M's foreign policy Flashcards
1
Q
Why was M still angry at Britain and France despite the fact that he maintained a reasonably good relationship with them?
A
Because he was still mindful of the mutilated victory
2
Q
What did he want to do to Italy’s international status?
A
At least the level of Britain and France
3
Q
Why did M think that Italy was in line to replace Britain and France in terms of international dominance?
A
He thought that these countries were decadent and that the future lay with more virile nations such as fascist Italy
4
Q
Why do some historians see the aggresive, adventurous foreign policy as a distraction?
A
They think that M thought that it would distract from economic issues and domestic policy failures at home
5
Q
How had Italy had its international reputation damaged following WWI?
A
Due to its failures
6
Q
Give an example of one of these failures
A
Caporetto (1917)
7
Q
How did Italy redeem herself following Caporetto?
A
At the Battle of Vittorio Veneto in 1918
8
Q
How did the British and French view their Italian allies during WWI?
A
As a liability
9
Q
Give a quote from M where he talks about how war can be a force for improving ones character
A
He said it brings the stamp of nobility upon those who have the courage to wage it
10
Q
How did Italians still feel towards the post war treaties?
A
Bitter
11
Q
What did M know would happen if he could bring about a revision of these treaties?
A
It would increase his prestige both domestically and abroad
12
Q
The status of which two places in particular needed to be settled in Italy’s favour?
A
Fiume and the Dodecanese Islands
13
Q
What did M consider the Med to be?
A
Mare Nostrum, meaning ‘our sea’
14
Q
What was M determined to do within the Med?
A
Achieve Italian dominance
15
Q
Why would this be difficult?
A
Because both France and Britain had interests there
16
Q
Explain France’s influence in the Med
A
France controlled the island of Corsica and the North African Coastline stretching across Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco
17
Q
What two strategic points of entry into the Med did Britain control?
A
The Suez Canal and Gibraltar
18
Q
Why would M need to proceed carefully in the Med?
A
Because both Britain and France were among the world’s greatest naval powers
19
Q
The prospect of annexing which country was still tempting to M?
A
Albania - a country that was formerly party of the Ottoman Empire and that was still Islamic by religion and culture
20
Q
Describe the geopolitical status of Albania from 1921
A
After a lengthy dispute between Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia, a regency council was appointed to rule over the country. Albania became a republic under the leadership of King Zog in 1925. The country was already economically dependent on Italy with its bank in Rome
21
Q
Why was M keen to gain control of Albania?
A
So that he could use it as a stepping stone to extend Italian influence in the Balkans
22
Q
Who was his main adversary in the region?
A
Greece
23
Q
What did Britain and France both possess that M was especially jealous of?
A
Great colonial empires
24
Q
What did he do as a result?
A
Sought to create an Italian overseas empire by conquest
25
What territories in Africa did Italy already possess?
Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland - but these in no way matched that of the other two powers
26
What was the main opportunity for extension in Africa still left?
Abyssinia, where Italy had already been embarrassed in 1896
27
Why did M's foreign policy successes reflect on himself and his regime?
Whatever successes he had here would reflect on the quality of his leadership and serve as example of the achievements of fascism, which would help popularise fascism abroad
28
When was a rival fascist regime set up in Europe?
1933
29
Why was M concerned about Hitler’s territorial ambitions?
Because they may have had an impact on Italy
30
Why would increasing the size of the army and equipping them with modern weapons prove difficult
Because this would prove expensive and a further drain on their already limited resources
31
Why had the success of the battle for grain not been in enough in terms of achieving autarky?
Because Italy remained woefully short and far from self sufficient in the production of war materials like oil, steel and explosives
32
Why was Italy limited in terms of manpower?
Because the Battle for Births was in its earlier stages and was bound for failure
33
Why was M's aim that Italy become amongst the major powers and an influential voice in international affairs unrealistic?
Because it did not have the economic or military means to achieve this
34
Why was Italy free to follow her foreign policy ambitions during the 1920s?
Because there was no immediate threat from other powers
35
How did M act as a peacemaker in 1923?
When Britain was opposed to French occupation of the Ruhr, M tried to act as a mediator between the two countries
36
How did this earn the distrust of both Britain and France?
Because they both realised that M was trying to play them off against one another
37
What would Italy need the support or in order to pursue this ambitious foreign policy?
reliable allies
38
What did M do in pursuit of this?
Launched himself into alliances, signing treaties with many European countries
39
Which countries did he form alliances with in 1923?
- Poland
- Czechoslovakia
- Austria
40
Which countries did he form alliances with in 1924?
- USSR
- Switzerland
41
Which countries did he form alliances with in 1925?
- Hungary
- Spain
- Albania
- Greece
42
Why were these treaties and alliances not that important?
They were largely commercial and of little political importance since M's was prepared to quickly prepared to swap allegiances if it was in Italy's interest
43
What did British Ambassador in Rome Sir Ronald Graham say to illustrate how fickle M was in terms of foreign policy?
That M was always prepared to 'offer Italian friendship to the highest bidder'
44
Why did M's ambitions for Italy to become a major player in international affairs not matter?
Because he failed to achieve this
45
How was M's aggresive foreign policy received at home?
It was widely supported
46
Give some example of groups that supported M's foreign policy?
- War veterans
- Those who had enthused over D'Annunzio's capture of Fiume
- Nationalists
- Former members of the squadristi looking for further opportunities to engage in violence and conquest
47
What does Martin Blinkhorn say about the combination of these groups
That the resultant cocktail was a dangerous and intoxicating one, especially when composed by someone as vain and violent as M
48
Why did M have to tread carefully in terms of his foreign policy?
He had to appear to be a respectable statesman so he could achieve his aims through diplomacy
49
Why can M be seen as unprepared to deal with foreign policy upon coming to power?
Because he did not have any clear foreign policy
50
How had M's ideas around foreign policy changed since his youth?
It was clear that he had renounced his old anti-war and anti-imperialist ideas, but it was not clear what views he had developed to replace these ideas
51
What was his attitude towards WWI?
He loudly supported intervention
52
What was his attitude towards the WWI peace settlement?
He condemned it and coined the term 'mutilated victory' but it was unclear what revisions to the peace treaties he would seek
53
What general foreign policy aim did he develop in his first few months in office?
In his words 'to make Italy great, respected and feared'
54
What did he think Italy needed to do to achieve this great power status?
Via miltary build up, diplomatic intrigue and, if necessary, war samosa
55
What was M's ambition for Italian international power?
That Italy would one day be the dominant power in the med, would develop and expand its colonial empire in Africa and would have the balkans as its own sphere of influence, with M as the architect of all this
56
What did he hope this process would transform Italians into?
A more energetic and aggresive people
57
What was the problem with M's foreign policy plans during the 1920s?
They lacked detail
58
Explain how they lacked detail?
He was not sure which colonies he would expand, he was not sure how he would achieve this dominance in the med or how much power he desired in the Balkans
59
Where can we see consistency with M's foreign policy over time?
Because his objectives remained the same, even if the situation forced him to adopt to a variety of tactics to achieve these objectives
60
Describe how M wanted to act unilaterally in terms of foreign policy
He wanted to conduct it himself, circumventing the foreign office, reaping international prestige and internal support. Foreign policy would come to take up more and more of his time as the years went on
61
Why was M wrong to convince himself that he was ushering in a new era of foreign policy?
The desire for great power status, high military expenditure and colonial adventures had been a liberal ambition too
62
How did M exceed the liberals in trying to achieve this ambition?
He pursued these goals more relentlessly and recklessly, particularly in the 1930s
63
Why was this so negative for M?
Because he squandered vast sums on colonial projects and led Italy into a disastrous war, which resulted in the collapse of fascism, civil war and the death of M himself
64
What did M think was necessary to create a nation?
Bloodshed
65
What was the language and rhetoric of fascism all about?
Struggle and the virtues of war and the warrior
66
Why did M see violence as more than just a necessary evil?
