Churchill and International Diplomacy 1939-51 exam q Flashcards
Did Churchill manage Relations with Roosevelt successfully? - YES
Roosevelt was convinced into passing the Lend Lease Act in March 1941 giving $31.6 billion of assistance to the British war effort.
Despite pressure from his own generals (they wanted a French invasion titled ‘Sledgehammer’) Roosevelt therefore felt he had no choice when he met Churchill at Casablanca in 1942 but to accept Churchill’s Med strategy.
The result was the invasions of N Africa & Italy in 1942-3: they diverted 100s of 1,000s of Germans from the Eastern Front, gave the British & US armies valuable experience of fighting the Germans in campaigns they could win & knocked Italy out of the war.
The commanders of the land, sea & air forces invading France in 1944 were all British.
Did Churchill manage Relations with Roosevelt successfully? - NO
The destroyers provided by the USA in 1940-1 were obsolete but GB was so desperate for them they had to give up some bases in return.
British dependence on Lend Lease gave the Americans power in the relationship.
The USA took Britain’s gold reserves in South Africa as security for Lend Lease and made large profits from supplying arms.
Churchill had to work very hard to maintain the partnership with Roosevelt, much harder that than the American which could be seen to reflect the power balance in the US favour.
Roosevelt was slow to offer support partly because of domestic issues but partly because he suspected that Churchill was more concerned with British imperial interests than defeating Germany & Japan.
At the Tehran Conference (below) in November 1943 FDR allied with Stalin against Churchill to force him to agree to invade France in 1944.
By then it was clear, following the Soviet victories at Stalingrad & Kursk compared with the slow progress made by British forces in Italy that FDR saw Stalin as a more important ally than Churchill. By the time of the Tehran Conference it was rumoured that it was a meeting of the “big two and a half” (with GB being the half) rather than “the big 3
How far was Churchill weak in his dealings with the Soviet Union in the years 1941-5 - WEAK
Churchill failed to convince Roosevelt of the threat of the USSR and was side-lined when Stalin and Roosevelt had a private meeting at Tehran in 1943. Faced with humiliating put downs by Roosevelt, he did not hide his displeasure and lost his composure. For example when Roosevelt joked with Stalin Churchill visibly reddened.
Even more importantly, Roosevelt sided with Stalin at this conference, forcing a reluctant Churchill to sideline his Mediterranean strategy & agree to an invasion of France in 1944.
At Yalta in Feb. 1945 he was forced to accept that Poland would fall under Soviet influence and lose her eastern territories in post war Europe. This was embarrassing b/c GB had supposedly gone to war to defend Polish independence & accepting the pro-Soviet Lublin Committee as the legitimate Polish govt. meant denying that status to the Polish govt. in exile. It also meant that Polish soldiers fighting on the British side from the eastern territories which the USSR would now keep would not be able to return to their homes; 30 committed suicide in protest. Feeling against this in GB was so strong that Churchill faced a 3-day debate on a motion of no confidence in which 25 MPs signed a motion protesting against the agreement & one Conservative MP resigned his seat.
Similarly Churchill was forced to agree at Potsdam in July 1945 to hand over 25% of German land to the USSR & Communist Poland. Churchill disagreed with this, fearing that it would make Germany bitter & resentful (like the Treaty of Versailles), but he had no choice but to agree b/c the Red Army controlled this area & (as over Poland) the USA refused to back him in resisting the Soviet demands.
How far was Churchill weak in his dealings with the Soviet Union in the years 1941-5 - NOT WEAK
The sheer scale of the Red Army’s contribution and victory in the East (85% of German casualties occurred on the Eastern Front) resulted in Churchill needing Stalin much more by 1943 than Stalin needed Britain. Any leader would have struggled under these circumstances.
Churchill managed to maintain a reasonable working relationship with Stalin despite his hatred of Communism & Stalin’s suspicion of him as the main advocate of British intervention against the Communists in the Russian Civil War in 1919. They shared a fondness for alcohol and Stalin seemed to have respected Churchill’s position on some issues, e.g. the bombing of Germany which diverted significant German resources from the Eastern Front.
Until the Tehran Conference in November 1943 Churchill managed to fend off Stalin’s demands for a “2nd Front” in France.
Stalin accepted Churchill’s division of power at their meeting in 1944 and did not support the Communists against the British in Greece.
Did Churchill’s lack of understanding of De Gaulle lead to poor relations between them - YES
De Gaulle constantly accused both GB & the USA (“the Anglo-Saxon powers” as he called them) of failing to understand or sympathise with the status he thought he was entitled to as the leader of the “Free French” forces & saviour of France (even though he was only a brigadier general & Under Secretary for War).
