Topic 1: Nature and Functions of War Flashcards
Francis Fukuyama
“The End of History”
LIBERALISM
Thesis: With the end of the Cold War, is also the end of history: the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution = the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government
20th century was defined by ideological violence (liberalism vs absolutism, bolshevism, fascism, communism). The end of the 20th century = unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism, and the Western idea has proven triumphant.
Again: The passing of Marxism-Leninism first from China and then from Soviet Union is the death of communism as a living ideology
- This means the growing “common marketization” of international relations and a diminution in the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states
- There will still be conflict between those states still “mired in history” and the developed ones of the West
Important Point of Liberalism: Ideas are the cause, not the effect. Hegel’s Ideals produce the framework of the material world
John J. Mearsheimer
“Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War”
Main Argument
REALIST
Thesis: The Cold War gave order to the anarchy of international relations, and the prospect of major crises, even wars, in Europe is likely to increase dramatically now that the Cold War is receding into history
Realist school of IR theory - The character of the state system, not the character of the individual states composing it, drives states toward war
Also put: The distribution and character or military power among states are the root causes of war and peace
Peace in Europe 1945 to fall of cold war flowed from three factors:
1) the bipolar distribution of military power in Europe
2) the rough military parity between powers (U.S. and S.U.)
3) both powers armed with large arsenal of nukes.
Biopolarity: More Stable
- Only two major powers are in contention, and those powers demand alliances from minor powers, producing a rigid alliance structure
- Smaller states are thus more secure from each other and from rival great power
Multipolarity: Unstable
- Deterrence is more difficult to maintain in a multipolar state system because power imbalances are commonplace (example: Germany and Russia ganging up on Poland in 1939)
- BC the shape of international order is in flux, the resolve of opposing states and the size and strength of opposing coalitions is hard to calculate (example: Germany failed to foresee U.S. entry into WWII)
- With fall of USSR Europe will return to a multipolar distribution of power; which plagued the European state system from its founding (Peace of Westphalia, 1648) until 1945. a system that created powerful incentives for aggression
NOTE: The bipolar and multipolar systems both are likely to be more peaceful when power is distributed equally in them. Example: Nuclear weapons as a stabilizer.
The Long Peace - Key Elements: bipolarity, equal balance of military power, and nuclear weapons
Samuel P. Huntington
“The Clash of Civilizations?”
Overall
CULTURALISM
Fukuyama and Mearsheimer miss a central aspect of the future of global politics.
Thesis: The fundamental source of conflict in the post Cold-War world will not be ideological or economic, but cultural.
Nation states will remain the most powerful actors, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations.
In the politics of civilizations, peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations join the West as movers and shapers of history, shedding colonialism’s shackles.
Old divisions of First, Second, and Third Worlds are obsolete. It is more relevant to group countries not in terms of political or economic systems but in terms of culture and civilization - the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity.
World will be shaped by interactions among seven or eight major civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African. Most important conflict will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations. Violent conflicts between groups in different civilizations most likely to lead to global wars.
Samuel P. Huntington
“The Clash of Civilizations?”
6 Reasons why civilizations will clash
6 Reasons why civilizations will clash:
1) Differences between civilizations are real and basic - differentiated by language, history, culture, traditions, and, most importantly, religion
2) The world is becoming smaller and interactions between people are increasing - enhancing civilization-consciousness → invigorates differences and animosities
3) economic modernization and social change are separating people from local identities, and weaken the nation state as a source of identity, leading to religion filling the gap, providing a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations –> the “unsecularization of the world.”
4) Growth of civilization-consciousness enhanced by the dual role of the West - West at the peak of power, but non-Wests increasingly have the desire, the will, and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways. De-westernization of indigenous elites.
5) Cultural characteristics and differences less mutable and less easily compromised and resolved than political/economic ones.
6) Economic regionalism is increasing, reinforcing civilization-consciousness.
Example:
End of Cold War means end of ideologically defined states in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, permitting traditional ethnic identities and animosities to come to the fore.
Clash occurs at micro-level, along fault lines between adjacent groups over territory, and at macro-level, as states from different civilizations compete for military and economic power, struggle over control of international institutions, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values.
