Britain's position in the world 1951-97

Question 1

Why did GB decolonise? - the impact of WW2 (3)

Answer 1

humiliating surrender of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942 & the collapse of the French & Dutch empires in the Far East during WW2 showed that white rule in that region was not invincible; this encouraged the Communists in Malaya to rebel against British rule.

· Attempts by British colonial officials to exploit the Empire to support the war effort caused resentment, e.g. farmers in Kenya being forced to sell their crops at a fixed price.

· The British defeats in Asia, the cost of the war & the growth of Indian nationalism forced GB to withdraw from India, former the “jewel in the crown” in 1947; this encouraged nationalists elsewhere in the Empire, initially in Malaya but later in Africa & the West Indies too.

Question 2

Why did GB decolonise? - economic weakness (4)

Answer 2

After WW2 (which cost GB 25% of her national wealth & left her $29 billion in debt to the USA) GB could no longer afford, even before the Suez Crisis, to defend her Empire.

· Attempts by GB after WW2 to strengthen her weakened economy by exploiting her colonies further caused resentment. The East African Groundnuts Scheme turned much of Tanzania into a dust bowl & the Colonial Development Corporation was insensitive to local concerns & hindered any economic development which did not benefit GB.

· Furthermore, GB’s economic weakness meant she could no longer supply the colonies with the investment capital & manufactured goods they needed & the British govt. obstructed efforts to secure them from other countries like the USA or W Germany.

· In order to overcome the financial problems at the end of the war Britain was heavily dependent upon the USA and they were opposed to colonialism and put pressure on Britain to abandon her Empire, in India in 1947, Palestine in 1948 and in 1956 to abandon Egypt and Suez (right). It was difficult for Britain to resist this unless they played the Cold War card, as they did in Malaya.

Question 3

Why did GB decolonise? - economic weakness (BUT???) (3)

Answer 3

The British economy grew in the 1950s so it was changing political attitudes, dependence on the USA, the growth of anti-colonial nationalism & events like Suez which forced her to withdraw.

· To some extent the Empire was still an economic asset rather than a liability: a closed imperial economy could guarantee markets, cheap food and raw materials. GB withdrew from India & Palestine b/c they were seen as an economic drain rather than an asset

but fought for 12 years in Malaya to retain control of Malayan rubber & tin. Malaya was given its independence in 1957 but British troops weren’t withdrawn until 1960. Ghanaian independence in 1957 was conditional on Ghana retaining its trade links with GB.

Question 4

Why did GB decolonise? - The Growth of Anti-Colonial Nationalism (5)

Answer 4

A number of charismatic nationalist leaders emerged like Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, where the British hoped to hand over power to conservative nationalists but Nkrumah won the elections instead & became the first prime minister of independent Ghana in 1957.

· Many of these leaders were western educated & influenced by western ideas, e.g. Kwame Nkrumah learnt Pan African Nationalist & Marxist ideas while studying at university in both the USA

· Macmillan’s “Wind of Change” speech in 1960 was an acknowledgement of this trend: the wind of change is blowing through this continent … this growth of national consciousness is a political fact”.

· In some places this nationalism turned violent: in Malaya, a Communist rebellion against British rule lasted for 12 years (1948-60); in Kenya the Mau Mau uprising led to the deaths of over 20,000 people & in Cyprus Greek terrorism tied down 25,000 British troops.

Question 5

Why did GB decolonise? - The Suez Crisis 1956 (3)

Answer 5

Suez was seen as a victory for anti-colonial nationalism & a sign of Britain’s declining influence, which encouraged resistance to British rule in Kenya & Cyprus.

· Some might argue that it encouraged independence movements elsewhere, even peaceful ones as in Ghana & Nigeria.

· It resulted in many in Britain seeing that she could no longer maintain a global empire & ignore what the USA thought. Eden’s fall & Macmillan’s “Winds of Change” speech showed that this was influencing the Conservative govt. as well as the Labour opposition & the general public.

Question 6

Why did GB decolonise? - The Suez Crisis 1956 (BUT???) (3)

Answer 6

The importance of Suez might be questioned as there were plans for African decolonisation (especially in Ghana) before Suez, while India, Pakistan and Burma became independent in 1947.

· British influence in Africa did not suddenly collapse after Suez and withdrawal from Empire (apart from Ghana) took place in the early 1960s.

· Suez only reinforced the pre-existing fact that GB was heavily dependent on the USA, both economically & militarily. This had already influenced the withdrawal from India.

Question 7

Why did GB decolonise? - Macmillan’s “Wind of Change” Speech 1960 (4)

Answer 7

It was important in recognising a change of approach in Africa and the Caribbean.

· It was a recognition of a changing situation, with Macmillan dropping the idea of multi-racial governments in East and Central Africa.

· It was significant in showing how Conservative attitudes had changed; the League of Empire Loyalists were only a small minority.

· It reflected M’s desire to manage decolonisation as part of trying to retain influence.

Question 8

Why did GB decolonise? - Macmillan’s “Wind of Change” Speech 1960 (BUT???) (2)

Answer 8

Coming after decolonisation had already started (GB had already given independence not just to India, Pakistan & Burma but also to Malaya & Ghana) it reflected rather than caused a change in attitude.

