WC exam questions topic 1 Flashcards
Was India the decisive reason for Churchill’s exclusion from political power 1929-36? - YES - his career
- WC had a distinguished political career before 1929 - Home Secretary at 35, Chancellor of the Exchequer 1924-9. A member of the Conservative shadow cabinet. Robert Rhose James argued his attacks on gov policy on India guarantted he wouldn’t get a ministerial post until at least 1935 - ‘India could not be likely forgiven by its principal victim’
Was India the decisive reason for Churchill’s exclusion from political power 1929-36? - YES - out of touch
- Politicians of all parties agreed India should be self governing dominion within British empire so he was out of touch with political mainstream - the gov was ‘national’ - members of all 3 parties. Headed by 1935 Labour MacDonald PM and Conserv Baldwin who succeeded him were infuriated with his opposition
- Turned many fellow Conserv against him with personal attacks on senior gov ministers - eg attempt to force India Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare to resign in 1934 fo misleading HOC - didn’t gain support from one MP
Was India the decisive reason for Churchill’s exclusion from political power 1929-36? - YES - bad judgement
- Attack on Gallipoli in 1915, return to gold standard in 1925
- Knowledge on indian politics poor - massively understimated desire for independence, failed to appreciate the support of Gandhi from Muslims and Untouchables as evidence that they supported british rule
- Therefore failed to recognise India must be given a greater role in the gov to ‘take the wind out of the sails’ of the independence movement
- Obsecured that he was right about Hitler
Was India the decisive reason for Churchill’s exclusion from political power 1929-36? - YES - more reasons
- Greatly exaggerated power of 1935 Gov of India Act - didnt realise it left the most important matters like defense, law and order, and foreign policy in GB hands
- Forced to ally with extreme right wingers and racist pro hitler views and seperated from more progressive Conserv like Leo Amery who were natural allies against Hitler
Was India the decisive reason for Churchill’s exclusion from political power 1929-36? - NO - not INDIA
- Distrusted for other reasons besides India, not just Gallipoli and gold standard but also lack of party loyalty. Defected to Liberals in 1904, rejoined Conserv 20 years later.
Labour didn’t gov campaign General Strike in 1926 - Supported by over 60 MPs over India but really by 3 over rearment
- Support to Edward VIII during abdication arguably damaged him more than views on India - the shouting down of his speech defending Ed was greatest humiliation of his parliamentary career
Was India the decisive reason for Churchill’s exclusion from political power 1929-36? - NO - other reasons
- His views on India on temporary damage - did not stop civil servants like Desmond Morton giving him valuable information about German rearment
- In some aspects, right about India - recognised Lancanshire cotton industry relied on exports to India - Muslims and Untouchables rejected Gandhi leadership and that a premature British departure would lead to a religious civil war
- Not the major issue - faraway country as far as british voters were concerned - more concerned about economic depression and threat of war with Germany
What Churchill right to campaign for GB to rearm in response to the threat of Hitler - YES
- Everything Churchill said about Nazi Germany was true - Hitler did glorify war and taught young people that Germans were the master race - right to understand Hitler respected strength and could only be stopped by war or a credible threat
- Hitler rearmed as soon as he came into power in 1933: when he became Chancellor he asked his generals how much money he wanted for rearmament and then doubled it - GB didn’t rearm seriously since 1937
- WC able to focus on German air power - Hitler knew he couldn’t compete with GB naval supremacy so he focused on air power to help his army achieve a rapid breakthrough (Blitzkrieg) - GB would be vulnerable to invasion if Ger dominated the air
What Churchill right to campaign for GB to rearm in response to the threat of Hitler - NO
- Could be argued he exaggerated German threat at this stage; as late as 1936 the French could have stopped Hitler remilitarising the Rhineland without a shot being fired
- Foreign office figures (from Ralph Wigram) on the size of the Luftwaffe which he relied on were exaggerated and less accurate than the official Air Ministry figures
Why do you think Hitler may have deliberately exaggerated the size of the air force?
