Conflict in the Middle East: 2.1

Question 1

Give a timeline of events from 1964-67 leading up to the Six Day War (no details necessary)

Answer 1

• January 1964
  [] Cairo Conference
• 1 January 1965
  [] failed Fatah attack on Israeli irrigation gains mass publicity
• February 1966
  [] new Syrian government increased support for Fatah
  [] Syrian government accused Nasser of doing nothing substantial to help Palestinians
• November 1966
  [] Egyptian-Syrian defence pact signed
• 13 November 1966
  [] Samu Incident
• 7 April 1967
  [] Syrian-Israeli dogfight
• 12 May
  [] commander-in-chief of IDF publicly threatened to invade and occupy the Syrian capital if they didn’t cease support for Fatah
• 13 May
  [] false Soviet warning to Egypt that Israeli troops were massing on the border of Syria
• 14 May 1967
  [] Egyptian army put on alert thanks to false USSR alert about Israeli troops massing on the Syrian border the day before
• 15 May
  [] Egyptian troops enter Sinai
• 16 May
  [] Nasser ordered UN to leave Sinai
• 18 May
  [] UN leave Sinai and Nasser’s troops move to Israeli border
• 23 May
  [] Nasser closed Tiran Straits
• 29 May
  [] Nasser demanded that Israel return all occupied territories taken in the 1948-49 war as well as the Palestinian hostages they held
• 30 May
  [] Egyptian-Jordanian defence pact
  [] Jordanian troops put under Egyptian orders
• 31 May
  [] USA suggested that Israel take action to re-open the Straits
• 1 June 1967
  [] Six Day War starts

Question 2

Describe the key features and significance of the Cairo Conference in January 1964

Answer 2

• Nasser invited leaders of all Arab states
• by the end of the Conference, 3 main results:
  [] Headwater Diversion Plan; Syria and Lebanon to divert two of three sources of the River Jordan to prevent from flowing into Sea of Galilee - in this way, Israel would have less water for irrigation of agricultural settlements/farms in the Negev Desert - IF DIDN’T WORK, ALL ARAB STATES TO PREPARE FOR WAR TO DESTROY ISRAEL
  [] PLO and PLA set up (Palestinian Liberation Organisation/Army); support for Palestinians made clear and Palestinians finally able to join their own army that couldn’t simply be presented as a terrorist organisation by Zionist media - PLO also took some responsibility for Palestinian refugees in camps from Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, which was useful for the leaders of these countries politically and economically
  [] Nasser’s leadership of the Arab world (Syria currently taking spotlight because of dispute over control over River Jordan’s sources with Israel) as well as his anti-Israeliness proved without having to go to war and thus further damage Egypt’s economy

Question 3

Describe the impact of the Cairo Conference on Israel

Answer 3

• not threatened by the PLA or PLO
  [] had limited powers and the PLA only ever had around 12 000 soldiers in total
• not threatened by promises of war
  [] UN peacekeepers creating buffer zone between Egypt and Israel, so had security in this sense
  [] armies of Syria and Egypt were poorly trained and lacked experience in comparison to the military prowess of the IDF
• the fact that Nasser wanted to avoid war proved that Egypt was economically weak, and could not afford war at this stage, so an attack very soon was unlikely
• Headwater Diversion Plan was the only threat
  [] gave rise to Syrian-Israeli tensions once Syria began construction of a canal in 1965
  [] led to the dogfight of 1967
  [] was one of the causes of the 6 Day War as threats to water supply were SERIOUS; many Israelis were farmers and if couldn’t do this, no livelihood and economic collapse, as well as shortages of drinking water and food shortages/famine

Question 4

Who were Fatah ?

Answer 4

• PLO rejectionists (Palestinian)
• founded in 1959 by Yasser Arafat
  [] believed Israel had no right to exist and should be replaced by only one state (Palestine) where Jews and Arabs lived together PROVES THAT PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS/FIGHTERS WERE NOT ANTI-SEMITIC, SIMPLY WANTED LAND BACK; Zionist media did not mention this however as propaganda against Palestinians
  [] also believed Palestinians shouldn’t rely on other Arab states to solve their problems (less invested personally than Palestinians, so never necessarily first priority and would take much longer)

Question 5

Describe the significance of Fatah operations from 1965-67

Answer 5

• 1 January 1965, failed Fatah operation to blow up canal that channelled water to the Negev Desert gained huge (negative) publicity due to Israel’s need to keep global sympathy on their side
  [] backfired, as Palestinians regarded Arafat as a hero and many joined Fatah
• from 1965-67, over 100 raids were launched on Israel
  [] harsh Israeli reprisals every time, destroying targets inside of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, making Fatah unpopular especially in Jordan, but Syria supported even more after these reprisals
  [] raids kept the Palestinian cause in the news, kept relevant with publicity - pressure slowly building up on world leaders to do something about the problem

