Churchill mock q Flashcards by Sofia Gillani

WHY CHURCHILL WAS OUT OF OFFICE 1929-39

The reasons for his exclusion from office were:
Mistakes like the Gallipoli campaign in 1915 & the return to the gold standard in 1925 gave the impression that he had poor judgement & could not be trusted.
This impression was reinforced by his extreme views on India (he considered himself an expert despite not having been there since the 1890s) & his support for Edward VIII during the Abdication Crisis.
The fact that Churchill was wrong about these issues led to him not being listened to when he was right about Hitler.
Whatever the merits of C’s views, they were clearly opposed to the views of Stanley Baldwin, who was Conservative leader until 1937; b/c of this C did not regain ministerial office when the Tories returned to govt in 1931.
His opposition to appeasement meant he was telling the public what they didn’t want to hear: they were desperate to avoid war after the horrors of WW1 in which 900,000 British soldiers had died. He was also out of step with both Baldwin & Chamberlain, both of whom were committed to appeasement.

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TO WHAT EXTENT DID CHURCHILL’S OPPOSITION TO HIS OWN PARTY’S POLICY ON INDIA SERIOUSLY DAMAGED HIS CAREER?

Politicians of all parties (Conservative, Labour & Liberal) agreed that India should become a self governing Dominion within the British Empire (like Canada & Australia) so Churchill’s views were regarded as out of date & out of touch with the political mainstream. This was especially important b/c the govt. of 1931-40, though in practice increasingly Conservative dominated, was a “National” one including members of all 3 parties & until 1935 headed by the Labour politician Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister. Both MacDonald and Conservative leader Stanley Baldwin, who succeeded him as PM in 1935, were infuriated by Churchill’s opposition to their policy on India, which in their view disqualified him from returning to govt.
Churchill turned many fellow Conservatives against him by making personal attacks on senior govt. ministers, e.g. his attempt to force India Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare (right) to resign in 1934 (for allegedly misleading the House of Commons) did not gain the support of a single MP.
Churchill’s views on India confirmed the impression given by his previous failures, notably the attack on Gallipoli in 1915 & the return to the gold standard in 1925, that his judgement was faulty.
His knowledge & understanding of Indian politics was poor. He massively underestimated India’s desire for independence, failing to appreciate the support Gandhi enjoyed from the mass of Hindu peasants. He misread criticism of Gandhi from Muslims & Untouchables as evidence that they supported British rule. He greatly exaggerated the amount of power the 1935 Govt. of India Act gave to Indians, failing to realise that it left the most important matters (defence, law & order & foreign policy) in British hands.
Churchill’s views on India forced him to ally with extreme right wingers & separated him from the more progressive Conservatives like Leo Amery who were his natural allies in standing up to Hitler. Another of these, Duff Cooper, described Churchill’s opposition to Indian self govt. as “the most unfortunate event that occurred between the 2 world wars”.
The fact that Churchill was wrong about India obscured the fact that he was right about Hitler.

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TO WHAT EXTENT DID CHURCHILL’S OPPOSITION TO HIS OWN PARTY’S POLICY ON INDIA SERIOUSLY DAMAGED HIS CAREER? COUNTER ARGUMENTS

Churchill was distrusted for many reasons besides India, not just Gallipoli & the return to the gold standard but also his lack of party loyalty. Conservatives resented him b/c of his defection to the Liberals in 1904, Liberals b/c he rejoined the Conservatives 20 years later. Labour hated him for leading the govt. campaign against the General Strike in 1926.
He was supported by about 60 MPs over India but only really by 3 (Brendan Bracken, Bob Boothby & Duncan Sandys) over rearmament.
Churchill’s support for Edward VIII during the Abdication crisis arguably damaged him even more than his views on India. The shouting down of his speech defending Edward in December 1936 was the greatest humiliation of his parliamentary career.
The unpopularity of his views on India inflicted only limited & temporary damage on Churchill’s career. It did not prevent civil servants & even the Secretary of State for Air (with Baldwin’s permission) giving him valuable information about German rearmament which he used to attack govt. policy, nor did it prevent people like Amery who strongly disagreed with him about India allying with him on the German issue. When war broke out in 1939 Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain realised he had no choice but to restore Churchill to the Cabinet (as First Lord of the Admiralty) for the first time since 1929.
Churchill was in some respects right about India: he recognised that the Lancashire cotton industry relied on exports to India, that Muslims & Untouchables rejected Gandhi’s leadership & that a premature British departure would to lead to a religious civil war between Hindus & Muslims (below).
India was not a major issue as far as most ordinary British voters were concerned: it was a faraway country of much less concern than the economic Depression or the threat of war with Germany

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Churchill wrong about the king

Edward VIII became King of GB when his father George V died in January 1936. Churchill was not very close to E but had known him for a long time & felt a strong sense of loyalty to him. It was this, not any desire to exploit the issue for personal advantage against Baldwin, which motivated his support for E during what came to be called the Abdication Crisis.
Churchill’s support for E was illogical given his pro-Nazi views (some of his closest friends, like “Fruity” Metcalfe & his wife “Baba Blackshirt” were members of the British Union of Fascists) at a time when Churchill’s campaign for more rearmament to defend GB agt. Hitler was starting to gain momentum.
By November 1936 there was speculation that E VIII would have to abdicate (give up his throne) b/c he was determined to marry Wallis Simpson, an American divorcee. He could not do this & remain King b/c as King of England he was Head of the Church of England which did not at that time allow divorce. Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin (with the support of the Cabinet & other political leaders) made this clear to E but agreed to Churchill meeting E in an attempt to persuade him to give up Wallis so he could stay as King.
Churchill was wrong: on 6 December, just 2 days after C’s meeting with E, Baldwin told the Cabinet that E must decide before Xmas. Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain feared that trade would be damaged if there was any further uncertainty. In any case, E had already decided (w/o telling C) that he would marry Wallis & abdicate.
On 7 December, badly misjudging the situation, C made a speech in the House of Commons to ask “that no irrevocable step will be taken before the House has received a full statement”. To his amazement, he was shouted down by other MPs shouting “drop it!” & was forced to sit down before finishing his speech b/c he was unable to make himself heard. Suspecting Baldwin had deceived him, he told him, “you won’t be satisfied until you’ve broken him, will you?”

C was suspected (unfairly) of using the issue to undermine Baldwin.

