Notes, Cautions, Warnings

Question 1

NATOPS

Chap 12

PNAC responsibilities (APU T)

Answer 1

The PNAC shall:

1. Assist in ensuring the continued safe flight of the aircraft.
2. Perform the critical memory items that do not involve the flight controls.
3. Use the pocket checklist to complete non-critical memory items.
4. Troubleshoot as required.

Question 2

NATOPS

Chap 12

Aircrew responsibilities (PCUBA)

Answer 2

The aircrewman shall:

1. Provide the pilots with verbal calls as necessary to ensure the continued safe flight of the aircraft.
2. Complete the applicable critical memory items.
3. Utilize the pocket checklist to complete the remaining non-critical memory items.
4. Back up the pilots with the pocket checklist to the maximum extent possible.
5. Assist the PNAC with troubleshooting.

Question 3

NATOPS

Chap 12

PAC responsibilites (MADCD)

Answer 3

The following should be performed for all emergencies:

1. Maintain control of the aircraft.
2. Alert crew.
3. Determine the precise nature of the problem.
4. Complete the applicable emergency procedure or take action appropriate for the problem.
5. Determine landing criteria and land as required.

Question 4

NATOPS Chap 12

Landing Definitions

Answer 4

Land immediately: Execute a landing without delay.

Land as soon as possible: Execute a landing at the first site at which a safe landing can be made.

Land as soon as practicable: Extended flight is not recommended. The landing site and duration of flight are at the discretion of the PIC.

Question 5

NATOPS Chap 12

Circuit Breaker Terms

Answer 5

Check: Visually observe circuit breaker condition. Do not change condition.

Pull: If circuit breaker is in, pull circuit breaker out. If circuit breaker is out, do not change condition.

Reset: If circuit breaker is out, push circuit breaker in. If circuit breaker is in, do not change condition.

Cycle: If circuit breaker is in, pull circuit breaker out, and then push circuit breaker back in. If circuit breaker is out, do not change condition.

Question 6

NATOPS Chap 12

Define Single Engine Conditions

Answer 6

The term “single-engine condition” is defined as a flight regime that permits sustained flight with One Engine Inoperative (OEI). Establishing single-engine conditions may include increasing power available (turning contingency power on and engine anti-ice off), decreasing power required (dumping fuel and jettisoning cargo), and achieving single-engine airspeed. This envelope must be
maintained until landing.

Question 7

NATOPS Chap 12

EMIF (2W)

Answer 7

1. Flying with greater than 110% torque
   with one engine inoperative may result in
   unrecoverable decay of Nr in the event of
   a dual-engine failure.
2. With engine anti-ice on, up to 18%
   torque available is lost. Torque may be
   reduced as much as 49% with improperly
   operating engine inlet anti-ice valves.

Question 8

NATOPS Chap 12

Engine High Side Failure in Flight (1C,3N)

Answer 8

Caution:
If an Np overspeed condition is reached (120%), the overspeed system will flame out the engine and the auto-ignition system will relight the engine. If Nr is not controlled and Np accelerates back to 120%, the overspeed system will flame out the engine again and
the auto-ignition system will reset the igniter 5-second timer. The Np overspeed/auto-ignition system will continue cycling until Np/Nr is controlled. A yaw kick may be experienced each time the engine relights.

Note:

1. Ng does not pass through the EDECU and is a highly reliable signal.
2. Torque signal maybe erratic or drop off for high side conditions driven by EDECU failure.
3. With high collective settings, Nr may increase slowly, making high-side failure confirmation difficult. Reducing collective will reveal increasing Nr and verify high-side failure. All of the following conditions exist:
   
   1. TRQ is 10% or greater than other engine.
   2. Ng is 5% or greater than other engine.
   3. Np is matched within 5% of other engine.
   4. Nr is at or above 103%.