- Obsessed with the danger of a German air attack on GB which the Ger weren’t planning - Luftwaffe designed specifically to support a land campaign in France - ARMY was weakest not air force
- Failed to foresee tanks and submarines would be in WW2
- Discredited himself for being wrong for India and Edward VII - needed extreme right wing Conservatives and younger MPs like Macmillan, Eden and Duff Cooper did not attach themselves to him despite agreeing
- Warmonger impression - Baldwin said ‘war is the environment in which he thrives’
- Pacifist feeling in GB - Con defeat in East Fulham byelection in 1933 - alarmed Baldwin, WC would not be listened to
Churchill was out of office in the 1930s because he was in conflict with his own party and leaders? - YES
WC’s defence of Edward VIII, whom he didn’t know v well, was similarly misjudged. This was shown 2 days after WC’s statement , when he suffered the greatest humiliation in his parliamentary career: he had to cut his speech short b/c he was howled down by hostile MPs. Again he was out of step with the leadership of his own party & his personal attacks on Baldwin infuriated most Tory MPs.
WC’s campaign to resist Nazi aggression by allying with other countries like France & perhaps even the USSR against Hitler was out of step with Chamberlain (who took over as PM from Baldwin in May 1937) & Halifax (who as Viceroy had earlier opposed WC over India) who were committed to “appeasing” Hitler rather than opposing him.
What Colville called his “record of untrustworthiness and instability” leading to “dangerous paths” referred not just to India & E VIII but earlier mistakes like Gallipoli & returning the £ to the gold standard.
Churchill was out of office in the 1930s because he was in conflict with his own party and leaders? - NO
WC’s views on India, E VIII & rearmament put him in conflict not just with his own party & leaders but other parties, institutions & the public as well. The public didn’t necessarily disagree with WC’s views over India & E VIII but they did not share his obsession with those issues either; they were much more concerned about “bread & butter” issues like unemployment & housing.
The Labour & Liberal parties even more than the Tories opposed WC’s views on India; in fact their main grievance with the 1935 Govt of India Act was that it didn’t go far enough. The Labour politician Ramsay MacDonald, PM 1929-35, disagreed with WC’s views at least as strongly as Baldwin did.
It is true that WC was out of step with his party over Hitler but by 1939 it had become clear, as Colville admitted in D, that he was right about this issue. Chamberlain’s decision to give Hitler the Sudetenland instead of forming a Grand Alliance against him as WC proposed backfired when less than 6 months later Hitler broke his promise not to annex the rest of Czechoslovakia; when he threatened Poland, Chamberlain had to reverse his policy, rearm & threaten to go to war if Hitler invaded Poland. On Hitler, WC was proved right & Chamb wrong, which explains Colville’s admission that “he is the only man in the country who commands anything like universal respect”.
Churchill was proposing unrealistic policies with regard to gaining international support against Hitler in the 1930s? - YES
As Chamb. pointed out, Churchill’s plan for a “Grand Alliance” was unrealistic. The French had no intention of defending either Czechoslovakia or Poland; they simply planned to sit behind their defensive line, the Maginot Line, & wait for the Germans to attack. They encouraged Chamb. to appease Hitler.
It was only after Hitler broke his promise at Munich by seizing the rest of Czechoslovakia (which was only 3% German speaking) in March 1939 that people in GB fully realised that Hitler could not be trusted & must be resisted to prevent him dominating Europe. In terms of British public opinion, Churchill was unrealistic & Chamb.’s appeasement policy ensured that when war finally did come in 1939 the nation was united behind it as it would not have been in 1938.
Ironically, although Churchill was a great believer in the British Empire, he ignored the Japanese threat, whereas Chamb. understood that the British Empire was a global power which was threatened by Italy & Japan as well as Germany.
Churchill was unrealistic about GB’s military preparedness: in 1938 there was no Expeditionary Force to deploy in Europe (most of the British army was in India or Palestine) & most of the Spitfire & Hurricane fighters which won the Battle of Britain came off the production line in the last year of peace
Churchill was unrealistic in putting faith in the League of Nations when it had no army of its own & had proved totally ineffective in combatting Japanese & Italian as well as German aggression.