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ASSESS HOW FAR THEY SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT CHURCHILL’S SPEECHES AND BROADCASTS ON GERMANY & REARMAMENT WERE ILL JUDGED - AGREE

It could be argued that Churchill exaggerated the German threat at this stage; as late as 1936 the French could have stopped Hitler remilitarising the Rhineland without a shot being fired.
The Foreign Office figures (from Ralph Wigram) on the size of the Luftwaffe which he relied on were actually exaggerated & less accurate than the official Air Ministry figures.
Churchill was obsessed with the danger of a German air attack on GB which in fact the Germans were not planning: the Luftwaffe was designed primarily to support a land campaign in France or the USSR. The weakest link in GB’s defences was the Army not the air force. Churchill failed to foresee how crucial tanks & submarines would be in WW2.
Churchill had unnecessarily discredited himself by being wrong about India & Edward VIII; this made people disbelieve him even though he was right about Hitler. By opposing Indian self govt. he allied himself with extreme right wing Conservatives who were often pro-Hitler & made it harder for him to find allies who agreed with him about Germany.
This partly explains why younger Conservative MPs like Macmillan, Eden & Duff Cooper, who agreed with Churchill about Hitler, did not attach themselves to him. Only Bracken, Boothby & Sandys can be counted as loyal followers of Churchill on this issue & they had very little political influence.
By 1937, Churchill’s constant warnings about Hitler were boring Tory MPs, one of whom commented, “he likes to rattle the sabre and does it jolly well, but you always have to take it with a grain of salt”.
There was also a widespread impression that he was a warmonger: as Baldwin put it, “war is the environment in which he thrives”.
His support for the pro-Nazi Edward VIII contradicted his opposition to appeasement.
He only spoke about foreign policy, giving the impression he didn’t care about the economic problems which preoccupied most of his countrymen.

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ASSESS HOW FAR THEY SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT CHURCHILL’S SPEECHES AND BROADCASTS ON GERMANY & REARMAMENT WERE ILL JUDGED - DISAGREE

The strength of pacifist feeling in GB, shown by the Conservative defeat in the East Fulham byelection in 1933 which alarmed Baldwin, meant that even though he was right about Hitler, Churchill would not be listened to whatever he said. His ally Robert Boothby said it was like “boxing a stone wall”. After the horrors of WW1 (in which 900,000 British soldiers died), no one wanted to listen when he said GB must prepare for another war against Germany.
There was a widespread feeling amongst both politicians & the public that the Treaty of Versailles had been too harsh on Germany & a mistake; it was seen as natural & inevitable that Germany would rise to be a great power again.
Many Conservatives feared Communism & saw Hitler as a potential ally against Communism. In Mein Kampf Hitler stated that he wanted to ally with GB against the USSR.
There was a widespread feeling that WW1 had been caused by an arms race between GB & Germany, so Churchill’s call for rearm. might provoke an unnecessary war.
It was unfortunate that Churchill was calling for rearm. during the Depression when there was great poverty & a public desire to spend money on welfare & housing instead.
By late 1936 by emphasising his support for the League of Nations Churchill began to get support from left wing figures including 2 significant Labour MPs & the General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress (TUC).

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Assess how far they support the view that Churchill was proposing unrealistic policies with regard to gaining international support against Hitler in the 1930s - AGREE

As Chamb. pointed out, Churchill’s plan for a “Grand Alliance” was unrealistic. The French had no intention of defending either Czechoslovakia or Poland; they simply planned to sit behind the Maginot Line, & wait for the Germans to attack. They encouraged Chamb. to appease Hitler. Stalin’s willingness to sign a pact with Hitler a year later shows his unreliability & in any case he had weakened his army by purging most of its commanders. Poland trusted him even less than they trusted Hitler & refused to accept the “help” of his army. US foreign policy was isolationist (Americans thought European affairs were none of their business) & remained so until 1941.
The surge of popularity Chamb. enjoyed after the Munich Agreement (he received over 1,000 congratulatory telegrams) showed that the great majority of Britons did not want war & were not ready for it. The fact that 74% of the population of the Sudetenland was German speaking weakened the moral case for war & it was still possible at that stage to believe that Hitler’s aims were confined to uniting German speakers as opposed to dominating the whole of Europe as Churchill claimed. In terms of British public opinion, Churchill was unrealistic & Chamb.’s appeasement policy ensured that when war finally did come in 1939 the nation was united behind it as it would not have been in 1938.
The fact that Churchill was nearly deselected by his constituency Conservative Association as a result of his strong criticism of the Munich Agreement showed that he was out of touch with the feeling in his own party .
Churchill was unrealistic about GB’s military preparedness: in 1938 there was no Expeditionary Force to deploy in Europe (most of the British army was in India or Palestine) & most of the Spitfire & Hurricane fighters which won the Battle of Britain came off the production line in the last year of peace. Chamb.’s appeasement therefore gave GB a vital breathing space without which she could not have survived in 1940.
Ironically, although Churchill was a great believer in the British Empire, he ignored the Japanese threat, whereas Chamb. understood that the British Empire was a global power which was threatened by Italy & Japan as well as Germany. In 1937 the chiefs of the armed forces warned the Cabinet that, if she had to fight all 3 at once, GB would lose.
Churchill was unrealistic in putting faith in the League of Nations when it had no army of its own & had proved totally ineffective in combatting Japanese & Italian as well as German aggression.
In 1938, all the Dominions except New Zealand were opposed to war but in 1939 they supported it, even South Africa which was especially strongly anti-war in 1938.

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Assess how far they support the view that Churchill was proposing unrealistic policies with regard to gaining international support against Hitler in the 1930s - DISAGREE

Churchill understood Hitler’s psychology better than Chamb. did; he understood that Hitler respected only strength & Chamb. failed to grasp that the more he tried to convince Hitler that he was being reasonable in considering Germany’s demands, the more Hitler simply thought he was weak & could be pushed around.

GB’s willingness to appease Hitler over the Rhineland, Austria & the Sudetenland convinced Hitler that he could get away with further aggression by invading the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 & then Poland in September.
The fact that Hitler seized the rest of Czechoslovakia less than 6 months after the Munich Agreement showed, as Churchill argued at the time, that Chamb. was wrong to trust him. This prompted the Daily Mirror to call him ‘the most trusted statesman in Britain … For years he warned us of dangers which have now become terrible realities. For years he pressed for the policy of strength, which the whole nation now supports.’
Whereas Chamb. distrusted France, the USSR & the USA, Churchill recognised that GB needed allies to stop Hitler. He consistently advocated a close alliance with France & recognised in 1939 (despite his anti-Communist views) that only an alliance with the USSR could deter Hitler from invading Poland. By guaranteeing Poland without seeking Soviet support in March 1939, it was Chamb., not Churchill, who showed a profound lack of realism. Churchill also understood that an alliance with the USA would be essential in the long term.
There is some evidence (e.g. the movement of Soviet aircraft to her western border) that the USSR would have been willing to fight for Czechoslovakia in 1938, supporting Churchill’s claim that a “Grand Alliance” between GB, France & the USSR would have deterred Hitler.
By agreeing to Hitler’s demand that Stalin be excluded from the Munich Conference, Chamb. so antagonised Stalin that just under a year later in August 1939 he decided to ally with Hitler rather than GB, giving Hitler a “green light” to invade Poland & making war inevitable.
Churchill understood that the Munich Settlement was a missed opportunity to use Czechoslovakia’s well equipped army against Hitler; this meant that the Skoda arms factory, the 2nd biggest in Europe, was working for Hitler in 1939 whereas in 1938 it would have been working against him. 1/3 of the tanks which enabled Hitler to defeat France in 1940 were Czech made.

