Topic 8: Ends and Means in Total War and Limited War Flashcards
Clausewitz
On War
On Absolute War vs Limited War
(Lecture)
- Limited war is more common than absolute war
- Absolute war is platonic (his experience with Napoleon is what motivates his thinking)
- Napoleonic wars are as close as possible
2 Senses of Total War:
1.
Clausewitz
On War
What are the risks in overshooting or undershooting the “culminating point of victory”?
NEED TO UPDATE
Culminating Point of Victory:
The point at which the attack becomes the defense
- The natural goal of all campaign plans, therefore, is the turning point at which attack becomes defense
- This culminating point in victory is bound to recur in every future war in which the destruction of the enemy cannot be the military aim, and this will presumably be true of most wars
- Only the man who can achieve great results with limited means has really hit the mark
OVERSHOOTING:
- If one were to go beyond that point, it would not merely be a useless effort which could not add to success. It would in fact be a damaging one, which would lead to a reaction
- and experience goes to show that such reactions usually have completely disproportionate effects
- This is why the great majority of generals will prefer to stop well short of their objective rather than risk approaching it too closely
- and why those with high courage and an enterprising spirit will often overshoot it and so fail to attain their purpose
Clausewitz
On War
If “absolute” war is not “real” war, what is the point of understanding the concept of absolute war?
Its the least common BUT its the most dangerous
- Its a huge threat to the world order
- How can they commit people to this? “Don’t take first step without considering the loss” (this goes against Napoleon’s engage and see what happens mentality)
- Pull between needing to know what we want to achieve and how before entering and yet war is very unpredictable - will always be a tension dilemha between the two
-consider what to expect to gain, how to get it done and the cost of peace
—-
No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.
ABSOLUTE WAR:
- War turns into something quite different from what it should be according to theory; turns into something incoherent and incomplete (absolute war)
- It follows that war is dependent on the interplay of possibilities and probabilities, of good and bad luck, conditions in which strictly logical reasoning often plays no part at all and is always apt to be a most unsuitable and awkward intellectual tool. It follows, too, that war can be a matter of degree.
- Theory must concede all this; but it has the duty to give priority to the absolute form of war and to make that form a general point of reference
Clausewitz
On War
Why does Clausewitz hammer so hard and in such detail on the principle that war must serve policy?
How does the concept of absolute war relate to this question?
NEED TO UPDATE
WAR IS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY
Strategy is the bridge that connects policy to operations and tactics
- if it does not link its not integrated at policy level - its uninitgrated at best and unproductive at worst
- policy drives the below but reality is that its a circular model
- C: realistic strategy needs to be recognize what is capable in operations/tactis so who rules when the shooting stops
War is only a branch of political activity; that it is in no sense autonomous.
- If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character
- As policy becomes more ambitious and vigorous, so will war, and this may reach the point where war attains its absolute form
- In no sense can the art of war ever be regarded as the preceptor of policy, and here we can only treat policy as representative of all interests of the community.
- Subordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is policy that has created war.
- Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political.
MAIN POINT: In short, at the highest level the art of war turns into policy-but a policy conducted by fighting battles rather than by sending diplomatic notes.
Kuwait War Main Points
(Michael Gordon and Gen. Bernard Trainor
The Generals’ War)
Bush was extremely hands off – he said “it was the general’s war to win or lose”
Bush’s decision to end the war is a great example of not overshooting > ending the war at the correct moment
Kuwait War Main Points
(Michael Gordon and Gen. Bernard Trainor
The Generals’ War)
How does the ending of the 1991 war illustrate important political effects of friction in military operations?
Did that war end satisfactorily? By what criteria?
POLITICAL EFFECTS OF FRICTION:
- Bush asked Powell “what do you need” rather than “this is what we are going to do” (Huge departure from Obama’s War excerpts. The CJCS had much more leeway for decision making in Gulf War, and had huge say in how the war was fought. This may have had some impact on the way Obama ran his war cabinet during Afghanistan deliberations)
- Powell said we want one more day (reiterating with Schwarzkopf said)
- Bush was worried about the perception of brutalization that were in the press.
- They agreed to close the war that night at 0100 and threaten the Iraqis with air strikes if they did not abide by the cease fire.
The war end too early:
Unfortunately the war wasn’t really over on the ground. Most thought that the war should not be over until the escape routes moving north were destroyed the the republican guard had been destroyed. The XVIII airborne (Luck) and the VII corps (franks) hadn’t finished the fight “the war was coming to an end before the job was completed, but nobody with enough rank to change that decision objected.
Powell had decided to recommend ending the war for reasons beyond military ones.