It was a creative force unlocking rebirth. It was to be welcomed and embraced
67
What did M say in support of war in 'Doctrine of Fascism' (1932)?
He said that it was the 'true test of manhood and nationhood'
68
What did M say to a group of senior naval officers in 1926 in support of the idea that Italy needed to take control of the med?
A nation that has no access to the sea cannot be called a free nation, a nation that has no access to the oceans cannot be called a great power, Italy must become a great power
69
What does RJB Bosworth say about M's unilateral approach to foreign policy in 'Mussolini' (2002)
That from the beginning of his career M had directed his ambition to be considered a 'great man' by advertising his expertise in international affairs. For most of his regime he had direct control over the ministry of foreign affairs. He also had control of the ministries associated with the armed forces
70
What title does Bosworth say M took up in the 1930s that reflects his focus on foreign policy?
'First Marshal of the Empire'
71
What does McGregor Knox say about the motivations behind M's foreign policy in 'Hitler's Italian allies' (2000)?
That like Hitler, M saw himself as a man of destiny whose job it was to make Italy a great power internationally
72
How did the merger between the PNF and the nationalists in 1923 impact foreign policy?
It involved the acquisition of alot of the nationalist parties aims. Part of the merger agreement involved M adopting a more aggresive foreign policy, supported by a strong armed forces
73
How did M's radical approach to foreign policy build up over time?
When he came to power, his attitude to foreign policy was not grandiose or aggresive. He announced that he did not want an ideological foreign policy and that he was more concerned with protecting Italy's interests than being adventurous. The idea of the mutilated victory and majorly extending Italian influence became a theme only gradually
74
What does DMS suggest motivated M's foreign policy?
M wanting to create a modern Roman Empire by extending Italy's colonial territories in East Africa
75
Why was it natural that M turned his attention to Abyssinia?
It was next to the Italian colonies already in existing and there had been a long standing dispute over where the border lay between the two. M believed that it was within Italy's sphere of influence and wanted to avenge the humiliation in 1896
76
Why did M also want to acquire Sudan?
So he could unite all his African territories into one geographical unit
77
Which nation did Italy come into conflict with due to M's desire to take back control of the med?
Britain
78
Why was the navy one of M's greatest successes?
He managed to expand and modernise it
79
How did this improved navy allow Italy to frustrate Britain?
They captured Malta, a British naval base, which destabilised British influence in Egypt. The invasions of Greece and Egypt in the 1940s were also part of this strategy
80
What did M naively ask Hitler to do to support his ambitions in the med?
To abandon his ambitions with the USSR to help Italy in the med
81
What does RJB Bosworth say about how Italy's foreign policy was perhaps outdated?
He says that Italy behaved as if it was a 19th century power, replicating the grab for Africa indulged by the great powers at this time
82
Why did Italy no longer have powerful enemies in the north come 1922?
Due to its friendship with France and the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
83
Why did Italy have to make sure to stay on the right side of Britain and France?
Because any change to the status quo in Europe had to have their consent
84
How did the Italian economy compare to that of Britain, France and the USA?
It was tiny by comparison, still essentially a rural and peasant society. Italy lacked the industrial muscle to be a great power
85
Give a statistic to illustrate how Italy had failed to become economically self sufficient by the time they entered WWII
The US Ford Motor Company produced more armaments that the entirety of Italy
86
How was Italy penned in by Britain and France?
Britain had surrounding naval bases in Malta, Cyprus, Gib and Alexandria. France held Corsica and Tunisia, both of which Italy wanted
87
What was the only way Italy could really challenge this French and British dominance?
By splitting them or finding a powerful ally against one or both of them
88
What was the only country that fitted this mould?
Eventually Germany, although they were initially too weak following WWI
89
How did the army and King at home constrain M's ability to engage in reckless foreign policy?
Because they were opposed to risky endeavours, and at this point M lacked his grasp on the Italian public to overrule these two institutions. The KIng could dismiss him, and the blackshirts could not stand up to the army
90
What happened to an Italian general and his team while they were out mapping the Albanian-Greek border?
They were shot by Greek assassins
91
Describe M's over the top response
Italy seized the Greek island of Corfu after shelling it and killing several civilians. This resulted in a major international crisis which had to be resolved by an ambassadors conference brokered by Britain, as M refused to negotiate with the League of Nations. Italy eventually withdrew from Corfu after receiving compensation of 50 million lire
92
What does this episode show about Italy's power?
That while they may have been able to bully smaller powers, they could not stand up to the great powers
93
What did this episode make M realise about Britain?
The importance of maintaining good relations with Britain
94
Why would it be relatively easy to maintain good relations with Britain at this time?
Because Austen Chamberlain, Britain's foreign secretary for much of the 1920s, was an admirer of Italian Fascism
95
How did the incident enhance M's image?
It was a propaganda victory at an important time
96
Since what year had Albania been independent of Turkey?
1912
97
What did the League of Nations do regarding Albania in 1921?
Enstrusted Italy with the guardianship of the country's independence
98
Which country did Albania have border disputes with?
Greece
99
What does DMS say about the incident was useful for propaganda purposes?
That this first instance of violence on an international stage won him a reputation for courage and patriotism
100
Describe the civilian casualties caused by the shelling
Some shells landed on an orphanage and refugee camp
101
Describe the divide in international opinion following M's seizure of Corfu
Many foreign powers were critical of M's 'gunboat diplomacy', seeing it as impulsive and ill advised. There was support for Italy in the French and British press. The Observer applauded M's virile direction of his country's affairs
102
How did M justify his actions to British reporters?
By saying that Britain would have done the same if it had been British officers that had been killed
103
Why was the fact that this was the first major crisis M had faced put him under lots of pressure?
Because if he failed to get his way, it would reflect badly on the regime and public opinion might turn against him. This might lead to political instability and the return of communism
104
What did a British diplomat say in support of this idea?
'The whole fascist fabric might collapse like a pack of cards'
105
Why were M' foreign policy aims not as grand and far reaching as they first seemed?
Most of them were not totally new
106
Why was his ability to shape foreign policy limited upon becoming PM?
Because he was reliant on the foreign office he inherited
107
Why was this not an issue?
They shared his belief in Italy's right to gain territory and spheres on influence in the Eastern Med and Africa. M's style might be different, but the substance would be along familiar lines
108
What happened as M became less restrained?
He developed a more assertive foreign policy
109
What was did he think about the future of world politics?
He thought that the future lay with young virile nations like Italy and Germany rather than the old decadent ones like Britain and France
110
What did he do from the 1930s?
Took advantage of what he saw as good opportunities to finally establish Italy as a major power
111
List the 7 main influence on foreign policy
- Italy's goegraphical position
- Foreign policy traditions
- Fascist ideology
- Financial links to the USA
- Limited economic resources
- The Versailles settlement
- The international context (the power and policies of other nations)
112
What did Sir Ronald Graham, British ambassador in Rome, report back in Jan 1923?
Said that M's position was troubled and so striking a foreign policy success was important to him, especially as he is having trouble with some of his own followers. His foreign policy was be opportunistic and Italian friendship will be on offer to the highest bidder. His impression was that they would prefer to work with GB, but at a price
113
What did he report back in June 1923?
Reminded the gov that Italian foreign policy was based upon principles different to their own. Frankly opportunistic and egotistic. M has proclaimed and emphasised that his FP will be in the sole interests of Italy and one of 'nothing for nothing'
114
How did the global power dynamic shift from the 1920s to the 1930s?
- In ther 1920s Germany was potentially powerful but was hemmed in by the ToV. The USSR had been involved in civil war and was trying to recover. This left Britain and France unchallenged
- By the 1930s Britain was weaker because it was overstetched and France was politically weak, with unstable govs and political divisions. Germany had been rearming and was led by a determined nationalist who aimed to reassert German might. Italian rhetoric showed that it was a great power but reality proved otherwise. Britain and France were becoming more concerned about the growing might of the USSR, and of the threat to their empires in the East from militaristic Japan
115
Explain Italy's 'makeweight policy'
Italy was trying to establish itself as a great power. Limited economic and military resources made this difficult. Many statesmen therefore realised the best way to make territorial gains was to exploit the rivalry of major powers and offer their alliances. Italy could offer to join one side in return for concessions. This required a rough balance between rival blocks in which Italy's intervention could be a determining factor. This policy was classically favoured by Grandi, M's most able diplomat
116
What is often regarded as the key turning point of his foreign policy?