· The speech was a result rather than a cause of changing political attitudes in GB: Labour was now committed to decolonisation, the general public were more interested in the economy & the Empire was no longer the focus of national pride which it had once been.

Question 9

How successfully did GB deal with de-colonisation? - successful (4)

Answer 9

· The success of the transition from Empire to Commonwealth (sealed in the London Declaration 1949) was shown by the speed with which South Africa rejoined the Commonwealth after the abolition of apartheid in 1994 & the desire of Mozambique & Cameroon to join it in 1995 despite having no ties with GB. The participation of the white dominated Dominions in the Korean War 1950-3 showed their continued loyalty to GB after WW2.

· GB dealt successfully with the Malayan “Emergency” 1948-60 by defeating the Communist rebellion & giving Malaya its independence in 1957 while retaining British control of the profitable extraction of rubber & tin.

· The granting of independence to Ghana in 1957 was a success: it was agreed peacefully with Ghana agreeing to remain in the Commonwealth & retain its trade links with GB.

· Macmillan’s “Winds of Change” speech in 1960 showed that GB recognised in advance the need to decolonise Africa peacefully rather than being forced out violently as the French were in Algeria.

Question 10

How successfully did GB deal with de-colonisation? - unsuccessful (4)

Answer 10

This crisis divided the British Commonwealth along racial lines b/c India & Pakistan supported Egypt while the white ruled Dominions supported GB.

· The delay in giving independence to Kenya until 1963 resulted in a brutal civil war in which over 20,000 died; the violence was exacerbated by British exploitation of ethnic & tribal divisions & the speed of her eventual departure.

· Granting independence to Cyprus in 1960 failed to heal the strife between Greeks & Turks which culminated in the Turkish invasion in 1974. Similarly the granting of independence to Nigeria in 1960 did not prevent a catastrophic civil war 1967-70 in which 2 million Nigerians died & 4.5 million were displaced.

· British policy towards Rhodesia consistently failed: Wilson’s economic sanctions failed to restore British control & the independence agreement of 1979 simply paved the way for the
disastrous dictatorship of Robert Mugabe.

Question 11

What was the most serious crisis GB faced 1951-97? - Korean War 1950-3 (4)

Answer 11

This was by far the biggest war GB has been involved in since WW2, with 700 British dead compared with 255 in the Falklands War, 47 in the First Gulf War & only 16 in Suez. and It was by far the longest war, lasting 3 years compared with 2 months (Falklands), 4 days (Gulf) & only one day (Suez).

· The Korean War involved 19 countries (20 if the USSR is counted as a participant) with over 2.5 million troops involved (of whom 14,000 were British) & over 700,000 killed.

· The N Korean invasion of S Korea posed a serious threat to world peace & to the credibility of the UN, reflected in the fact that it was the only war in which the USA & China have fought against each other.

BUT the British role was much less than the US one (over 300,000 troops) or even the S Korean (600,000).

Question 12

What was the most serious crisis GB faced 1951-97? - Suez 1956 (4)

Answer 12

This war was a huge crisis for Eden personally (it ended his political career) & was catastrophic for GB’s status as a major power; it showed conclusively that she could not act without US support (in all the other wars she did have US support).

· It gave comfort to GB’s enemies, especially the USSR which was able to criticise British imperialism while invading Hungary.

· It paved the way for decolonisation in Africa & Asia from 1957 onwards. It permanently damaged GB’s relations with the oil rich Arab world.

BUT it was the shortest & least costly of all 4 wars.

Question 13

What was the most serious crisis GB faced 1951-97? - Falklands 1982 (4)

Answer 13

As Thatcher said at the time, it was the first (& only) time since WW2 that British sovereign territory had been invaded by a foreign power.

· Unlike in Korea & the Gulf GB had to fight alone with US support (an air base & intelligence) but without US participation.

· B/c the war was fought 1,000s of miles away in the South Atlantic & the British troops were much more at risk in troopships which could be sunk than they would have been on dry land this war was very risky & could have led to a costly & humiliating failure which would have ruined GB’s reputation as a military power & ended Thatcher’s premiership as Suez ended Eden’s.

BUT in international terms it was the least significant of the 4 wars & much smaller, shorter & less costly than Korea: less than 1,000 in total were killed compared with 700,000 in Korea.

Question 14

What was the most serious crisis GB faced 1951-97? - First Gulf War 1991 (5)

Answer 14

As in Korea GB needed to show support for the USA.

· Vital oil supplies were at stake.

· It was by far the 2nd biggest war after Korea, with 1.6 million soldiers involved.

BUT:

· As in Korea British involvement was minimal compared with US & British losses were less than 50.

· With the USA involved against only Iraq the result was never in doubt.

Question 15

WHY DID GB NOT JOIN THE EEC UNTIL 1973? (4)

Answer 15

GB saw herself as a global power with a large colonial empire until the 1960s, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council & her own theoretically independent nuclear deterrent. In the EEC only France had these same assets.