Groups within civilizations form kinship groups. Stronger bonds within them.
John J. Mearsheimer
“Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War”
Three counter arguments
Disputes three counter arguments:
1) “obsolescence of war” theory - conventional modern war so deadly that it is unthinkable (M. says this ignores several wars post ‘45 that were decisive and quick).
2) Economic liberalism → prosperity, will keep states aligned and peaceful (M. counters that this ignores effects of anarchy: when security is scarce, states care about relative rather than absolute gains. Also, threats from economic interdependence).
3) Liberal democracies do not fight one another and most European states are now democracies (M. disputes that democracies can be prone to nationalism and aggression, that liberal democracies must still worry about relative power among themselves, and that lack of war between democracies may be due to chance and common rivals, e.g. Britain and U.S vs Germany in WWII and then Soviets)
* note: another counter-point: democracies still fight wars, even if not against one and other
Fareed Zakaria
“Economics Trumps Politics”
ECONOMIC ARGUEMENT
Thesis: The world economy grew at its fastest pace in four decades between 2000 and 2007. The relative calm of the present day (Al Qaeda unable to launch another major attack anywhere, denunciations of bin Laden, violence on the decline, feels like a more dangerous world than it actually is) has a deep structural basis: Across the world, economics is trumping politics. Wars, coups, and terrorism have lost much of their ability to derail markets more than temporarily.
Political tumult and economic growth are happening together. Historical precedents are the turn of the century boom of the 1890s and 1900s, and the postwar boom of the 50s and 60s. Commonality: large countries were entering the world economy, increasing its size and shape.
Now is third expansion of the global economy, and the largest. Over last two decades, 2 billion people have entered the world of markets and trades, which used to be a small club of Western countries. Emerging markets have accounted for over half of global growth.
The collapse of the Soviet Union was the seminal economic event of our time - created only one basic approach of organizing a country’s economy.
The movement of capital is the financial force that has powered the new era.
There are costs to the products of success, the problems of plenty: Some countries rich in natural resources are getting free rides. The impact of global growth on natural resources and the environment.
Globalization and economic modernization are breeding nationalism. The rise of nationalism is concomitant with the rise of economic fortunes, as nations that were poor and unstable now becoming richer, and people desire recognition and respect.
Rising powers taking the option to enter the Western order but doing so on their own terms.
America has unprecedented economic growth, but it will face its most intense competition yet with the rise of emerging nations, and can survive because it knows how to adapt.
The unipolar order of the last two decades is waning because of the broader diffusion of power across the world.
Carl von Clausewitz
On War
(Princeton University Press, 1976)
What is War?
War is a duel on a larger scale, an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will. Force is the means of war.
The aim of warfare is to render the enemy powerless, to coerce him by putting him in a situation worse than the sacrifice you have asked him to make.
Passion and emotion cannot fail to be involved in war, or else war becomes one of algebra, and looking at comparative numbers of forces would be enough to determine the winner without fighting.
First interaction and first extreme: War is an act of force without a logical limit to the application of that force. It follows that each side compels its opponent, leading to extremes.
Second interaction and second extreme: If I have not defeated my enemy, I will fear he will defeat me.
Third case of interaction and third extreme: Power equals means multiplied by strength of will. Will can only be gauged by motive. Enemy will do the same calculation, leading to extremes.
When whole communities go to war, the reason always lies in some political situation, and occasion is due to some political object.
Main point: War is therefore an instrument of policy, a continuation of policy by other means. Not something autonomous.
Carl von Clausewitz
On War
What is the nature of war?
In practice, there are shortcomings on both sides, and man is not perfect, so there are moderating forces → tendency toward extremes is reduced.
- The nature of war impedes simultaneous concentration of all forces because of fighting forces, country, and its allies.
- The political object of war will determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.
- Defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack. Periods of inaction can be explained by the superiority of the defensive.
- War is a gamble, subject to chance and the subjective nature of war, and imperfect knowledge, taking war away from the realm of theoretical extremes and toward basing plans on probability and inferences.
Carl von Clausewitz
On War
Paradoxical Trinity
War is more than a true chameleon, slightly adapting its characteristics to a given case. Its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity composed of:
- primordial violence and hatred (the people),
- the play of chance and probability (commanders and army),
- its subordination to reason as an instrument of policy (government)
War is like an object suspended between these three magnets.
