai-Shek to Taiwan.
Thus, terror was significant in different respects: in China it was crucial, more so than propaganda or ideology, as the war saw the incumbent government defeated and thus, allowed Mao to rise to power. In contrast, a failed coup gave Hitler widespread publicity that contributed to the gain in popular support.
Perspectives Terror
However, it is clear it was to a greater extent in China.
In Germany, Hitler was forced to use the electoral vote system to come to power after the failure of the Beer-Hall Putsch noting that “if out-voting them takes longer than out-shooting them, at least the results are guaranteed by their own constitution”. As such, it was rather propaganda and ideology that was far more important.
In contrast, Mao “unashamedly condoned the use of terror” and even used it to consolidate power within his own party; in the Futan incident in 1930, 4,000 Red soldiers thought to be political rivals were killed. As such, terror and force were instrumental for the removal of political opponents both internally and in the GMD.
Therefore, while the use of force was crucial for Mao, it was limited for Hitler.