· GB’s key relationship was with the USA, to whom she was $29 billion in debt from WW2 & on whom she defended for her defence, hence her support for the USA in the Korean War 1950-3. NATO not the EEC was the key to GB’s security & the humiliating withdrawal from Suez in 1956 showed that GB could not act without US support.

· Even after decolonisation in the 1960s GB still had close links with the Commonwealth & was reluctant to sacrifice these in return for EEC membership; in fact British access to New Zealand lamb was one of the major sticking points in the negotiations for British entry in 1973.

· Neither party was unequivocal in its support for EEC membership: Heath was probably the only major British politician in either party who was totally committed to EEC membership: Wilson tried unsuccessfully to enter in 1967 but opposed British entry in 1973 b/c most of his party was against. The Tories were generally more supportive but with important exceptions like Enoch Powell.

Question 16

WHY DID GB JOIN THE EEC IN 1973? (4)

Answer 16

Some British politicians were convinced believers in European unity from their youth, especially Heath who visited Nazi Germany in the 1930s & served in WW2, convincing him that unity was essential to ensure that nothing like WW2 could ever happen again.

· It is no coincidence that Macmillan decided to prepare for EEC membership in the same year (1960) that he recognised in his “Winds of Change” speech that GB must decolonise; the Empire & Commonwealth were no longer a viable alternative to the EEC.

· As it became increasingly clear by 1960 that the EEC economies (especially W Germany) were growing faster than GB, Mac realised that EFTA wasn’t a viable alternative & that if GB couldn’t beat the EEC, she would have to join it.

· Both the Conservative & Labour parties initially favoured the “special relationship” with the USA over EEC membership but this argument was undermined by the fact that the USA urged GB to join so she could act as a “bridge” between the USA & Europe.

Question 17

Why has GB’s relationship with Europe proved controversial? - Great Power Status

Answer 17

Churchill & Eden especially saw GB as a “victor” state from WW2 which did not need to co-operate with France & W Germany as much as they needed to co-operate with each other to ensure peace & prosperity. Moreover, given the previous history of relations between France & Germany, they doubted whether such co-op. would succeed.

Question 18

Why has GB’s relationship with Europe proved controversial? - The “Special Relationship” with the USA

Answer 18

Both parties thought this was more important than with Europe, especially in terms of military security through NATO.

Question 19

Why has GB’s relationship with Europe proved controversial? - The Commonwealth.

Answer 19

· Both parties thought links with the Commonwealth were also more important than with Europe & that it could be a viable alternative trading bloc to the EEC.

· Traditional Conservatives wanted to continue prioritising GB’s “kith & kin” (i.e. Canadians and New Zealanders & white settlers in Africa) in the Commonwealth

Question 20

Why has GB’s relationship with Europe proved controversial? - The Impact of Europe on the British Economy (4)

Answer 20

· They also saw the ECSC as a threat to GB’s own coal & steel industries & the EEC as a threat to the British economy generally, especially in terms of trade, agriculture & sterling (the British currency).

· By 1960 Macmillan had decided that GB could not afford to stay out of the EEC & should apply for membership despite reservations on the part of many govt. departments including the Foreign Office, the Treasury, the Board of Trade & the Ministry of Agriculture.

· The fact that GB had to pay so much more into the EEC Budget than she got out of it (mainly to the Common Agricultural Policy) was v unpopular in GB & Thatcher’s success in reducing it by 66% in 1984 made her unpopular in the EEC.

· Pro-Europeans emphasised the economic benefits of EEC membership, including free trade based on common regulations (especially following the Single European Act which Thatcher signed in 1986), attracting overseas investment & giving GB unfettered access to the biggest common market in the world right on our doorstep, while anti-Europeans argued that the British people had been deceived into thinking that it was just a common market whereas in reality it was really a political project to establish a European “super-state” overturning British sovereignty.

Question 21

Why has GB’s relationship with Europe proved controversial? - National Sovereignty (3)

Answer 21

Until 1960 both major parties opposed EEC entry on grounds of national sovereignty, i.e. GB’s right to determine her own affairs with the govt answerable to a sovereign British Parliament which could not be overruled by the European Court of Justice. Labour leader (1955-63) Hugh Gaitskell shared the concern of the right wing Tory MP Enoch Powell about sovereignty & argued that joining the EEC would mean GB turning its back on “1,000 years of history)”.

· From 1960 until the late 1980s most Tories were pro-EEC on economic grounds b/c they saw it as just a “common market”, but they became increasingly fearful of EEC political integration leading to “a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels” as Thatcher put it her speech in Bruges in 1988. Her determination to resist this contributed to the resignations of Lawson in 1989, Howe’s in 1990 & her own soon afterwards.

· Major’s decision to sign the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 divided his party b/c many Tories feared it would infringe British sovereignty; these Eurosceptic Tories then joined with Labour (who opposed the exemptions from the Social Chapter guaranteeing workers’ rights which Major had secured) to defeat the govt. in several parliamentary votes on the treaty, so like Powell they put national sov’ty above party loyalty.

