Blair and more Flashcards
1
Q
‘Divisions within the Conservative Party were the main reason for their defeat in 1997.’ How far do you agree? - Conservative Divisions
A
- The Conservative Party were divided about Britain’s role in Europe: the Euro sceptics loathed the Europeans’ moves towards greater monetary and political union. However the majority believed Britain should play a full role.
- In 1991 the Maastricht treaty was signed, committing the European states to full integration which was seen as a betrayal by Eurosceptic Conservatives. Major had negotiated British opt outs from two key aspects, (a) the social chapter (regarding workers’ rights) and (b) the single European currency (now called the euro) but he faced an unlikely alliance of sceptics in his own party supported by Thatcher and the Labour Party who supported the treaty but wanted the social chapter back in it (this gave them an excuse to vote with the Tory rebels in the hope of defeating the govt.) This plus Major’s small majority led to 2 damaging defeats in the House of Commons for his Maastricht bill & he only forced it through by telling MPs if they did not vote for him he would resign.
- The 1992 election had cut Major’s majority to just 21 & even this was steadily reduced by a string of byelection defeats, making it even easier for his opponents to undermine him in Parliament and make his government look weak.
2
Q
‘Divisions within the Conservative Party were the main reason for their defeat in 1997.’ How far do you agree? - Tony Blair & New Labour
A
- After 18 years of Tory rule many people felt like it was time for a change.
- Blair’s youth and optimism appealed to voters: he had the charisma that Major lacked. Unlike Foot & Kinnock he was clearly a credible PM.
- Labour developed a very effective media machine under Alastair Campbell. They managed to get some traditionally Conservative papers like the Sun (GB’s best selling paper, which had always supported Thatcher) onside.
- Blair dropped Clause IV promising to reverse Thatcher’s privatisation which led to the support of a number of businessmen and hit the old view that the Conservatives were the party of business. New Labour’s pro-EU policy helped with this (b/c the single market was so beneficial to British business).
- Rather as the Tories did by “stealing Labour’s clothes” in 1951, Blair kept the Tories’ popular policies (income tax cuts, curbs on trade union power, strong defence & law & order) while ditching the unpopular ones, promising to spend more on health & education & help working families on low incomes.
3
Q
‘Divisions within the Conservative Party were the main reason for their defeat in 1997.’ How far do you agree? - Scandals
A
- A series of revelations about the sexual indiscretions of some of his MPs like David Mellor undermined the Tory party and also made them look like hypocrites when they were trying to promote policies based around family values.
- There were also scandals around financial corruption like the case of Neil Hamilton who was shown to have accepted cash from Mohamed Al-Fayed (owner of Harrods) to ask questions in Parliament.
4
Q
‘Divisions within the Conservative Party were the main reason for their defeat in 1997.’ How far do you agree? - The Economy
A
- By September 1992 measures to curb inflation had tipped the British economy into recession. As unemployment rose GDP diminished and it became obvious the pound was too high. When the pound fell on the international currency markets Major and his Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont tried to prop it up by pushing up interest rates (15% at the worst point) to unsustainably high levels. All this failed and on Black Wednesday Britain was forced to withdraw from the ERM, allowing the £ to fall to a realistic level.
- For the first time since WW2 an economic crisis had occurred under a Tory govt., destroying their reputation for being the party of economic competence (as the £ devaluation in 1967 & the IMF crisis in 1976 had done for Labour).
- This was especially damaging for the Tories b/c they had won the 1992 election by telling lies about both their own tax plans & Labour’s. They hugely exaggerated how many people would be affected by Labour’s proposed tax rises for high earners & claimed they “had no plans” to raise taxes but then increased VAT.
5
Q
WHY DID GB DECOLONISE? - The Impact of WW2
A
- The humiliating surrender of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942 (below) & the collapse of the French & Dutch empires in the Far East during WW2 showed that white rule in that region was not invincible; this encouraged the Communists in Malaya to rebel against British rule.
- Attempts by British colonial officials to exploit the Empire to support the war effort caused resentment, e.g. farmers in Kenya being forced to sell their crops at a fixed price.
- The British defeats in Asia, the cost of the war & the growth of Indian nationalism forced GB to withdraw from India, former the “jewel in the crown” in 1947; this encouraged nationalists elsewhere in the Empire, initially in Malaya but later in Africa & the West Indies too.