Question 9

NATOPS Chap 12

ENGINE TORQUE OR TGT SPIKING/FLUCTUATIONS (1W)

Answer 9

Warning:
PCL movement during engine fluctuations may precipitate an engine failure. Consider performing APU Emergency Start procedure prior to manipulating the PCL. Maintaining a low power setting when moving the PCL will minimize the Nr decay rate if the malfunctioning engine fails.

Question 10

NATOPS Chap 12

COMPRESSOR STALL (1C)

Answer 10

Caution:
If the Ng decay relight feature attempts to relight the engine, subsequent compressor stalls may
occur and damage the engine. A yaw kick may be experienced each time the engine relights. The
engine must be manually shut down.

Question 11

NATOPS Chap 12

ENGINE HIGH-SPEED SHAFT FAILURE (1C,1N)

Answer 11

Caution:
Following a high-speed shaft failure, the engine will overspeed, the Np overspeed system will flame out the engine, and the auto-ignition system will activate the
relight feature. The engine Np governor will eventually bring Np down toward 100%. The engine must be manually shutdown to prevent further damage.

Note:
The Engine Np Sensor is unreliable with Np < 20%. For this reason any (#1/#2) DRVSHAFT FAIL should be acknowledged and ignored when Engine Np <20%.
No maintenance action is required when in this condition.

Question 12

NATOPS Chap 12

ABORT START (1C)

Answer 12

Caution:
During aborted starts, failure to immediately stop fuel
flow may result in engine overtemperature.

Question 13

NATOPs Chap 12

DUAL ENGINE FAILURE (3W [outside of EP])

Answer 13

1. Rotor rpm decays rapidly following a dual-engine failure or the loss of the second engine after a single-engine failure. Delay in lowering the collective
   will result in loss of rotor rpm and may cause catastrophic failure of the rotor system due to dynamic instability at low rpm.
2. Altitude hold will remain engaged unless deselected. If the collective TRIM RLSE switch is not depressed, the AFCS will attempt to maintain aircraft altitude. AFCS commanded collective movement could result in a
   catastrophic loss of Nr.
3. Flying with greater than 110 percent torque with one engine inoperative, may result in unrecoverable decay of Nr in the event of a dual-engine failure. (If both engines fail, generators will drop off line at approximately 80 percent Nr, resulting in loss of both pilot and copilot mission and flight displays.)

Question 14

NATOPS Chap 12

SINGLE-ENGINE FAILURE IN FLIGHT (1W [outside EP])

Answer 14

Engine failure accompanied by an explosion or unusual noise indicates damage to the engine. There is a possibility that any attempt to restart the engine may result in a fire. Under such circumstances, do not try to restart the engine unless it is needed to maintain level flight.

Question 15

NATOPS Chap 12

ENGINE AIR RESTART EMERGENCY PROCEDURE (1 N,C,W) (1N [outside ep])

Answer 15

Warning:
If APU is unavailable, and a crossbleed start is necessary, maximum torque available will be reduced during the start sequence. Depending on operating conditions, level flight may not be possible. Ensure AIR SOURCE ECS/START switch is placed to ENG for crossbleed starts.

Caution:
For a crossbleed start, the donor engine should indicate the maximum Ng safely obtainable. Receiving engine Ng less than 24% prior to advancing PCL to IDLE may result in a hot start.

Note
Either a single- or dual-engine restart may be attempted following dual-engine failure. Decision should be based on applicability of respective start
envelopes and considerations of longer time to idle when executing a dual-engine restart

Note
In the event of an alternator failure, the Ng signal may be unavailable. Engine start will not be possible without ac power provided to the ignition exciter.

Question 16

NATOPS Chap 12

UNUSUAL VIBRATIONS ON DECK (1C)

Answer 16

Caution:
Application of the rotor brake may aggravate lead/lag
tendencies and cause a mechanical failure.

Question 17

NATOPS Chap 12

HUNG DROOP STOP(S) (1N)

Answer 17

Note:
While operating in cold weather, consideration
should be given to turning the BLADE DE-ICE control
panel POWER switch to the POWER ON position. This
will activate the droop-stop heaters and aid the droop
stops in seating.