Question 22

Why has GB’s relationship with Europe proved controversial? -The Conservative Party (3)

Answer 22

· Some Conservatives (though a minority) opposed entry, notably Enoch Powell who was more concerned with national sov’ty than economic issues. Macmillan was the first PM to apply to join the EEC.
Heath, who took GB into the EEC in 1973, was the most pro-Europe PM ever.

· Thatcher & many other Conservatives became increasingly fearful in the 1980s of political integration. Her strident rhetoric led to disputes with her Cabinet colleagues, including Lawson’s resignation in 1989, Howe’s in 1990 & her own soon afterwards.

· Major’s decision to sign the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 divided his party to such an extent that his authority was undermined, forcing him to resign in 1995 & challenge the “bastards” (as he called them) to stand against him. John Redwood accepted the challenge but Major defeated him.

Question 23

Why has GB’s relationship with Europe proved controversial? - The Labour Party (4)

Answer 23

Labour leader (1955-63) Hugh Gaitskell opposed EEC entry but by 1960 some leading Labour politicians like Roy Jenkins were in favour.

· The Labour Left saw the EEC as a capitalist conspiracy against socialism which might stop a Labour govt. nationalising industries like coal & steel but this didn’t stop Wilson applying to join in 1967.

· For party political reasons (in the hope of bringing Heath down) Labour officially voted against EEC entry in 1973 (though many Labour MPs, unofficially led by Jenkins, rebelled & voted for it) & only accepted it in 1975 after holding a referendum..

· Labour called for withdrawal from the EEC in the 1983 election but abandoned this policy in 1987 & have never since returned to it.
By 1997 Blair’s “New Labour” had emerged as much more pro-European than the increasingly Eurosceptic Tories.

Question 24

Why has GB’s relationship with Europe proved controversial? - Public Opinion

Answer 24

The uncertainty of the public was shown by the fact that they were 2:1 against membership before the 1975 referendum but then voted 2:1 for it.

Question 25

HOW FAR DID BRITAIN’S ATTITUDE TO EUROPE CHANGE 1951-97? - change (4)

Answer 25

· GB saw no need to join the ECSC in 1951 or the EEC in 1957 but by 1960 had realised that the EEC economies (especially W Germany) were growing faster than her own so it would be in her interest to join, especially after the sterling crisis of 1967.

· In the 1950s GB prioritised the Commonwealth & Empire over Europe but following the Suez humiliation in 1956 & Macmillan’s “Wind of Change” speech in 1960 successive British govts. realised that trade with the EEC was more important than with the Commonwealth.

· Labour policy fluctuated in the 1970s b/c of Wilson’s opportunistic attempts to keep his party united over the issue: he opposed entry in 1973 but then called for a “yes” vote in the 1975 referendum. A lurch to the left in the 1980s culminated in Labour campaigning in the 1983 election for withdrawal from the EEC but by 1987 they had dropped this policy & in the 1990s, especially under Blair, became increasingly pro-European. By 1997 they were clearly the more pro-European of the 2 main parties.

· Eurosceptics would argue that the British people were deceived in the 1970s into thinking that GB was simply joining a “common market” with no serious political implications, but from the 1980s it was becoming increasingly clear that the European project was for political union as well as a common market, shown by the Single European Act 1986 which eroded the national veto & the conversion of the EEC into the EU in 1993.

Question 26

HOW FAR DID BRITAIN’S ATTITUDE TO EUROPE CHANGE 1951-97? - no change (4)

Answer 26

GB joined the Western European Union in 1954 but it was always subordinate to NATO in terms of GB’s military security.

· GB has continued to value her “independent” nuclear deterrent & membership of the UN Security Council as important to her role as a global power.

· Concerns about sovereignty have been constant: these were a reason why both major parties opposed joining the EEC in the 1950s & were reiterated by both Benn (Labour) & Powell (Tory) in the 1970s, then by Tory Eurosceptics like Teddy Taylor & Bill Cash in the 1980s & 90s.

· The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was a constant concern for GB: before entry the Ministry of Agriculture was one of the most Eurosceptic govt. departments & the CAP was the main reason for GB’s large net contribution to the EEC Budget which Thatcher complained about so much in the 1980s.

Question 27

How similar were Conservative and Labour attitudes to Europe in the period from 1951 to 1997? - similar (4)

Answer 27

Both parties consistently saw NATO & links with the USA rather than Europe as the key to GB’s military security, though both supported membership of the WEU as a supplement to NATO.

· Neither party showed any interest in joining the ECSC in 1951 or the EEC in 1957, both seeing them as rivals rather than partners & not wanting to lose control over their own economy. Both had concerns about the Commonwealth & saw GB as a global rather than a European power. Both in the 1950s saw EFTA as an alternative to EEC membership.

· There were pro- & anti-Marketeers in both parties, e.g. Labour’s Roy Jenkins was no less enthusiastic than Heath, while Enoch Powell (Tory) & Tony Benn (Labour) both opposed the EEC b/c it would mean GB surrendering her sovereignty without consulting the people.

· Both parties in govt. supported EEC membership: Wilson avoided committing himself for as long as possible but there was never any real doubt that he would recommend a “yes” vote in the 1975 referendum; although the Tories became increasingly Eurosceptic neither Thatcher nor Major questioned whether GB should stay in the EEC.