6
Q
WHY DID GB DECOLONISE? - Economic Weakness
A
- After WW2 (which cost GB 25% of her national wealth & left her $29 billion in debt to the USA) GB could no longer afford, even before the Suez Crisis, to defend her Empire.
- Attempts by GB after WW2 to strengthen her weakened economy by exploiting her colonies further caused resentment. The East African Groundnuts Scheme turned much of Tanzania into a dust bowl & the Colonial Development Corporation was insensitive to local concerns & hindered any economic development which did not benefit GB.
- Furthermore, GB’s economic weakness meant she could no longer supply the colonies with the investment capital & manufactured goods they needed & the British govt. obstructed efforts to secure them from other countries like the USA or W Germany.
- In order to overcome the financial problems at the end of the war Britain was heavily dependent upon the USA and they were opposed to colonialism and put pressure on Britain to abandon her Empire, in India in 1947, Palestine in 1948 and in 1956 to abandon Egypt and Suez (right). It was difficult for Britain to resist this unless they played the Cold War card, as they did in Malaysia
7
Q
WHY DID GB DECOLONISE? - NOT Economic Weakness
A
- The British economy grew in the 1950s so it was changing political attitudes, dependence on the USA, the growth of anti-colonial nationalism & events like Suez which forced her to withdraw.
- To some extent the Empire was still an economic asset rather than a liability: a closed imperial economy could guarantee markets, cheap food and raw materials. GB withdrew from India & Palestine b/c they were seen as an economic drain rather than an asset but fought for 12 years in Malaya to retain control of Malayan rubber & tin. Malaya was given its independence in 1957 but British troops weren’t withdrawn until 1960. Ghanaian independence in 1957 was conditional on Ghana retaining its trade links with GB.
8
Q
WHY DID GB DECOLONISE? - The Suez Crisis 1956
A
- Suez was seen as a victory for anti-colonial nationalism & a sign of Britain’s declining influence, which encouraged resistance to British rule in Kenya & Cyprus.
- Some might argue that it encouraged independence movements elsewhere, even peaceful ones as in Ghana & Nigeria.
- It resulted in many in Britain seeing that she could no longer maintain a global empire & ignore what the USA thought. Eden’s fall & Macmillan’s “Winds of Change” speech showed that this was influencing the Conservative govt. as well as the Labour opposition & the general public
9
Q
WHY DID GB DECOLONISE? - The Growth of Anti-Colonial Nationalism
A
- A number of charismatic nationalist leaders emerged like Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt who humiliated Eden during the Suez Crisis in 1956 & Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, where the British hoped to hand over power to conservative nationalists but Nkrumah won the elections instead & became the first prime minister of independent Ghana in 1957.
- Many of these leaders were western educated & influenced by western ideas, e.g. Kwame Nkrumah learnt Pan African Nationalist & Marxist ideas while studying at university in both the USA & GB. Jomo Kenyatta, the Kenyan nationalist leader, also studied at uni in GB.
- Anti-colonial nationalism, inspired by the US civil rights movement, was a global force: in 1955 representatives from 25 countries (including Ghana & Cyprus which were then still ruled by GB) met to demand independence for the European colonies in Asia & Africa.
- Macmillan’s “Wind of Change” speech in 1960 acknowledged this trend: the wind of change is blowing through this continent … this growth of national consciousness is a political fact”.
- In some places this nationalism turned violent: in Malaya, a Communist rebellion against British rule lasted for 12 years (1948-60); in Kenya the Mau Mau uprising led to the deaths of over 20,000 people & in Cyprus Greek terrorism tied down 25,000 British troops.
10
Q
WHY DID GB DECOLONISE? - Macmillan’s “Wind of Change” Speech 1960
A
- It was important in recognising a change of approach in Africa and the Caribbean.
- It was a recognition of a changing situation, with Macmillan dropping the idea of multi-racial governments in East and Central Africa.
- It was significant in showing how Conservative attitudes had changed; the League of Empire Loyalists were only a small minority.
- It reflected M’s desire to manage decolonisation as part of trying to retain influence.
11
Q
WHY DID GB DECOLONISE? - NOT The Suez Crisis 1956
A
- The importance of Suez might be questioned as there were plans for African decolonisation (especially in Ghana) before Suez, while India, Pakistan and Burma became independent in 1947.
- British influence in Africa did not suddenly collapse after Suez and withdrawal from Empire (apart from Ghana) took place in the early 1960s.