The 1935 Abyssinian campaign
117
How can foreign policy events between 1922-35 be seen?
Most of the events can be seen as relatively minor affairs, which were spun as great successes by propaganda. They helped consolidate M's position and create an image, more, myth than reality, of Italy as a rising power
118
Describe how M forced compensation payments from Greece in 1923 over Corfu
Italian official killed while trying to resolve a Greek-Albanian border dispute. M demanded that Greece apologise and pay 50 million lire. Italy invaded Greek Corfu despite the fact that Greece was conciliatory. The League of Nations condemned Italy and demanded withdrawal. Britain threatened naval action and M withdrew after receiving the 50 million lire. Italian propaganda spun it as a great success
119
Explain how M gained Fiume in 1924
Sent an Italian military commander to rule there. Yugoslavia agreed to give it to Italy in Jan 1924. Portrayed as a great propaganda success despite the fact that the port was declining in economic importance as Yugoslavia developed a rival port, Split
120
Explain how M guaranteed Germany's western border with the 1925 Locarno Pact
M was persuaded to join the meeting and guarantee the Locarno Pacts where Germany, France and Belgium accepted their borders. M's attempt to get Italy's Brenner border with Austria included failed
121
Describe how Albania became an Italian protectorate in 1926
Further extended Italian influence
122
Describe the 1933 Four Powers Pact
Leaders of Germany, Italy, France and Britain met in Rome. M wanted to build a rival to the League of Nations to sort out European affairs. Four power cooperations and spheres of influence, with agreed revisions, were discussed. This was displayed by the press as displaying Italy as the centre of European diplomacy, but nothing concrete came out of the meeting
123
Describe how M warned H to stay out of Austria in 1934
Austrian Nazis wanted union with Germany (Anschluss) and so assasinated Austrian Chancellor Dolfuss. M mobilised his troops on Italy's Austrian border and claimed that this deterred to Anschluss. H was probably not intending to take Austria then anyway
124
How was M offered a free hand in Africa in return for support against the growing menace of Hitler in 1935?
Britain, Italy and France protested against Germany rearmament, which violated the ToV. They agreed to prevent any future changes in Europe. M believed that he had French and British consent for invasion of Abyssinia in return
125
How can foreign policy during 1935-9 be seen?
Italy was at war virtually all the time. This ironically contributed to M's decision not to join Hitler in the war in 1939
126
Describe how M conquered Abyssinia between Oct 1935-Apr 1936
M sent troops after a border clash with Abyssinia. LoN imposed some sanctions. This led to a growth of nationalist support for the war in Italy. Britain and France failed to arrange a compromise. Italy defeated Abyssinia in May 1936. Victor Emmanuel was crowned emporor of Abyssinia
127
Describe how M intervened in the Spanish Civil War in July 1936
Sent planes and troops to help nationalist General Franco to revolt against Spain's socialist gov. Expected a short war but it lasted three years. Italian troops defeated at Guadalajara but Franco eventually won
128
Describe the 1936 Berlin Axis
Vague alliance with no formal commitment
129
Describe how Italy joined Germany and Japan in the Nov 1937 Anti-Comintern Pact
Directed against the USSR
130
Describe how M accepted H's invasion of Austria in 1938
H gave M 12 hours notice. M accepted Anschluss. This was unpopular in Italy
131
Describe how M was hailed as a peacemaker in Sep 1938 Munich
M took a high profile at the conference giving the Czech Sudetenland to Germany and avoided the threat of European War. This did little in practise
132
Describe how M invaded Albania in Mar 1939
Imitation of Hitler's seizure of Czechoslovakia, which he already virtually controlled. King Zod fled, and there was little resistance
133
Describe the May 1939 Pact of Steel
M proposed a pact with Germany. Agreed to cooperate fully in the event of a war. Italy said it would not be ready to fight until 1943, but this was not written into the agreement
134
Describe how Italy declared herself non-belligerent in Sep 1939
M accepted Italy was not ready for war and stayed out of WWII
135
How had the Libyan War helped M gain power?
It helped him rise to prominence in the PSI due to his emotive opposition
136
How would war then cause him to split the party?
Because he supported WWI
137
How did WWI help him gain power?
He fought in WWI and founded the fascist movement with rebellious ex-combattants. He exploited the fears, expectations and turmoil caused by WWI to gain power
138
What happened to A in 1924?
It was admitted to the LoN after being proposed by Italy. They were opposed by Britain who saw them as too uncivilised
139
In 1930
The coronation of Ras Tafari as King of Kings
140
What did Italy do in 1932?
Drew up an invasion plan
141
What happened in Dec 1934?
Italian and A forces clash at the dispute d Wal Wal Oasis
142
Feb 1935
Italy begins to dispatch extra troops to Italian East Africa
143
Apr 1935
Stresa Front appears to give M to go ahead to invade
144
Sep 1935
LoN reports the Wal Wal crisis as neither sides fault as both sides considered the oasis to be in their territory
145
3 Oct 1935
I launched its invasion
146
6 Oct 1935?
I forces catch Adowa
147
7 Oct 1935
LoN declares Italy to be the aggresor
148
11 Oct
LoN votes to impose sanctions
149
18 Nov 1935
Limited sanctions go into effect
150
Dec 1935
Britain and France draw up the secret Hoare-Laval Pact (giving Italy half of Abyssinia). It is leaked an they withdraw it under the pressure of domestic public opinion, which is hostile to Italy
151
5 May 1936
Italian forces take Addis Ababa. The King of Kings flees to Britain
152
9 May 1936
A formally annexed by I, with Eritrea and Italian Somaliland becomes part of Italian East Africa
153
July 1936
LoN ends sanctions
154
What did Marshal Badoglio, Chief of General Staff report back to M in a Dec 1934 memorandum?
The problem of Italian-Abyssinian relations has shifted from a diplomatic plane to one that can only be solved by force. The objective is the complete destruction of the Abyssinian army. In no other way can we build the empire. The speedier our action the less likely it is that there will be diplomatic complications. In Japanese fashion there will be no need for an official declaration of war and emphasise the defensive character of operation. No one in Europe would raise any difficulties provided that actions were completed quickly. It would suffice the declare to England and France that their interests would be recognised
155
How did Margherita Sarfatti predict the consequences of the invasion when talking to M in 1935?
You already have enough to colonise in Apulia, Sicily and Calabria. There's positive work to do here. If you goto Ethiopia you will fall into the hands of the Germans and then you will be lost. If the price to play for the empire is the ruin of Europe this price is too high
156
What were the political reasons for the invasion?
- Develop the cult of the duce
- The desire to act to keep fascism on the boil
- To have a war to foster excitement
- Fascism favoured war
- Increase Italian prestige
157
What were the international reasons for the invasion?
- Long held Italian nationalist dream
- Avenge Adowa
- Consolidate Italy's position in East Africa
- Show Italy as an imperial power like Britain and France
- Increase Italian prestige
158
What were the economic reasons for the invasion?
- Develop emigration and export markets
- To find oil
159
What did Italy gain from the invasion?
- Great victory to avenge Adowa
- Consolidated 'Italian East Africa'
- Sanctions rallied the nation: the Queen Mother led the campaign to give gold rings to finance the war effort
- The Church praised the civilising mission
- Provided M's finest hour when he was at the peak of his popularity
160
Why did they invade at this time?
- Divert attentions from the Depression and the failure of the corporate state
- Exploit the favourable international situation
- To show Hitler Italy's power and to get to war before Germany got too powerful
- Stresa and other occasions led Italy to believe that Britain and France would not object
161
What were the downsides of the invasion?