Question 6

Describe the Israeli raid on Samu, 13th November 1966

Answer 6

• reprisal for death via landmine of 3 Israeli police
  [] who laid the mine was unknown but Fatah suspected
  [] shows harshness of Israeli reprisals; without even concrete evidence attacked - some could interpret this as Israel simply looking for excuses to attack Palestinians and their supporters, helping to discourage support for Palestinians and thus make Palestinians weaker politically, taking away bargaining and pressuring power to regain a Palestinian state
• King Hussein of Jordan wrote a letter of condolence to Israel in hopes of avoiding reprisal, but arrived too late
• 600 troops, 11 tanks + 60 Israeli vehicles driven into Samu (small West Bank settlement)
  [] reduced Samu to rubble
  [] 100 Jordanian troops passing by and fought IDF troops - unexpected as thought that Jordan was becoming less and less supportive of the Palestinians

Question 7

Describe the consequences of the Samu Incident for Eshkol (Israeli PM), King Hussein and the USA

Answer 7

• USA:
  [] Israel had destroyed friendly relations between the US and Jordan (the ONLY Arab nation open to negotiation etc.)
  [] lost influence completely in the Middle East at least for a while - detrimental to the US’ position in the Cold War and the USSR could use US support of Israel and its violence as well as mass Arab support for the Soviets as propaganda against the USA
• Eshkol:
  [] faced MASSIVE international criticism for the excessive use of power
  [] many argued that Jordan was the wrong target for Eshkol to stop Fatah activity, as Syria was a much more enthusiastic supporter of Fatah
  [] destroyed any hope of friendly Jordanian-Israeli relations (Jordan was the only country open to talking and peace with Israel at the time)
  [] criticism made Eshkol cautious about further military action, but this just made him look weak to all sides, including Israelis
• King Hussein:
  [] faced much Jordanian protest for failing to protect Palestinians
  [] riots in the West Bank calling for his removal
  [] criticism forced him to abandon hope for positive relations with the West and with Israel, and he publicly called for revenge to take the heat off of him and prove that he was anti-Israeli - despite this didn’t want a war as Jordan couldn’t afford it and so tried to stall Fatah activity out of the West Bank to preserve Jordan’s finances
  [] this made him look like a massive hypocrite and meant that no one believed he was seriously anti-Israeli - accused Nasser of doing nothing for Palestinians + hiding behind UN in Sinai to take the heat off of him - WORKED as this was the second accusation in the same year of Nasser’s inaction regarding Palestine

Question 8

Describe Eshkol’s key justifications + their significance for the Samu Incident 13 November 1966

Answer 8

• was punishment for 3 Israeli deaths
  [] not a reason to blame Samu of all places
  [] reduced an entire settlement to rubble for 3 deaths
  [] some viewed this as honourable and a good reason to protect Israel via discouraging terrorist activity by putting pressure on the leaders of the countries where Fatah had bases, whilst others viewed it as excessive force
  [] sympathy went to Palestinians because of this
• Israel needed to send a clear message to the Arab settlements in the West Bank not to support Fatah
  [] provides explanation for targeting Samu, but doesn’t explain why they wouldn’t target the bigger supporter of Fatah, Syria
• Israel needed to force King Hussein to stop Fatah activity
  [] on one hand, nonsensical as Syria was bigger supporter
  [] HOWEVER, due to earlier efforts to establish good relations with Israel, the Israelis knew that Hussein may have been the most malleable and likely to restrict Fatah activity out of the West Bank; regardless of who was the bigger supporter, this reduced pressure on Israel’s military expenditures (though were relatively low at this time)

Question 9

Describe the key events of the April 7 1967 dogfight between Israeli and Syrian jets

Answer 9

• 7 April, Syrian gunners in the Golan Heights fired on Israeli tractor in the DMZ
  [] in retaliation, Israeli jets sent to attack the Syrian gunners’ position
• Israeli jets also struck Syrian villages in the Golan Heights
  [] Syrians brought in their own fighter jets
  [] 6 Syrian jets lost and the rest chased back to Damascus (the Syrian capital) by Israeli jets

Question 10

Describe the significance of the Israeli-Syrian dogfight

Answer 10

• Israel WANTED TO PROVOKE AN ATTACK
  [] Moshe Dayan said that would order tractors into the DMZ to purposefully annoy Syria and provoke an attack
  [] Israeli response was instantaneous and prepared
  [] attacking Syria would mean demoralising the Syrian military (as IDF was stronger and would win) and thus giving Israel better publicity and support from its people and Zionists
• losing 6 jets in one day was a massive blow to Syrian and the wider Arab pride

Question 11

Why did the USSR falsely report an Israeli preparation to invade on the 13th of May 1967 ?