- Suez only reinforced the pre-existing fact that GB was heavily dependent on the USA, both economically & militarily. This had already influenced the withdrawal from India.
12
Q
WHY DID GB DECOLONISE? - NOT Macmillan’s “Wind of Change” Speech 1960
A
- Coming after decolonisation had already started (GB had already given independence not just to India, Pakistan & Burma but also to Malaya & Ghana) it reflected rather than caused a change in attitude.
- The speech was a result rather than a cause of changing political attitudes in GB: Labour was now committed to decolonisation, the general public were more interested in the economy & the Empire was no longer the focus of national pride which it had once been. Even in the Conservative Party attitudes had changed since the withdrawal from India, the retirement of Churchill as PM & the Suez Crisis.
13
Q
HOW SUCCESSFULLY DID GB DEAL WITH DECOLONISATION? - FAILURE
A
- The British policy of supporting a corrupt king in Egypt led to his overthrow in 1952 & the rise of the nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser who nationalised the Suez Canal, provoking the disastrous Suez Crisis in 1956.
- This crisis divided the British Commonwealth along racial lines b/c India & Pakistan supported Egypt while the white ruled Dominions supported GB.
- The delay in giving independence to Kenya until 1963 resulted in a brutal civil war in which over 20,000 died; the violence was exacerbated by British exploitation of ethnic & tribal divisions & the speed of her eventual departure.
- Granting independence to Cyprus in 1960 failed to heal the strife between Greeks & Turks which culminated in the Turkish invasion in 1974.
- Similarly the granting of independence to Nigeria in 1960 did not prevent a catastrophic civil war 1967-70 in which 2 million Nigerians died & 4.5 million were displaced.
14
Q
HOW SUCCESSFULLY DID GB DEAL WITH DECOLONISATION? - SUCCESSFUL
A
- The success of the transition from Empire to Commonwealth (sealed in the London Declaration 1949) was shown by the speed with which South Africa rejoined the Commonwealth after the abolition of apartheid in 1994 & the desire of Mozambique & Cameroon to join it in 1995 despite having no ties with GB.
- The participation of the white dominated Dominions (Canada, Australia, New Zealand & S Africa) in the Korean War 1950-3 showed their continued loyalty to GB after WW2.
- GB dealt successfully with the Malayan “Emergency” 1948-60 by defeating the Communist rebellion & giving Malaya its independence in 1957 while retaining British control of the profitable extraction of rubber & tin.
- The granting of independence to Ghana in 1957 was a success: it was agreed peacefully with Ghana agreeing to remain in the Commonwealth & retain its trade links with GB.
15
Q
WHICH WAS THE MOST SERIOUS CRISIS GB FACED 1951-97? - Korean War 1950-3
A
- This was by far the biggest war GB has been involved in since WW2, with 700 British dead compared with 255 in the Falklands War, 47 in the First Gulf War & only 16 in Suez.
- It was by far the longest war, lasting 3 years compared with 2 months (Falklands), 4 days (Gulf) & only one day (Suez).
- The Korean War involved 19 countries (20 if the USSR is counted as a participant) with over 2.5 million troops involved (of whom 14,000 were British) & over 700,000 killed.
- The N Korean invasion of S Korea posed a serious threat to world peace & to the credibility of the UN, reflected in the fact that it was the only war in which the USA & China have fought against each other. At one stage in 1951 it seemed that the USA might use nuclear weapons against China, risking a Soviet response.
BUT the British role was much less than the US one (over 300,000 troops) or even the S Korean (600,000)
16
Q
WHICH WAS THE MOST SERIOUS CRISIS GB FACED 1951-97? - Suez 1956
A
- This war was a huge crisis for Eden personally (it ended his political career) & was catastrophic for GB’s status as a major power; it showed conclusively that she could not act without US support (in all the other wars she did have US support).
- It damaged GB’s key special relationship with the USA more than any other event since the British-US war of 1812.
- It gave comfort to GB’s enemies, especially the USSR which was able to criticise British imperialism while invading Hungary.
- It paved the way for decolonisation in Africa & Asia from 1957 onwards.
- It permanently damaged GB’s relations with the oil rich Arab world.
BUT it was the shortest & least costly of all 4 wars.
17
Q
WHICH WAS THE MOST SERIOUS CRISIS GB FACED 1951-97? - Falklands 1982
A
- As Thatcher said at the time, it was the first (& only) time since WW2 that British sovereign territory had been invaded by a foreign power.
