Topic 12: Threat Assessment and Strategic Planning Flashcards
Eyre Crowe and Thomas Sanderson
“The German Threat? 1907”
Argues that a German maritime supremacy is incompatible with the British Empire and it should be known that Europe will counter against such an occurrence
Takeaway: Advocates allowing Germany to build and expand (where no counter claims exist) but that in doing so England must also enlarge its own fleet. For every German ship, England will lay down two.
Naval power driving force in 1907; in England’s best interest to be the protector of free trade and support the independence of nations; thus, should counter threats to both
Says countries naturally would enjoy preponderance of power on the sea, but lacking the ability, prefer England to have it over other nations
As German naval power grew and merchants were able to fully see might of colonizers power abroad, Germany grew hungry for that same “World Power” status; viewed colonization as a must given its growing population (though its colonies were not overly successful)
With Germany’s rise came a combative political relationship with England, which saw England make “concession after concession”; successful under Bismarck
Neville Henderson
“The German Threat?” 1938
Writes in 1938. Downplays German threat by saying she is just preparing herself for any emergency
Remedy of war on German nationalism under Hitler “worse than the disease”
Argues concessions can be made in Czech proposals; disagrees when people say that Hitler would march against Czechoslovakia without warning – says he will give notice
Takeaway: Gives multiple excuses for German action in the leadup to WWII and ends up being wildly wrong
Eliot A. Cohen
“The Threat from Russia”
Sees Russia’s annexation of Crimea as the foundation of a menace that could rival any conflict seen in the 20th century
Dismemberment of a sovereign state, whose border were recognized by the Budapest Declaration of 1994, something that cannot stand; emphasizes fact that it happened to European state as opposed to elsewhere in the world
Reactionary sanctions and hand-wringing not enough
Argues that there is something about liberalism that creates its own nemeses or at least inhibits its defenses against them; maligns the public today, which he says lacks engagement
Takeaway: Advocates for an increase in defense spending, putting troops in the frontline states of NATO, and aiding vulnerable Ukrainian populations; call this move for what it is – an invasion and fanaticism rather than sanitized discourse
Argument is ideological in a sense that he highlights idea of freedom outside of tangible benefits people in the West associate with it
Vladimir Putin
“The Threat to Ukraine from the West”
Transfer of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 treated as a formality because it was transfer within a state (USSR) – no one predicted the USSR would collapse and Crimea would be isolated from its Russian history; “Russia not simply robbed, but plundered”
Maidan coup was instigated by terrorists and Russophobes who immediately moved to suppress native Russians once in power, starting with Crimea
Says no Russian armed forces ever entered Ukraine
Lambasts West for recognizing Ukraine’s and Kosovo’s right (‘Kosovo precedent’) to self-determination but not Crimea’s; double-standard; referendum clearly showed allegiance to Russia; says Western logic intimates that to be an independence movement, blood must be shed – why?
Infamous policy of containment by the west in 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries clearly continues; against having
“military alliance at home, in our backyard, in our historic territory”
“If you compress spring back to its limit, it will snap back hard”
Eyre Crowe and Thomas Sanderson
“The German Threat? 1907”
Neville Henderson
“The German Threat?” 1938
How do the respective rationales of Crowe, Sanderson, and Henderson reflect the dilemmas of deterrence and crisis management?
Is there a strategic concept for resolving such dilemmas?
***need to build out
Eyre Crowe and Thomas Sanderson
“The German Threat? 1907”
Neville Henderson
“The German Threat?” 1938
Is it a good idea to empathize with an adversary? Is it feasible to have empathy without sympathy?
When a threat is uncertain, which emphasis in policy—deterrence or reassurance—is least risky?
If British, French, and Russian statesmen had acted more in line with Sanderson’s and Henderson’s thinking, might World War I have been avoided? If British, French, and Soviet statesmen in 1938 had acted more in line with Crowe’s logic, might they have resisted Hitler earlier?
