Topic 7 -Policy, Strategy, and Operations Flashcards
Clausewitz
On War
Topic: Friction
Book I, chap. 7; Book II, chap. 3; Book III, chap. 1; Book VI, chaps. 1, 5
Key takeaways:
“Friction, as we choose to call it, is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult.”
“Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.
- It is more appropriate to use “art of war” over “science of war” because “perception by the mind is already a judgment and therefore an art but, war is neither one or the other, but a mixture of both ultimately war does not belong in either the arts or the sciences but “rather it is part of man’s social existence.
- “War is a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed-that is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts.”
- Decide strategy first: “Once it has been determined, from the political conditions, what a war is meant to achieve and what it can achieve, it is easy to chart the course.”
- highlights the importance of restraint in making decisions, not over- shooting your goals, but making limited decisions that collectively will achieve your main goal
- defense in war is relative, the object of defense is preservation, stronger position because it is easier to hold ground then to take it. “..the defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows” Defense can be tactical or strategic.
Examples:
Frederick the Great, small forces, small kingdom, smart, restrained decisions and calculations, allowed him to defeat a superior enemy. Did not overreach
Clausewitz
On War
How should the concept of “friction” affect strategic planning and decisions for war?
Friction Distinguishes real war from war on paper
- difference between reality and reality at the tactical level (unexpected things, human error etc.) every fault and exaggeration on paper is immediately exposed in reality (ambiguous information in war – strategies probability sometimes impossible to predict)
- This should be taken into account and plan for contingency
- Clausewitz, “perseverance in the chosen course”
Clausewitz
On War
How many academic strategic theories incorporate the concept of friction satisfactorily?
Reconsider what Clausewitz means when he says that all strategic success is at base tactical success, and that combat is the only effective force in war.
- Tactical level can change outcomes at strategic level
- There is only one force in war: combat. Even if its only the threat of it. The means by which the purpose is achieved. The only way to defeat an enemy is to attack
Clausewitz
On War
How do Clausewitz’s arguments about attack and defense at tactical and strategic levels relate to each other?
- Related because countries don’t do one or the other. They do both but they do them at different levels of analysis. A defensive campaign can be fought with offensive battles, and in a defensive battle we can employ offensively.
- He also believes that a defensive posture ultimately necessitates a counterattack (and therefore a shift to an offensive posture) as soon as it becomes advantageous for the state to do so. “Begin defensively and end by attacking.”
Stephen Biddle
Military Power
Main Argument
Systemic and Dyadic
Main argument: force employment is a powerful—and explicable— determinant of capability
- Determination of capability usually made on the basis of numerical preponderance, economic strength, local ratios/superiority
- After preponderance, the most influential ideas on capability concern technology. Views on its role fall into two schools, systemic and dyadic.
1. Systemic: changing technology shifts attack and defense balance for all states in the international system. Whichever side, offense or defense is favored by the current technology available will win
2. Dyadic: relative technology between individual states maters. Lanchester theory: only the two sides relative holdings matter, unilateral advantage more important than systemic change.
But these theories are usually not well elaborated and are too vague to be accurately/ empirically tested to see if they hold true
Stephen Biddle
Military Power
Key Points:
Tech and Preonderance
Op/Tactical Force Deployment
Defense planners cannot maximize technological sophistication and numerical preponderance simultaneously there is a quality and quantity trade off to important to actually know which is more relevant
Force Employment and nonmaterial factors such doctrine, skill, morale, or leadership taken into account in net assessments and war plans but often excluded from explicit theories of capability and ignored by international relations theorists
- Unless force employment is wholly uncorrelated with preponderance or technology, analyses that leave it out will systematically mispredict their effects. The more important force employment is, the worse the bias, and the greater the consequences for both policy and scholarship.
- The data show no support for a simple assumption that preponderance or technology predetermines capability.