- The initial US reaction was equivocal so the “special relationship” hung in the balance.
- Unlike in Korea & the Gulf GB had to fight alone with US support (an air base & intelligence) but without US participation.
- B/c the war was fought 1,000s of miles away in the South Atlantic & the British troops were much more at risk in troopships which could be sunk than they would have been on dry land this war was very risky & could have led to a costly & humiliating failure which would have ruined GB’s reputation as a military power & ended Thatcher’s premiership as Suez ended Eden’s.
= BUT in international terms it was the least significant of the 4 wars & much smaller, shorter & less costly than Korea: less than 1,000 in total were killed compared with 700,000 in Korea.
18
Q
WHICH WAS THE MOST SERIOUS CRISIS GB FACED 1951-97? - First Gulf War 1991
A
- As in Korea GB needed to show support for the USA.
- Vital oil supplies were at stake.
- It was by far the 2nd biggest war after Korea, with 1.6 million soldiers involved.
BUT: - As in Korea British involvement was minimal compared with US & British losses were less than 50.
- With the USA involved against only Iraq the result was never in doubt.
19
Q
WHY DID GB NOT JOIN THE EEC UNTIL 1973?
A
- GB saw herself as a global power with a large colonial empire until the 1960s, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council & her own theoretically independent nuclear deterrent. In the EEC only France had these same assets.
- GB’s key relationship was with the USA, to whom she was $29 billion in debt from WW2 & on whom she defended for her defence, hence her support for the USA in the Korean War 1950-3. NATO not the EEC was the key to GB’s security & the humiliating withdrawal from Suez in 1956 showed that GB could not act without US support. In Greece, Turkey, Iran & the Mediterranean, formerly British preserves, she had to hand the initiative to the USA.
- Even after decolonisation in the 1960s GB still had close links with the Commonwealth & was reluctant to sacrifice these in return for EEC membership; in fact British access to New Zealand lamb was one of the major sticking points in the negotiations for British entry in 1973.
- Neither party was unequivocal in its support for EEC membership: Heath was probably the only major British politician in either party who was totally committed to EEC membership: Wilson tried unsuccessfully to enter in 1967 but opposed British entry in 1973 b/c most of his party was against. The Tories were generally more supportive but with important exceptions like Enoch Powell.
- Churchill declared himself in favour of European unity but did not clarify whether GB should be involved; Eden was hostile so not until Macmillan (& only towards the end of his premiership) did GB have a PM who supported entry.
20
Q
WHY HAS GB’S RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE PROVED CONTROVERSIAL? - The “Special Relationship” with the USA
A
Both parties thought this was more important than with Europe, especially in terms of military security through NATO.
21
Q
WHY DID GB JOIN THE EEC IN 1973?
A
- Some British politicians were convinced believers in European unity from their youth, especially Heath who visited Nazi Germany in the 1930s & served in WW2, convincing him that unity was essential to ensure that nothing like WW2 could ever happen again.
- It is no coincidence that Macmillan decided to prepare for EEC membership in the same year (1960) that he recognised in his “Winds of Change” speech that GB must decolonise; the Empire & Commonwealth were no longer a viable alternative to the EEC.
- As it became increasingly clear by 1960 that the EEC economies (especially W Germany) were growing faster than GB, Mac realised that EFTA wasn’t a viable alternative & that if GB couldn’t beat the EEC, she would have to join it.
- In 1960 Mac ordered previously sceptical govt. departments like the Foreign Office, the Treasury, the Board of Trade & the Ministry of Agriculture to prepare for EEC membership: he also appointed pro-European ministers like Duncan Sandys & Christopher Soames to accelerate this process.
- Gaitskell was anti-EEC but many senior Labour politicians, notably Roy Jenkins & George Brown, were in favour. Wilson was more flexible than Gaitskell & Labour became more pro-Euro. in govt., applying to join the EEC in 1967.
- Both the Conservative & Labour parties initially favoured the “special relationship” with the USA over EEC membership but this argument was undermined by the fact that the USA urged GB to join so she could act as a “bridge” between the USA & Europe.
22
Q
WHY HAS GB’S RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE PROVED CONTROVERSIAL? - Great Power Status
A
Churchill & Eden especially saw GB as a “victor” state from WW2 which did not need to co-operate with France & W Germany as much as they needed to co-operate with each other to ensure peace & prosperity. Moreover, given the previous history of relations between France & Germany, they doubted whether such co-op. would succeed.