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DID CHURCHILL BECOME PRIME MINISTER BECAUSE HE WAS THOUGHT TO BE THE BEST MAN FOR THE JOB? - YES

Churchill was popular with the public b/c he had consistently been right about Hitler when virtually all other politicians had been wrong. He was respected for his courage in speaking out against appeasement even when it damaged his career to do so.
He had growing support within Parliament, especially from a small group of Tories like Brendan Bracken & Robert Boothby; Labour MPs distrusted him on most issues but respected his opposition to appeasement & he was friendly with the Liberal leader Archibald Sinclair.
Churchill unlike Chamb. understood that to prosecute the war effectively the Govt. must be genuinely National as opposed to Conservative dominated.
The trade unions & Ernest Bevin (the Labour politician & trade union leader who became Churchill’s Labour Secretary in his wartime Cabinet) noticed that Churchill was more willing than other ministers in Chamberlain’s govt. to work with the unions to maximise war production.
He was respected even by his opponents as a great orator (public speaker) & parliamentary performer. His brilliant speech in the Norway debate on 8 May 1940, balancing defence of his record with outward loyalty to Chamb., was much better than Chamb.’s own.
Even Halifax recognised that Churchill was much better suited to being a war leader; he had a fascination for war, had written extensively about it & had fought in India, South Africa & WW1. No one doubted that he had the energy & enthusiasm to tackle the war more vigorously than Chamb. had done.

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DID CHURCHILL BECOME PRIME MINISTER BECAUSE HE WAS THOUGHT TO BE THE BEST MAN FOR THE JOB? - NO

As First Lord of the Admiralty & the leading advocate of intervention in Norway, Churchill was far more directly responsible for the disastrous failure of that campaign than was Chamb. Apart from the failed landings at Namsos, Andalsnes & Narvik, no troops could be landed at Trondheim at all b/c the Navy failed to take control of the fjord there.
Very few Tory MPs, even those who rebelled in the Norway vote, envisaged that Churchill would succeed Chamb. The great majority preferred Halifax b/c they regarded Churchill as disloyal: he had left the Tories to join the Liberals in 1904 & only rejoined in 1924 & during the 1930s had criticised the policy of his own party, not just on appeasement but also India & Edward VIII. Although the Labour Party forced Chamb. to resign by refusing to serve under him, they would have been at least as happy to serve under Halifax as Churchill. The trade unions were particularly suspicious of him b/c of his leading role in suppressing the General Strike in 1926.
Tony Corfield argues that Chamberlain’s key failure was to mobilise industry for the war effort, mainly b/c he refused to seek the co-operation of the trade unions & the Labour Party in this. This prompted Labour to demand a change of PM & a truly National govt. which would include them; crucially this was supported by influential Conservative politicians like Kingsley Wood, who was Air Secretary 1938-40.

· The civil service distrusted Churchill’s judgement, remembering past mistakes like Gallipoli & the return to the Gold Standard, not to mention his opposition to Indian self govt. & his support for the pro-Nazi Edward VIII.

The naval commanders & his Cabinet colleagues found him interfering (often in matters outside his responsibilities as First Lord of the Admiralty), overbearing & difficult to work with.
The King & Queen resented Churchill’s support for Edward VIII. So virtually everyone except the press & the general public preferred Halifax (below) & Churchill only won the premiership b/c Halifax didn’t want it.
He was widely seen as “yesterday’s man” b/c he was in his 60s & had not been a govt. minister for over a decade prior to the outbreak of war

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Was Churchill’s Mediterranean commitment a strategic error? - YES

Churchill’s “soft underbelly” strategy assumed that British forces would only be fighting against the Italians, but in both N Africa & Italy they found themselves fighting the much more formidable Germans; the result of this was that progress in both cases was much slower & the losses much greater than he anticipated.
The deployment of the bulk of GB’s land forces & a large proportion of her air & naval forces in the Med. diverted resources from other campaigns like the Battle of the Atlantic which was more crucial to GB’s survival & the bombing of Ger. which could obviously strike at Ger. much more directly.
The deployments in Greece & Crete in 1941 were strategic errors in which valuable equipment was lost, removing the possibility of victory in N Africa before the Gers. arrived.
The N African campaign, which the Gers. regarded as an irritating sideshow, never diverted more than a tiny % of Ger. manpower from the all-important Eastern Front.
“Operation Torch” in 1942 & the invasion of Italy in 1943 delayed the opening of the real “2nd front” in France until 1944.
Delay enabled the Gers. to strengthen their defences on the northern French coast.
The Ital. campaign held down less than 1/3 of the no. of troops the Gers. had in France & not much more than 1/10 of the no. they had on the Eastern Front. Tito’s partisans in Yugoslavia tied down more Ger. troops than the Allied forces in Italy.

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Was Churchill’s Mediterranean commitment a strategic error? - NO

It was a brave & correct decision to send troops, tanks & aircraft to N Africa to resist the Italian offensive in 1940. Churchill correctly judged that the threat of a Ger. invasion of GB had passed.
The garrison in Egypt had to be reinforced b/c an Axis victory there would have destroyed British power in the Middle East, denied GB vital oil supplies while giving them to the Gers. & threatened both India & the USSR.
The Med. strategy was worthwhile b/c the Italian forces were ill equipped, poorly led & weakly motivated. The successes of the Navy at Taranto & Cape Matapan & of the Army in Libya & East Africa with relatively small British forces showed this.
Deployment in the Med. was the only way GB could really hit back at Ger. after the defeat of France. British forces on their own were nowhere near strong enough to invade France & the RAF did not yet possess the heavy bombers to inflict serious damage on Ger. itself.
As Douglas Porch has argued, the Med. deployment made sense because it played to GB’s strengths, including her naval supremacy which enabled Tobruk to hold out in 1941 by reinforcing & supplying the garrison there & in 1943 it prevented the evacuation of the Axis troops in Tunisia.
The Med. front diverted significant numbers of Ger. motor transport & aircraft from the Eastern Front & Hitler’s unwise decision to reinforce his army in Tunisia resulted in the capture of around 230,000 Axis troops. According to Martin Kitchen “the Axis lost many of their finest troops who would have contributed greatly to the defence of Europe”. In all 50 Ger. divisions were tied down in the Med. which could have been used more effectively elsewhere
Despite the advantages the Germans had in defending mountainous terrain in Italy, the Allied forces inflicted 536,000 casualties on the Germans while suffering only 312,000 themselves.
By 1943 it was clear that the Allies (GB, USA & USSR) had superior resources, so it made sense to stretch the Germans’ limited resources across as many fronts as possible