Question 18

NATOPS Chap 12

MAIN TRANSMISSION MALFUNCTION (2W,3N)

Answer 18

Warning:
Possible indications of main transmission imminent failure may include: yaw attitude excursions with no control input, an increase in power required for a fixed collective setting, failure of a main generator or hydraulic pump, increased noise, increased vibration levels, or abnormal fumes in the cabin.

Warning:
Operation of the main gearbox with no oil pressure may result in failure of the tail rotor drive takeoff pinion gear and subsequent loss of tail rotor drive.

Notes:
1. Consideration should be given to performing the applicable steps of the Immediate Landing/Ditching
emergency procedure and transiting at a minimum power airspeed and low altitude flight profile (approximately 80 feet and 80 KIAS) to permit a
quick flare followed by an immediate landing/ditching.

2. A loss of all main transmission lubricating oil may result in unreliable temperature indications from the main transmission temperature gauge and
temperature sensor (caution).

3. Continued operations in the precautionary range for temperature and pressure are acceptable provided that the ambient conditions and flight regime of the aircraft correspond with the guidance set forth in the transmission limitations section of Chapter 4.

Question 19

NATOPS Chap 12

TAIL/INTERMEDIATE TRANSMISSION MALFUNCTION (2W, 1N)

Answer 19

Warnings:

1. High power settings require maximum performance of the tail rotor drive system and may precipitate
   ultimate drive failure.
2. Consideration should be given to transiting at an altitude sufficient to enter an autorotation and
   performing the applicable steps of the Immediate Landing/Ditching emergency procedure.

Note:

An INT XMSN OIL HOT or TAIL XMSN OIL HOT caution occurring simultaneously with a WCA MISCOMPARE alert may be an indication of a mission computer / back up computer card failure.

Question 20

NATOPS Chap 12

#1/#2) INPUT CHIP CAUTION (1N

Answer 20

Note:

Consideration should be given to returning the engine PCL to fly prior to touchdown

Question 21

NATOPS Chap 12

LOSS OF TAIL ROTOR DRIVE ALTITUDE AND AIRSPEED SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH AUTOROTATION (1W) (1W [outside ep])

Answer 21

Warning:
Altitude hold will remain engaged unless deselected.
If the collective TRIM RLSE button is not depressed, the AFCS will attempt to maintain aircraft altitude through the collective trim servo. AFCS commanded collective movement can result in an accelerated yaw rate.

Warning:
Attempting to continue flight with uncontrolled yaw rates and forward speed will result in a total loss of aircraft control regardless of PAC inputs.

Question 22

NATOPS Chap 12

LOSS OF TAIL ROTOR DRIVE ALTITUDE AND AIRSPEED NOT SUFFICIENT
TO ESTABLISH AUTOROTATION (1C)

Answer 22

Caution:
Altitude may have to be adjusted based on rate of
yaw and/or turn

Question 23

NATOPS Chap 12

LOSS OF TAIL ROTOR CONTROL (5W,1N)

Answer 23

Warnings:
1. Following the appearance of the #1 TAIL RTR SERVO caution without the associated BKUP PUMP ON and
#2 TAIL RTR SERVO ON advisories, the aircraft will demonstrate normal yaw responses in flight regimes that do not require excessive tail rotor performance; however, at slower airspeeds, below approximately
40 KIAS, more pronounced effects of loss of tail rotor control may become more apparent.

2. After touchdown, rapid reduction of collective or PCLs may cause excessive and uncontrollable
   yaw rates.
3. If an uncontrolled right yaw develops at too low of an airspeed, loss of waveoff capability may result. Increasing collective may increase the yaw to
   unrecoverable rates. Performing loss of tail rotor drive (altitude and airspeed not sufficient to establish autorotation) procedures may be required.
4. If the tail rotor control cables are damaged, the hydraulic transients associated with switching the tail
   rotor servo from NORM to BKUP may cause catastrophic damage to the tail rotor controls.
5. Servo hardovers in the yaw channel may result in
   loss of tail rotor control. Consideration should
   be given to securing the SAS/BOOST and/or TRIM
   as necessary

Note:
A momentary uncommanded right yaw will occur when the tail rotor servo switches from normal to backup in a hover. The rate and magnitude will primarily depend on power required and wind direction and magnitude.

