Topic 11: The Nuclear Revolution: Theory and Practice Flashcards
Lawrence Freedman
“The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy”
What are the basic concepts of deterrence theory?
Lecture: Deterrence in the cold war became a buzz word and really had no concrete doctrine.
- “Prevent by fear”
- It was more a desired effect - how the recipient will react to it, it only matters what the deterree believes
- Aim of the adversaries perception, intent and choices
The means to create deterrence are: force (delivery systems, bombers, and missiles) and doctrines (targeting)
Freedman: Deterrence is a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started, or to prevent them from doing something that another state desires. A credible nuclear deterrent, Bernard Brodie wrote in 1959, must be always at the ready, yet never used
Two sets of types: 1 set:
1. Basic: ability to deter an attack against yourself. Credibility of deterrence higher
- Extended: Ability to deter attacks against third parties: other countries etc.. (humanitarian missions, civilians in safe area etc..)
Set 2: (that are not logically compatible)
- Deterrence by Denial: prevent from succeeding - COUNTERFORCE
- destruction of their nuclear forces - Deterrence by Punishment: threat to destroy anything more important than what they could gain - COUNTERVALUE
- economic or political targeting civilians
Problems with tactical nuclear weapons:
- Exercises demonstrated that they would be difficult to employ and it would be almost impossible to spare civilians
- Soviet view – a war in which any type of nuclear weapons was used could never be limited
- Tactical nuclear weapons and deterrence
- Must distinguish between deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment
- Proponents of TNWs argued that they were effective for both
- By 1960s consensus was that a limited nuclear strategy was not feasible
Lawrence Freedman
“The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy”
What were changes in ideas and policies about nuclear strategy in the second half of the 20th century?
- Shift from not willing to deploy Nuclear Weapons to massive retaliation (Truman to Eisenhower)
- Massive retaliation – threat to respond to any Communist aggression with a massive nuclear strike on USSR and China
- Adopted in Eisenhower administration - NEW LOOK
- New Look resulted in NATO strategy being oriented around hope that nuclear weapons could be employed in a manner favorable to the West
- Nukes became permanent part of NATO strategy.
- Policy of containment was continued under Eisenhower
- Perception of nuclear weapons changed as tactical nuclear weapons developed. Some believed tactical nuclear weapons could be used on the battlefield without strategic escalation
- a nuclear based strategy allowed the U.S. and allies to spend less on conventional manpower – economic rationale was powerful
NATO could not defeat a Soviet invasion of Western Europe without a massive conventional force.
- Attitude to acceptability of countervalue targeting in Kennedy administration
- Early 1960s – Kennedy Admin – initially believed Soviets had advantage in missiles (missile gap), but intelligence later confirmed that U.S. had significant advantage
- Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara shifted focal point for strategic innovation back to the Pentagon
Promoted assured destruction, damage limitation, and flexible response - Kennedy admin adopted strategy of flexible response
- Strategy took Chinese-Soviet split into account. Massive retaliation had called for immediate strategic strike on both Chinese and Soviet cities. New strategy separated the two and provided options.
- Increased protection for U.S. command and control facilities, and plan spared USSR command and control
- Strategic reserves would be held
- Plan allowed for targeting of various target types based on situation
- Initial strike would be counterforce
- Soviets did not have counterforce capability at this time
Counterforce became associated with first strike - Counterforce had proved to be irrelevant in Cuban Missile crisis
1980s - Limited Nuclear War
- don’t want to destroy command and control system
- you delay and reduce second attack but will enevtually launch pn them
- must devo war plans even though flawed if deterence doesnt work
Chapter 12: The Formal Strategists
- Civilian experts became influential in nuclear strategy because it involved technical innovation, large-scale engineering projects, and the aim was to deter rather than engage in combat
- RAND corporation played a significant role
- Operational research – use of scientific method (often quantitative) to study social phenomena related to military operations/strategy
- Game theory – provided a means of reducing strategic problems to a manageable form. Assumes rationality.
Examples: Prisoner’s dilemma and Chicken
Lawrence Freedman
“The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy”
What are the arguments for and against counterforce targeting, and for and against resting nuclear strategy on countervalue targeting and capability for “assured destruction”?
Counterforce Targeting:
Focused on destroying enemy military capability (denial) instead of the civilian population
- FOR
- Promoted by limited war proponents
- Promoted by Air Force, but as element of total war. Civilian casualties would still be high, but counterforce allowed for actual defeat of the enemy. It is also difficult to distinguish between military and economic targets. AF supported striking all military forces, not just nuclear, to increase likelihood of winning war at tolerable cost.