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HOW EFFECTIVELY DID CHURCHILL DEAL WITH HIS GENERALS? - EFFECTIVELY

There were few disagreements about major decisions between C & Sir Alan Brooke, who commanded the British forces as Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1941. He supported C’s bold decision to send substantial land, sea & air forces to N Africa when the threat of an invasion of GB in 1940 had passed.
C’s faith in Montgomery was arguably justified b/c of his success in raising the morale of the 8th Army in N Africa in 1942, leading to the decisive victory in the 2nd battle of El Alamein in 1942 & the subsequent expulsion of the Gers. from N Africa in 1943.
The Brit generals, especially Brooke, agreed with C that the invasion of France should be postponed until 1944 b/c of the risk that a premature invasion would be a costly failure.
C’s imagination & energy led to brilliant ideas like “Operation Fortitude” to deceive Hitler into thinking that the invasion of France in 1944 would be in the Pas de Calais rather than Normandy.
Despite all their differences, Brooke greatly admired Churchill for the way he inspired the Allied cause and for the way he bore the heavy burden of war leadership. In his diary he wrote, “I should not have missed the chance of working with him for anything on earth”.

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HOW EFFECTIVELY DID CHURCHILL DEAL WITH HIS GENERALS? - INEFFECTIVELY

C thought the politicians in WW1 had not intervened enough to keep the generals in line. He was critical of the generals in the pre-war period b/c he thought they were over-cautious & too inclined to use GB’s military weakness (especially the Army) as an excuse for not taking or even threatening military action to stop Hitler.
During the French campaign in 1940 C ordered Lord Gort, the commander of the BEF (British Expeditionary Force), to keep trying to break through across the German lines to link with the main French army; knowing there was no chance of success in this, Gort defied this order & retreated to Dunkirk instead. Had C’s orders been followed, the BEF would have been lost.
As this showed, C was too desperate to keep France in the war at any cost rather than recognising that French defeat was inevitable & that GB must conserve her forces for her own defence. When the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill, thwarted a crazy plan by C to send extra Brit forces to France when the Fr. Army was on the brink of defeat, C retaliated by removing him soon afterwards.
Brooke wrote of C, ‘Winston had ten ideas every day, only one of which was good, and he did not know which it was.’ His diaries & the memoirs of other generals are full of complaints of C interfering with details which he should have left to the professionals.
C disliked Sir Archibald Wavell (right), the commander of Brit forces in N Africa, despite his spectacular victories against numerically stronger Italian forces in 1940-1. C’s decision to divert 60,000 troops with most of their equipment in a doomed attempt to stop the German invasion of Greece in 1941 denied Wavell the opportunity to win a decisive victory against the Italians in N Africa before the Germans arrived.
Excessively eager for quick action, Churchill forced Wavell to launch Operation Battleaxe in June 1941, which failed b/c the Gers. had more & better tanks, air superiority & better trained troops. After this C removed him.
C didn’t get on with Wavell’s successor, Claude Auchinleck, either; C accused him as he had accused Wavell of being overcautious. C was infuriated by the loss of Tobruk to numerically inferior Ger. forces in June 1942 & removed Auch. in August despite his decisive defensive victory which halted the Ger. advance in the first battle of El Alamein & the fact that the subsequent even greater victory in the 2nd battle of El Alamein (October-November 1942) was largely down to Auchinleck’s thorough preparation. Ignoring this, C gave credit for this victory to Bernard Montgomery (below right, known as “Monty”) whom he appointed commander of the 8th Army in N Africa in August 1942. “Monty” was at least as cautious as Wavell & Auchinleck (the Americans always criticised him for this) & frustrated C both by delaying the battle until he had massive superiority in men, tanks & aircraft & by failing to prevent Rommel escaping with most of his forces following the Ger. defeat. C preferred Monty to Wavell & Auchinleck (right) b/c he was so self confident (though others found him arrogant).

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WAS THE BOMBING OF GERMANY JUSTIFIED? - YES

The bombing of Berlin in September 1940 provoked the Luftwaffe into switching its bombing from the airfields to London, which was arguably decisive in enabling Fighter Command to win the Battle of Britain (though Churchill could not have foreseen this). The “Dambusters” raid was technologically brilliant & raised morale.
Harris understood that German morale was unlikely to crack; he focused on the economic impact of bombing. He understood why the bombing before 1942 had been so ineffective but with the Lancaster bomber now available he knew it could be much more effective from then on.
It was politically necessary to show Stalin, who was furious that the opening of the “2nd front” (the invasion of France) was delayed until 1944, that GB was doing all it could to aid the USSR; Speer, Hitler’s Armaments Minister, felt that the diversion of German resources from the Eastern Front to combat the bombing was on such a scale from 1943 onwards that it amounted to “a 2nd front”. 70% of German fighters & 75% of their 88-millimetre guns were deployed agt. the British & US bombers rather than the Red Army. The bombing also forced the Germans to switch aircraft production from bombers to fighters: by 1944 only 18% of new Ger. aircraft were bombers, greatly relieving the pressure on the Red Army.
As Speer admitted the bombing of Hamburg in July 1943 (killing 40,000 people) did damage civilian morale, with many civilians blaming Hitler & fleeing in mass panic. He thought that 6 more such attacks would bring arms production “to a total halt”.
The bombing raids drew in German fighters which were then destroyed; this was crucial in achieving the almost total air supremacy without which the success of D-Day would have been impossible.
With the Luftwaffe virtually destroyed by mid 1944, crippling damage was inflicted on oil supplies, the chemical industry (halving Germany’s explosives production) & the railways (halving the number of freight wagons carried by German trains). Overy has concluded that “bombing gradually dismembered the economic body” & in January 1945 Speer admitted to Hitler, “the war is over in the area of heavy industry & armaments”.
The bombing offensive only absorbed 7% of GB’s total war effort, so it was not disproportionate. Overy has concluded that taking account of the damage to the Luftwaffe, the diversion of German resources from the Eastern Front & the successful bombing of France in preparation for D-Day, “it is difficult to think of anything else the Allies might have done with their manpower & resources that could have achieved as much at such comparatively low cost”.

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WAS THE BOMBING OF GERMANY JUSTIFIED? - NO

The RAF bombing of Hamburg in July 1943 killed 40,000 German civilians (most of whom were burnt to dead)through the deliberate starting of firestorms in a hot dry summer through the use of incendiary bombs targeted at the half timbered buildings in the historic centre.
The bombing of Dresden in February 1945 (which Churchill approved despite later expressing concern about it) killed only about 20,000 but there was less military justification for it b/c the war was virtually won, there was no war industry there & it was known to be full of refugees fleeing the Red Army.8,325 British bombers were destroyed & 55,000 pilots killed.
The bombers used to bomb Germany would have been better employed, as the Navy & Army argued at the time, in protecting Atlantic convoys or British troops in North Africa. Overy argues that Churchill’s role was decisive in approving the priority given to bombing Germany & that Churchill was influenced by the political need to show Stalin he was “doing something” to hit Germany rather than genuinely military considerations.
The early bombing of Germany was so inaccurate (the crews were not trained for it) that only 3% of bombs fell within 5 miles of their target. The resort to “area” rather than precision bombing from 1942 onwards was a reflection of this.

