Topic 10: Society, Polity, Culture, and Capability

Question 1

Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder
“Democratization and War”

Main Argument

Answer 1

Main argument:
Emerging democracies are more war prone than established ones because internal institutions and factions are less stable and there is a weakening of central authority.
—-
The idea that democracies never fight each other as become an axiom, something that has been used by American statesmen to justify foreign policy that encourages democratization abroad

However, evidence actually shows that in transitional phases of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war prone, not less, and do fight with democratic states

This is especially true in formerly autocratic states where democratic participation is on the rise (ex. Contemporary Russia). States going from total autocracy to mass democratization are twice as likely to fight wars after democratization than if they remained autocracies.

So generally through his research: democratizing states were more likely to fight wars than were states that had undergone no change in regime. This relationship is weakest at 1 yrs post democratization and strongest at 10 years

States seek “prestige” by seeking victories abroad – making them aggressive and vulnerable to slights

Question 2

Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder
“Democratization and War”

Why might emerging democracies and partial democracies be war-prone? If we accept Mansfield and Snyder’s argument, does that mean we must reject democratic peace theory?

Answer 2

History shows that often nationalistic sentiment goes hand in hand with democratization. Nationalism can be used to get the public behind war in a democratizing state. (esp clear in new states – ex. Post soviet states) Additionally institutions are frail and distrusted.

Elites must go along with the wave of democratization and nationalism or risk death

Question 3

Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder
“Democratization and War”

Do Mansfield and Snyder discredit “democratic peace” theory?

Answer 3

Not exactly, but gives it parameters. New democracies must be managed to avoid war

In the case of Eastern Europe, with the help of democratic international institutions, and pressure to join western alliances there were a series of carrots and sticks to move nations along after cold war, avoiding violence

Question 4

Chaim Kaufmann
“Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars”

Main Argument

Answer 4

Partitions For - Compare with Kumar

Main Argument:
Ethnic wars divide people two deeply, so the only solution is dividing them into demographically separated and defensible enclaves

• Solutions to ethnic wars do not depend on their causes
• Instead, once they have broken out:

1) ethnic war is hyper-nationalist and violence hardens ethnic identities
2) populations are geographically intermingled, where security dilemmas intensify violence and motivate ethnic cleansing. SO overall – what occurs during ethnic wars make it impossible to have ethnic cooperation later (ex. Kurds in Turkey in 1990s)

The only stable resolution to ethnic civil war is dividing the population into demographically separated and defensible enclaves or national homelands, it makes the need for ethnic cleansing, etc, disappear

It is important to note that ideological conflicts are different and require a separate set of fixes than ethnic wars, which are more deeply seeded than political ones

Proposes partition as a solution (though not fool proof). If possible, it is best to insure that minority is small enough that majority doesn’t need to feel them)
Ex. There haven’t been wars among Bulgaria, Greece or Turkey since divided in 1920s

The data: of 27 civil wars that have ended: 12 ended by complete victory of one side, 5 by partition, 2 suppressed by military occupation by a 3rd party and 8 ended by an agreement that didn’t partition nation (somehow he takes this to mean that partition is better…)

Intervention to resolve ethnic wars should 1) aim to physically separate warring communities and balance relative strengths to avoid need for resettlement and 2) in some cases military intervention may be needed so stronger side doesn’t take advantage of initial weakness of other side, or if genocide is taking place

Backside: partition can’t dissolve ethnic mistrust and population transfers due to partition cause suffering

Question 5

Chaim Kaufmann

“Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars”

Question 6

Radha Kumar

“The Troubled History of Partition”

Answer 6

Partitions Against - Compare with Kaufmann

Main Argument:
Partition has not historically been a successful method of resolving ethnic conflict and in many cases actually increases violence

Divide and Quit
Kumar claims that partition really arose as something imposed as a way for outside powers to unshoulder colonies or divide up spheres of influence

• Divide and quit can be described a pushing partition through without establishing boundaries of new states or planning for wars that might ensue
• Kumar uses the partitions in Cyprus, India, Palestine and Ireland as examples where it actually furthered violence and forced mass migration (riots after division, continued conflict)

Two colonial rationales for partition:

1. Wilsonian national self determination (Poland and Romania) which supported ethnic self-determination as freedom from colonial rule
2. the British colonial policy of identifying irreconcilable nationhoods (Ireland, India, Cyprus, Palestine), which “reluctantly espoused partition as a lesser evil than constant civil war

India’s partition (though still violent and causing displacement) has been slightly more successful, likely because the conflicts that followed partition were mostly contained and its distance from Europe.