Question 24

NATOPs Chap 12

TAIL ROTOR QUADRANT CAUTION (1C)

Answer 24

If the helicopter is shut down and/or hydraulic power is
removed with one tail rotor cable failure, disconnect
of the other tail rotor cable will occur when force from
the boost servo cannot react against control cable quadrant spring tension. The quadrant spring will displace the cable and servo piston enough to
unlatch the quadrant cable.

Question 25

NATOPS Chap 12

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM WARNING (1C [outside of ep])

Answer 25

If the BACK UP PUMP PWR circuit breaker is out and a condition exists that requires the backup pump to operate, then either the hydraulic system must be configured so that the backup pump will not activate upon resetting the circuit breaker, or ac power must be secured prior to resetting the circuit breaker. Damage to the current limiters may occur and will be indicated by a loss of all loads on No. 1 ac primary bus.

Question 26

1 PRIMARY SERVO OR #1 TRANSFER MODULE LEAK (1W,1N)

NATOPS Chap 12

Answer 26

Warning:
Failure to ensure BACKUP HYD PMP switch is in AUTO or ON position prior to landing with a #1 RSVR LOW or #1 HYD PUMP caution present will result in loss of tail rotor directional control when the weight on wheels switch is activated.

Note:
Be prepared for a loss of tail rotor control

Question 27

2 PRIMARY SERVO OR #2 TRANSFER MODULE LEAK (2N)

NATOPS Chap 12

Answer 27

Note:
1. Failure to ensure BACKUP PUMP switch is in AUTO or ON position prior to landing with a #2 HYD PUMP
caution present will result in loss of pilot assist servos when the weight on wheels switch is activated.

2. Be prepared for loss of the
   pilot-assist servos.

Question 28

NATOPS Chap 12

BOOST SERVO HARDOVER (2C)

Answer 28

Cautions:
1. Up to 75 pounds of left pedal force will be required when hovering with boost servos off with starboard crosswinds. This value is significantly reduced
with port crosswinds.

2. Landings with BOOST SERVO OFF on all single spot air-capable ships should only be attempted if there is
   no large landing platform (LPD or larger) or shore base available.

Question 29

NATOPs Chap 12

UTILITY PUMP CAUTION (1C)

Answer 29

Caution:
Utility hydraulic pump with low or no hydraulic fluid
shall be secured to prevent damage to the pump.

Question 30

NATOPs Chap 12

AFCS DEGRADED CAUTION (1N) (1W,1N [outside ep])

Answer 30

Note:
If the AFCS DEGRADED caution appears during a night/IMC coupled hover or automatic approach, consideration may be given to continuing hover/approach if not disoriented or unstable.

Warning:
Altitude hold may be disengaged due to a malfunction in the engine torque indication system, resulting in false high torque indication for both engines and high torque signals to the AFCS.

Note:
Backup pump initiation with AFCS heading hold engaged may cause heading hold failure. Should the malfunction occur, pressing one of the fail advisory mode reset pushbuttons will restore system operation.

Question 31

NATOPs Chap 12

STABILATOR AUTO MODE FAILURE (HALPMAN) (4W, 1N)

Answer 31

Warnings:

1. The stabilator may fail without illumination of the associated caution and aural warning tone. Initial indication of failure may be an uncommanded pitch change during accelerated or decelerated flight
2. If accelerated flight is continued with the stabilator in the full down position, longitudinal control will be lost.
3. With the stabilator fixed at or near 0 degrees, nose-high attitudes may occur at slow speeds
4. A combination of high airspeed/low altitude coupled
   with a runaway down stabilator will necessitate immediate pilot action to maintain control of the aircraft.