HOW IMPORTANT WAS CHURCHILL’S ROLE 1944-5?

It became increasingly apparent that GB’s role on the Western Front was subordinate to the
USA’s; whereas the number of Brit & US troops landing on the Normandy beaches in June 1944 was roughly equal, by Feb. 1945 there were twice as many US as Brit troops on the main Western Front.
The failure of the Brit operation at Arnhem in (Operation “Market Garden” in September 1944) contrasted with the US successes in the Battle of the Bulge (Dec. 1944 – Jan. 1945 & the Rhine crossing in March 1945.
Although GB had theoretically gone to war for Polish independence, Poland was overrun by the Red Army 1944-5 & Stalin imposed a Communist dictatorship subordinate to the USSR. Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary & Czech. also came under Soviet control & there was nothing C could do about it.
C felt the USA were blind to this danger; they rejected his proposal of invading Austria & Yugoslavia from Italy to limit Soviet expansion in Central Europe.
The USA refused to support C’s ambitions in the Mediterranean & the British were on their own when C decided to intervene on the side of the Royalists against the Communists when a civil war broke out in Greece after the Ger. departure in 1944.

Assess how far they support the view that Churchill was a great wartime leader - YES

Churchill was right on all the big issues: he was right about Hitler before the war, right to fight on in 1940-1 when all seemed lost, right to focus on gaining US support as the key to winning the war, right to support the USSR during the war but also right to see the danger she would pose after it.
His courage, energy, self-confidence & above all his rhetorical skill inspired GB at her moment of greatest peril in 1940. He raised morale by insisting that GB would never surrender (“we shall fight them on the beaches”) & that “this was their finest hour”.
Despite finding Churchill infuriating & impossible to work with Brooke (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) wrote, “I should not have missed the chance of working with him for anything on earth”.
Without him GB would probably have made a peace agreement in 1940 which would have left Nazi domination of Europe unchallenged. He skilfully retained the support of Halifax & Chamberlain by arguing that GB would have a stronger negotiating position if she was able to repel a German invasion, appearing to leave the door to peace open.
The attack on the French navy at Mers-el-Kebir convinced President Roosevelt GB was determined to continue the war & was therefore worth supporting; this outweighed the damage to relations with France, which had already surrendered.
Churchill made a brave & correct decision to send British forces to N Africa in 1940, judging correctly that the danger of invasion had passed & the Mediterranean was crucial. It also played to GB’s strengths, especially her naval superiority, & enabled her to gain much needed victories against relatively weak Axis forces.
Douglas Porch has argued that Churchill was right to argue for the invasions of N Africa & Italy in 1942-3: they diverted 100s of 1,000s of Germans from the Eastern Front, gave the British & US armies valuable experience of fighting the Germans in campaigns they could win & knocked Italy out of the war. If the US had followed Churchill’s proposal to land further east, victory in N Africa would have been achieved more quickly.

Assess how far they support the view that Churchill was a great wartime leader - NO

Churchill had many faults as a war leader: he was self-centred, impatient, often unfair in his judgement of his generals (especially, according to Corrigan, his sackings of Wavell & Auchinleck). He was exasperating to work for: as Brooke put it, ‘Winston had ten ideas every day, only one of which was good, and he did not know which it was’. He was saved from many strategic errors by Brooke, his brilliant Chief of the General Staff.
He made serious strategic errors: in the Norwegian campaign he insisted on ships being sent without air support, troops or equipment b/c he was so impatient to attack the Germans. He was lucky that the failure of this campaign, for which as First Lord of the Admiralty he was partly responsible, enabled him to become PM.
He tended to be over-influenced by political considerations: his desperation to keep France in the war in 1940 led to him ordering Gort to attack south, away from the coast, & only Gort’s disobedience of this order saved the BEF. Similarly, Dowding had to threaten to resign to force Churchill to let him hold the fighters back for the Battle of Britain.
Churchill’s decision to attack the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir caused the death of 1,300 French sailors, was railroaded through by Churchill despite the scepticism of both Cabinet colleagues & the Admiralty & seriously damaged Anglo-French relations.
Churchill constantly urged Wavell to attack the Italians in N Africa before he was ready; Wavell was right to wait until December 1940 when the time was ripe.
The diversion of much needed forces from N Africa to Greece in spring 1941 meant the chance to finish the N African campaign before the Germans arrived was lost. It made no military sense & was politically motivated; in particular Churchill hoped it would appeal to US public opinion.
Charmley & Clark have accused Churchill of being too quick to support the USSR in 1941, therefore paving the way for Soviet domination of Eastern Europe & committing GB to a prolonged war, which bankrupted her, destroyed her Empire & left her totally dependent on the USA. Clark even argues that GB should have withdrawn from the war in 1941.
Support for Churchill was not unanimous: he faced 2 votes of no confidence in 1941 & a censure motion in 1942 following the humiliating defeats at Singapore in Feb. 1942 & Tobruk in June 1942 when the British surrendered to numerically inferior enemy forces.

Assess how far they support the view that the Conservatives lost the 1945 general election because of social changes -SOCIAL CHANGE

The Beveridge Report which advocated benefits for the sick, widowed, retired, unemployed & families paid for by weekly National Insurance contributions was widely supported & (although Beveridge himself was a Liberal & the Tories promised to implement his Report) people trusted Labour more than Churchill & the Conservatives to deliver it b/c it was thought to be more in line with Labour’s Socialist ideas than Tory free enterprise. In fact Churchill said privately that “the government had gone further with Beveridge than he would have gone himself” & that Beveridge was “an awful windbag & a dreamer”. When he claimed in 1945 to support free school milk, the Welfare State & govt. intervention in the economy he was not believed b/c he had never supported these things before.
The unprecedented degree of govt. intervention in the economy which was necessary to win WW2 was seen as a success for Socialism & in many ways a model for the social changes people wanted to see after the war, e.g. free school milk to improve the nutrition of working class children, Factory Acts to improve health & safety at work, the Wages Council Act which improved wages for the low paid & more generous welfare benefits following the abolition of the means test which humiliated poor people by forcing them to prove their need for benefits. Even Churchill’s own daughter admitted that “Socialism as practised in the war never did anyone any harm & quite a lot of people good. The children of the country have never been so well-fed or healthy … this common sharing & sacrifice was one of the strongest bonds that united us. So why cannot this continue into peace?”
Servicemen were even more likely to vote Labour than other people b/c they often resented their officers (who were thought to owe their positions to a privileged background rather than their military ability) & wanted the better society they thought they had risked their lives for. They wanted a more meritocratic & socially mobile society in which people could rise up the social scale despite coming from a poor background according to their ability as opposed to a deferential society in which people from an upper class background were automatically looked up to by their supposed inferiors b/c of what their father did for a living or what school they went to. A vote for Labour was seen as a vote for social mobility as opposed to deference.
Better housing was a key issue following the prevalence of “slum” housing in the pre-war years & the destruction of 2 million homes during the war. The Tories were associated with the “slums” of the 1930s & Labour more trusted to prioritise building decent homes for the poor.