- **Look at tactics to understand higher levels-
- Operations and tactics level of war are most proximate to realized capability
- many of the effects of grand strategy or institutional structure can best be understood via their effects on preponderance, technology, and operational/tactical force employment
Examples:
- In WWI Problem: how to conduct meaningful military missions with the increased lethality of machine guns, barbed wire, trenches ?
- plans to advance were frustrated quickly leading to wars of great length and intensity that was unforseen
Solution: force deployment - Tactical advances where artillery and infantry worked together to suppress the defense created a drastic shift in the WWI trench warfare stalemate
- slow attacks to protect defenders and mow down
opponents
- 2001 - Invasion of Afghanistan - utilized fewer than 100 men with northern alliance to overthrow Taliban regime - horses, airpower, and innovation tech
Stephen Biddle
Military Power
Why does Biddle believe judgments about a nation’s power are likely to be wrong if they are derived from economic data about resources without an understanding of the nation’s military operational practices?
- Economic data gives an incomplete picture: the size of armies and their technological capabilities matters less than integrated force employment
- Modern system of force employment: cover, small unit mobility, suppressive fire
- Trade offs in technology can make or break how you do in war
- –
Stephen Biddle
Military Power
Why haven’t all countries adopted the “modern system” of force employment?
Biddle’s argument: Armies that fail to adopt modern system will fail to win against armies that do
so why not….
Its complex, requires political and organization changes. Not all armies have the skill for such tasks > Civil-military conflict can be an obstacle because of concerns over too much military independence and prevent professional expertise
- Social or cultural constraints: modern system demands high degree of independence which is incompatible with hierarchy
- Conflicting funding priorities / Military-industrial complex can force states to spend more money on weapons development than actually training soldiers how to use them most effectively.
- Requires extensive independent decision making by enlisted personnel and many states don’t want to give so many individuals this autonomy
- Defense in depth, for example requires States to yield territory early in hope of regaining it later. This is unpopular with residents of border areas and small states (such as Israel) or states with outlying natural resources (such as France) make it unattractive
Robert Jervis
“Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”
Security Dilemma and Offense/Defense
Security Dilemma:
one state’s gain in security, sought to protect the status quo, often inadvertently threatens others
- The dilemma will operate much more strongly if statesmen do not understand it and don’t accurately see how their actions may alarm others (“failure in empathy”)
- If states have too little sensitivity: they overestimate the amount of security that is attainable and will over-arm/downgrade conciliatory policies – exacerbate the dilemma
- If states have too much sensitivity, they will be too conciliatory; treat aggressors as insecure defenders of status quo (rise of Hitler WW2)
Offense/Defense Balance and the Security Dilemma
- Often times capabilities for implementing premptive startegy for defensive purposes/policy are not obseribly distinguishable from capabilities designed for aggressive attacks
In assessing threat, it’s hard to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons and which have the advantage. - Technology and geography are two main factors that determine whether offense/defense has advantage. Weapons are highly valuable; must be employed before they are attacked.
If offense has advantage…
its easier to destroy the other’s army and take their territory than to defend your own
- Dilemma is most vicious when commitments, strategy, or technology dictate that the only route to security is through expansion; status quo powers must then act as aggressors – increases the chance of war
If defense has advantage…
it’s easier to protect than assault – can be easier to de-escalate these situations in the beginning. If defense is dominant, wars likely to become stalemates and only won at enormous costs.
When deciding between which to take, states have to consider:
- Cost-benefit analysis: cost more to attack or defend?
- Inventory of force: is there an incentive to strike first or to absorb the other’s blow?