- Bred complacency in M by further inflating his ego
- Drained economic and military resources
- Budget deficit rose from 2.5 billion to 16 billion lire
- Settlement of 130,000 Italians in A was costly
- Needed 250,00 occupying troops dependent on supplies from 2000 miles away
- In Oct 1936 the lire was devalued by 40%
- By 1939 only 2% of Italian trade was with its colonies
- Italian rule was repressive and corrupt
- Italy only fully controlled a few areas
- Italy had to fight a guerilla war until it was lost to the British in 1941
- Gained a reputation for brutality
- Upset Britain and France
- Sanctions forced trade shift to Germany
- Showed weakness of the LoN, which encouraged Hitler
- Allowed Hitler to remilitarise without foreign influence, thus increasing German influence
162
Describe the success of the Italian empire by this point
Developed in East Africa from the 1880s. Italy's control was limited. Attempts to encourage 1000s of Italians to settle there as colonists failed. In 1935 there was 250 Italian settlers in Somaliland; by 1937 only 1300 families had emigrated to Libya
163
Why was propaganda important during the campaign?
Indulged in propaganda glorifying Italy's military prowess, which masked the death and destruction caused by a war between a modern industrial state and a near feudal African Kingdom
164
How did Italy try to present its actions as defensive?
Italy alleged that A was a barborous and uncivilised state whose conduct placed itself out of the covenant of the LoN. A month later the world was told that Abyssinia's warlike, aggresive spirit had imposed was upon Italy
165
How many fascist fighters were mobilised?
400,000
166
How did the 'The Times' portray these troops?
Said these 'happy Italian troops' were 'singing joyously' as they were made the unlikely promise that the modern methods of warfare to be employed would 'guarantee a war without tears'
167
Why were these modern methods of warfare so negative for the Abyssinians?
Their use of things like mustard gas and aircrafts made for brutal subjugation. The Abyssinians were ill equipped and pyscologically ill prepared for the sort of war they faced. The Abyssinian army, with its spears and vintage rifles meant that they never had any chance of stopping the fascist advance with their fiat machine guns and variety of modern weapons
168
What did M's son, Vittorio, think about the war?
He was exhilirated by it. In his book, 'Flying over the Ethiopian Mountain Ranges', he described the war as 'magnificent sport' and 'exceptionally good fun'
169
Why can the campaign be seen as inefficient?
It should have taken a matter of weeks, yet it took 7 months for the Italian armies to meet their objectives
170
Why did Italy not even do that much of the fighting?
It was the Eritreans from Italy's 1st colony who bore the brunt of the fighting. M's critics said that the Italians built the roads and the natives had done the fighting
171
Describe the brutal pacification tactics
10 Abyssinians were to be killed for every Italian casualty. Some villages were gassed and in others all the males were killed
172
What did an Italian senator say to a British diplomat about the sanctions?
You have achieved the miracle of uniting the whole of Italy around M
173
What did British foreign minister Hoare say about the state of Italy at this time?
No one doubts Italy is behind M
174
What did Barzini, an Italian journalist in the 1930s, say about the effects of the war?
'M's pictures were cut out of newspapers and magazines and pasted on the walls of poor peasant cottages and schools. Schoolgirls fell in love with him as a film star. His memorable words were written on the side of village houses.
175
What did Carlo Levi say about the peasant reaction to the campaign in his book 'Christ stopped at Eboli' (1944). Levi was a writer banished to the south
- They were not interested in war and saw it as just another inevitable misfortune
- Not afraid to go to war: 'To live here like dogs or die there like dogs is just the same'
- The purpose and conduct of the war was the business of the north: 'The war is for the benefit of those in the north. We're to stay at home until we starve. And now there's no chance of going to America
176
What did fascist journalist Pini say about building the empire in 1937?
Having made the empire, we must make imperialists
177
Historians assessment of the campaign
!!!
178
Carocci
Italians began to identify with fascism thanks to the LoN sanctions
179
Clark
M's finest hour. The empire was popular and so was the Duce. In every other respect the conquest of Ethiopia was a disaster. The economic cost was huge and it led to military complacency. Diplomatically it left Italy isolated on a hostile world, the British, Italy's traditional ally, never forgave M
180
Bell
The immediate effects of the victory were exhilirating. M had succeeded where the old Italy had failed. He had defeated not only the Abyssinians but the LoN. He abandoned his former cautious approach to foreign affairs and looked for new worlds to conquer
181
Whittam
Proved to a crucial turning point in the history of the regime and the history of inter-war European diplomacy. Increased the prestige of M and the regime in the short term. This year was the most popular in the history of modern Italy. Italy had defied the world. M had affirmed the truth of the phrase 'M is always right'. M proved Badoglio, the King and the diplomats wrong. The problem with euphoria is that it is hard to sustain and once it has disappered leaves behind a sense of disillusionment and anti climax. M and Ciano believed that a dynamic foreign policy would maintain the momentum. These efforts proved counterproductive. Increased emphasis on racism was a result of the war. M became over confident and disregarded the advice of his soldiers and diplomats, believing the propaganda about him. War had been expensive with high wastage of weapons and transport. The country was in constant guerilla warfare until Britain took over in 1941, and this was a heavy burden for the faltering economy and overstretched military. The success here led to the notion of breaking out the med which brought Italy into conflict with western democracies
182
What three options does Whittam say M had in 1936
- Act as a mediator between Germany and the West
- Rejoin with the West in a revived Stresa Front
- Align with Germany
- The effects of the Ethiopian war made the last option seem best
183
How did M help get the Spanish civil war off the ground?
He sent 12 planes which together with 30 planes from Germany were crucial in allowing Franco to transport his Army of Morocco to Spain. This helped sustain a revolt that might otherwise have failed
184
What did this small lending of resources become?
A major deployment of resources
185
International reasons why he intervened
- Stop French, left wing influence in Spain
- Cultivate an ally in a strategic area
- Establish greater influence in the Med
- Demonstrate Italy's might
186
Ideological reasons why he intervened
- Fight against decadent democracy and socialism
- Spread fascism
187
Domestic reasons why he intervened
Maintain the momentum for fascistisation at home
188
General reasons why he intervened
- Stay in the limelight
- Have another war
- Abyssinian victory had made them overambitious
189
What did M think about how long the conflict would last?
He thought it would be over quickly
190
Why did few others favour it apart from M?
Because of the potential costs and little anticipated gain
191
What were the economic impacts of intervention?
- Disrupted trade and reinforced the trend of increased trade with Germany
- Cost 14 billion lire (6 months tax revenue) and required special levies
- Lira was devalued
- Italy lost half her foreign currency reserves
192
What were the political impacts of intervention?
Made the gov unpopular, apart from with the church
193
What were the military impacts of intervention?
- Italy was on the winning side and claimed a great victory
- Prevented Italy consolidating her strength after Abyssinia
- Used up much needed weapons of ammunition
- Italy's military strength was much less in 1939 than in 1936, meaning it was unprepared for WWII
- Humiliated at Guadalajara; Italian weakness was exposed
194
What were the international impacts of intervention?
- Italy gained a potential supporter in a strategic position
- Helped establish another fascist regime
- Italy gained little real value, just Spanish neutrality
- Diverted Italian attention from the German threat to Austria
- Increased Italy's links with Germany
- Reinforced the quarrel with Britain and France, but they still wanted Italian friendship
195
What did Ulrich Von Hassell, German ambassador in Rome, say about the conflict and its impact on geopolitics in a Dec 1936 report back to Berlin?
Germany should be happy about continued Italian involvement. Could be similar to the Abyssinian conflict in bringing out the actual, opposing interests of the powers and preventing Italy from being drawn into the net of the west. Draws out the natural opposition between Italy and France and sets up Italy and GB as allies for control in the Med. All the more clearly will Italy see the appeal of confronting the West with Germany
196
What was the appeal of staying neutral?