Question 28

How similar were Conservative and Labour attitudes to Europe in the period from 1951 to 1997? - different (3)

Answer 28

· When Macmillan decided in 1960 to apply to join the EEC Labour remained opposed until Wilson replaced Gaitskell as leader in 1963. Macmillan argued that it would benefit the economy, essential given the limited success of EFTA and the limited purchasing power of the Commonwealth. He also believed that it would stimulate the economy and wanted to Britain to help lead the community as a strong unit against the USSR. However, Labour argued it would be abandoning the Commonwealth and the USA for limited economic gain.

· Labour opposed Heath’s application to join the EEC 1971-3, voting both against the principle of membership in 1971 & the European Communities Bill in 1972. Whereas the Tories became more Eurosceptic over time, Labour became increasingly pro-European, especially under Blair’s “New Labour” (right); by 1997 Labour were clearly the more pro-European of the 2 parties.

· Tory & Labour MPs who opposed the Treaty of Maastricht in the 1990s did so for opposite reasons: Tories b/c they were opposed to European integration, Labour b/c they opposed Major’s opt out from the Social Chapter guaranteeing workers’ rights.

Question 29

Assess the reasons why Britain’s attitude towards Europe changed 1951-97 (4)

Answer 29

In the 1950s the British govt. stayed aloof from the ECSC & EEC b/c they saw them as economic rivals rather than potential partners, doubted whether (given their previous history) the continental Euros. could co-operate effectively & b/c they regarded links with the Empire & the USA as more important. By the end of the decade it was becoming clear (at least to Macmillan) that the EEC was prospering so if GB couldn’t beat them they should join them, that Euro. co-op. was working & that with the “Wind of Change” blowing through Africa the Empire might be less important in future. Moreover, the USA was in favour of GB joining the EEC.

· By the 1960s it was clear that the EEC economies (especially W Germany) were growing faster than GB’s & although GB joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960 this was not seen as a viable alternative to EEC membership.
But Labour were divided so Wilson instructed his party to oppose EEC entry 1971-3 & then, after being re-elected as PM in 1974, avoided committing himself until the referendum in 1975 when he came out in support of staying in.

· In the early 1980s both parties became more Eurosceptic, the Tories b/c of the controversy about GB’s net contribution to the EEC Budget & mounting concern about political integration, while Labour came out against EEC membership as part of a lurch to the left which viewed the EEC as a capitalist conspiracy which would prevent a Labour govt. from implementing radical socialist policies. Labour called for withdrawal in the 1983 election.

· By contrast Labour switched back to a pro-EEC stance in the 1987 election & became increasingly pro-EEC until by 1997 they were clearly the more pro-Euro. of the 2 main parties. This was due to Labour supporting the protection of workers’ rights in the Social Chapter of the Treaty of Maastricht & the influence of Blair’s “New Labour” eclipsing the “Old Labour” view of the EEC as a capitalist conspiracy

Question 30

WERE RELATIONS BETWEEN GB & THE USSR INVARIABLY HOSTILE?- yes (3)

Answer 30

There was a fundamental ideological gulf between the USSR as a Communist dictatorship & GB a capitalist democracy. GB condemned Soviet imperialism in E Europe (e.g. the invasion of Hungary in 1956), while the USSR opposed British imperialism in the hope of increasing its influence in Africa & Asia.

· GB joined NATO b/c she saw Soviet domination of E Europe (including E Germany, surrounding the British troops in W Berlin) as a threat to W Europe & potentially to GB itself. GB saw the USSR as her main enemy & her nuclear deterrent was aimed primarily at the USSR.

· The USSR opposed the British & US military presence in W Germany & W Berlin. GB supported the USA against the USSR during the crises in Berlin & Cuba 1961-2. Each country spied on the other, e.g. GB expelled 105 Soviet diplomats accused of spying in 1971. The Soviet govt. called Thatcher the “iron lady” for her strong anti-Communist rhetoric & support for Reagan & she took this as a compliment.

Question 31

WERE RELATIONS BETWEEN GB & THE USSR INVARIABLY HOSTILE? - no (3)

Answer 31

· Despite her instinctive anti-Communism Thatcher was the first western politician to see that the future Soviet leader Gorbachev was different from previous Soviet leaders: they exchanged visits in 1984 & later she persuaded Reagan that Gorbachev was “a man we can do business with”. She also sympathised with Soviet hostility to Reagan’s SDI b/c (like them) she feared it would undermine nuclear deterrence.

· Relations between GB & the USSR improved steadily in the Gorbachev era (1985-91), especially when Gorbachev allowed the former Soviet satellite states in E Europe to break free from Communism in 1989, ending the Cold War.

· Relations improved even further after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The new Russian leader, Boris Yeltsin, was grateful for British support against the attempt by Communist hardliners to restore old fashioned Soviet control in 1991. He visited GB in 1992 to discuss trade & military co-operation & praised Major for his “profound understanding of Russia & its reforms”. Economic links were especially close with GB supporting Russian entry into the G8 & many successful Russian businessmen buying property in London.