***need to build out
John Ikenberry
“China’s Choice”
Argues that China’s rise isn’t purely between it and the US, as realists argue, but that it is China versus the Western system; China can thrive if operates within the system and will likely choose to do so; if US frames the argument as such, the risk of conflict diminishes
- Not all power transitions generate war (UK ceded authority to US; Japan’s economic rise not conflictual)
- Current western order distinctive in that it is more liberal than imperial; it is integrative and expansive
- The system was used to check West Germany and Japan post-WWII by binding them to the system through pacts and agreements; new post-Cold War states also integrated
Three features of Western order critical to its longevity:
1. Rules built around non-discrimination and market openness
2. Coalition-based character of leadership
3. Dense and broad system of rules and institutions
System only incentives China to work within it, especially given integrative nature of rise of technology
System built to accommodate rising powers; threats also minimized due to great power possession of nuclear weapons
Thrust of argument: US needs to reinforce system and maintain it, ensuring it does not decompose into a system of bilateral or multilateral agreements that allows China to counterbalance and do the same.
China may be able to overtake the US in some respects, but not the entire system.
- liberal international order and china has adopted and is championing some of the ideas/norms like capitalism
- Nuclear deterrence are both nuclear power but with Thucydides were not nuclear powers - so less likely to result in war bc cost is higher with nuclear war so wont happen
John Ikenberry
“China’s Choice”
Where does Ikenberry’s argument fit among the theories surveyed in sections 2 and 3? Does his argument show what western military strategy in the region should be?
What is the most important word that does not appear anywhere in Ikenberry’s article?
Ikenberry would reject Gilpin And Allison
Is the possibility of deliberate aggression by the West what China should worry most about?
NO - Ikenberry
Liberal order if well maintained would prevent aggression; more worried about domestic western politics
Non - military - political/economic inclusion in order
Security dilemma - more likely to come from circumstances and misunderstanding rgar striking
Worry about their own internal dynamics - Hong Kong etc
Graham Allison
“The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?” The Atlantic 2015
Main point:
Central point: a new strategy is not enough but rather a long pause for reflection. China is not a problem to be fixed but rather a condition that will have to be diligently managed if war is to be avoided
Focuses on conflict between ruling and rising powers as outlined by Greek historian Thucydides in the prelude to the Peloponnesian War
Sparta (ruling power) interpreted Athens’ rising posture as unreasonable, ungrateful, and threatening; led to new alliance structure aimed at counterbalancing each other, and also to “entangling alliances” that sucked the powers into conflict it otherwise might not have become involved in; end result was a Spartan victory but a weak Greece susceptible to invasion by a third part (Persia) waiting in the wings
Evidence doesn’t inspire confidence: in 12 of 16 case studies, war was the result of such clashes
Current underestimations and misapprehensions of hazards inherent in US-China relationship exacerbate hazards
Capability is key when calculating threat of rising power; however unimaginable the consequences and unlikely the intentions, none of these factors sufficient in preventing war
We, including Allison, fail to recognize magnitude of China’s fast-paced rise, which happened so rapidly “we have not yet had time to be astonished”
Lee Kuan Yew: China wants to be China and accepted as such – why wouldn’t it seek to be number one in Asia, and in time, the world? So, why inconceivable that china not seek to implement its own Monroe Doctrine in Asia?
Deng Xiaoping policy of “hide and bide” – build capacity while hiding extent of capabilities; current president Xi now starting to project foreign policy abroad and states that “the growing trend toward a multipolar world will not change”
Don’t discount honor (a la Lebow reading) – many Chinese believe it is now headed back to its rightful place where its power commands respect
Graham Allison
“The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?”
How does Allison’s argument relate to Ikenberry’s?
Compare to Ikenberry’s
Ikenberry Reading - Chinese choice
1. liberal international order and china has adopted and is championing some of the ideas/norms like capitalism
2. Nuclear deterrence are both nuclear power but with Thucydides were not nuclear powers - so less likely to result in war bc cost is higher with nuclear war so wont happen
Gilpin Reading - rising dom power, hegemonic war
Is the possibility of deliberate aggression by the West what China should worry most about?