Makeweight diplomacy
197
What was the appeal of siding with the West?
Counter the growing power of Germany
198
What was the appeal of siding with Germany?
M could associate Italy with the growing might of Germany
199
Make the case that he should side with the west
- Sections of their elites admired M's actions against communism
- Close links to the powerful USA
- Wanted support against Hitler
- GB had the world's largest fleet
- France was Italy's neighbour
- Traditional Italian hostility to the uncivilised Germans
- King and elite traditionally friendly with GB
- German alliance unlikely to be popular
200
Make the case that they should side with Germany
- Britain and France were decadent democracies on the wane
- GB and France supported the status quo and this would prevent
- LoN had imposed sanctions
- GB dominated Med
- The west had blocked previous Italian colonial expansion
- France protected anti-fascist exiles
- Fellow fascist state
- Dynamic, vigouros state
- Germany had a parallel vision to spazio vitale (lebensraum)
- Hitler favoured Italian alliance in Mein Kampf
- Favoured war
- Italy contained 250,000 German speakers in South Tyrol, but Hitler made no claims on this territory
- Had left the LoN in 1933
- Hitler refused to apply sanction durin Abyssinian campaign
- Became a major supplier of crucial materials and energy
- Both on the same side as Franco
201
Reasons for Italy to go to war
- M wanted to keep up momentum following Abyssinia
- M wanted to dominate the Med
202
Reasons for Italy not to go to war
- Little evidence fascist propaganda had created a war like nation
- Economy not yet self sufficient
- Vulnerable to naval attack
- Resources used up in Abyssinia and Spain
- Military power more impressive on paper than in reality
203
How did Hitler fail to imitate M in 1923?
With his Munich Putsch
204
How did M move closer to Britain and France in 1934
By opposing Anschluss
205
How did M closer to Germany in 1934?
Hitler met M in Venice
206
How did M closer to GB and France in 1935
Joined the Stresa Front v Germany
207
How did M closer to Germany massively in 1935
Due to the sanctions
208
How did M closer to Germany in 1936-9?
Both Germany and Italy aided Franco
209
How did M closer to in Oct 1936?
M talked of an axis with Germany after agreements with Hitler
210
How did M closer to GB and France in 1937?
M came to a gentleman's agreement accepting the status quo in the Med
211
How did M closer to Germany in 1937?
- M visits Germany in Sep and is impressed
- In Nov Italy joined the anti-comintern pact with Germany and Japan
- Italy withdraws from the LoN in Dec
212
How did M closer to GB and France in 1938
- GB made an agreement with Italy recognising Italian Abyssinia
- M is seen by the West as helping restrain Germany and keep the peace
213
How did M closer to to Germany in 1938?
- Hitler visits Italy
- M accepts Anschluss
- Anti semitic decrees
- M is impressed by the contrast of German power compared to the feeble west at the Munich conference
214
How did M closer to the west in March 1939
- Hitler breaks Munich agreement and seizes Bohemia without consulting M
- M briefly toys with the idea of a new Stresa Front to resist German domination
215
How did he move closer to Germany in May 1939
He sent Ciano to negotiate a military alliance with Germany; treaty left on their terms; pact of steel signed
216
How did Germany break the terms of the anti comintern pact in Aug 1939?
By signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact
217
What two options was M torn between in Aug 1939?
Wavered continually between Germany if war breaks out in the hope of gains and declaring Italy neutral
218
What happened of the 1 Sep 1939?
Germany attacks Poland and Italy declares herself non-belligerant
219
What happened on the 3 Sep 1939?
Britain and France declare war on Germany
220
What did M do on 3 Sep 1939?
Tried to arrange another Munich style conference to avoid war
221
What did Italy do in 1941
Decalred war on Britain and France
222
Describe the first meeting between M and H in Venice in June 1934
Tense. Hitler was not wearing uniform and felt inferior to the uniformed M. M insisted on using his poor German. Dismissed H as a 'silly little clown'
223
How did M disregard the historical status of Germans in Sep 1934?
He says that these people were wholly illiterate in the days when Caesar, Virgil and Augustus flourished in Rome
224
Describe what M thought of Germany when he went to visit in Sep 1937
Very impressed. Spoke to a crowd of 900,000. Deeply moved by what he described as the most powerful nation in Europe rising magnificently to greatness
225
How did M gain H's favour in 1938?
H said he would 'never forget' what M had done by allowing Anschluss
226
Make the case that the Pact of Steel was a blunder?
- M wanted a defensive alliance
- Germany drew up the terms
- Tied Italy to German decisions
- Assumed a 4 year breathing space after Ciano said Germany would not be ready for war until 1943, but this was not written into the terms. The Germans implied acceptance of this delay, but were secretely planning to attack Poland
- The day after the pact was ratified, Hitler told his generals, 'secrecy is an essential condition for success. Italy and Japan must not be told our plans
- M should have been aware of Germany's dynamism; the Axis powers were moving at different speeds
- Italian press claimed the pact was popular as it would enable Italy to realise its great dreams; none of this was correct
227
What did M say about his long term foreign policy programme to the Fascist Grand Council in Feb 1939?
Italy is in an inland sea which is linked to the Oceans by the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gib, dominated by GB. Italy therefore does not have free access to oceans; Italy therefore truly is a prisoner of the Med. We must draw the following conclusions
1) The aim of Italian policy, which cannot and does not have European territorial ambitions outside of Albania should be to break the bars of this prison
2) Having broken the bars, Italian policy has the one basic aim of marching towards the Ocean. The Indian Ocean through linking up the Sudan, Libya and Ethiopia or the Atlantic Ocean through French North Africa
In either case we find ourselves confronted by the French and the British. To attempt to solve such a problem without securing our rear in the continent would be stupid. The policy of the Rome-Berlin Axis is therefore the answer to this fundamentally important historical problem
228
How did Germany upset Italy in Aug 1939?
They told Ciano that they were planning to attack Poland and negotiating for an alliance with the USSR; they insisted it was a localised war and accepted Italy was free to stay out. Ciano was horrified and felt Italy had been duped. He commented in his diary: 'I return to Rome completely disgusted with the Germans, with their leader and with their way of doing things. They have betrayed us and lied to us'
229
What did M say in his announcement of the Rome-Berlin Axis?
- They will hoist the flag of anti-bloshevism
- Common way of looking at the world
- Both based on young people who we train in courage, discipline, resistance, love of the fatherland and contempt for easy living
- Follow the same goal in the sphere of economic autarky. Without economic independence the political independence of a nation is doubtful
230
M gave a directive to Ciano which was given to Hitler through Ribbentrop in May 1939. What did it say?
- The two Axis powers need a peace period of at least three years
- Only from 1943 that a war effort can have the greatest chance of success
- A period of peace is necessary for Italy for the following reasons...
- To settle Libya and Albania militarily and to pacify Abyssinia, where an army of 500,000 men must be recruited
- To finish the building and reconstruction of 6 battleships currently underway
- For the renewal of all our heavy and medium callibre artillery
- Carry out autarkic plans to prevent a blockade from the wealthy democracies
- To stregthen more firmly the bonds between the Axis powers and their people
- For all these reasons Italy does not want a premature war, despite the fact that they saw it as inevitable
- May be possible that within three years Japan will have brought their war with China to an end
231
M's attitude towards what country changed as a result of the axis?
Austria
232
What is the best evidence for this?
His different responses to Anschluss in 1934 to 1938
233
Describe his response in 1934
- M sent troops to Italy's Brenner Frontier
- M earned prestige at home and abroad for standing up to Hitler
234
Describe his response in 1938
- In June 1936 M had told Austria to deal directly with Germany, implying that he was not prepared to defend. He was thus giving up one of Italy's most important strategic gains from WWI
- M accepted Hitler's invasion in Mar 1938
- H promised not to forget this support
- Considerable private concern amongst some Italian ministers
- Many saw this as a humiliation for Italy and it was unpopular with the people
235
What were the domestic effects of the axis for the regime?