Question 32

‘Britain’s relationship with the USA was close throughout the period from 1951 to 1997.’ - In arguing that Britain’s relationship was close (3)

Answer 32

Britain & the USA had strong ties of culture, language, trade and history. · Britain provided bases for the US bombing of Libya in 1985. GB also participated in the 1st Gulf War to expel Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 & the intervention in Bosnia in 1995

· A ‘special relationship’ was forged as the 2 nations fought alongside each other in WW2. Churchill (whose mother was American) tried to revive this during his 2nd premiership 1951-5 & Macmillan used his wartime friendship with Eisenhower to repair relations with the USA after Suez. Britain supported the USA in the Cold War by participating in the Berlin Airlift 1948-9 (they both maintained a military presence in W Germany & W Berlin throughout the Cold War) & the Korean War 1950-3.

· There was a special relationship between specific PMs and Presidents, such as between Thatcher and Reagan (right) in the 1980s who admired each other & had shared beliefs. Kennedy asked Macmillan for general advice over the crises in Berlin & Cuba 1961-2.

Question 33

‘Britain’s relationship with the USA was close throughout the period from 1951 to 1997 - In arguing that the relationship was not close throughout the period (3)

Answer 33

It was limited by Britain’s economic decline, which meant it could offer only limited support in Korea, Kuwait etc. GB increasingly had to hand over responsibility to the USA in the Middle East (especially after Suez) & in the Pacific (especially her withdrawal from east of Suez).

· The USA had concerns outside Europe in the Pacific & Latin America that did not concern Britain. The US reaction to Suez, offering financial support only if GB withdrew, showed the relationship was not always close. The USA did not support the British Empire. Wilson’s refusal to send British troops to Vietnam irritated President Johnson. The priority Heath gave to Europe over the USA damaged relations. GB wasn’t involved in the key decisions JFK made during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 which was the closest the world has come to nuclear war.

· Even Thatcher & Reagan had their differences: Thatcher was angered by Reagan’s invasion of Grenada in 1983 without consulting her (even though it was in the Commonwealth) & thought the “zero option” whereby the USA & USSR would get rid of all their nuclear weapons in Europe favoured the USSR too much b/c of their superiority in conventional weapons. She also disliked Reagan’s SDI project b/c she feared it would undermine nuclear deterrence.

Question 34

HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS THATCHER’S FOREIGN POLICY? - The EEC (3)

Answer 34

Thatcher negotiated a 66% reduction in GB’s net contribution to the EEC budget in 1984 & didn’t care how unpopular this made her in the EEC.

· She negotiated the Single European Act in 1986 which was v beneficial to the British economy b/c it gave her unfettered access (including financial services, which was a huge boost to the City of London) to the biggest single market in the world right on our doorstep.

BUT her strident opposition to a European “super state” & to GB joining the ERM contributed to the resignations of Heseltine in 1986 (b/c he favoured the European rather than the US takeover of Westland, a British helicopter company), Lawson in 1989 (over the ERM) & Howe in 1990, all of which contributed to her downfall. She was so weakened that she was forced reluctantly t join the ERM in 1990

Question 35

HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS THATCHER’S FOREIGN POLICY? - The Falklands War 1982

Answer 35

Given the distance & the dangers to which the British Task Force was exposed, this was a gamble which paid off handsomely; her then Defence Secretary,

Heseltine, said the govt would probably have fallen if the war had not been fought or if it had been lost.

· It restored national pride & played a big part in Thatcher’s election victory in 1983.

Question 36

HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS THATCHER’S FOREIGN POLICY? - The Cold War

Answer 36

When the USSR called Thatcher the “Iron Lady”, it boosted her domestic popularity.

· She was the first western leader to recognise the potential of Mikhail Gorbachev, whom she invited to London in 1984 even before he became the Soviet leader.

· She can therefore take some credit for the liberation of eastern Europe from Soviet control in 1989.

BUT her role in the ending of the Cold War was peripheral: the key factor was the economic decline of the USSR & the decisive negotiations were between the USSR & the USA with GB not involved.

Question 37

HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS THATCHER’S FOREIGN POLICY? - The “Special Relationship” with the USA

Answer 37

Thatcher was a passionate believer in this relationship & established perhaps the greatest ever rapport between British & US leaders with Ronald Reagan. This was based on genuine personal warmth as well as shared political views.

· US diplomatic & logistical support was v helpful in the Falklands War in 1982.

BUT there were still disagreements, especially about Reagan’s SDI or “Star Wars” plan to develop a facility for shooting down Soviet missiles & his invasion of Grenada in 1983 w/o consulting GB despite it being a member of the British Commonwealth.

Question 38

HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS THATCHER’S FOREIGN POLICY? - Nuclear Weapons

Answer 38

Thatcher’s decision to install US Cruise missiles in GB & to build the Trident submarine launched missile to strengthen GB’s defences against the USSR were controversial in GB but she faced her opponents down & her strong commitment to nuclear defence (in contrast to Labour’s unilateralist policy) was an important factor in her election victories in 1983 & 1987.