Answer 11

• may have wanted to prompt Egypt into war
  [] makes Israel vulnerable again
  [] shows that has influence over the Middle East in terms of Cold War
  [] would have made US support Israel in the war again and thus reinforce Arab support for the USSR, NOT the US
• may have simply been a mistake

Question 12

What was the significance of Nasser’s actions from the 14th to the 30th of May leading up to the 6 Day War ?

Answer 12

• Nasser still wanted ultimately to avoid war, so his threats to Israel suggested that he may have believed that Eshkol would give into his demands
  [] since Samu, Eshkol = weak seemingly
• Nasser believed that the Arab forced would win in conflict with Israel
  [] massively outnumbered the Egyptians in terms of troops and weapons + vehicles
  [] had Soviet supply now to compete with Israel’s US aid
• Nasser’s direct opposition to Israel and intent to destroy Israel made Nasser an Arab hero and greatly raised his profile

Question 13

Describe and date the key events of the 6 Day War (31 May - 10 June)

Answer 13

• 31 May
  [] US prompts Israel to take action regarding opening Straits of Tiran (not direct permission for war but implied)
• 1 June
  [] Moshe Dayan appointed as Defence Minister by Eshkol
  [] wanted war; thought that an Arab attack was very likely but not immediately, so knew if struck quickly and gained surprise advantage could easily decimate the Arab forces
• 4 June
  [] Dayan + Israeli government secretly decided on war
  [] Dayan told reserve troops to go home for weekend so as to make Arabs let guard down
• 5 June
  [] IDF destroyed Egyptian airfields, occupied Gaza strip, destroyed Syrian airforce and airfields, destroyed Jordan’s air forces/fields
  [] Jordanian troops attack West Jerusalem (SIGNIFICANT FOR JEWS - LOSING JERUSALEM WOULD BE HORRIBLE)
• 6 June
  [] IDF tanks cross Sinai to Suez Canal
  [] fierce Israeli-Jordanian fight over control of Jerusalem
• 7 June
  [] IDF capture Sinai and East Jerusalem
  [] Jordan accepts UN ceasefire call
• 8 June
  [] Egypt accepts UN ceasefire call
  [] IDF take advantage of Jordan’s compliance to ceasefire and take West Bank from Jordan
• 9 June
  [] IDF attack Syrian army in Golan Heights
• 10 June
  [] IDF take Golan Heights
  [] Syria accepts UN ceasefire call
  [] war ends

Question 14

Describe the impact of the 6 Day War on Arabs

Answer 14

• lost a lot of land to Israel
• 20 000 men killed, 430 aircraft destroyed, 800 tanks destroyed
  [] decimation to Arab military meant severe blow in Arab pride
  [] also made Nasser seem as if he had little foresight, due to his previous assurances that the Arabs would win in a conflict with Israel, as well as his aggressive escalation up until the 30th of May
• Arabs received negative publicity for Nasser’s escalative actions up until 30 May DESPITE ISRAEL’S VIOLENCE IN THE SIX DAY WAR
  [] gave sympathy, pride and global support to Israel instead of the Arabs
• took publicity away from the PALESTINIANS and instead gave to Israel, Jordan, Syria and Egypt
• many Arabs and Palestinian settlements were now in Israeli hands
  [] harsher conditions and military occupation enforced, taking away rights, freedoms and ability to organise massive resistance from Palestinians (at least in part)

Question 15

Explain two interpretations of Israel’s actions in the Six Day War

Answer 15

• defensive:
  [] Nasser’s escalation of conflict until the 30th of May justified the Israeli attacks as simple pre-emptive strike
  [] global support and appreciation of Israeli military and tactical power flowed in
  [] Zionist and Western publications in particular were very supportive of the Israeli efforts and the gained territories
• aggressive:
  [] many argued that the Six Day War was simply a planned land-grab from Israel justified by the escalation of Arab-Israeli conflict in May
  [] Dayan publicly stated that he KNEW Nasser’s actions and escalation was mainly to save face, and not meant as an actual threat of war (though it quickly became one anyway) - despite this still attacked since also knew that Egypt and Syria would be easy to defeat
  [] Dayan also stated that Israel wanted more land, and Nasser’s closure of the Tiran Straits was the perfect cover
  [[ Israel refused Jordanian offer of ceasefire UNTIL IT CONTROLLED THE WEST BANK
  [] destroyed a US intelligence ship during the 6 Day War to prevent the USA from learning about Israel’s intentions to gain more land, not simply defend itself against aggression