It weakened it. Italy's growing dependence on Germany was greeted with unease by Italians
236
How did more educated Italians respond to the alliance with Germany?
They disliked the Axis and were disappointed by the Anschluss. We have already seen how they found the reform of customs and the anti semitic decrees offensive
237
How do historians view his decision to join with Germany in Axis in 1936?
They see it as his biggest mistake and the cause of his downfall
238
Why do some historians see the international context as making M's downfall inevitable?
Some historians argue that the axis was inevitable for geopolitical and ideological reasons and that once the axis was signed it essentially sealed M's downfall
239
How do others counter this view?
They say that even after the axis was signed in 1936 there were still other options available to M
240
Substantiate this idea
- Pro Western sympathy amongst much of the elite
- In 1937 the King put gentle pressure of M to temper his enthusiasm for Germany and stressed the traditional friendliness towards GB
- Contacts were maintained in the west
- M can be seen as still following a policy of equidistance until 1940
- Very fluid diplomatic situation between 1936-40
241
How does Italian historian De Felice support this view?
Argues that right up to 1940 M seriously considered joining with Britain and France instead. Said it was only after the might of Germany was displayed through connquering much of Europe by 1940 that he decided to side with them
242
What do Conservative Italian historian Quartararo and the British historian Lamb argue prevented an alliance with GB
In recent study 'M and the British' they argue that it was GB's arrogant attitude towards Italy that prevented an alliance
243
How does Morgan espouse the more traditional view?
Believes that in both timing and content, the axis indicated that M had made a choice. It was a statement of the percieved division in Europe between the dictatorships and the democracies, which was accentuated by M's foreign and domestic policy actions thereafter
244
Historians assessments on the nature of the axis
!!!
245
Wiskemann
Italian actions from 1936 did not amount to any kind of foreign policy, nothing but a surrender to pressure from Hitler with no regard for Italy's interest or capacity
246
Cassels
M contrived the axis of his own free will. The axis was no sense a concrete political arrangement. For M, it was left vague enough to be abandoned if need be. But within 18 months it became an obligation dictated by harsh necessity from which there was no exit. The beginning of the end for M and the regime was accepting Anschluss in 1938, with fascist Italy becoming a satellite of Germany
247
Blinkhorn
The axis marked the first step in what proved to be a fatal relationship: the die was cast in 1938 when M accepted Anschluss, henceforth the relative positions of the two dictatorships were confirmed. M became undoubtedly the lesser figure and the junior partner in the new relationship. Subsequent events reinforced Italy's subordinate status
248
Clark
In 1938-9 M was still playing along with H in order to wring concessions from Britain and France and extend the new empire. This was a dangerous game
249
Overy and Wheatcroft in 'The Road to War' (1989)
During 1936 Italy moved out of the western camp and towards Germany as a direct result of Abyssinia and Spain. This was a product of necessity rather than intention. As one German diplomat put it: 'The new relationship was not created by a spontaneous in urge of either of the two powers but was instead ad hoc, on rational grounds as a result of the necessities infront of them'. What they had in common was the fact that they were the have nots in relation to those who had been satisfied by the peace treaties. M could never reconcile himself to the fact that despite being the senior fascist in Europe, Hitler had greater resources behind him. The fact they were fascists gave the relationship a gloss of ideological brotherhood. Italy was useful to H as a fascist outpost in the Med, keeping GB and France away from central Europe. Germany was useful to M as a source of economic support for rearmament, and as a power to divert the attention of GB and France away from Italian adventures in the Med. Each saw the other as an instrument in their own power game; manipulation rather than friendship bound them together
250
Lamb in 'M and the British' (1997)
Strong evidence to suggest that foreign secretary Eden could have kept M out of H's camp and preserved the power balance in Europe. The evidence is conclusive that after conquering Abyssinia, M wanted to renew friendship with Britain. He both feared and disliked Hitler and was intenting on keeping Austria out of Nazi hands. The British policy of appeasing Hitler and opposing M was disastrous. Abyssinia and Spain were sideshows compared to H's fanatical determination to use his powerful armies for aggresion, but unfortunately Eden couldn't see this.
M would have been a slippery and treacherous ally, but in the face of the Nazi menace his goodwill was essential for peace in Europe. The Baldwin and Chamberlain govs delayed in recognising Abyssinia as belonging to Italy until 1938. There can be little doubt that recognising this in 1936 would have kept M out of H's arms. On such small things great events depend
251
Bell
Ideology was called in at a late date to consolidate an alliance which had been made on economic and political grounds. Factors such as German support for the Abyssinian campaign, Italian dependence on German coal and cooperation over Spain contributed. M's aims for foreign policy of expansion in the Med could only be achieved in opposition to Britain and France and therefore in alliance with Germany
252
What did M want to do in terms of foreign policy?
Be in control of it, whether he was foreign minister or not
253
Who was he assisted by in the 1920s?
Grandi
254
Whose advise did he seek when he wished for a more assertive foreign policy?
His appointed his ambitious son in law Ciano to be foreign minister
255
What was Ciano's attitude to Germany?
He favoured closer links with Germany before becoming disillusioned over Hitler's treatment of Italy
256
How did Grandi and Ciano combine to try and save Italy from German influence in 1943?
By supporting a coup against M
257
Describe Dino Grandi and his contribution to Italian foreign policy in the 1920s and early 1930s
One of the ablest fascists and played a significant role in foreign policy. As an ex socialists he joined the fascist in Sep 1920 and although he disagreed with some of M's policies he recognised that his leadership was necessary for the movement. Key leader in the March on Rome. As undersecretary in the foreign ministy from 1925, he had a major influence on M's involvement in the Locarno Pacts and was appointed foreign minister in 1929. He gave foreign policy a unity and consistency of goals that it had previously lacked. His two basic goals were to challenge French dominance and create a vast colonial empire in East Africa. Grandi felt this had to be done without a European war that Italy would not survive. He favoured working through the LoN and acting as a makeweight between France and Germany
258
Describe his contributions during the 1930s
In the early 1930s M favoured a more dynamic foreign policy and took control for himself in Jul 1932. Grandi was sent as an ambassador to London in 1932-9. He was very helpful there and was a key part in the LoN sanctions not being extended to oil. Helped persuade Chamberlain to ask M to organise the Munich conference of 1938. Although he came to be increasingly critical of M's foreign policy, he considered his rule necessary and kept his post by flattering M. Grandi was convinced that in case of war Italy should side with the allies. Even after the pact of steel he thought Italy could switch sides as it had done in 1915. He returned to Italy in Jul 1939 and became Justice Minister. He tried to prevent Italy's entry into the war until the military collapse of France made this inevitable
259
How did Grandi finally rebel against M?
After experiencing disaster in Greece he was convinced that the King should reassert his decision and pull Italy out of war. His opportunity came after allied landing in Sicily, when he persuaded M to call the Fascist Grand Council. He presented a motion which implied M should be replaced, and it was passed by 19-7. He then tried to organise an armistice
260
What happened to Grandi after this?
- The Americans insisted he should not be part of the new Italian gov
- Grandi was condemned to death in his absence by the Salo Republic by organising an anti M coup
- In 1947 he was tried and acquitted by the High Commission of the Expurgation of Fascism
261
Describe Count Galeazzo Ciano's rise to power
Son of an aristocrat, trained as a lawyer and briefly became a journalist. Entered the foreign service in 1925. After marrying M's daughter, Edda, in 1930 his career took off, much to the disgust of others who saw him as a man of indiscretion and ambition. In 1933 he became Chief of M's Press Office and in 1936 the Minister for Press and Propaganda. He then fought as a bomber pilot in the Abyssinian campaign. In 1936 he was named foreign minister at 33. Ciano centralised foreign policy and pursued a personal style of diplomacy based on his own friendships and dislikes. He certainly lacked Grandi's perceptiveness, and is generally described as a shallow character
262
I'll ask you some questions about Prof John Gooch!!!
!!!