Churchill was proposing unrealistic policies with regard to gaining international support against Hitler in the 1930s? - NO
Churchill understood Hitler’s psychology better than Chamb. did; he understood that Hitler respected only strength & Chamb. failed to grasp that the more he tried to convince Hitler that he was being reasonable in considering Germany’s demands, the more Hitler simply thought he was weak & could be pushed around.
GB’s willingness to appease Hitler over the Rhineland, Austria & the Sudetenland convinced Hitler that he could get away with further aggression by invading the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 & then Poland in September.
The fact that Hitler seized the rest of Czechoslovakia less than 6 months after the Munich Agreement showed, as Churchill argued at the time, that Chamb. was wrong to trust him. This prompted the Daily Mirror to call him ‘the most trusted statesman in Britain … For years he warned us of dangers which have now become terrible realities.
There is some evidence (e.g. the movement of Soviet aircraft to her western border) that the USSR would have been willing to fight for Czechoslovakia in 1938, supporting Churchill’s claim that a “Grand Alliance” between GB, France & the USSR would have deterred Hitler.
Churchill understood that the Munich Settlement was a missed opportunity to use Czechoslovakia’s well equipped army against Hitler; this meant that the Skoda arms factory, the 2nd biggest in Europe, was working for Hitler in 1939 whereas in 1938 it would have been working against him. 1/3 of the tanks which enabled Hitler to defeat France in 1940 were Czech made.
Churchill became PM because he was the best man for the job? - YES
Churchill was popular with the public; he had consistently been right about Hitler when virtually all other politicians had been wrong. He was respected for his courage in speaking out against appeasement even when it damaged his career to do so. He was respected even by his opponents as a great orator (public speaker) & parliamentary performer. His brilliant speech in the Norway debate on 8 May 1940, balancing defence of his record with outward loyalty to Chamberlain., was much better than Chamberlain’s own & contributed to his success in gaining the premiership.
The trade unions & Ernest Bevin (the Labour politician & trade union leader who became Churchill’s Labour Secretary in his wartime Cabinet) noticed that Churchill was more willing than other ministers in Chamberlain’s govt. to work with the unions to maximise war production.
Even Halifax recognised that Churchill was much better suited to being a war leader; he had a fascination for war, had written extensively about it & had fought in India, South Africa & WW1. No one doubted that he had the energy & enthusiasm to tackle the war more vigorously than Chamb. had done.
He was a very experienced politician: he had been Home Secretary, First Lord of the Admiralty (twice), Colonial Secretary & Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Churchill became PM because he was the best man for the job? - NO
As First Lord of the Admiralty & the leading advocate of intervention in Norway, Churchill was far more directly responsible for the disastrous failure of that campaign than was Chamb. Apart from the failed landings at Namsos, Andalsnes & Narvik, no troops could be landed at Trondheim at all b/c the Navy failed to take control of the fjord there. The naval commanders & his Cabinet colleagues found him interfering (often in matters outside his responsibilities as First Lord of the Admiralty), overbearing & difficult to work with.
Very few Tory MPs, even those who rebelled in the Norway vote, envisaged that Churchill would succeed Chamb. The great majority preferred Halifax b/c they regarded Churchill as disloyal: he had left the Tories to join the Liberals in 1904 & only rejoined in 1924 & during the 1930s had criticised the policy of his own party, not just on appeasement but also India & Edward VIII. The King & Queen resented Churchill’s support for Edward VIII. So virtually everyone except the press & the general public preferred Halifax & Churchill only won the premiership b/c Halifax didn’t want it.
Although the Labour Party forced Chamb. to resign by refusing to serve under him, they would have been at least as happy to serve under Halifax as Churchill. The trade unions were particularly suspicious of him b/c of his leading role in suppressing the General Strike in 1926.
He was widely seen as “yesterday’s man” b/c he was in his 60s & had not been a govt. minister for over a decade prior to the outbreak of war.