Question 39

HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS THATCHER’S FOREIGN POLICY? - Decolonisation

Answer 39

Thatcher solved the Rhodesian problem which had bedevilled previous PMs (especially Wilson) through the Lancaster House Conference in 1979 in which agreement was reached on black majority rule.

BUT:

· This led to the disastrous dictatorship of Robert Mugabe.

· Thatcher’s opposition to economic sanctions against the racist regime in South Africa made her unpopular with the Queen & the Commonwealth & was proved wrong by events: it was economic pressure which forced the S African govt to free Mandela in 1990 & end the racist apartheid system in 1994.

Question 40

HOW HAS MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS AFFECTED BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY? (4)

Answer 40

GB is one of only 5 countries (the USA, France, Russia & China are the others) to have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
GB was a major contributor to the UN budget, had a judge on the International Court of Justice & was a leading member of the important Economic & Social Council.

This is an important symbol of her great power status.

B/c of this, whenever possible GB has tried to gain UN support to justify her actions, e.g.:

· the Korean War 1950-3

· the First Gulf War in 1991

· the intervention in Bosnia in 1995.

GB also contributed to the international peacekeeping force in Cyprus from 1964 onwards & in the former Yugoslavia (2,500 troops) in the 1990s.

Security Council membership gives GB the power to veto UN resolutions, which she does as rarely as possible but has done on the following occasions:

· GB vetoed 6 resolutions 1963-73 condemning her for refusing to use force against the racist rebel govt. in Rhodesia.

Question 41

WHY WAS GB’S NUCLEAR DETERRENT CONTROVERSIAL 1951-97 - argument for the detterant (4)

Answer 41

GB needed a nuclear deterrent to deter the USSR from invading W Europe & threatening GB itself. A nuclear deterrent was needed b/c the USSR’s conventional forces were so much stronger than those of the West.
This was important for W Europe as a whole (France was the only other W European country with its own nuclear deterrent), not just GB.
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· Measures were taken to ensure that possession of nuclear weapons would not need to nuclear war: in 1963 GB joined the USA & the USSR in banning nuclear testing in space, under water & in the atmosphere. GB with other nuclear powers signed the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty in 1968 to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

· Thatcher believed that idea of “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD) had “given us 40 years of unprecedented peace in Europe. It would be unwise to abandon a deterrence system that has prevented both nuclear & conventional war … abolishing all nuclear weapons .. would make conventional, biological or chemical war more likely”. - She opposed the “zero option” of both sides in the Cold War scrapping their nuclear weapons, fearing that the USSR’s superiority in conventional forces would tempt her to invade W Europe.

· Nuclear deterrence worked, forcing the USSR to withdraw from the nuclear arms race & from E Europe in 1989, which ended the Cold War.

Question 42

WHY WAS GB’S NUCLEAR DETERRENT CONTROVERSIAL 1951-97 - argument against the detterant (4)

Answer 42

After 1962, when Macmillan persuaded Kennedy to supply GB with Polaris missiles to carry British warheads, the British nuclear deterrent was so dependent on the USA that it could not truly be described as “independent”. GB also gave the USA permission to use its air bases for a nuclear strike on the USSR if necessary.

· The British nuclear deterrent was so small as to be irrelevant compared with those of the USA & the USSR. Consequently GB played virtually no part in the Cuban Missile Crisis or the arms control negotiations between the 2 superpowers in the 1970s (leading to the SALT Agreements in 1972 & 1979) & 80s (which ended the Cold War).

· It was absurd to waste billions of £s on nuclear weapons which could never be used; the money would be far better spent on conventional forces, education or the NHS. One of the reasons why the British economy fared so much worse than W Germany’s or Japan’s was b/c too much was spent on nuclear weapons instead of investment in industrial innovation.

· The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was formed in 1958 to campaign against the nuclear arms race, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. 100,000 people attended a CND march in 1960, showing public concern.

Question 43

Domestic opposition to Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons was a serious challenge to British governments - agree (4)

Answer 43

By 1954-5 the cost of rearmament was approaching the levels of the Second World War & there was a growing awareness that British economic growth b/c too much was being spent on defence at the expense of industrial investment. In the 1980s Labour unilateralists like Tony Benn argued that the money spent on nuclear weapons should be diverted to the NHS.

· There were questions about how “independent” of the USA the British nuclear deterrent really was (she relied on US delivery vehicles). There was concern over Polaris, although Kennedy did acknowledge Britain’s right to use it independently when ‘supreme national interests’ were concerned. Anti-nuclear protestors argued that GB was subservient to the USA, especially in the 1980s when the combination of Reagan’s aggressive policies (especially SDI) & the installation of US Cruise missiles in GB provoked massive demonstrations, reflecting the fact that the fear of nuclear war was greater than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis.

· The unilateralists took control of the Labour Party when Michael Foot became leader in 1980: Labour argued for unilateral nuclear disarmament in the 1983 & 1987 elections.

· Some argued (including some military figures) that GB spent too much on nuclear weapons which she was never likely to use at the expense of conventional weapons; indeed there was a danger that she might have to resort to using nuclear weapons prematurely b/c her conventional deterrent was inadequate.