263
How did he feel towards the slavs and Yugoslavia
M loathed the slavs. Wanted to conquer and dominate Yugoslavia.
264
How did he say he felt about the LoN
He loathed it
265
What does he say M was ready to engage in in the 1920s
Pacts and alliances
266
What does he say the Corfu incident revealed about M?
His impetuous nature
267
Who does he say he was thinking of a war against?
Turkey
268
What does he say about M's attitude about forceful foreign policy
He said that M always thought about a forceful foreign policy but that this only came into practise in the 1930s
269
What does he think that M's main foreign policy goal was in the 1920s
Preventing a franco German alliance
270
Why does he say thta M wanted to prevent a franco german alliance
Because he thought that if this was the case France would be able to dominate Europe
271
Why does he say that M couldn't afford to concentrate on foreign policy in the 1920s
Because the Matteoti Crisis and its consequences meant he had to shift his attention to domestic policy
272
What examples of conflict between Italy and France does he point towards
Conflicts with France over naval power and Tunisia. Minor naval arms race in the Med
273
Which politician does he say prevented M from achieving his foreign policy goals in the 1920s
Stresseman
274
Why does he think this
International politics and the appearance of Stresemann limited M. Stresemann represented democractic force and aligned with GB and France. Made this goal of splitting the powers impossible
275
What foreign policy attitude did Yugoslavia have that made M detest them even more
They were francophiles
276
Make the case that the 4 power pact was a missed opportunity
If the big 3 in Europe and Italy were to have cooperated long term then it could have prevented war. If other nations had followed M's lead of encouraging diplomacy war might have been avoided
277
Make the case that the 4 power pact could have never worked any way
- France weren't interested in it anyway so a watered down version anyway
- Hitler signed out it as it would provide a rival to weaken the LoN rather than out of genuine commitment to the cause
- Hitler's rise to power made peace unlikely as he was pulling out of diplomatic relations and preparing for war
278
What kind of campaign was launched after the Libyan people launched an effective campaign against Italian occupation
A pacification campaign
279
Italy tried to assert control in Tripolitania and Cyrenacia. How many lives did this war claim
56,000
280
What type of authority was reorganised due to effective opposition
Colonial authority
281
Describe this reassertion of colonial authority
From 1931-2 Bagdolio’s forces waged a punitive pacification campaign. Grazania replaced him on the basis that M granted him the authority to smash resistance unincumbered by Italian or international law. M agreed and this intensified repression
282
By what point had Italian policy in Libya reached a full scale war against Mukhtar's forces?
1932
283
What did they build in the north to stop people from fleeing into Egypt?
A barbed wire fence
284
What kind of weapons did they controversially use?
Chemical weapons
285
How many people underwent forced migration
100,000
286
How many people were executed daily
30
287
How were they killed
Either hanged or shot
288
The Italians set up concentration camps. What did Italian propaganda at home refer to them as?
Modern refugee camps
289
Why was it wrong to call them modern
Because 1000s died from poor conditions
290
What is the irony of all this fascist violence occuring at Libya at this time
It happened while M was attempting to be some sort of peacemaker in Europe
291
What happened to livestock
They were killed to stop people from eating
292
Who was the religious leader of the resistance
Omar Mukhtar
293
What happened to the resistance once he was killed
It disintergrated
294
How were the Libyans being used as guinea pigs
Because it was seen as a test to see whether Italian generals would be able to conduct a colonial war in Abyssinia later
295
Why did he get natives from Italian Somliland to do the fighting on Italy's behalf
- Cheaper to employ
- Wouldn't have been massive backlash if lots of them died but there would have been with Italian soldiers
296
What did Italians want to do once the war was over
Consolidate their power
297
When was Mukhtar killed
Sep 1931
298
List some of the things that they did to try and consolidate their power
After the war is over Italy wants to consolidate. Land seizure and forcing the sale of land at low prices. Want to settle 500,000 Italian over the next 30 years (12% of pop). Force the natives to settle on less arable land. Invest in infrastructure but the natives see little improvement. Enforced migration
299
How did Dolfuss feel about M
He loved him, especially because he saw Italy as being able to protect Austria from Germany
300
What is the name of the pass that separates Austria from Italy
The Brenner Pass
301
Why did M lose his qualms with Austria in 1933
Because Hitler became the bigger power in Europe
302
Why were Nazi racial theories hostile to Italians
Because they saw them as an inferior med race
303
Why did M sign the Rome Protocol in 1934
M knew that if anschluss occured Germany would be next door. He therefore promised to uphold Austrian independence through the protocol
304
What treaty was anschluss forbidden by
ToV
305
Why was M opposed to anschluss
M against this because he thought it might lead to demands for the return of Austrian land Italy gained after the war
306
How did Dolfuss copy the Italian model as a response to anschluss
The chancellor doesn’t want Anschluss and is willing to work with M. Dissolved parliament and banned the Nazi and socialist parties and declares Austria a catholic state. Formed an Austrian fascist party, looks to set up his own corporate state.
307
How was this response counterproductive
ustrian Nazis rebelled against this. Socialists went on strike. Austrian army shelled the working class districts. Collapsed into civil war. Hitler might capitalise on this
308
Describe the meeting between H and M in June 1934
Met in June 1934, H and M, M said H just quoted the boring mein kampf. M said he did not agree to Anschluss. H agreed. The power dynamic is on the Italian side
309
Describe the instability in Austria in 1934
Austria 1934 Austrian Nazis tried to commit a putsch and shot him. The ringleaders of the putscg were shot without trial. M feared that it could lead to German occupation and so ordered 40,000 troops to the border and so the threat of invasion receded.
309
Describe the controversy in 1934 Yugoslavia and how it relates to Italy
Assassination of King Alexandra in 1934 Yugoslavia. 9 Oct so after Austria. A Macedonian employed by the Croat SS, Yugoslavia blamed Hungary for housing this SS. M spitefully sided with Hungary. In spit of France. Grandi boasted Italy would go to war if Hungary was attacked. Seems odd to be sabre rattling because it doesn’t concern Italy. France was blamed for not providing protection – how did thye let this happen on their soil. Hungary blamed too. Discovered that the Italians had houses the SS assassins, paid for weapons and provided training. Trying to cover up their involvement. Involved because they were trying to hurt France. M’s involvement was never proven but it was shown that Italy had tried to negotiate with France to blame Hungary at the LoN. Shows how M’s principles can quickly change. Shows that Italy and M look to pragmatically act in their own self interest. Assassination also weakens Yugoslavia who are a rival in the Adriatic.
309
What are the two differing interpretations about M's response here
It can be argued that M was merely acting out of self interest as he didn’t want Germany to gain this strategically important country on the border with Italy. It could also be argued that M used his position of superior at the time to do something genuinely brave and stand up to Hitler
310
What nickname did Omar Mukhtar have?
The Lion of the Desert
311
Why was France less willing to sign the 4 power pact
France wasn’t willing to accept the terms because it had allies who opposed it – the little entente
311
What did Hitler do to make M feel betrayed in 1934
He attempted anschluss after promising M he had no interest in doing this in Venice just a month earlier
311
When did the Stresa Front take place
Apr 1935
312
Why was it so detrimental that GB, France and Italy were not willing to invade Germany
Because this was what was necessary to prevent rearmament
313
Why was GB unwilling to invade
Because the pop was strongly anti war
314
Why does Buchanan think it was so important
Most important attempt to stop Hitler before WWII
315
What 'mad' decision does he think GB made just months later
To impose sanctions on Italy over the Abyssinian campaign as this pushed M into Hitler's arms
316
Why were France willing to accept Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia
As a necessary price to pay for stresa unity
317
Which two nations longed for unity against Hitler due to rearmament
Italy and France
318
What does he say was at the core of the talks
Necessity of preserving Austrian independence
319
What two goals did Italy have going into the meeting?