Carl von Clausewitz
On War
Means of War - What does Clausewitz mean when he says that “Combat is the only effective force in war”?
There is only one means of war: Combat
Everything that occurs in war must originally derive from combat. Combat is the strand that runs through the entire web of military activity, holding it together.
It is the only effective force in war. Destruction may be only a means to some other end, and so the aim of combat is to destroy an enemy’s forces as a means to a further end.
The destruction of enemy’s forces is the most superior, effective means, and is balanced by cost and danger. Only avoiding these risks propel the use of other means.
Carl von Clausewitz
On War
What is the purpose of war?
When does he say “the object must be renounced and peace must follow”? Do statesmen heed this advice?
Three broad objectives: armed forces, the country, and the enemy’s will.
As long as the enemy’s will is not broken, animosity and hostile elements will not have ended. Must overcome the enemy’s will. Of all the possible aims in war, the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces always appears as the highest. The wish to annihilate the enemy’s forces is the first-born son of war.
The fighting force should be destroyed first, then subdue the country. Finally, the enemy can be brought to the peace table, for a peace treaty will extinguish most sparks of animosity.
Carl von Clausewitz
On War
What is the relationship between the ends and means of war?
According to Clausewitz, why is defense superior to the attack? What is the relationship between the two?
One interp:
The fighting force should be destroyed first, then subdue the country. Finally, the enemy can be brought to the peace table, for a peace treaty will extinguish most sparks of animosity.
BUT
The aim of disarming the enemy (the object of war in the abstract) is not always encountered in reality.
Limited by probability of consequences and excessive costs.
Disarming the enemy does not need to be achieved to make peace. There are many wars in which defeating the enemy was not realistic, as the enemy was stronger. Not every war needs to be fought until one side collapses.
Other ways to success other than through outright defeat: the destruction of forces, conquest of enemy territory, temporary occupation or invasion, projects with an immediate political purpose, and passively awaiting the enemy’s attacks (convince enemy that the political object must be renounced because the costs will outweigh the benefits).
Political forces may be changed by events, affecting the enemy’s strength.
- the means of combat should be proportionate and tailored to meet the ends aka political goal:
Because war is controlled by a political object, the value of the object must determine the sacrifices to be made in magnitude and in duration. Once effort has gone beyond the value of the political object, object must be renounced and peace must follow. Statesmen heed this advice, as seen with Frederick the Great, who was much weaker than Austria, but in husbanding his strength and balancing against Austrian superiority, the political object did not seem worth the cost, and Austria made peace.
The enemy’s expenditure of effort can be increased through 1) invasion 2) operations to increase enemy’s suffering 3) wearing down the enemy.
Sun-Tzu
The Art of Warfare
Main Argument
Main Thesis: Idea of War
The ideal outcome is to achieve political goals without waging war
Use phycological and political warfare to achieve goal before gets to point of fighting
Specifics:
Better to take a state intact than to destroy it (differs from Clausewitz)
- The highest form of warfare is to attack strategy itself. The lowest form is to attack cities.
- “The skillful strategist defeats the enemy without doing battle.”
- Know the enemy to know thyself, and victory is never in doubt
Sun-Tzu
The Art of Warfare
Ideas of War (ch 4)
The warrior can bring his own invulnerability can not bring about the enemy’s vulnerability (differs from Clausewitz). Invulnerability is defense (like Clausewitz), vulnerability is attack.
Victorious army is victorious first, and seeks battle later. The defeated army does battle first, seeks victory later.
In war, there are five steps: measurement, estimation, calculation, comparison, victory.
Sun-Tzu
The Art of Warfare
Like Clausewitz
Exhaust a fresh enemy, starve a well-fed enemy, unsettle a settled enemy. Anticipate the enemy’s movements.
Attack the undefended (victory), and defend the unattacked (defense). Do not let be known where the attack is intended. Weakness stems from preparing against an attack. Strength from obliging enemy to prepare against attack (like Clausewitz).
Know the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses. Military dispositions are like water, which shuns the high and moves to the low; War shuns the strong and attacks the weak. There is no constant in the five elements of war.