23
Q
WHY HAS GB’S RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE PROVED CONTROVERSIAL? - National Sovereignty
A
- Until 1960 both major parties opposed EEC entry on grounds of national sovereignty, i.e. GB’s right to determine her own affairs with the govt answerable to a sovereign British Parliament which could not be overruled by the European Court of Justice. Labour leader (1955-63) Hugh Gaitskell shared the concern of the right wing Tory MP Enoch Powell about sovereignty & argued that joining the EEC would mean GB turning its back on “1,000 years of history)”.
- In the 1970s & 80s the Labour left winger Tony Benn agreed with Powell in rejecting EEC entry on sov’ty grounds; Powell even urged his supporters to vote Labour in 1974 b/c Labour promised a referendum on the issue; for him national sov’ty was more important than party loyalty.
- From 1960 until the late 1980s most Tories were pro-EEC on economic grounds b/c they saw it as just a “common market”, but they became increasingly fearful of EEC political integration leading to “a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels” as Thatcher put it her speech in Bruges in 1988. Her determination to resist this contributed to the resignations of Lawson in 1989, Howe’s in 1990 & her own soon afterwards.
- Major’s decision to sign the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 divided his party b/c many Tories feared it would infringe British sovereignty; these Eurosceptic Tories then joined with Labour (who opposed the exemptions from the Social Chapter guaranteeing workers’ rights which Major had secured) to defeat the govt. in several parliamentary votes on the treaty, so like Powell they put national sov’ty above party loyalty.
24
Q
WHY HAS GB’S RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE PROVED CONTROVERSIAL? - The Commonwealth
A
- Both parties thought links with the Commonwealth were also more important than with Europe & that it could be a viable alternative trading bloc to the EEC.
- Traditional Conservatives wanted to continue prioritising GB’s “kith & kin” (i.e. Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders & white settlers in Africa) in the Commonwealth.
25
WHY HAS GB’S RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE PROVED CONTROVERSIAL? - The Impact of Europe on the British Economy
- Both the Conservative & Labour Parties stayed aloof from the European Coal & Steel Community (founded in 1951) & the EEC (founded by the Treaty of Rome in 1957) b/c they saw them as a threat to British national sovereignty. They also saw the ECSC as a threat to GB’s own coal & steel industries & the EEC as a threat to the British economy generally, especially in terms of trade, agriculture & sterling (the British currency).
- By 1960 Macmillan had decided that GB could not afford to stay out of the EEC & should apply for membership despite reservations on the part of many govt. departments including the Foreign Office, the Treasury, the Board of Trade & the Ministry of Agriculture.
- Wilson applied (unsuccessfully) to join the EEC in 1967 b/c he thought it was the only way to revive a stagnant economy.
- The fact that GB had to pay so much more into the EEC Budget than she got out of it (mainly to the Common Agricultural Policy) was v unpopular in GB & Thatcher’s success in reducing it by 66% in 1984 made her unpopular in the EEC.
- Pro-Europeans emphasised the economic benefits of EEC membership, including free trade based on common regulations (especially following the Single European Act which Thatcher signed in 1986), attracting overseas investment & giving GB unfettered access to the biggest common market in the world right on our doorstep, while anti-Europeans argued that the British people had been deceived into thinking that it was just a common market whereas in reality it was really a political project to establish a European “super-state” overturning British sovereignty.
- Controversy over whether GB should join the EEC Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was the issue over which Lawson resigned as Chancellor of the Exchequer; he & other ministers like Major believed it would help to tackle inflation. GB joined after Thatcher’s departure in 1990 but then crashed out in 1992 following a sterling crisis which fatally undermined the economic credibility of the Major govt. This convinced many Tories to become more Eurosceptic.
26
WHY HAS GB’S RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE PROVED CONTROVERSIAL? - The Labour Party AND public opinion
- Labour leader (1955-63) Hugh Gaitskell opposed EEC entry but by 1960 some leading Labour politicians like Roy Jenkins were in favour.
- The Labour Left saw the EEC as a capitalist conspiracy against socialism which might stop a Labour govt. nationalising industries like coal & steel but this didn’t stop Wilson applying to join in 1967.
- For party political reasons (in the hope of bringing Heath down) Labour officially voted against EEC entry in 1973 (though many Labour MPs, unofficially led by Jenkins, rebelled & voted for it) & only accepted it in 1975 after holding a referendum.