Question 44

Domestic opposition to Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons was a serious challenge to British governments - disagree (2)

Answer 44

Opposition to GB’s possession of nuclear weapons never came close to changing govt. policy under either Conservative or Labour govts. Labour were only ever unilateralist when they were in opposition.

· Labour’s unilateralist policy in the 1980s was electorally disastrous, contributing to the defection of the SDP in 1981 & to landslide Tory election victories in 1983 & 1987. This forced Labour to change its policy & it was not re-elected until 1997 by which time Blair’s “New Labour” had a clear commitment to nuclear defence.

Question 45

How far did Britain maintain its position as a major power in the period from 1951 to 1997 - Membership of International Organisations (3)

Answer 45

Britain retained its position in the UN as a permanent member of the Security Council.

· Britain’s membership of NATO and the EEC enhanced both her security & her prosperity. Thatcher’s success in reducing the size of GB’s net contribution to the EEC budget by 66% shows the influence she had in the EEC.

· The eagerness of countries like Mozambique which had no historic ties with GB to join the Commonwealth showed the continuing influence of British “soft power”.

Question 46

How far did Britain maintain its position as a major power in the period from 1951 to 1997 - Membership of International Organisations (BUT???) (2)

Answer 46

The loss of Empire reduced GB’s status; as US Secretary of State Dean Acheson said, she “had lost an empire but not yet found a role”. It is no coincidence that Macmillan decided to apply to join the EEC in the same year (1960) as his “Winds of Change” decolonisation speech.

· Britain’s role and influence in Europe was limited, shown by the ability of De Gaulle to veto British entry into the EEC 1961-2 & 1967. The EEC & EU were always dominated by the French-German axis to the exclusion of GB. Policies like the Common Agricultural & Fisheries Policies were clearly not designed to suit British interests.

Question 47

How far did Britain maintain its position as a major power in the period from 1951 to 1997 - Military Power (3)

Answer 47

Britain possessed a nuclear deterrent.

· Britain was involved in a number of international crises, participating in the Korean & Gulf Wars 1950-3 & 1991.

· Britain was able to win the Falklands conflict.

Question 48

How far did Britain maintain its position as a major power in the period from 1951 to 1997 - Military Power (BUT???) (3)

Answer 48

The Suez crisis showed GB could not act unilaterally without US support.

· GB’s economic weakness after WW2 forced into handing over the initiative to the USA in the Middle East (Turkey, Iran & Palestine / Israel) & later east of Suez, including Malaysia & Singapore.

· GB could not defend herself against the USSR without US support & the crucial arms control negotiations in the 1970s & 80s were decided between the USA & the USSR without any real British involvement.

Question 49

How far did Britain maintain its position as a major power in the period from 1951 to 1997 Relationship with the USA (2)

Answer 49

The close relationship with the USA allowed Britain to retain its status, e.g. in helping with her “independent” nuclear deterrent & to win the Falklands War. It has been argued that Thatcher played an important role in convincing Reagan that Gorbachev was a different kind of Soviet leader whom they could “do business with”.

· Nevertheless GB’s refusal to participate in the Vietnam War showed that she could take an independent line from the USA.

Question 50

How far did Britain maintain its position as a major power in the period from 1951 to 1997 Relationship with the USA (BUT???)

Answer 50

BUT in the relationship with the US the US was dominant and often ignored Britain, e.g. the invasion of Grenada (a member of the Commonwealth) without consulting GB in advance in 1983. The installation of US Cruise missiles in GB in 1983 was seen by protestors as evidence of British subservience to the USA.

Question 51

Britain was involved in the Cold War only to maintain its status as a great power - agree (3)

Answer 51

GB regarded herself as one of the “big 3” victor states in WW2 & despite her economic weakness was determined to engage in the Cold War to maintain her great power status even if that meant “punching above her weight”; the fact that excessive military spending restricted her economic growth reflected this.

· It had always been British foreign policy to prevent any one country dominating Europe, hence the need to restrict Soviet expansion by helping to form NATO. GB’s “independent” nuclear deterrent was essential to maintaining her great power status & was aimed primarily to defend GB against the USSR.

· Initially GB hoped to maintain her Empire, which was threatened in Malaya & Africa by Communist subversion. She fought in Malaya to stop Communism rather than to sustain colonial rule (she gave Malaya independence 3 years before British troops were withdrawn).

Question 52

Britain was involved in the Cold War only to maintain its status as a great power - disagree (4)

Answer 52

GB had economic reasons for getting involved in the Cold War b/c Communism threatened her status as one of the world’s leading economies with London as the world’s biggest financial centre.

· GB’s nuclear deterrent could be seen simply as self defence against a possible Soviet attack rather than a symbol of great power status.

· GB had no choice but to support the USA in the Cold War b/c of her dependence on the USA both for economic aid & military security.

· GB had historically been suspicious of Russia, e.g. the expansion of Tsarist Russia in Central Asia had been seen as a threat to British India. GB feared Soviet control of Eastern Europe might tempt the USSR to invade western Europe, which would directly threaten GB.