Note:

In Manual Mode, the following are not recommended:
— Swimmer deployments lower than 15 feet AGL.
— Night takeoffs, approaches, and landings (except one-time landing following failure).
— Automatic approaches to a hover.
— Simulated emergency procedures, including practice autorotations.
— Flight in known IMC.

Question 32

NATOPS Chap 12

ELECTRICAL POWER FAILURE/DUAL GENERATOR FAILURE (2W,2N) (2W [outside ep])

Answer 32

Warnings:
1. Loss of electrical power to the engine will result in engine anti-ice activation regardless of engine anti-ice or DE-ICE MASTER switch position, reducing maximum torque available by up to 18%. With a malfunctioning inlet anti-ice valve, torque available can be reduced by as much as 49%.

2. Exceeding airspeed versus stabilator angle limits may result in unrecoverable pitch angles.

Notes:

1. The capability of slewing the stabilator is retained via the dc essential bus using battery power. Travel is limited to 35° if full down or 30° if full up when a power failure occurs.
2. The stabilator position indicator will be inoperative with no power to the ac essential bus. Attempt to check visually.

Warnings:

1. Without electrical power to the dc Primary buses, the engine and inlet anti-ice valves are automatically opened. With an improperly operating engine inlet anti-ice system, a loss of up to 49 percent power available per engine is possible.
2. On aircraft with no installed LWR CNSL SEC LTS rheostat the lower console lights will remain on unless the LIGHTS SEC PANEL (PILOT OVHD circuit breaker panel) circuit breaker is pulled. Pulling this circuit breaker will also secure the glareshield lights. In the event of a total loss of ac power, this circuit breaker must be reset in order to provide any lower console or glareshield lighting.

Question 33

NATOPS Chap 12

#1/#2) FUEL FLTR BYPASS OR (#1/#2) FUEL PRESS CAUTION (1W

Answer 33

Warning:
Intermittent appearance of a FUEL PRESS caution may be an indication of air leaking into the fuel supply lines, which could cause momentary fluctuation in engine power or flameout.

Question 34

1 AND #2 FUEL FLTR BYPASS OR #1 AND #2 FUEL PRESS CAUTIONS (2W,1N)

NATOPS Chap 12

Answer 34

Warnings:
1. Intermittent appearance of a FUEL PRESS caution
may be an indication of air leaking into the fuel supply lines, which could cause momentary fluctuation in engine power or flameout.

2. Be prepared for dual-engine failure. Recommended airspeed is 80 KIAS to minimize Nr droop should dual- engine failure occur.

Note:

Consideration should be given to performing applicable steps of the Immediate Landing/Ditching emergency procedure.

Question 35

NATOPs Chap 12

EXTERNAL ENGINE FIRE (1N)

Answer 35

NOTE:
HF transmissions, Sunlight filtered through smoke, haze, water, or at sunrise or sunset may trigger the fire detectors and cause a false fire indication.

Question 36

NATOPs Chap 12

APU FIRE (1N)

Answer 36

NOTE:
HF transmissions, Sunlight filtered through smoke, haze, water, or at sunrise or sunset may trigger the fire detectors and cause a false fire indication.

Question 37

NATOPs Chap 12

COKPIT/CABIN FIRE (4W,1C,1N)

Answer 37

Warnings:
1. Severity of the fire and conditions present will dictate whether an immediate landing/ditching is required.

2. Vapors from the portable fire extinguisher agent, although not poisonous, can cause asphyxiation by displacement of oxygen in a confined space. The cabin should be ventilated as soon as practical.
3. It may not be advisable to secure all electrical power, thus losing AFCS, ICS, and flight instruments prior to achieving VMC or landing/ditching.
4. Loss of electrical power to the engine will result in engine anti-ice activation regardless of engine anti-ice or DE-ICE MASTER switch position, reducing maximum torque available by up to 18%. With a malfunctioning
   inlet anti-ice valve, torque available can be reduced by as much as 49%.