Additionally, partition often gives way to further partition in the future (India/Pakistan > then Bangladesh)

Ends by saying that “divide and quit” obviously gives way to future violence so in the future it might look more like “divide and forced to stay”

Question 7

Is Kaufmann or Kumar more convincing?

What counterfactual (what if/what has not happened) histories do you assume in making your judgment?

Answer 7

I think that Kumar is more convincing. Kaufmann skims over too many historical problems with partition and seems to sympathize with the idea that colonial powers know best. My biggest issue with him is his nonchalant mention of forced migration, which is a massive issue for people and obviously in the case if Israel and Palestine has led to generations of conflict.

Kumar focuses more on origins of the problem and why there’s some moral complicity here, Kaufman says basically that causes and solutions are separate so no use looking at the past

Question 8

Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz
“Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II”

Main Argument

Answer 8

Combat Motivation - Primary Group
Shils and Janowitz’s data comes from the western front and the North Africa campaign

Main Argument

• German soldiers fought to the end largely due to primary group dynamics
• A soldier’s ability to resist was a function of the capacity of his primary group (squad or section) to meet his basic needs (including affection and esteem)

Details:

• The acceptance of political, ideological, and cultural symbols were secondary factors
• When the primary group was disrupted via separation, loss of communication, loss of leadership, low food supply or inadequate medical care, then soldiers became focused on survival and thus there was little last-ditch resistance

They found:

• As long as the primary group was intact, Allied propaganda focused on political and ideological factors was unsuccessful
• Allied propaganda was most successful when it focused on primary/personal values like survival
• Factors strengthening primary group solidarity: the hard core and community of experience

The nucleus of the primary group were the “hard core” – men who adhered to Nazi ideology, had enthusiasm for military life, and valued toughness and group solidarity

Factors weakening primary group solidarity: isolation, familial ties, and desire for physical survival

High degree of devotion to Hitler was also a factor in prolonging German resistance

Question 9

Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz
“Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II”

Why did the Wehrmacht hold together and continue fighting like wild dogs even after defeat was nearly certain?

Answer 9

German soldiers fought to the end largely due to primary group dynamics

If their primary group (squad or section) was meeting their basic needs, soldiers identified with them and developed a sense of loyalty

Soldiers fought for physical survival of their primary group and also sought to maintain the acceptance/affection of their primary group

Question 10

Omer Bartov
“Daily Life and Motivation in War: The Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union”

Main Argument

Answer 10

Main argument:
Bartov argues that primary group theory cannot adequately explain German motivation on the Eastern front because there was no unit cohesion

Bartov argues that this high casualty rate means there was no “primary group” or unit cohesion, yet German soldiers kept fighting

• Bartov provides examples of several German units that experienced over 100% casualties, meaning that over time the entire unit was replaced.
• He also notes that unit leaders changed as often as every few days due to casualties.

Ideology

• German soldiers had a particular affinity for Adolf Hitler and displayed extreme loyalty, even once it was clear that Germany was losing the war
• Bartov uses quotes from German soldiers’ letters as evidence that propaganda effectively convinced many soldiers that their cause was just, they were fighting to save German civilization, and that the Russians were inferior and diabolical

Question 11

Omer Bartov
“Daily Life and Motivation in War: The Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union”

How and why does Bartov disagree with Shils and Janowitz?

Answer 11

Bartov argues that ideological motivation has an important role in soldiers’ willingness to fight and performance. Shils and Janowitz argue that it is primarily a function of primary group dynamics. Bartov contends that this isn’t possible on the eastern front because casualty rates were so high that primary groups could not develop.

Question 12

Bartov vs Shils and Janowitz

Combat Motivation

Can the two interpretations be reconciled?

Answer 12

Ideological motivation plays an important role in armies’ performance

COMBAT MOTIVATION:
Two main schools of thought on combat motivation
Ideology

1. Bartov - Ideology
2. Shils and Janowitz - Primary groups

They can be reconciled by recognizing that:

• Bartov was examining the eastern front
• Shils and Janowitz used was from the western front

Bartov notes that Shils and Janowitz examined the western front, but that the fighting on the eastern front was much more brutal

Question 13

Kenneth M. Pollack
“Arabs at War”

Main Argument

Answer 13

Unit Cohesion

Key question: “What is it that has consistently hindered Arab militaries over the years?”