Assess how far they support the view that the Conservatives lost the 1945 general election because of social changes - OTHER FACTORS

Despite Churchill’s personal opposition to the appeasement of Hitler, most Conservatives had
supported it while Labour had opposed it so many blamed the Tories for it.
Churchill made a big mistake in claiming that Labour would introduce a kind of Gestapo; this was absurd given the huge contribution to the war effort in the wartime coalition with Attlee as Deputy Prime Minister working v closely with Churchill & Bevin organising war production as Labour Secretary. Labour had always been clearer than the Tories in their opposition to Fascism.
Socialism was fashionable at that time (unlike today) b/c the USSR was widely admired as the main architect of Hitler’s defeat; even Churchill himself

Assess how far they support the view that Churchill was the dominant force in his wartime relationship with President Roosevelt - YES

Roosevelt was convinced into passing the Lend Lease Act in March 1941 giving $31.6 billion of assistance to the British war effort.
While the Atlantic Charter in August 1941 did make an aim of self-determination, something which had the potential to undermine the British Empire, most notably in India, it was vague enough not to force specific action by the British and did tie America into supporting the UK. Although the USA had not yet entered the war the Charter referred to “the destruction of Nazi tyranny”.
Churchill was able to resist US & Soviet pressure for an invasion of France before 1944: with insufficient US troops available, the bulk of the landing force would have had to be British & the battle against the U-boats was not won until May 1943, nor air superiority until April 1944. This gave Churchill significant leverage with Roosevelt in the early years of the alliance.
Despite pressure from his own generals (they wanted a French invasion titled ‘Sledgehammer’) Roosevelt therefore felt he had no choice when he met Churchill at Casablanca in 1942 but to accept Churchill’s Med strategy.
The result was the invasions of N Africa & Italy in 1942-3: they diverted 100s of 1,000s of Germans from the Eastern Front, gave the British & US armies valuable experience of fighting the Germans in campaigns they could win & knocked Italy out of the war. Roosevelt was persuaded to focus on winning in Europe first before fully turning to Japan.
By 1944 Roosevelt and Churchill were able to agree that there should be free and democratic elections in post war Europe with nothing explicit said about the British Empire.
The commanders of the land, sea & air forces invading France in 1944 were all British.

Assess how far they support the view that Churchill was the dominant force in his wartime relationship with President Roosevelt - NO

The destroyers provided by the USA in 1940-1 were obsolete but GB was so desperate for them they had to give up some bases in return.
British dependence on Lend Lease gave the Americans power in the relationship. The USA took Britain’s gold reserves in South Africa as security for Lend Lease and made large profits from supplying arms.
The Atlantic Charter’s declaration in favour of self-determination of all people of the world potentially threatened the British Empire, especially in India.
Churchill had to work very hard to maintain the partnership with Roosevelt, much harder that than the American which could be seen to reflect the power balance in the US favour. Roosevelt was slow to offer support partly because of domestic issues but partly because he suspected that Churchill was more concerned with British imperial interests than defeating Germany & Japan.
By June 1944 half of the ground troops were US and after the failure at Arnhem (operation Market Garden) in 1944 the British were increasingly bypassed in command decisions.
By February 1945 there were twice as many US troops as British on the main Western Front.
It was the Americans who won the Battle of the Bulge in 1944-45 and secured the Rhine crossing at Remagen in 1945 (succeeding where the British had failed at Arnhem).
Roosevelt refused to meet Churchill privately in Tehran in 1943 to decide on a joint policy towards Stalin. Churchill’s Balkan plan to head off Soviet gains in Eastern Europe was rejected by Roosevelt, who saw it as a pointless distraction from fighting in France & western Germany.
At Quebec in 1944 Churchill got no commitment for post war financial assistance. By 1945 GB had a debt of £21 billion & had to borrow a further $4.3 billion from the USA to keep afloat.

How far was Churchill was weak in his dealings with the Soviet Union in the years 1944–5? - WEAK

- Churchill failed to convince Roosevelt of the threat of the USSR and was side-lined when Stalin and Roosevelt had a private meeting at Tehran in 1943. Faced with humiliating put downs by Roosevelt, he did not hide his displeasure and lost his composure. For example when Roosevelt joked with Stalin Churchill visibly reddened.
Even more importantly, Roosevelt sided with Stalin at this conference, forcing a reluctant Churchill to sideline his Mediterranean strategy & agree to an invasion of France in 1944.
In a desperate attempt to restore GB’s declining influence, Churchill did a cynical deal in 1944 to allow Stalin 90% influence in Romania & 75% in Bulgaria in return for 90% British influence in Greece. By Churchill’s own admission, it immediately occurred to him, “might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we have disposed of these issues so fateful to millions of people in such an offhand manner?” He later referred to this agreement as a “naughty document”.
Churchill was giving the “green light” to a Soviet takeover of Romania & Bulgaria but the reality was even worse than that b/c Stalin also took over Hungary (which was meant to 50/50 in the 1944 agreement) as well as Czechoslovakia, Poland & eastern Germany (not mentioned at all).
At Yalta in Feb. 1945 he was forced to accept that Poland would fall under Soviet influence and lose her eastern territories in post war Europe. This was embarrassing b/c GB had supposedly gone to war to defend Polish independence & accepting the pro-Soviet Lublin Committee as the legitimate Polish govt. meant denying that status to the Polish govt. in exile (representing the pre-war anti-Communist regime) which was based in London. It also meant that Polish soldiers fighting on the British side from the eastern territories which the USSR would now keep would not be able to return to their homes; 30 committed suicide in protest. Feeling against this in GB was so strong that Churchill faced a 3-day debate on a motion of no confidence in which 25 MPs signed a motion protesting against the agreement & one Conservative MP resigned his seat.
Similarly Churchill was forced to agree at Potsdam in July 1945 to hand over 25% of German land to the USSR & Communist Poland. Churchill disagreed with this, fearing that it would make Germany bitter & resentful (like the Treaty of Versailles), but he had no choice but to agree b/c the Red Army controlled this area & (as over Poland) the USA refused to back him in resisting the Soviet demands.