Caution:
If source of fire is unknown, consideration should be
given to securing Mission Power immediately when securing unnecessary electrical equipment to prevent system damage.

Note:
Consideration should be given to selecting the Diagnostics (DIAG) page in order to identify failing components.

Question 38

NATOPS Chap 12

IMMEDIATE LANDING/DITCHING (PILOT) (3W) (1W [outside of ep])

Answer 38

Warnings:
1. Jettisoning stores at descent rates greater than those listed in the NATIP may result in aircraft/rotor system impact from jettisoned stores.

2. After actuation, the position of the emergency jettison window lever may cause snagging of personal survival gear, impeding egress. Time permitting, reset jettison handle to the aft position prior to egress.
3. Failure to remain strapped in aircraft until all violent motion or in-rushing water stops may result in injury or incapacitation

Warning:
Downward travel of seat may cause injury or entrapment.

Question 39

NATOPs Chap 12

UNDERWATER EGRESS (5W)

Answer 39

Warning:

1. The downward stroke of the seat will change the frame of reference needed for egress. Extended handles, windows, and controls will not be located in the same relative position. Keep legs clear from under seat area. Downward travel of seat may cause injury or entrapment.
2. Do not inflate LPU until outside helicopter.
3. Water pressure may prevent opening the emergency egress windows until the cabin fills with water. The windows should be jettisoned prior to water entry to optimize the ability of the crew to safely egress.
4. Failure to disconnect ICS cord can impede egress. Personal gear may snag during egress, notably on collectives, MTS HCUs, Parking Brake and RAST release handles, PCLs/Fuel Selectors/Fire T–Handles, or extended Emergency Jettison Window handles
5. If entanglement or disorientation delays egress, hold onto a reference point with one hand. Using the other hand, place the Emergency Breathing Device second stage regulator in your mouth, clear water from your mouthpiece, and continue with egress.

Question 40

NATOPs Chap 12

DUAL EGI FAILURE (1N) (3N [outside ep])

Answer 40

Note:
Do not initiate a manual or auto test via the diagnostics page for troubleshooting EGI issues. It will cause the EGI to freeze and require maintenance to remove the batteries to clear the problem.

Notes:
1. Attitude data (pitch and roll) from both EGIs is required for full autopilot and approach coupler functionality. Loss of either EGI attitude data (pitch and/or roll) or the CPLR fail advisory light will result in AFCS degradation. This includes loss of all approach coupler functionality and, depending on the nature of the failure, loss or degradation of autopilot functions. SAS 1, SAS 2, trim, and stabilator functions are retained.

2. Loss of heading and velocity data from EGI No. 2 will result in loss of approach coupler functionality.
3. Once aircraft attitude is valid (“ALGN-G”), benign maneuvering (30 to 90° heading changes using 10 to 20° angle of bank) will aid an IF alignment.

Question 41

NATOPS Chap 12

HELLFIRE MISSILE HANGFIRE (1W,1C,2N)

Answer 41

Warnings:
1. The Hellfire missile thermal battery produces voltage for up to 30 minutes after the Hellfire missile squib is automatically fired during the launch sequence. If continued flight is possible, the aircraft should remain
airborne with Hellfire missile pointed in a safe direction for a minimum of 30 minutes to allow the thermal battery to become inert.

Caution:
Personnel should not handle hung ordnance for at least 30 minutes after attempted launch.

Note
1. Normal rocket motor burn time is less than 3 seconds. A rocket motor failure may cause the motor to slow burn or smolder and smoke for more than 3 seconds.

2.• The missile thermal battery does not provide the voltage for the rocket motor fire train. Aircraft power via the Signal Data Converter (AH SDC) is required to fire the rocket motor squibs. If motor squibs have not fired within 1.5 seconds after launch attempt, the missile Safe and Arm Device (SAD) will mechanically return to the safe condition. This will disconnect the firing circuit from the rocket motor squibs.