For a time in 1943, Churchill found De Gaulle so infuriating (he also knew Roosevelt hated him) that he seriously considered removing him as leader of the Free French forces based in GB. By autumn of that year Churchill was finally persuaded by his War Cabinet that De Gaulle had so much more support than any other possible leader that there was no alternative to him.
Churchill lost his temper with De Gaulle just before D Day in June 1944 when De Gaulle criticised British plans, accusing him of “treason” & telling him to his face that GB had to choose between France & the USA as her main ally, she would always choose the USA. De Gaulle never forgot this & it influenced his later policy (after the war) of allying with W Germany b/c he didn’t trust either GB or the USA. He blocked British entry into the EEC in 1963.
Did Churchill’s lack of understanding of De Gaulle lead to poor relations between them - NO
Even his fellow Frenchmen found De Gaulle impossible to work with: in 1937 a general who had taught him at the St Cyr military academy described him as having a “cold & lofty attitude” & was he was not even promoted to colonel until the end of that year.
When De Gaulle escaped to GB following the French defeat in 1940, Churchill immediately invited him to make a radio broadcast to the French people & later recognised him as leader of the Free French despite Foreign Office reservations.
Roosevelt hated De Gaulle far more than Churchill did (Churchill & his wife both admired him), describing him as “an apprentice dictator” b/c of his well publicised ambition to be President of France. In fact it was Roosevelt not Churchill who favoured De Gaulle’s rival General Giraud as leader of the Free French following Operation Torch (the invasion of French North Africa) in 1942.
De Gaulle’s suspicions that Churchill wanted to seize parts of France’s colonial empire were completely unfounded: the British attacked Dakar in West Africa in 1940 in an unsuccessful attempt to hand it over to the Free French. Syria & Madagascar, which were conquered by British forces in 1941 & 1942 respectively, were immediately handed over to the Free French rather than being absorbed into the British Empire.
What was agreed at the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences regarding the future of Germany and Poland? - GERMANY
It was agreed at Tehran in November 1943 that Germany would be divided after the war so she could no longer pose a military threat but nothing was decided at this stage b/c the war was still far from won.
It was agreed at Yalta February 1945 (by which time Germany had already been invaded from both sides) that Germany must surrender unconditionally, i.e. she would have to agree to whatever terms her enemies chose to impose on her. This had originally been agreed by Churchill & Roosevelt at Casablanca in 1942 & was designed to reassure Stalin that GB & the USA would not make a separate deal with Germany leaving the USSR to fight Germany alone. When the German forces offered to surrender to the Western Allies alone in 1945, Eisenhower (the commander of the Western Allied forces) insisted that they surrender to the USSR at the same time.
It was also agreed that Germany would be divided into 4 zones of occupation, not just British, US & Soviet but also French. Churchill argued strongly for a French zone, partly b/c he was genuinely pro-French & partly b/c he wanted an extra Western power to “gang up” against Stalin, who agreed to this proposal only on condition that it was the French zone should be taken out of the British & US zones, not the Soviet one.
Berlin would be similarly divided.
Germany would undergo demilitarization (she would be disarmed & any industry making weapons of war would be dismantled) and denazification (for the West this meant introducing democracy, for the USSR it meant abolishing capitalism).
What was agreed at the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences regarding the future of Germany and Poland? - POLAND
At Yalta it was agreed that the Communist govt. already installed in Poland (the Lublin Committee) by the USSR should be recognised provided it was established “on a broader democratic basis” & “free elections” were held. In practice this meant nothing b/c the Red Army controlled Poland so Churchill had no choice but to accept Stalin’s definition of “democracy” & “free elections” (as also happened later in the Soviet zone of Germany). By 1947 Poland was firmly under Communist control & 1,000s of anti-Communists had been arrested or even shot.
The Polish eastern border would follow the Curzon Line, which meant Stalin would keep most or all of the eastern Polish territory he had taken in the Nazi-Soviet Pact just before the outbreak of war in 1939. This meant that Polish soldiers from those areas fighting on the British side would not be able to return to their homes (30 of them committed suicide in protest against this) & millions of Poles still living there would be forcibly moved to the west. Stalin’s proposal that Poland be compensated by being given territory in eastern Germany on Poland’s western borders was accepted.
The agreements on Poland were awkward for Churchill b/c GB had gone to war to defend Poland’s borders in 1939 & many Poles had fought bravely on the British side in the Battle of Britain, North Africa & Italy. Churchill’s concessions to Stalin angered the Polish government in exile (representing the anti-Communist pre-war Polish govt.) which was based in London. He was also concerned that giving Poland too much German land would cause hostility between Germany & Poland, which was exactly what Stalin intended (b/c it would force Poland to turn to the USSR for protection).
