Topic 9: Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Flashcards
Martha Crenshaw
“The Strategic Logic of Terrorism”
Main Argument
TERRORISM AS A RATIONAL ACT
Main Points:
- Terrorism can be understood as an expression of political strategy and may follow logical processes that can be discovered and explained.
- Pros and cons weighed, and often other tactics attempted first.
- A tactic used when often urgent response needed and/or limited resources
- Brings international attention to cause
History/Evolution
- Since the French Revolution, terrorism has grown as a strategy to bring about political change opposed by established governments
- Historically, terrorism reveals similarities in calculation of ends and means, yet shows a unity in purpose and conception.
- Terrorism tactics have evolved > are innovative and often take place in unexpected (ex. Hijacking) > She talks a bit about hostage taking > Today it could be a means to itself, or publicity, and shows you’re serious to the world
Osama bin Ladin
“Speech to the American People”
Main Argument
NOTE: This tape was recorded in 2004 and was given to Al Jazeera
Main Argument:
9/11 was retaliation for the loss of security felt by the Arab people, now the US does not feel secure. Bin Ladin feels he made his concerns clear prior to 9/11 and without response has engaged in draining the United State’s resources through prolonged wars.
More details:
- Al Qaeda is permitted to retaliate against the oppressor (the USA)
- Security is an “indispensible pillar of human life” and the US has taken away freedom from them, so we should also not be secure
- Motivated by the “oppression and tyranny of the American/Israeli coalition against our people in Palestine and Lebanon” (he compares this to a crocodile meeting a helpless child)
- American behavior, killing women and children (the Bush presidents in particular) motivated him
- Bin Laden believes he made his concerns and intentions very clear in interviews in the 90’s but the US hid and largely ignored them
9/11 exceeded his expectations because the US has already spent so much money on retaliation wars, overreact for every small thing and has revealed our own corruption by leading with interests of corporations like Halliburton, when we could have just checked for WMDs and left
The American people and our economy are the real losers in this situation
Ends with “your security is in your own hands. Every state that doesn’t play with our security has automatically guaranteed its own security”
Martha Crenshaw
“The Strategic Logic of Terrorism”
By what criteria can terrorism be judged strategically rational?
Crenshaw argues that terrorism is a rational strategy employed to achieve political means
CONDITIONS: (under resourced, out numbered, urgent)
- Extremists seek radical change to the status quo or defense of threatened privileges
- Usually want to displace political elites
- Usually terrorism follows the failure of other methods (ex. 19th century Russia)
- Usually an imbalance of support and relative power to traditional government
- Why are terrorist groups small? Could be because most of population doesn’t share beliefs, or terrorist groups aren’t great at gaining support or because in repressive states people fear punishment (but in such repressive situations, terrorist groups might assume they have secret followers when they actually don’t)
- Time constraints and the need to act on a certain opportunity might contribute
Calculation of Cost and Benefits:
COST:
- Generally high costs (unless offset by advance preparation of a secure underground)
- Can risk loss of popular support, may seem elitist, loose moral high ground
BENEFIT:
- Can be great at agenda setting, making people think/talk about something; international stage
- May be able to produce ‘revolutionary settings’ where large scale change more possible
T. E. Lawrence
“Science of Guerrilla Warfare”
Main Argument
Guerilla Warfare (compare to Mao)
Main Argument:
Guerrilla warfare as a military tactic to destroy material; It is a tactic and not overall messaging and strategy
A guerrilla rebellion must have an unassailable base, where no attack is feared, which could by physical like the desert or in the minds of the ‘men’ who participate. A rebellion can be complete with only 2% striking force, and 98% just passively sympathetic (enough for you to hide amongst them and they must have technical equipment to destroy the enemies organized communication
T.E. Lawrence bases his study of guerrilla warfare after the Arab Revolt against the more advanced army of the Turks (1916-1918), consisting of half-armed and inexperienced Arab tribesmen
T. E. Lawrence
“Science of Guerrilla Warfare”
Example: Arab Revolt
Since Napoleon, most countries only really focused on conventional warfare, aiming to seek the other armies center of power and destroy it in battle. Since that is not how “irregulars” or guerrilla fighters operate, it was hard for a formal army to take them seriously, but informal forces kept winning
- Arab army not motivated by money or political advance like traditional armies, but by ideals, and were free to leave
- Over the course of the war, the Turks stood at the defensive and the Arab tribesmen continually won advantages
- He feels that considering “victory can only be purchased by blood” it was hard for the Turks to beat the Arabs since they had no organized forces to aim at
- Relatable to Bin Laden in that he says the Arab aim was to occupy all Arabic speaking lands in Asia, so if that means that Turks must get killed than so be it, but that wasn’t the aim. If the Turks went quietly the war would have been overThe Arabs were able to spread out amongst the locals in a way that was very difficult for the Turks to defend
- In most wars forces strive to keep contact, to avoid tactical surprise, but this war couldn’t be that because the Arabs would not reveal themselves until the moment of attack (the Turks never got the chance to fire a shot he says)
- Also similar in that he mentions draining the Turks by requiring more men to constantly be reinforcing troops beyond an economically sound level
- The Arabs had nothing to defend, so no need for defense; Controlling something like the Sea or the Desert are equally good, you can always have eyes on enemy’s front line
Mao Tse-tung
“On Guerrilla Warfare”
Main Argument
Guerrilla Warfare (Compared to Lawrence)
Main Argument:
Guerrilla warfare as a stage for liberation and awakening; population wide and all encompassing
- Guerrilla warfare is necessary in the face of imperial oppressors
- though it should initially take a unique form, eventually guerrilla forces just coalesce into a more traditional military structure to win
“Fish in Sea”
T. E. Lawrence
“Science of Guerrilla Warfare”
Mao Tse-tung
“On Guerrilla Warfare”
Is guerrilla warfare a substitute for conventional military operations?