Robert Jervis
“Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”
Geography Buffer Zones and Example: Schlieffen Plan
Example: Schlieffen Plan – example of the influence geography on strategy
- Germany was surrounded by powerful states; because she could not hold off both her enemies, she would have to defeat one quickly and then deal with the other
- If either France or Russia stayed out of war, this would have succeeded. They both had to fight to deny Germany
- Germany’s arrogant and erratic behavior and desire for unreasonably high security can partially be explained by desire to escape geographic plight
Buffer zones: often result of geography – they slow attackers progress
Ex: Afghanistan’s “non-conducting” qualities in 19th century – possessed few roads and no railroads; made it impossible for Russia to make effective use of her numerical superiority and invade British Empire (pg. 395)
Preventative war:
Bismark called it “committing suicide from fear of death”
Beliefs about war that can deepen the security dilemma:
War will be profitable for winner
Wars are expected to be frequent and short; result in states forming alliances that prevent bargaining and realignment, results in bi-polarity in international system which increases tension and reduces cooperation
Robert Jervis
“Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”
Offense/Defense Differentiation
Being able to differentiate between offensive and defensive positions can abolish security dilemma
- Status quo powers can identify each other and cooperate, get advanced warning of aggression, agree on policies that support the status quo/reduce chances of war
- There is debate about whether or not this is possible to determine; whether a weapon is offensive/defensive depends on particular situation and geography.
- Ex: anti-aircraft weapons seem defensive, but Egyptian attack on Israel in 1973 would have been impossible without air defenses supporting the battlefield
Robert Jervis
“Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”
Four Worlds
First World: offense has advantage, offensive posture not distinguishable from defensive posture = doubly dangerous, arms race likely (Europe before WW1)
Second World: Defense has the advantage, offensive posture not distinguishable from defensive posture; = security dilemma, but security requirements maybe compatible
Third World: offense has advantage, offensive posture is distinguishable from defensive posture = no security dilemma
Fourth World: Defense has the advantage, offensive posture is distinguishable from defensive posture; doubly
safe
Jack S. Levy
“The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology”
Does Levy discredit offense-defense theory?
Critique of Jervis
Main Point - the concept of offensive/defensive balance is too vague and encompassing to be useful in theoretical analysis
- Offense/defense balance needs to be understood and defined in terms of perceptions of decision makers (they are not objective)
- Need to resolve tautologies. Ex: hypothesis that military technology favoring offensive increases incentive to strive first.
- Critique of Jervis; there are numerous factors besides technology and doctrine affecting the incentive to strike first (geography, diplomatic and domestic considerations); - incentive to strike first should not be confused with aggressive policy – its possible to strike first and employ strategy of defense (Bismarck, Israel in 1973)
Critical of Jervis’s cost benefit analysis of offense/defense strategies:
- it is incomplete and fails to specify what constitutes offense or defense in the first place.
- Cannot compare marginal utilities until they are defined.
- Suggests a better way to discuss relative resources than in terms of military spending is attack/defense ratios
- Conventional wisdom is that offense needs at least 3:1 ratio (the greater the minimum ratio, the greater advantage of the defense)
Jack S. Levy
“The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology”
Main Arguments
Offense/defense balance of military technology has been defined in terms of the ease of territorial conquest, the characteristics of armaments, the resources needed by the offense in order to overcome the defense, and the incentive to strike first
Important distinction between deterrence and defense, also offense/defense balance differs in pre-nuclear and nuclear era
- Deterrence based on countervalue punishment
- Strategic and Tactical defense – defined by a condition of relative passivity and immobility in waiting for the enemy to attack
- Strategic: need only invade and then hold territory
- Tactical: military tactics may be offensive in one theater and defensive in another
Jack S. Levy
“The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology”
Characteristics of Armament
Characteristics of armament:
question of whether some arms systems contribute more to offense or defense
- Tactical mobility are primary determinants of offense; protection and holding power of defense; striking power, rapidity of fire, and range could go either way (tank)
- What is most important is not characteristics of individual weapons but aggregate impact of all weapons systems in a given arsenal
- Some armaments that were previously seen as stabilizing are destabilizing in nuclear age because by protecting populations, they undermine deterrence (air defense, anti ballistic defense)