- Counterforce requires a large number of warheads…wasn’t feasible early on - AGAINST
Resting nuclear strategy on countervalue targeting and capability for “assured destruction”
Counter Value Targeting - Focused on destroying population centers (punishment)
- Invites retaliation on cities
- Massive civilian casualties; moral questions
- Devloped civil defense for this reason: shelters, population relocations,
- FOR
- Requires much fewer warheads than counterforce - AGAINST
- Does not necessarily destroy enemy military capability
- paradox that doves thought punishment was best and hawks thought countervalue best
- doves believed it would make war unthinkable
- hawks thought never rely on deterrence you haven’t seen play out so have an option to limit destruction - Can’t bank on deterrence never failing so:
Herman Kahn – RAND strategist who argued for a credible first strike capability.
First strike – opening strike of a nuclear war directed against the enemy’s nuclear capability to prevent retaliation (counterforce strike)
- how to make first strike effective
Second strike force – a force capable of surviving a first strike and ensuring effective retaliation (retaliation will be countervalue)
Lawrence Freedman
“The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy”
How did NATO strategy for the defense of Western Europe affect the development of nuclear strategy?
- New Look resulted in NATO strategy being oriented around hope that nuclear weapons could be employed in a manner favorable to the West
- Nukes became permanent part of NATO strategy
- A nuclear based strategy allowed the U.S. and allies to spend less on conventional manpower – economic rationale was powerful
- NATO could not defeat a Soviet invasion of Western Europe without a massive conventional force - US supplies weapons to allies but they cannot be launched without permission from the US
- PALs need to be authorized and activated to launch (see Ellisburg)
Lawrence Freedman
“The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy”
How much did actual practice in nuclear strategy reflect the dominant concepts of theorists?
Chapter 16: Assured Destruction
Assured destruction – capability to deter a deliberate nuclear attack by maintaining ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor, even after absorbing a first strike. Concept developed in mid-1960s
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) – when both the U.S. and the USSR had an assured destruction capability
Since nuclear weapons are so offense-dominant, there was skepticism of missile defense (especially by McNamara)
McNamara understood that any action by the U.S. (such as a ballistic missile defense shield) would cause a reaction by the Soviets (action-reaction phenomenon)
The recognition that negotiation of mutual restraint was required led to the first offers of strategic arms limitation talks during the Johnson administration
Lawrence Freedman
“The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy”
Can nuclear strategy be rational? What would Clausewitz think about nuclear weapons?
- War as a means of Policy:
- Most wars fall short of absolute war - what stakes would a nuclear war be worth? C argues the cost should be worth the benfit
- Conflicts now - what would you be fighting over that would want to use a nuclear bomb? - Nuclear Weapons as an Instrument:
- Suggest nuclear weapons are not rational - but could argue that the threat of using nuclear weapons is rational
- Or argue it could be rational against certain adversaires; if counties don’t have nuclear capabilities and wont be able to retaliate
- being able to deliver on threat - so with that the threat itself and not delivering it - Make world safer from conventional war
- increase peace by reducing temptation to take risk of conventional war - Friction:
- accidents, friction - things go wrong that aren’t accounted for but the stakes are higher with nucs
- example: B52 hydrogen bomb over north carolina - Defense Dominance:
- C agrees with dfense first that can turn into offensive act
- effective missle defense can blunt most of incoming attack
- tech feasability
**For exam use one part of nuclear theory to narrow in on and connect to Claus
Daniel Ellsberg
The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner
Main argument
Main Takeaway: Military viewed with more importance ability to strike fast / preserve response capabilities than to prevent false alarm / unauthorized action. No measures in place to reverse a Go command.
3 Cs: command, control, and communications
Overall: Nuclear foot ball C&C by president Pilot drills at Kadero Kunsan base 2 man rule Unlock code go/stop and return messages
Details:
- Focuses on decision-making under uncertainty / presence of ambiguous information
- Technology cannot always be trusted; can have false positives; supposed improvements to issue of ambiguity not so improvising
Wohlstetter’s “positive control” process (solution to ambiguity)
- Started “launch on warning”: planes take to the skies and rendezvous at holding area awaiting further instructions to return to base or proceed to target
Ellsberg asks, “How deter unauthorized action once planes in sky?”
- In theory, pilots would not proceed to target without a subsequent positive order. But Ellsberg shows that a lack of such order itself is ambiguous when coupled with lack of “launch on warning” training where planes actually take-off (difficult to practice given expense and risk of nuclear accident on runway, thus no return to base muscle memory ingrained in pilots)
- Lack of training + geopolitical environment could lead pilots:
1. to believe an eventual training exercise was the real thing
2. that an accident on base was actually evidence of foreign attack, and they could proceed to target without a positive order
Flipside: How pilots know positive order actually “authenticated”?
- Turns out that authentication codes in envelopes held by pilots were the same for all places in SAC and Pacific forces, and rarely changed
- A rogue pilot could in fact open his envelope and give the code, appearing authentic.
