The USA Conflict Home and Abroad: 3.3 Flashcards
The nature of the conflict, 1964-68
1
Q
Describe the guerrilla tactics of the Vietcong in South Vietnam used in their war against the US and ARVN forces
A
- getting the support of the local people
[] killed unpopular/corrupt village/city officials
[] used propaganda playing on dislike of Diem’s government/dislike of the US puppeteering the SV government and gave talks in villages
[] many VC LIVED in the villages and around locals, giving a personal angle to local support of the VC
[] dressed like ordinary people (making them feel more part of the wider community and as if they were fighting for the people against tyranny) and moved in secret/on foot/on bikes - weakening and terrorising the US and ARVN forces by using ‘hit and run’ attacks/ambushes
[] dressed like ordinary Vietnamese, meaning couldn’t tell if were VC or civilian - if civilian, shooting/attacking would have detrimental effects in terms of media coverage
[] used light weapons + equipment to move quickly and quietly
[] stayed close to US bases and troops so that US planes could not bomb them without destroying US property or personnel
[] used simple traps like pits with sharp spikes (often covered in faecal matter to promote infection of the wound to the foot) to create discord and unease amongst enemy troops and injure/incapacitate them indirectly
[] bombed and sabotaged roads/bridges
[] made networks of tunnels to hide in and escape through, which were often too small for American soldiers to fit through - fought rare battles (like Ap Bac) so that they weren’t expected and were easier to win due to the surprise and often unpreparedness of the enemy
2
Q
Describe the use of VC tunnels during the Vietnam war and their significance
A
- the VC took inspiration from Vietminh fighting the French colonial rule in the 50s and built their own, more complex, network of tunnels
- these tunnels used to provide ease of movement without detection of the VC, storage of supplies like weapons and fuel, hospitals for wounded or sick troops or civilians and living spaces for troops - even kitchens sometimes
[] the tunnels connected many villages surrounding Saigon
[] gave ease of access to the locals in these villages and the support they provided
[] gave ease of access to possible bases in close proximity to Saigon and the government, making the government feel threatened or intimidated by VC activity
3
Q
Describe the US and ARVN response to the VC’s use of tunnels in the Vietnam War
A
- initially tried to use “tunnel rats” (small troops) to investigate/infiltrate/collapse the tunnels since most Americans were too big to fit
[] the VC knew about this and planted traps for these tunnel rats accordingly, like boxes of snakes or bats etc. - eventually began to bulldoze over any entrances they found to collapse the tunnels
[] were EXTREMELY well concealed however, so US activity did very little damage to the tunnel networks
4
Q
Describe the significance of the attack of a US base built over an opening to the Cu Chi VC tunnels for the attitudes of American troops to the war
A
- would cause US troops to feel unsettled and threatened by the VC
- would lead US troops to fear the VC and even feel hopeless in face of their organisation and strength even with less arms or funding than the US
- would make many US troops want to return home instead of fighting against the VC
5
Q
Explain why US tactics were largely ineffective against the guerrilla tactics of the VC
A
- US troops and military advisors thought in terms of traditional battles
[] emphasis placed on capturing land, which side retreated first and casualty counts as the most important outcomes
[] despite (minimal) efforts to establish friendly relations w/villagers, US troops regarded with suspicion/hatred/dislike due to the ultimately destructive military tactics used (caused a lot of collateral damage also) - once US forces would move out of an area they had “captured”, the VC and Vietnamese would simply move back in and set up bases again
- didn’t understand the people, culture of VC guerrilla tactics at all and so didn’t know how to properly counteract them
6
Q
When did Johnson authorise Operation Rolling Thunder ?
A
February 1965
7
Q
When did Operation Rolling Thunder begin ?
A
2 March 1965
8
Q
What was Operation Rolling Thunder ?