To what extent did Churchill achieve his aims in the wartime conferences? - SUCCESS
To what extent did Churchill achieve his aims in the wartime conferences? - FAILURES
What were Churchill’s plan for post war Europe and his attitude to post-war Europe and Empire? - IN FAVOUR OF EUROPEAN UNITY
Churchill spoke in favour of greater European unity in Zurich in 1946. He believed in the concept of ‘The European family and urged a ‘United States of Europe’.
He did not see greater links with Europe as incompatible with other international links such as with the United Nations or British Commonwealth.
He had a history of promoting European co-operation. He had supported Briand’s idea of a European union in 1930 and had offered to unite Britain and France in 1940.
He spoke of reducing trade barriers and promoting economic co-operation in Europe.
He was far from being either isolationist or someone who was more interested in empire; he was a frequent visitor to Europe and had supported involvement in two world wars to maintain the balance of power in Europe.
What were Churchill’s plan for post war Europe and his attitude to post-war Europe and Empire? - NOT IN FAVOUR OF EUROPEAN UNITY
Despite advocating a major role for Britain in a more united Europe, Churchill still believed in Britain’s imperial role and the maintenance of the empire.
Therefore Britain’s closest economic ties were still with the commonwealth and Empire.
Britain’s closest military relationship was with the USA.
Post war Europe was still suffering the effects of war. Germany was divided into occupation zones and in 1949 into two separate countries East and West.
France and Britain’s relationship had been damaged by the war. Britain resented French surrender and many French had supported the Vichy regime. Even De Gaulle and the Free French were not on good terms with Churchill.
Thus while Churchill supported post-war European institutions like the European Coal and Steel Community he did not advocate joining them
Churchill’s iron curtain speech was wise - YES
The part of Churchill’s speech which referred to the “Iron Curtain” is often quoted out of context, ignoring the fact that Churchill also expressed his “strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade Marshal Stalin”, denied that the USSR wanted for war & called for a general peace settlement negotiated through the newly formed United Nations.
Truman shared Churchill’s suspicion of Stalin & arranged for the speech to be held in his home state b/c he wanted Churchill to say what he wanted said but did not yet dare to say himself b/c it would be too unpopular. Many of his advisers, notably George Kennan, believed that Russia (whether Tsarist or Communist) would always aim to expand her territory & would need to be contained.
Image result for iron curtain mapStalin’s behaviour in Poland, where he had deliberately allowed the Nazis to crush the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, showed that he had no intention of allowing the Poles to decide their own future, even though this was theoretically the cause GB had gone to war for in 1939.
Churchill’s iron curtain speech was wise - NO
Stalin accused him of showing an insensitive disregard for the losses the USSR had suffered during WW2 & their desire for security resulting from this. Stalin estimated that 7 million Soviet citizens had died in WW2, which as he pointed out was “several times more than Britain and the United States together”.
Given that Germany had invaded Russia through Poland in both world wars & that Romania & Hungary had participated in the German invasion, it was arguable that the USSR had a right to ensure that those & other neighbouring countries like Czechoslovakia & Bulgaria had governments friendly towards the USSR. This was security not “expansionism” as Churchill called it.
Many people even in GB & the USA thought Churchill went too far in condemning a country which had so recently been their ally against Hitler & had inflicted 85% of German casualties during WW2; it had, as Churchill himself admitted, been the Soviet army not the British or US which “tore the guts out of Hitler’s war machine”. The Chicago Sun newspaper called his speech “poisonous” & there were hostile demonstrations outside his hotel in New York. Even Truman who privately agreed with Churchill’s speech did not at first publicly support what he had said.
Did Churchill manage to preserve Britain’s place in the world? - YES
Britain managed to maintain its links with the Empire and gained considerable support from its dominions and colonies.
It sustained an alliance with both the USSR and USA and up until 1944 played a major role in determining the way the war would be fought. It did this without committing major land forces to Europe. The USA was persuaded to support Britain in North Africa and prioritise Europe over the Pacific despite their own interests in the region
Britain managed to get the Empire to support the war effort in spite of major nationalist movements in places like India and not all the Empire was lost by the end of the 1940s
Despite signing the Atlantic Charter Britain was not forced to commit to ending the Empire (although in the long term this happened).
Churchill was able to postpone D-Day until 1944 despite pressure as the invading force would be mainly British, giving Churchill a veto over American action.