Strengths: Cowardice, Unit cohesion, Poor logistics

Primary drivers of Arab military ineffectiveness factors:

• Poor tactical leadership – poor initiative and inability to coordinate combined arms
• Poor information management - led to fog of war/friction
• Poor weapons handling - could not take full advantage of their equipment
• Poor maintenance – low readiness rates, reduced access to equipment

These four can be split into two categories:
The most significant factor was poor tactical leadership
1. poor tactical leadership
2. limited technical skills

Examples: Syrian vs. Israeli tanks (1973); Syrian vs. Israeli air combat over Lebanon (1982); Iran vs. Iraq (1981-1982)

Lessons:

1. Unit cohesion is a necessary but not sufficient factor in military effectiveness
2. Unit cohesion is extremely important in some missions (static defense) but not in others (armor engagement)
3. Good generalship is important, but “even superb strategic moves may amount to nothing if the nation’s tactical formations are incapable of executing

Question 14

Kenneth M. Pollack
“Arabs at War”

If Arab military personnel fight so bravely, why does Pollack believe that Arab military organizations have been ineffective in combat?

Answer 14

Arab militaries have been ineffective due to poor tactical leadership, poor information management, poor weapons handling, and poor maintenance.

Question 15

Kenneth M. Pollack
“Arabs at War”

What explanations other than cultural ones might there be?

Answer 15

As Caitlin Talmadge explains, some of these poor military practices may be explained by deliberate attempts to prevent coups.
Regimes facing internal threats may restrict or deliberately inhibit the development of conventional military capability to protect the regime.

Question 16

Caitlin Talmadge

“Different Threats, Different Militaries: Explaining Organizational Practices in Authoritarian Armies”

Answer 16

UNIT COHESION

Key question: “Why do some states generate competent, professional military organizations, while others fail to do so even when they have the required economic, demographic, and technological endowments?”

Answer: It’s not regime type – its presence of institutions. But regime determine strength of institutions.
Ex: China, Korea, India – communist/authoritarian/democracy – all militarily successful because have institutions
North and South Vietnam - expect military organization to have taken very similar forms in the two regimes, yet it diverged radically (north=long standing, stable single-party state –> conventional, south= no functioning institutions after colonialism and the war–> coup prevention)

Main argument
- Tallmadge contends that military organizational practices explain this variation and that states largely choose these practices based on the internal and external threats to the regime.

• Internal threats often dominate regimes’ calculations in designing the coercive apparatus of the state
• Where political institutions are weak and civil- military relations deeply conflictual, coup fears tend to dominate regimes’ threat calculations, resulting in organizational practices that are likely to undermine conventional military capability, even when incentives to develop that capability are strong.
• Politicization of the military (politicians involved in military affairs)—what Huntington would have called “subjective control”—is not necessarily bad, nor does the military autonomy he favored automatically lead to optimal forms of military organization.

Military Organizational Practices for Conventional War
Four main practices
1. Promotion patterns: Promotion based on merit
2. Training Regimens: Rigorous, realistic training at both large and small unit level
3. Command Arrangements: Decentralized but unified battlefield command
4. Information Management: Encourage information sharing

These practices prevent coups but also prevent effective generation of conventional combat power

Question 17

Caitlin Talmadge
“Different Threats, Different Militaries: Explaining Organizational Practices in Authoritarian Armies”

Is this explanation of military ineffectiveness cultural, political, or both?

Answer 17

This explanation is largely political as it focuses on threats to the ruling regime as the factor that most significantly affects the choice of military organizational practices.

Question 18

Caitlin Talmadge
“Different Threats, Different Militaries: Explaining Organizational Practices in Authoritarian Armies”

Will personalist dictatorships always be pushovers?

Answer 18

Personalist dictatorships are fragile because they are “devoid of institutions separate from the leader” and “require only that a rival arrest or assassinate a single person…to assume the reins of power.”

The Choice of Military Organizational Practices

• Tallmadge argues that military practices “reflect the dominant, proximate threat to the ruling regime”
• Internal threats dominate and can outweigh even significant external threats. Regimes with significant coup threats are unlikely to develop effective military capability because it would be an internal threat.
• Coups are offense-dominant; best defense is prevention

Two main indicators of coup risk:
- Strength of a regime’s political institutions – weakly institutionalized regimes are the most likely to adopt coup prevention practices

1. Personalist regimes are fragile because only one individual must be arrested or killed for a coup to be successful. Characterized by a single individual’s domination of both the military and the state apparatus - fragile, will strongly prioritize coup prevention
2. Military dictatorships - leadership circle consisting of a group of officers that decides who will rule and helps make policy. The experience of having come to power through a coup should induce a very similar set of fears among leaders.

Key features of a state’s civil-military history:
- If civil-military relations have been conflictual, regime will be fearful of coups
- One party regimes are best able to avoid internal threats because they can easily co-opt opposition ad credibly share power
- Objective control – politicians staying out of purely military affairs and avoiding politicization of the officer corps
- Subjective control – politicization of the military
Neither objective nor subjective control are necessarily bad