- Similar command and control issues present on bases when personnel flouted two-man rule in authentication posts and Minutemen lock combinations intentionally set to 00000000
Daniel Ellsberg
The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner
How should practice amend theory in nuclear strategy? Refer back to the Sagan reading in Section 5.
** ask in recitation
Daniel Ellsberg
The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner
Was mutual nuclear deterrence during the Cold War stable, or were we just lucky?
Ellsberg leads you to believe nuclear deterrence during the cold war was just lucky
Lots of room for human error in very high stake situations
Vipin Narang
Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict
Main Argument
Regional nuclear powers choose identifiable nuclear postures, which matter in their ability to deter conflict
- Previous literature focuses too heavily on nuclear postures / capabilities of US/USSR and not enough on regional powers (7 of 9 nuclear states regional powers)
- too much attention focused on theory that mere possession of nuclear weapons = deterrence in itself (this view counters positions of Waltz and Jervis)
- Posture (def) = incorporation of nukes into military structure, rules governing deployment, circumstances of potential use, against whom, and authorization
His “Posture Optimization Theory”:
- Suggests regional power selects posture in response to external security and internal political / financial constraints
- The decision is a top-down political decision not bottom-up technology driven outcome
Vipin Narang
Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict
3 Types of Posture Optimization Theory
Three distinct postures under “Posture Optimization Theory”:
- Catalytic (ex. Japan, N. Korea): aims to entice superpower intervention on behalf of regional power
- no major deterrent benefit against conventional conflict - Assured retaliation: threats retaliation in event state suffers nuclear attack; no major deterrent benefit against conventional conflict
- chosen if face resource constraints - Asymmetric escalation (ex. Iran): threatens first use against even conventional attack; better at deterring conventional attack but runs risk of unauthorized / accidental use due to mismanagement
- posture taken by states “alone” in international system; delegates more authority to military
Definition:
- Suggests regional power selects posture in response to external security and internal political / financial constraints
- The decision is a top-down political decision not bottom-up technology driven outcome
Vipin Narang
Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict
Which aspects of Cold War deterrence theory and nuclear strategy are transferable to the 21st century and which not? What does your answer assume about future developments in international politics and military technology?
Vipin Narang
Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict
How do strategic issues for today’s nuclear powers differ from or resemble those of the Cold War superpowers?
Fail Safe (1964) Directed by Sidney Lumet
Key Themes
- Every war (including thermonuclear) must have a winner and loser and recently, nuclear has become possible, even probable
- In a nuclear war, all sides lose – “war isn’t what it used to be”
- 1,000 years ago, there were wars that wiped out entire civilizations, similar to loss of 100M in a nuclear war
- Who wins and who loses? How is it a culture with only some of its people? There won’t be many survivors, if any at all - Machines are constantly receiving data
- Regardless of what failed (whether human or mechanical), something failed
- This raises the question of whether technology is sometimes too powerful
- Even if machine fails, human beings can always correct mistake – BUT machines work so fast and mistakes are so subtle that human beings can’t know - Checks and counterchecks – who has the responsibility?
- Nature of technology – machines are developed for a certain situation and then are used for other applications
- The only thing people can agree on is that no one is responsible - Limited war – is it possible?
- Depends on the weapons used, locations of those weapons, and how those weapons are used 🡪 entire military posture
- Can we confine exchange of nuclear weapons to military targets alone? Or must war lead inevitably to the destruction of cities?
Yes – the object of war is to inflict maximum damage to the enemy, destroy its ability to resist
- How can you restrict a war?
Mutual agreement with Russians to strike only missile bases
What if military bases are near cities? - We should stop war, not limit it
- Carrying out policy v. making policy?
- There is no such thing as limited war, not with hydrogen bombs
- Trying to make war more efficient – succeeded because we have the capacity to blow up the war 100 times over
Fail Safe (1964) Directed by Sidney Lumet
Overview
Cold War tensions between the US and SU lead to an accidental nuclear strike after an error message is sent to a group of US bombers to bomb Moscow
- The film starts with a debate between a professor and his colleagues over the highest price the US should be prepared to pay in a war
- When early warning radars detect an unidentified aircraft in US airspace, several bombers loaded with nuclear weapons head to fail safe points and continue to orbit until the unidentified aircraft can be identified
- The General is so worried about an accident or a miscommunication that he requests the bombers to be told again only to orbit
- The unidentified aircraft is determined to be an off-course civilian airliner, so the alert is cancelled and the bombers are told to stand down
- However, a computer error causes the fail safe box for one US bomber group to receive orders for an attack on Moscow (“CAP 811” – code for bombers to proceed beyond the fail safe point)
- The Air Force command realizes the plane is headed for Russia, but can’t make contact with the bomber
- Technology induced accident possible fail safe mechanism might be giving them a “go” signal
- Issue: once bombers are beyond a certain point, pilots are not to listen to any verbal communications (even the President) because they could be the Kremlin