How far was Churchill was weak in his dealings with the Soviet Union in the years 1944–5? - NOT WEAK

- The sheer scale of the Red Army’s contribution and victory in the East (85% of German casualties occurred on the Eastern Front) resulted in Churchill needing Stalin much more by 1943 than Stalin needed Britain. Any leader would have struggled under these circumstances. - Churchill managed to maintain a reasonable working relationship with Stalin despite his hatred of Communism & Stalin’s suspicion of him as the main advocate of British intervention against the Communists in the Russian Civil War in 1919. They shared a fondness for alcohol and Stalin seemed to have respected Churchill’s position on some issues, e.g. the bombing of Germany which diverted significant German resources from the Eastern Front. - Until the Tehran Conference in November 1943 Churchill managed to fend off Stalin’s demands for a “2nd Front” in France. - Stalin accepted Churchill’s division of power at their meeting in 1944 and did not support the Communists against the British in Greece. - Churchill was determined to promote Britain’s position. He travelled to 16 conferences compared to 12 for Roosevelt and 7 for Stalin.

DID CHURCHILL’S LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF DE GAULLE LEAD TO POOR RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM? - YES

- De Gaulle constantly accused both GB & the USA (“the Anglo-Saxon powers” as he called them) of failing to understand or sympathise with the status he thought he was entitled to as the leader of the “Free French” forces & saviour of France (even though he was only a brigadier general & Under Secretary for War). - For a time in 1943, Churchill found De Gaulle so infuriating (he also knew Roosevelt hated him) that he seriously considered removing him as leader of the Free French forces based in GB. By autumn of that year Churchill was finally persuaded by his War Cabinet that De Gaulle had so much more support than any other possible leader that there was no alternative to him. - Churchill lost his temper with De Gaulle just before D Day in June 1944 when De Gaulle criticised British plans, accusing him of “treason” & telling him to his face that GB had to choose between France & the USA as her main ally, she would always choose the USA. De Gaulle never forgot this & it influenced his later policy (after the war) of allying with W Germany b/c he didn’t trust either GB or the USA. He blocked British entry into the EEC in 1963.

DID CHURCHILL’S LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF DE GAULLE LEAD TO POOR RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM? - NO

- Even his fellow Frenchmen found De Gaulle impossible to work with: in 1937 a general who had taught him at the St Cyr military academy described him as having a “cold & lofty attitude” & was he was not even promoted to colonel until the end of that year. - De Gaulle’s suspicion that Churchill wanted to seize parts of France’s colonial empire were completely unfounded: the British attacked Dakar in West Africa in 1940 in an unsuccessful attempt to hand it over to the Free French. Syria & Madagascar, which were conquered by British forces in 1941 & 1942 respectively, were immediately handed over to the Free French rather than being absorbed into the British Empire. - Churchill understood De Gaulle far better than De Gaulle understood him, recognising that “although in exile, dependent upon our protection and dwelling in our midst, he had to be rude to the British to prove to French eyes that he was not a British puppet. He certainly carried out this policy with perseverance”. He also said, "I have never forgotten, and can never forget, that he stood forth as the first eminent Frenchman to face the common foe in what seemed to be the hour of ruin of his country and possibly, of ours”. - Just before D Day Churchill arranged for De Gaulle to be flown to GB & invited him to broadcast to the French people; De Gaulle refused b/c the script did not acknowledge his claim (without an election) to be the leader of France. He called Churchill a “gangster” & accused the British of wanting to flood France with “false money”. - Despite this, Churchill agreed to De Gaulle becoming the provisional leader of France following the liberation of Paris in 1944. - In fact Churchill genuinely loved France, as shown by his constant advocacy of a French alliance against Hitler in the 1930s, his attempt to unite France with GB as a way of keeping France in the war in 1940 & his proposal that France be given a zone of occupation in Germany after the war. Far more than Roosevelt, he was convinced that a strong France was essential to the European balance of power.

ASSESS THE VIEW THAT CHURCHILL DID NOT TREAT POLAND FAIRLY AT THE YALTA CONFERENCE IN FEBRUARY 1945

- At Yalta it was agreed that the Communist govt. already installed in Poland (the Lublin Committee) by the USSR should be recognised provided it was established "on a broader democratic basis” & “free elections” were held. In practice this meant nothing b/c the Red Army controlled Poland so Churchill had no choice but to accept Stalin’s definition of “democracy” & “free elections” (as also happened later in the Soviet zone of Germany). By 1947 Poland was firmly under Communist control & 1,000s of anti-Communists had been arrested or even shot. - The Polish eastern border would follow the Curzon Line, which meant Stalin would keep most or all of the eastern Polish territory he had taken in the Nazi-Soviet Pact just before the outbreak of war in 1939. This meant that Polish soldiers from those areas fighting on the British side would not be able to return to their homes (30 of them committed suicide in protest against this) & millions of Poles still living there would be forcibly moved to the west. Stalin’s proposal that Poland be compensated by being given territory in eastern Germany on Poland’s western borders was accepted. - The agreements on Poland were awkward for Churchill b/c GB had gone to war to defend Poland’s borders in 1939 & many Poles had fought bravely on the British side in the Battle of Britain, North Africa & Italy. Churchill’s concessions to Stalin angered the Polish government in exile (representing the anti-Communist pre-war Polish govt.) which was based in London. He was also concerned that giving Poland too much German land would cause hostility between Germany & Poland, which was exactly what Stalin intended (b/c it would force Poland to turn to the USSR for protection). - The feeling in GB that Poland had been treated unfairly was so strong that Churchill had to face a 3-day debate in the House of Commons in February 1945 in which 25 MPs drafted an amendment condemning the agreement & one Conservative MP resigned his seat in protest.

What was agreed at the Tehran, Yalta & Potsdam Conferences regarding the future of Germany?

- It was agreed at Tehran in November 1943 that Germany would be divided after the war so she could no longer pose a military threat but nothing was decided at this stage b/c the war was still far from won. - It was agreed at Yalta February 1945 (by which time Germany had already been invaded from both sides) that Germany must surrender unconditionally, i.e. she would have to agree to whatever terms her enemies chose to impose on her. This had originally been agreed by Churchill & Roosevelt at Casablanca in 1942 & was designed to reassure Stalin that GB & the USA would not make a separate deal with Germany leaving the USSR to fight Germany alone. When the German forces offered to surrender to the Western Allies alone in 1945, Eisenhower (the commander of the Western Allied forces) insisted that they surrender to the USSR at the same time. - It was also agreed that Germany would be divided into 4 zones of occupation, not just British, US & Soviet but also French. Churchill argued strongly for a French zone, partly b/c he was genuinely pro-French & partly b/c he wanted an extra Western power to “gang up” against Stalin, who agreed to this proposal only on condition that it was the French zone should be taken out of the British & US zones, not the Soviet one. - Germany would undergo demilitarization (she would be disarmed & any industry making weapons of war would be dismantled) and denazification (for the West this meant introducing democracy, for the USSR it meant abolishing capitalism). German reparations were partly to be in the form of forced labour. The forced labour was to be used to repair damage that Germany had inflicted on its victims. Nazi war criminals were to be found, and put on trial in the territories where their crimes had been committed; Nazi leaders were to be executed. - The Potsdam Conference in July 1945 (just after the German surrender) confirmed almost everything that was agreed at Yalta but in more detail: it was agreed that northern East Prussia would be given to the USSR & southern East Prussia, Pomerania & Silesia to Poland. This meant Germany lost 25% of her pre-war territory (twice as much as in the Treaty of Versailles) & 11 million Germans were forcibly expelled from these areas & the Sudetenland, which was returned to Czechoslovakia. Churchill thought this would weaken & anger Germany to a dangerous extent (like the Treaty of Versailles), but there was little he could do b/c Stalin’s Red Army controlled all these areas & in the middle of the conference he lost the election & was replaced by Attlee as PM.