- Wilson (who was privately pro-EEC) was forced to hold the referendum in 1975, rather like Cameron in 2016, b/c his party & Cabinet were so divided on the issue.
- Labour called for withdrawal from the EEC in the 1983 election but abandoned this policy in 1987 & have never since returned to it.
- By 1997 Blair’s “New Labour” had emerged as much more pro-European than the increasingly Eurosceptic Tories.
Public Opinion
- The uncertainty of the public was shown by the fact that they were 2:1 against membership before the 1975 referendum but then voted 2:1 for it
27
WHY HAS GB’S RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE PROVED CONTROVERSIAL? - The Conservative Party
- Macmillan was the first PM to apply to join the EEC.
- Heath, who took GB into the EEC in 1973, was the most pro-Europe PM ever.
- Some Conservatives (though a minority) opposed entry, notably Enoch Powell who was more concerned with national sov’ty than economic issues.
- Thatcher & many other Conservatives became increasingly fearful in the 1980s of political integration.
- Her strident rhetoric led to disputes with her Cabinet colleagues, including Lawson’s resignation in 1989, Howe’s in 1990 & her own soon afterwards.
- Major’s decision to sign the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 divided his party to such an extent that his authority was undermined, forcing him to resign in 1995 & challenge the “bastards” (as he called them) to stand against him. John Redwood accepted the challenge but Major defeated him.
28
WERE RELATIONS BETWEEN GB & THE USSR INVARIABLY HOSTILE? - YES
- There was a fundamental ideological gulf between the USSR as a Communist dictatorship & GB as a capitalist democracy.
- GB condemned Soviet imperialism in E Europe (e.g. the invasion of Hungary in 1956), while the USSR opposed British imperialism in the hope of increasing its influence in Africa & Asia.
- GB joined NATO b/c she saw Soviet domination of E Europe (including E Germany, surrounding the British troops in W Berlin) as a threat to W Europe & potentially to GB itself. GB saw the USSR as her main aim & her nuclear deterrent was aimed primarily at the USSR.
29
‘Britain’s relationship with the USA was close throughout the period from 1951 to 1997. - CLOSE
Britain & the USA had strong ties of culture, language, trade and history.
- A ‘special relationship’ was forged as the 2 nations fought alongside each other in WW2. Churchill (whose mother was American) tried to revive this during his 2nd premiership 1951-5 & Macmillan used his wartime friendship with Eisenhower to repair relations with the USA after Suez. There was a special relationship between specific PMs and Presidents, such as between Thatcher and Reagan (right) in the 1980s who admired each other & had shared beliefs. Kennedy asked Macmillan for advice over the crises in Berlin & Cuba 1961-2.
- Britain supported the USA in the Cold War by participating in the Berlin Airlift 1948-9 (they both maintained a military presence in W Germany & W Berlin throughout the Cold War) & the Korean War 1950-3.
- Each was the other’s most important military ally. GB & the USA almost always supported each other in the UN, e.g. over Korea, Iraq & Bosnia.
- They shared secret intelligence & info about nuclear weapons which enabled GB to develop her own “independent” nuclear deterrent. Membership of NATO reinforced the relationship & was crucial to GB’s defence against possible Soviet aggression in Europe.
- US support (providing intelligence & an air base) was crucial to the British victory in the Falklands
30
WERE RELATIONS BETWEEN GB & THE USSR INVARIABLY HOSTILE? - NO
- Following Stalin’s death in 1953 there was a “thaw” in relations including Soviet leader Khrushchev visiting GB in 1956 & British PM Macmillan visiting the USSR in 1959.
- Despite the ideological & military rivalry neither side wanted the Cold War to turn “hot”.
- Despite her instinctive anti-Communism Thatcher was the first western politician to see that the future Soviet leader Gorbachev was different from previous Soviet leaders: they exchanged visits in 1984 & later she persuaded Reagan that Gorbachev was “a man we can do business with”. She also sympathised with Soviet hostility to Reagan’s SDI b/c (like them) she feared it would undermine nuclear deterrence.
- Relations between GB & the USSR improved steadily in the Gorbachev era (1985-91), especially when Gorbachev allowed the former Soviet satellite states in E Europe to break free from Communism in 1989, ending the Cold War.
- Relations improved even further after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The new Russian leader, Boris Yeltsin, was grateful for British support against the attempt by Communist hardliners to restore old fashioned Soviet control in 1991. He visited GB in 1992 to discuss trade & military co-operation & praised Major for his “profound understanding of Russia & its reforms”. Economic links were especially close with GB supporting Russian entry into the G8 & many successful Russian businessmen buying property in London.