NO - Ikenberry
Liberal order if well maintained would prevent aggression; more worried about domestic western politics
Non - military - political/economic inclusion in order
Security dilemma - more likely to come from circumstances and misunderstanding rgar striking
Worry about their own internal dynamics - Hong Kong etc
YES - Allison and Gilpin
International order would think more likely because hegemonic power threatened by china
What is the point for a waxing or waning power to engage in aggression?
Graham Allison
“The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?”
Is the possibility of deliberate aggression by China what the West should worry about most?
What historical analogies are least misleading in estimating the odds of conflict between China and the West?
War between U.S. and China is likely but not inevitable
Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross
“Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,”
Pose 4 variations of US grand strategy:
- Neo-Isolationist:
least ambitious and least popular within the foreign policy community; protection of America peoples and ideals is the only vital US interest (thus anti-interventionist proponents of strategic independence); realist focus on power; Collapse of USSR leaves a rough balance of power in Eurasia and China/Russia now contain each other, thus US need not seek out a larger role to play when it is “strategically immune”; nuclear weapons ensure protection; requires rather small force structure unlikely to cost more than 2 percent of GDP;
- Critiques: isolationism would likely breed competition and thus give rising powers more opportunities to challenge US; leads to constant need for reassessment of security environment; savings smaller than loss of influence that will occur; reduces US role in managing crisis when wants to take on role again
- Mearsheimer-esque strategy
- Selective Engagement: seeks peace amongst Great Powers (Russia, China, Japan), which have biggest potential for earth shattering conflict; stems from realism and focuses on large concentrations of power; where consequences of miscalculation most serious, US should engage abroad; recognize resources scarce and thus US cannot keep the peace everywhere in the world and must be selective; regional conflict matters to the extent that they could instigate great power involvement; focus is on Europe, East Asia, and Middle East; preservation of NATO though not its expansion; focus on opportunity cost in humanitarian interventions; necessary to have a “two regional wars” capability
Critique: lacks romance / idealism that rally folks behind it; narrow focus on power; does not define which minor issues are important; not as “selective” as seems since almost whole world important – tempting to protect frontiers of “what matters” in addition to “what matters”; costly – risks war for purposes of preventing it
Seems like a Betts argument - Cooperative Security:
posits that peace is effectively indivisible; informed by liberalism; focus on international institutionalism and democratic peace theory; help move transitional governments towards democracy; aggression anywhere by anyone should not be allowed; advocate arms control and non-proliferation, and preventive war if necessary; “strategic interdependence” connects US security to a host of distant troubles that should not be ignored; long-term project to thicken the current web of cooperative security; enlargement of NATO a positive; emphasis on humanitarian intervention; small number of states, incl. the US, should maintain robust militaries and US leadership in the cooperate climate important; strategy inherently involves several simultaneous military actions
Critique: room for defectors and free riders; dissuasion no easy task; likely need to prove collective action successful in successive conflicts to truly deter; democracies dependent on public sentiment don’t lend themselves to collective action; arms control verification an issue
Doyle-esque - Primacy:
- posits that only preponderance of US power ensures peace; coalitions and alliances insufficient; concerned with present and possible great powers; theorizes that other states will accept US hegemony and not balance against it; powers should rest easy knowing that US is benign; more judicious in which liberal projects merit support; US dominant across the board, not just in terms of GDP; problem not a lack of resources for primacy but a lack of will; think can assuage Russia’s fears of an expanding NATO; skeptical of international organizations; also concerned with proliferation; requires Cold War era force size, i.e. big, larger than at least the next two biggest adversaries combined
Critique: Futile for 5 reasons: globalization will allow others to compete on global stage; counterbalancing likely; insistence on American hegemony will engender resistance; US must be willing to wage preventive war; risk of imperial overstretch
Brzezinski and Kissinger primacy proponents
Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross
“Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,”
How do the strategic alternatives discussed relate to theories surveyed in sections 2 and 3?
Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross
“Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,”
Which of the four general strategies outlined make the most and least sense?
Where do the strategies of the Bush II, Obama, and Trump administrations fit in the Posen-Ross framework?
Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross
“Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,”
Have the past two decades changed the proper conceptualization of strategic alternatives? Is there a fifth model truly different from the four outlined that should be added to the list?