- He wanted the military to erase the memory of Vietnam by coming out victorious, but did not want to besmirch that by the impression that the US was pilling on and killing Iraqis for the sake of killing them. He wanted to err on the side of caution.
- The civilians actually had the impression from Powell that the republican guard had been destroyed, when they really hadn’t. “the closer one got to the battlefield, the more questionable the decision to end the war seemed.
- Final intelligence revealed most of the Iraqi equipment had not been destroyed and the retreating republican guard was still south of Basra and in the path of the oncoming ground forces.
- The last few hours were full of confusion in field commanders not sure if the primary objective was to protect their forces or take out as much of the Iraqi army as possible. “Uncertain about its ultimate objective, the Army had staggered to a halt, short of the finish line.”
Michael Gordon and Gen. Bernard Trainor
Cobra II
Main Argument
“military transformation” - shift in thinking away from things, numbers of things, and mass, to speed, agility, and precision
US still in Iraq not because it didn’t have a plan, but because it adhered too rigidly to the wrong plan
US political objectives were bold and extraordinarily ambitious 🡪 military operation intended to strike a blow at terrorism
- Oust a long-standing adversary
- Eliminate Iraq’s WMDs
- Implant a moderate and pro-American state
- Powerful demo of US power, serves as a lesson (for Iran, Syria, etc) of the potential consequences of supporting terrorist groups and pursuing nuclear, biological, and chemical arms
In conclusion, US would not just defeat a dictator; it would transform a region and send message that American intervention in Afghanistan was just the beginning of the US GWOT
THESIS: direct link between planning of Iraq War and insurgency that the American-led coalition confronted
Bush’s plan to transform American defense did not agree with plans to transform the Middle East
Bob Woodward
Obama’s Wars
When responsible officials disagree about what strategy makes sense, is compromise the right solution?
Compromise is not always the right solution because:
- Constraints of compromise > policy could be a compromise domestically but there could be operational and tactical issues
- Trying to split the difference dilutes the benefits of either plan with a less advantageous plan
- Extent to which the military is involved with making policy decisions and vice versa; whos voice do you privilege
What did Obama do here
Stephen Biddle
“Afghanistan’s Legacy: Emerging Lessons”
Main Argument
Coin can work, but only where counterinsurgents invest the lives, funding, forces, and time needed
Costs and benefits really need to be weighed. If benefits don’t outweigh, don’t bother.
Stephen Biddle
“Afghanistan’s Legacy: Emerging Lessons”
Are problems of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan unique or do they reflect problems inherent in intervention in all weakly institutionalized states?
It is important to consider political interests when engaging in COIN.
- The US tends to assume that their political interests align with their hosts, and in the case of Afghanistan this was a miscalculation, but often these interests will not match up anywhere in the world.
- This usually happens because elites want to keep a system in place the benefits them
Basically, if you’re going to engage in COIN be sure the costs outweigh the benefits, because as Biddle says several times, it is not quick or cheap. Otherwise, the US needs a new approach to counterinsurgency governance all together
Stephen Biddle
“Afghanistan’s Legacy: Emerging Lessons”
Did Obama make the right decisions in 2009? Did Trump and Mattis make the right decisions in 2017?
Biddle acknowledges that the war in Afghanistan likely will not be over any time soon, and probably won’t be until finding dries up or a negotiation compromise is reached, both are unlikely he says:
- Basically, Afghanistan shows that COIN is futile the way that the US originally envisioned it, and it was aimed a little too much at just “hearts and minds” and understated the combat function. It needs to be both hard and soft.
- Coin is difficult and slow, but there are ways to do it through long, involved and often costly engagements
Michael Gordon and Gen. Bernard Trainor
Cobra II
How does the second war against Iraq compare with the first?
Michael Gordon and Gen. Bernard Trainor
Cobra II
What factors in leadership, planning, political judgment, or military capability best account for the differences?
Bob Woodward
Obama’s Wars
How do domestic and bureaucratic politics affect decisions on strategy?
In Obama’s war domestic and bureaucratic politics play a huge role in decisions on strategy
Brings up big issue with strategy: milt vs cilians with operations - where do you draw the line?
- between military but affects politics and vice versa
- Ex: Japan wanting a limited war and attacking Pearl Harbor - military made the decision without informing civilians; at the time the Japanese viewed this as rational
Bob Woodward
Obama’s Wars
When responsible officials disagree about what strategy makes sense, is compromise the right solution?
- Constraints of compromise > policy could be a compromise domestically but there could be operational and tactical issues
- Trying to split the difference dilutes the benefits of either plan with a less advantageous plan
- Extent to which the military is involved with making policy decisions and vice versa; whos voice do you privilege