31
‘Britain’s relationship with the USA was close throughout the period from 1951 to 1997. - NOT CLOSE
- It was limited by Britain’s economic decline, which meant it could offer only limited support in Korea, Kuwait etc. GB increasingly had to hand over responsibility to the USA in the Middle East (especially after Suez) & in the Pacific (especially her withdrawal from east of Suez).
- The USA had concerns outside Europe in the Pacific & Latin America that did not concern Britain.
- The US reaction to Suez, offering financial support only if GB withdrew, showed the relationship was not always close. The USA did not support the British Empire. The USA didn’t consult GB during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 which was the closest the world has come to nuclear war.
- Wilson’s refusal to send British troops to Vietnam irritated President Johnson.
- The priority Heath gave to Europe over the USA damaged relations.
- Even Thatcher & Reagan had their differences: Thatcher was angered by Reagan’s invasion of Grenada in 1985 without consulting her (even though it was in the Commonwealth) & thought the “zero option” whereby the USA & USSR would get rid of all their nuclear weapons in Europe favoured the USSR too much b/c of their superiority in conventional weapons. She also disliked Reagan’s SDI project b/c she feared it would undermine nuclear deterrence.
32
HOW HAS MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS AFFECTED BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY?
B/c of this, whenever possible GB has tried to gain UN support to justify her actions, e.g.:
- the Korean War 1950-3
- the First Gulf War in 1991
- the intervention in Bosnia in 1995.
BUT
- The first time she used it was to stop a resolution (supported by the USA as well as the USSR) condemning her invasion of Egypt in 1956.
- GB vetoed 6 resolutions 1963-73 condemning her for refusing to use force against the racist rebel govt. in Rhodesia.
- In 1986 GB vetoed a resolution condemning the US bombing of Libya.
33
WHY WAS GB’S NUCLEAR DETERRENT CONTROVERSIAL 1951-97? - JUSTIFIED
- GB needed a nuclear deterrent to deter the USSR from invading W Europe & threatening GB itself. A nuclear deterrent was needed b/c the USSR’s conventional forces were so much stronger than those of the West. This was important for W Europe as a whole (France was the only other W European country with its own nuclear deterrent), not just GB.
- Soviet domination of eastern Europe (including E Germany, surrounding British forces stationed in W Berlin) & the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 showed the continuing need to deter Soviet aggression.
- Measures were taken to ensure that possession of nuclear weapons would not need to nuclear war: in 1963 GB joined the USA & the USSR in banning nuclear testing in space, under water & in the atmosphere. GB with other nuclear powers signed the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty in 1968 to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
- GB needed to respond to the installation of Soviet SS20 missiles in its E European satellite states which could hit targets in W Europe; the installation of US Cruise missiles in GB in the early 1980s was a necessary & proportionate response.
- Thatcher believed that idea of “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD) had “given us 40 years of unprecedented peace in Europe. It would be unwise to abandon a deterrence system that has prevented both nuclear & conventional war … abolishing all nuclear weapons .. would make conventional, biological or chemical war more likely”. She opposed the “zero option” of both sides in the Cold War scrapping their nuclear weapons, fearing that the USSR’s superiority in conventional forces would tempt her to invade W Europe.
- Nuclear deterrence worked, forcing the USSR to withdraw from the nuclear arms race & from E Europe in 1989, which ended the Cold War.
34
WHY WAS GB’S NUCLEAR DETERRENT CONTROVERSIAL 1951-97? - NOT JUSTIFIED
- After 1962, when Macmillan persuaded Kennedy to supply GB with Polaris missiles to carry British warheads, the British nuclear deterrent was so dependent on the USA that it could not truly be described as “independent”. GB also gave the USA permission to use its air bases for a nuclear strike on the USSR if necessary.
- The British nuclear deterrent was so small as to be irrelevant compared with those of the USA & the USSR. Consequently GB played virtually no part in the Cuban Missile Crisis or the arms control negotiations between the 2 superpowers in the 1970s (leading to the SALT Agreements in 1972 & 1979) & 80s (which ended the Cold War).
- It was absurd to waste billions of £s on nuclear weapons which could never be used; the money would be far better spent on conventional forces, education on the NHS. One of the reasons why the British economy fared so much less than W Germany’s or Japan’s was b/c too much was spent on nuclear weapons instead of investment in industrial innovation.