A
- US bombing campaign in North Vietnam
- targeted:
[] the limited amount of industry in North Vietnam (mainly steel and cement factories)
[] the Ho Chi Minh Trail to stop supplies going South - hit repeat targets
[] made the bombing predictable and resulted in Vietminh retaliation, shooting down planes in some instances - AVOIDED BOMBING:
[] Haiphong (the port from where USSR and Chinese aid in the form of weapons, troops etc. were received)
[] Hanoi (the capital)
[] this is because Johnson was wary of escalating the Cold War through causing tensions with the communist powers - planes dropped:
[] bombs
[] napalm
[] pineapple bombs - the campaign went against the advice of military advisors and troops to instead heavily carpet bomb North Vietnam indiscriminately to force them into negotiation
9
Q
Describe the key events of Operation Rolling Thunder from its start on the 2 March 1965 to its end in late 1968
A
- 2 March 1965
[] first bombs dropped - Christmas 1965
[] temporary stop in the bombing - January 1966
[] Johnson offered to negotiate with the North Vietnamese; declined
[] Johnson widened the available targets for bombing to Haiphong and Vietnam’s oil storages etc. - late 1968
[] bombing as part of Operation Rolling Thunder stops
10
Q
Describe the key effects of Operation Rolling Thunder on the North Vietnamese and their efforts in the war
A
- affected NV industry
[] HOWEVER, weapons and supplies were given by communist allies, and industry in NV wasn’t strong to begin with, so did little damage overall - significantly damaged portions of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, making it difficult to move supplies and troops south to help the Vietcong
[] HOWEVER, the Vietminh had many thousands of civilian workers and troops dedicated to constantly repairing the Trail, so didn’t affect too much in the way of transport
[] the bombing gave the North Vietnamese even more drive to send aid and supplies to the South Vietnamese communists
[] the North Vietnamese expanded upon existing tunnel systems and built new ones to further protect personnel and supplies for the Vietcong - bombing caused much destruction in Vietnam, especially of forests and villages
[] HOWEVER, it just gave new determination to defeat the USA, and gave more ammunition to the VC and North Vietnamese to recruit locals into their ranks through dislike of the USA’s tactics
[] also made the US seem bad worldwide since it was killing many civilians and damaging civilian livelihoods/lives unnecessarily - didn’t affect Haiphong or aid from communist allies SO China sent even more aid during the campaign, as did the USSR (rose by around $300 million between 1965 and 1967)
11
Q
When were the first US ground troops sent to Vietnam and why was it significant ?
A
- 8-10 March 1965
- marked significant escalation in US involvement in the war and paved the way for further escalation and sending of ground troops
12
Q
Why were US ground troops first sent to Vietnam ?
A
- as Operation Rolling Thunder went on, more US aircraft bases were built in Vietnam to hold the planes
- General Westmorland requested ground troops from Johnson to defend these bases
13
Q
List US troop numbers in Vietnam in 1964, 1965 and 1968
A
1964 - 23 300
1965 - 184 300
1968 - 536 100
14
Q
What was the main US counter-insurgency tactic used under Johnson ?
A
“search and destroy”
15
Q
What were “search and destroy” missions and what was their significance for demonstrating the issues with US military strategy in Vietnam ?
A
- US troops, working and shielding a core of ARVN troops, would search the jungles for VC camps + supplies
[] called helicopters which would bomb or spray chemicals on them - missions often on ground that the VC had booby trapped
[] a lot of US troops were injured by these - hit-and-run style fights often occurred on these missions
- problems:
[] the VC simply moved back into the area after the troops left
[] the US troops caused many casualties and collateral damage, damaging the US’ international image and the US’ image to the Vietnamese locals, who were made more likely to support the Vietcong by their destruction
[] missions created around 4 million South Vietnamese refugees
16
Q
What was Operation Cedar Falls, 1967 and its significance as a failure of the US military ?
A
- took place in the “Iron Triangle” (area where VC were strongest)
- helicopters transported troops to the village Ben Suc
- villagers transported out of Ben Suc and flown to refugee camps before the whole village was burned
- troops moved across the Iron Triangle for 3 weeks using the same tactics
- by the end, 750 VC were dead, with 450 US + ARVN casualties
- 3500 refugees from the Ben Suc area alone
- after the campaign, US declared Ben Suc and the Iron Triangle to be “free fire zones” (could be bombed without warning)
[] this was poorly conveyed to the Vietnamese villagers, who moved back to their villages only to be bombed and killed
[] any attempt to convey it was through dropped leaflets (most villagers were illiterate; shows the US’ lack of effort to understand the people and culture they were going up against)
[] made the US seem cruel and inhumane in public media
[] gave Cold War propaganda ammunition to communist countries and propaganda to the VC in continuing hatred of the US in Vietnam
17
Q
Why were defoliants and herbicides used in Vietnam from 1961 by the US ?
A
- to make VC bases/troops/supplies easier to find since the jungle was thick
- to deliberately kill crops near villages so that villagers couldn’t feed the VC to support them
[] however also affected the villagers’ food supply and reflected badly on the US both internationally and in terms of the Vietnamese’s view of the USA
18
Q
What was Operation Ranch Hand and its impact, 1961-1970 ?
A
- authorised by Kennedy
- use of chemical defoliants and herbicides in Vietnam
- first spraying was on 10th August 1961
- 24% of Vietnam sprayed between 64 and 70
[] often, villagers were not evacuated before their villages being sprayed
[] reflected VERY badly on the US due to the later health issues experienced - millions of Vietnamese and Americans had their health affected in some way by Operation Ranch Hand
- defoliants/herbicides used:
[] Agent Orange (use on jungles + forests)
[] Agent Blue (used on crops) - during the war, the defoliants/herbicides used were made quicker, more cheaply and more potently than for everyday use
[] as a result, they did not dissolve in water or soil
[] were cancerous and poisonous
[] poisoned drinking supplies and crops for years to come
[] caused at least 150 000 birth defects as reported by the Vietnamese Red Cross, and health issues like cancer, heart/lung/skin/bone diseases affected up to 3 million Vietnamese
19
Q
What was the reaction to the damage caused by Operation Ranch Hand in the US and why ?