M wanted Austria independence so it could remain a buffer state and wanted guarantees he could invade Abyssinia
320
What does he say M did to achieve the second goal
Alluded to the fact that if he was supported in these ambitions he would support the allies against Hitler. No one objected
321
What does he say would have likely happened if someone had objected
If they had objected it is doubtful that M would have sent 40,000 troops to the border
322
What did Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office Robert Vansittart say about the decision to impose sanctions
With this fiasco we lost Abyssinia, we lost Austria, created the axis, and made the coming war with Germany inevitable’
323
What mistake does he say GB made in negotiations with Hitler
He mistakenly thought he could appease Hitler
324
What mistake does he say Eden and Simon made months later
They went on a foreign policy visit to Berlin as if nothing had happened
325
What did the anglo german naval agreement do?
Permitted Germany to have a navy 35% the size of Britain's
326
What treaty did the agreement contradict
ToV
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What were the motivations behind
Intended to mark the beginning of an anglo German alliance against France and USSR
Limits German expanisionism
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Why did it anger France
Did this without the consent of any other stresa front member
French said Britain had no right
Signed on the 120th anniversary of the battle of waterloo at which British and Prussian troops defeated Napoleon
France can’t trust Britain
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What relation would the naval agreements to M
Just been betrayed. GB can’t be trusted. Lamb’s theory of lost ally of the democracies
330
His early policies were similar to M's. Give some examples of these policie s
- Penetration into the Balkans
- Intervention into the Spanish Civil War
- Friendly relations with the Nazis
331
How did he begin to differ with M over his policy towards Hitler
He became more critical of German alliance, opposed the Pact of Steel and wanted a barrier in the Balkans against the Germans
332
What policies did his hesistance towards Hitler lead him to support
- He wanted a barrier in the Balkans against them and so favoured an invasion of Albania
- Helped keep Italy out of the war in 1939
333
How did he begin to fall out of favour in 1940 due to his anti German stance
Because of his anti German stance at a time when Germany was doing so well, and he was eventually forced to accept the logic of joining Germany in war and was involved in the failed invasion of Greece. He kept his post but not his power until he was dismissed Feb 1943
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What did he controversially do in July 1943
Voted with Grandi in the Fascist Grand Council meeting that led to M being overthrown
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What happened to him after this
Imprisoned by the new government but escaped to Germany. He was then sent to the Salo Republic and tried and shot as a traitor, despite the pleas of his wife
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Why has he been useful for historians
Because his diaries have been a major source
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Why was he resented
He was resented for success that was seen as undeserved and born out of nepotism
338
Who edited his diaries
Muggeridge
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What did Muggeridge say about why Ciano attached himself to M
The focus of his life and thought was power. M represented power and he therefore attached himself to M
340
What did Hitler say about Italy when they declared non belligerance in Aug 1939
The Italians are behaving exactly as they did in 1914
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Why does it seem odd that M declared non belligerance
One of M's major aims was to build up the military strength of Italy and develop a warlike people
Believed that war helped forge a strong nation
By 1939 he had had 17 years of power to prepare Italy for war
He was bound by the Pact of Steel to join Italy in war
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What did Ciano say to German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to explain why Italy couldn't join the war in Aug 1939
Impossible militarily, politically, materially and psychlogically impossible for Italy to engage in war at this early stage. She has been engaging in wars for years and years. With the intervention in Spain and Abyssinia, the Italian people had been pushed into one armed conflict after another, with the result being a pronounced degree of war weariness. These years have also exhausted Italy's scant stock of materials
343
What did M say to Hitler in 25 Aug 1939
Given the state of military preparations in Italy, I cannot take initiative in any warlike operations. The war was planned for 1942 and at that date I should have been ready
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M sent Hitler a letter on the 26 Aug with a list of immediate needs from Germany. What did this list include
1.75 million tons of petrol coal and steel
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How many freight trains would have been required to transport all this
17,000
346
How did M implicitly criticise Hitler in the letter
He said that he would not have sent the letter if he had had the time, which had been agreed upon, to accumulate a stockpile and to accelarate the growth of self sufficiency
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Hitler replied to M via telegram and it was read out on Italian radio. What did the telegram say
I offer my heartiest thanks for the political and diplomatic assistance you have recently given to Germany and her just cause. I do not expect to need Italy's military aid. I also thank you, for everything that you will be able to do in the future for the cause of fascism and national socialism
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Anti German posters briefly appeared in several Italian cities in Sep 1939. What did they say?
Italian workers will never fight alongside the butchers of their Polish brothers
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What does historian Gallo say about M's actions in late Aug 1939
A man rocked between one decision and another by events he had not anticipated, a man whose mind could be changed by any man who talked to him cleverly enough, a nervous man with no plan who every day further lost his grip on reality. The facade was cracking in every direction, the miltary position was disastrous and the myth of the 'Fascist Grand Army' was evaporating
After 17 years of fascism Italy was in every respect worse than in 1915: though 42 divisions had been mobilised, in reality there were only 37. The air force was the best branch of the fascist armed services and there were 700 planes, but not all were in flying condition and no one knew where they were based
Industrial backing for this army was laughably understocked: on the 1 Sep 1939 there was enough steel for two weeks, iron or for 6 months and nickel for 20 days. Equipment produced by Italian industry was inefficient, the grenades did not explode, the nails fell out of the shoes, and the soles were through within miles.
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What can the fact that neither the economy or the armed services were ready for war suggest about Italian domestic policy
That it was a failure
351
What does the Italian response to war suggest about fascistisation of the people
Shows he failed as he could not produce a nation of warlike subjects as suggested by Italian's positive reaction to peace at Munich and non intervention in 1939
352
Why do we have to commend M's foreign policy decisions in 1939
Because declaring non belligerance was definitely the best decision for Italy
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What is Mack Smith's assessment of M's foreign policy in M's Roman Empire (1977)
By his own standards he was successful in much of what he tried to do. Insofar as he aimed to make Italy feared or hated in the world, he achieved his aims, even though he achieved the addition and unexpected reaction of scorn and contempt. He used to say that he wanted to test the courage of Italy in war, and here too succeeded. He meant to assert Italy's 'right' to territorial expansion. He was as good as his word, he prided himself on being a realist who saw life as a struggle and perpetual combat. The fact that he incidentally brought economic ruin and civil war to Italy was unintended. Any history of M's foreign policy has to be mainly a history of propaganda. By pursuing foreign governments he was the strong leader of a strong country, he made it possible to pursue a hostile foreign policy without having to waste scarce money on providing the material resources of war
354
Simplify Mack Smith's interpretation
- Successful in achieving his aims
- Achieved his goal of making Italy feared but this came to the cost of scorn and contempt
- Wanted to test the mettle of Italian and assert territorial expansion rights and achieved this at the cost of plunging Italy into civil war and economic ruin
- Successfully pursued a hostile foreign policy to appear as a strong leader without spending too much on wartime resources
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What does Italian historian L Villari say in Foreign Policy Under M (1956)
M's conduct in foreign policy gave Italy unprecedented prestige. No Italian minister had enjoyed such foreign policy success since Cavour and never had Italy been so greatly respected abroad. Diplomats realised this but so did emigrants, being finally proud to call themselves an Italian citizen
356
Why were most Italian relieved that M had declared non belligerance in 1939
- Finally gave Italy a brief respite from war
- Most Italians were concerned by the Axis, but at least M had not joined Hitler in war
357
Why can we be positive about M's foreign policy by 1939
Because he had broadly achieved his aims (DMS) and granted Italy unprecendented prestige (Villari)
358
Make the case that you could be actually much more critical of fascist foreign policy up until this point
When you examine what Italy actually gained from M achieving his aims it becomes debateable whether they were good aims. Growing evidence that Italy was not militarily and economically powerful enough as M's future aims would require. The next 4 years were a series of continuous setbacks, which particularly stemmed from his policies in the 1930s
359
List 4 things that M had already done or starting doing that would contributed to his downfall over the next 4 years
- The unpopular Axis
- Alienation of conservative groups
- Pressure on resources caused by his ambitious
- Increasingly desperate decision making without any proper evaluation of the likely consequences