Are there effective strategic alternatives to guerrilla warfare?
Lawrence
- he would argue yes
Mao
No, once hearts and mind sof population are there it turns into conventional warfare
Samuel P. Huntington
“Patterns of Violence in World Politics”
Main Argument
Main Argument:
Domestic violence is becoming the more prevalent and blurring with interstate violence
Domestic violence cannot be explained by international politics alone but the dominant forms of violence in each age mirror the politics of each age
Details:
- War after WWII has been less about different governments deciding to go to war.
- Governments are less willing to resort to interstate violence due to domestic political restraints or considerations of international gains
- Previously, interstate war was associated with changes in control of or influence over territory, but by the mid 20th century, the status quo became stabilized.
- Struggle between USSR and US shifted from being about territory to “peaceful competition” or a stabilized conflict between two superpowers.
- Though intergovernmental violence has lessened, violence in domestic politics in the developing world has remained.
- This looks less like interstate war but more like insurrectionary violence in which a nongovernmental body (party or movement) attempts to overthrow and existing government. Instead in these examples territorial boundaries served not as the focus of conflict but as the parameters.
Intergovernmental/Interstate war: symmetrical (2 governments imposing their will). Peace settlement likely
Antigovernment/Intrastate war: Asymmetrical (gov vs nongov). Peace settlements unlikely
Domestic violence patterns:
Independence -> Revolutionary war
Modernization and Development -> Revolutionary war or coup
Revolutionary war and group alienation: Revolutionary war is linked to the end of colonialism, agrarian movements, the processes of community definition and state creation.
Doctrines of La Guerre Revolutionnaire and Indirect Aggression
la guerre révolutionnaire: Limited war for American’s and insurrectionary wars for the French (ex. Algerian rebellion)
Indirect aggression: focused on the causes by which one government can encourage violence against another government (use of inflammatory radio broadcasts; infiltration of weapons, agents; bribes)
Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl,
“Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency”
Main Argument
Main argument: COIN is the future of US strategy and certain principles that COIN operations should follow.
The US has engaged in counter insurgency (COIN) operations for over a century (Philippines- currently in Middle East)
There are common principles all coin campaigns are based on (summarized and joined when related):
- Legitimate governments are powerful, that is the endgame in COIN
- There must be unity of effort and political motivation of COIN forces
- Soldiers must study the environment and culture and that is only useful with good intelligence
- Insurgents can be more effectively eliminated by isolating them from their cause and support
- Population needs to believe that they will be secure and their lives will improve from your forces involvement
- Long-term commitments are necessary, if insurgent thinks they can exhaust you and you leave, they win
- Manage expectations of population (example that often US gov is ‘disadvantaged’ because a lot of advancement is expected from them – if they put a man on the moon, we should all have electricity). Don’t make exorbitant promises
- Don’t overreact, use measured force. Also, learn and adapt through observation. This goes along with empowering the lowest levels, since they are observing the front lines
- The long term goal is that the host nation can stand on its own and the US can back out
- Forces must stay in touch with people, and gain popular support if possible
- Quotes Lawrence to suggest that if population can do something on their own, even if its more poorly done than US troops would do it, it is perhaps even better
- “Tactical actions must be lined to operational ands strategic military objectives and political goals”
- In the future of warfare, the US’s conventional power makes it likely that opponents will choose unconventional means
Gian P. Gentile
“A Strategy of Tactics: The Folly of Counterinsurgency”
COIN: compare with Hazelton
Hearts and Minds Focused - soft power
Main Argument:
Though COIN has become the US Army’s new way of war, it has become such a central focus that very little adaptation is taking place, making it a flawed doctrine.