- The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was formed in 1958 to campaign against the nuclear arms race, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Cris
- Nuclear weapons were a politically divisive issue, causing especially serious divisions in the Labour Party in the 1950s & 80s. Labour called for unilateral nuclear disarmament in the 1983 election.
- Following détente in the 1970s (when the SALT Agreements reduced the fear of nuclear war), there was a significant increase in tension in the 1980s, when Reagan deliberately escalated the nuclear arms race with his SDI project & the USSR described Thatcher as the “iron lady”. This prompted 100s of 1,000s to take part in CND marches to protest against the installation of Cruise missiles in GB.
35
Domestic opposition to Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons was a serious challenge to British governments.’ How far do you agree? - AGREE
- By 1954-5 the cost of rearmament was approaching the levels of the Second World War & there was a growing awareness that British economic growth b/c too much was being spent on defence at the expense of industrial investment. In the 1980s Labour unilateralists like Tony Benn argued that the money spent on nuclear weapons should be diverted to the NHS.
- There were questions about how “independent” of the USA the British nuclear deterrent really was (she relied on US delivery vehicles). There was concern over Polaris, although Kennedy did acknowledge Britain’s right to use it independently when ‘supreme national interests’ were concerned. Anti-nuclear protestors argued that GB was subservient to the USA, especially in the 1980s when the combination of Reagan’s aggressive policies (especially SDI) & the installation of US Cruise missiles in GB provoked massive demonstrations, reflecting the fact that the fear of nuclear war was greater than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis.
- The unilateralists took control of the Labour Party when Michael Foot became leader in 1980: Labour argued for unilateral nuclear disarmament in the 1983 & 1987 elections.
36
Domestic opposition to Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons was a serious challenge to British governments.’ How far do you agree? - DISAGREE
- Opposition to GB’s possession of nuclear weapons never came close to changing govt. policy under either Conservative or Labour govts. Labour were only ever unilateralist when they were in opposition.
- Labour’s unilateralist policy in the 1980s was electorally disastrous, contributing to the defection of the SDP in 1981 & to landslide Tory election victories in 1983 & 1987. This forced Labour to change its policy & it was not re-elected until 1997 by which time Blair’s “New Labour” had a clear commitment to nuclear defence.
37
How far did Britain maintain its position as a major power in the period from 1951 to 1997? - IT DID
- Britain retained its position in the UN as a permanent member of the Security Council.
- The close relationship with the USA allowed Britain to retain its status, e.g. in helping with her “independent” nuclear deterrent & to win the Falklands War. It has been argued that Thatcher played an important role in convincing Reagan that Gorbachev was a different kind of Soviet leader whom they could “do business with”. (Won plenty of other interventions and has a nuclear deterrant)
- Nevertheless GB’s refusal to participate in the Vietnam War showed that she could take an independent line from the USA.
- Britain’s membership of NATO and the EEC enhanced both her security & her prosperity. Thatcher’s success in reducing the size of GB’s net contribution to the EEC budget by 66% shows the influence she had in the EEC.
38
How far did Britain maintain its position as a major power in the period from 1951 to 1997? IT DIDN'T
- The loss of Empire reduced GB’s status; as US Secretary of State Dean Acheson said, she “had lost an empire but not yet found a role”. It is no coincidence that Macmillan decided to apply to join the EEC in the same year (1960) as his “Winds of Change” decolonisation speech.
- GB’s economic weakness after WW2 forced into handing over the initiative to the USA in the Middle East (Turkey, Iran & Palestine / Israel) & later east of Suez, including Malaysia & Singapore. The Suez crisis showed GB could not act unilaterally without US support.
- In the relationship with US the US was dominant and often ignored Britain, e.g. the invasion of Grenada (a member of the Commonwealth) without consulting GB in advance in 1985. The installation of US Cruise missiles in GB in 1983 was seen by protestors as evidence of British subservience to the USA.
- GB could not defend herself against the USSR without US support & the crucial arms control negotiations in the 1970s & 80s were decided between the USA & the USSR without any real British involvement.
- Britain’s role and influence in Europe was limited, shown by the ability of De Gaulle to veto British entry into the EEC 1961-2 & 1967. The EEC & EU were always dominated by the French-German axis to the exclusion of GB. Policies like the Common Agricultural & Fisheries Policies were clearly not designed to suit British interests.