What were Churchill’s plans for post war Europe and his attitude to post-war Europe and Empire?

- Churchill spoke in favour of greater European unity in Zurich in 1946. He believed in the concept of ‘The European family and urged a ‘United States of Europe’. - He did not see greater links with Europe as incompatible with other international links such as with the United Nations or British Commonwealth. - He had a history of promoting European co-operation. He had supported Briand’s idea of a European union in 1930 and had offered to unite Britain and France in 1940. - He spoke of reducing trade barriers and promoting economic co-operation in Europe. - He agreed with the establishment of the Council of Europe in 1949, with 800 influential Europeans meeting to establish a forum for co-operation. - He was a frequent visitor to Europe and had supported involvement in two world wars to maintain the balance of power in Europe.

What were Churchill’s plans for post war Europe and his attitude to post-war Europe and Empire? BUT

- Despite advocating a major role for Britain in a more united Europe, Churchill still believed in Britain’s imperial role and the maintenance of the empire. - Therefore Britain’s closest economic ties were still with the commonwealth and Empire. Britain’s closest military relationship was with the USA. - Post war Europe was still suffering the effects of war. Germany was divided into occupation zones and in 1949 into two separate countries East and West. - France and Britain’s relationship had been damaged by the war. Britain resented French surrender and many French had supported the Vichy regime. Even De Gaulle and the Free French were not on good terms with Churchill. - Thus while Churchill supported post-war European institutions like the European Coal and Steel Community he did not advocate joining them

CHURCHILL’S IRON CURTAIN SPEECH 1946 - was unwise

- He showed an insensitive disregard for the losses the USSR had suffered during WW2 & their desire for security resulting from this. Stalin estimated that 7 million Soviet citizens had died in WW2, which as he pointed out was “several times more than Britain and the United States together”. - Given that Germany had invaded Russia through Poland in both world wars & that Romania & Hungary had participated in the German invasion, it was arguable that the USSR had a right to ensure that those & other neighbouring countries like Czechoslovakia & Bulgaria had governments friendly towards the USSR. This was security not “expansionism” as Churchill called it. - Many people even in GB & the USA thought Churchill went too far in condemning a country which had so recently been their ally against Hitler & had inflicted 85% of German casualties during WW2; it had, as Churchill himself admitted, been the Soviet army not the British or US which “tore the guts out of Hitler’s war machine”. The Chicago Sun newspaper called his speech “poisonous” & there were hostile demonstrations outside his hotel in New York. Even Truman did not at first publicly support what Churchill had said. - Churchill included Yugoslavia as on the Soviet side of the Iron Curtain even though it was independent of Soviet control.

CHURCHILL’S IRON CURTAIN SPEECH 1946 - was wise

- The part of Churchill’s speech which referred to the “Iron Curtain” is often quoted out of context, ignoring the fact that Churchill also expressed his “strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade Marshal Stalin”, denied that the USSR wanted for war & called for a general peace settlement negotiated through the newly formed United Nations. - Truman must have known how strongly anti-Communist Churchill was & he largely shared Churchill’s views even though he didn’t at first say so publicly. Many of his advisers, notably George Kennan, believed that Russia (whether Tsarist or Communist) would always aim to expand her territory & would need to be contained. - Stalin’s behaviour in Poland, where he had deliberately allowed the Nazis to crush the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, showed that he had no intention of allowing the Poles to decide their own future, even though this was theoretically the cause GB had gone to war for in 1939. - Churchill’s speech was premature for some people but he was soon proved right by the ruthless suppression of democracy throughout Eastern Europe; by 1948 Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria & even the Soviet zone of Germany (later E Germany) had all been subjected to Communist dictatorships subservient to the USSR. As early as 1947 Truman announced that the USA would act militarily to stop the expansion of - Communism to any country not already controlled it by it (the “Truman Doctrine” or “containment”).

Did Churchill manage to preserve Britain’s place in the World? - YES

- Britain managed to maintain its links with the Empire and gained considerable support from its dominions and colonies. - It sustained an alliance with both the USSR and USA and up until 1944 played a major role in determining the way the war would be fought. It did this without committing major land forces to Europe. - Britain managed to get the Empire to support the war effort in spite of major nationalist movements in places like India and not all the Empire was lost by the end of the 1940s - The USA was persuaded to support Britain in North Africa and prioritise Europe over the Pacific despite their own interests in the region. Despite signing the Atlantic Charter Britain was not forced to commit to ending the Empire (although in the long term this happened). - Churchill was able to postpone D-Day until 1944 despite pressure as the invading force would be mainly British, giving Churchill a veto over American action. - Operation Market Garden shows Britain still had a role in strategy after D-day (although this was a failure). The commanders of land, sea & air forces at D-day were all British (although under the overall command of Eisenhower, who was American). - Slightly more than half of the soldiers who landed on the Normandy beaches were under British command (though not all of them were British) & the ships carrying them were mainly British.

Did Churchill manage to preserve Britain’s place in the World? - NO

- The war built a momentum in India which ended in division and independence in 1947. This was done against a backdrop of violence which the British were unable (and in some instances unwilling) to stop. - As the war progressed it became increasingly apparent that the USA was taking the leading role on the Western Front. Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander from 1944 and the British Plan of Market Garden in September of that year was a failure. - By 1943 Churchill’s contribution to the conferences was becoming less important. The Soviet victory at Stalingrad had put them in the driving seat for the defeat of Germany and this was reflected in their increasing influence Tehran conference when Roosevelt & Stalin ganged up on Churchill to make sure the invasion of France went ahead in 1944. - By Yalta Churchill was forced to face decisions which showed the lack of British power and influence, most notably the fact he could not protect Poland from Soviet control despite the fact that protecting Poland from - Germany was the reason Britain went to war in the first place. US economic power dwarfed UK, producing at least 4 times as many tanks & aircraft as GB in 1944-5. WW2 was a pyrrhic victory in economic terms, leaving GB $28 billion in debt by 1945