The US now commits itself to never-ending campaigns of nation-building that attempt to change entire societies (Afghanistan)
Population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) has become the only operational tool in the American Army’s repertoire to deal with problems of insurgency and instability
Gentile revisits COIN methodology, highlighting a focus on nation-building and long term investment as a necessity to success. He also traces it back to a French Army Officer who fought in Algeria, David Galula
In VIetman, the US almost did the reverse, focusing too strictly on conventional warfare (spoiler, we lost)
COIN is a recipe for long-term American combat presence in the world’s troubled spots
As presented, the COIN manual offers no other alternatives, strategies or methodologies, though history has shown that insurgencies can be defeated by means other than the population-centric approach (Sri Lanka)
Gentile uses Israeli army’s adaptation after fighting in Lebanon and then again in Gaza in 2008, the US could learn from this, he says
He also suggests that instead of reading about COIN, the US should get back to studying British empire in latter half of the 19th century
Jerrold M. Post
“Terrorist Psycho-Logic”
Compare to Crenshaw
Main Argument
- Though not psychopaths, Terrorists are drawn to terrorism in order to commit violence
- A specific psychological logic (psycho-logic) becomes the justification of violent acts
People with particular personality traits and tendencies are drawn disproportionately to terrorist careers. Such as:
- Action-oriented, aggressive, stimulus-hungry, excitement seeking
- On the more extreme end are “externalization” and “splitting” psychological mechanisms found in individuals with narcissistic and borderline personality disturbances (of course not in all terrorists, but at high frequencies)
- Cites another study where terrorists have high instances of early parental drama, either loss of a parent (esp. fathers) or severe familial conflict
- There is also a relationship between individuals loyalty to parents and parent’s loyalty to regime
- Terrorists may also be driven by the urge to “belong”, as many seem to come from fringes of society
How to counter: It really must be done case by case. Smaller, more autonomous groups only unite under external force. If aiming at a terrorist wing of a larger lawful political party, it is easier to put pressure on the violent wing
Jerrold M. Post
“Terrorist Psycho-Logic”
How does Post’s diagnosis compare with Crenshaw’s? Why the difference?
Agrees with Crenshaw that terrorists follow logical processes, however he goes a step farther to say that there is a specific logic “terrorist psycho-logic” that terrorists adhere to
BUT Just because of “logic”, it isn’t necessarily true that terrorists are mentally healthy individuals.
WHY:
This psychology is rooted in an “us vs. them” rhetoric, without any room for variation
They (the establishment) are the source of all evil, vs us (the freedom fighters, rightfully outraged), so if they are the source of the problem then they must be destroyed
Jerrold M. Post
“Terrorist Psycho-Logic”
Group Think
Suggests that terrorist organizations sometimes prefer to keep the struggle going to continue having a cause rather than accept terms that would meet most of their “goals”
In this case it is very hard to dissuade terrorists from being terrorists
Group think - survival of group over takes the political ends
Jacqueline L. Hazelton
“The ‘Hearts and Minds’ Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare”
Coercion Theory
COIN: compare with Gentile (and CCHN somewhat)
Overall:
- Insurgent focused - hard power
- Coercive, limited, military > focused on using overbearing force to target insurgents
Main Argument
The “coercion theory” offers a better explanation for successful counterinsurgency than the “good governance” or hearts and minds theory, by using force to control civilians, cutting the flow of resources to insurgents and “accommodating elites” to obtain information from them and enhance military power
Coercion Theory
Her theory of counterinsurgency success, called “coercion theory” differs from conventional “good governance” in two ways:
- It identifies armed and unarmed elites as the key actors in counterinsurgency, rather than the populace (accommodate a few>all)
- It identifies government’s use of force against insurgents and civilians as an important factor in counterinsurgency success, as opposed to limiting the use of force to avoid civilian harm
Jacqueline L. Hazelton
“The ‘Hearts and Minds’ Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare”
How does Hazelton’s argument relate to the disagreement between Gentile and Cohen, Crane, Horvath, and Nagl?
CCHN diff:
Hazelton finds fault with the current COIN methodology introduced by Cohen…etc,
Gentile diff:
but while she would agree with Gentile that COIN is flawed, she focuses more on the need for violence to end violence in counterinsurgency efforts.
Her theory:
The U.S. prescription for success is twofold: to provide support for liberalizing, democratizing reforms designed to reduce popular grievances and gain popular support while weakening the insurgency, and to target insurgent with military force without harming civilians.
She calls this the “good governance” approach, but others call it the “hearts and minds” approach
“good governance” COIN assumes populace is center of gravity, Hazelton thinks it is elites
Beating the insurgency has three requirements:
- Low-cost accommodation of elite domestic rivals must be provided (war-lords, regional/cultural leaders… etc) to gain fighting power and information on insurgency (this is cheaper than good-gov reforms)
- Utilize brute force to control civilians and reduce flow of resources to insurgency
- Application of coercive force to break insurgency’s will and capacity to fight on