A
- EXTREME PUBLIC OUTRAGE
- especially due to its effect of US troops as well as the Vietnamese
[] caused starvation and food shortage as well as many health problems) - sparked a lot of opposition to the US’ activity in Vietnam amongst activists
- October 1971, Defence Department stopped the spraying to calm the public, but much damage had already been done
20
Q
Name and date the 4 major battles of the Vietnam War, from 1963 to 1968
A
- 2 January 1963
[] Ap Bac - 14-26 November 1965
[] la Drang Valley - 14 January - 20 April 1968
[] Khe Sanh - 30 January - 24 February 1968
[] Tet Offensive
[] MOST DEADLY AND MOST POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT FOR THE VIETNAM WAR
21
Q
What was the Tet Offensive, 30 January - 24 February 1968 ?
A
- series of Vietcong attacks on 26 South Vietnamese cities
- started on Tet Lunar New Year, when there was usually a ceasefire to celebrate
[] surprised the ARVN and US, many of whom were off-duty
[] meant that the Vietcong could move quickly to do a lot of damage
22
Q
Describe the key initiatives of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese in the run-up to the Tet Offensive of 1968 to make sure that US and ARVN forces were caught off-guard on the day of the first actual attack
A
- late 1967, combined North Vietnamese and Vietcong force attacked areas just south of the DMZ
[] lured US and ARVN forces away from the cities and Saigon and made them guard the areas far from the cities in anticipation of future similar attacks - North Vietnam suggested it might have been ready to negotiate peace terms
[] this combined with recent VC and North Vietnamese losses to the US and ARVN forces made the US lower their guard a lot and get overconfident with pre-emptive success in the war - 20 January 1968. Khe Sanh
[] Khe Sanh was, again, just south of the DMZ, reinforcing the lure of US and ARVN forces away from the cities in preparation for the Tet Offensive
[] General Westmorland of the US demanded 6000 troops to Khe Sanh, weakening US forces in the cities
23
Q
Describe the key events of the Tet Offensive, 30 Jan - 24 Feb 1968
A
- 30 January
[] North Vietnamese and VC forces infiltrated the US embassy, ARVN headquarters, the Presidential Palace, radio stations and the airport of Saigon - US + ARVN troops were able to recapture most cities and land quite quickly (apart from the Old City of Hue and Khe Sanh)
24
Q
Describe the hopes of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese in terms of knock-on effects of the Tet Offensive, and whether they were fulfilled or not
A
- hoped that the attacks would set off a South Vietnamese revolution
[] didn’t happen
[] suggests stronger allegiance to the government present in the cities despite dislike still being strong
25
Q
Why were the attacks of the Tet Offensive so shocking to the US and ARVN troops ?
A
- was the first significant time that the South Vietnamese cities had been attacked
[] made previously safe people feel vulnerable - were on a HUGE scale relative to normal communist attacks - 84 000 troops took part
26
Q
Describe the significance of the Tet Offensive for the USA
A
- US politicians:
[] growing anti-war sentiments in Congress and unwillingness to fund further endeavours in the war beginning to grow
[] humiliation was the main reason for Johnson not running for office again in 1968 - US army:
[] some felt they could push through and win with more troops
[] others felt the ARVN did well in regaining land and wanted to leave - US public:
[] felt cheated and lied to by the government who had said publicly that they were winning in Vietnam
[] shocked by images of VC in the embassy
[] huge rise in opposition to war and distrust of the government, thus distrust of their authority and right to be in Vietnam in the first place
27
Q
Describe the significance of the Tet Offensive for North Vietnam
A
- lost HUGE numbers of VC (were almost wiped out)
- did not win in terms of gaining and keeping land/control at all
- South Vietnamese didn’t revolt as hopes
HOWEVER - VC quickly grew in number again
- was a huge political and propaganda win due to the places that they had managed to infiltrate and the inciting of protest against the war in the US
[] important, as the US government had to listen to the voices of its people in order to keep their own political careers safe
28
Q
Describe the significance of the Tet Offensive for South Vietnam
A
- government:
[] worried that the US would leave too soon - the government and troops were weak without US support or funding
[] slight relief at the fact that the South Vietnamese did not revolt against the government - people:
[] anger at the government for failing to protect them from attack
[] lingering feeling of vulnerability in the cities that hadn’t existed before
[] demonstrated that a communist takeover would be destructive
