Topic 5: Choosing War or Peace Flashcards
Thomas C. Schelling
Arms and Influence
Main Arguments
Schelling is a realist, but he was writing about economics so don’t put him in any specific camp
the “power to destroy is bargaining power. To exploit that is diplomacy.”
It is the threat of violence, or more violence to come after initial engagements, that can compel an adversary’s choice.
“Military Strategy can no longer be thought of as the science of military victory. Military strategy is about the diplomacy of violence.”
Do decision makers act like calm cool economists? Crisis management is like a pressure cooker it is not conduce to act calm, cool, and collected
Thomas C. Schelling
Arms and Influence
Compellence
One of two of Schelling’s two broad concepts under the diplomacy of violence. The other is deterrence
Compellence is a direct action that persuades an opponent to give up something desired; use of force to get enemy to change behavior
Involves initiating an action that typically does not cease until the opponent responds accordingly.
Definitive timeline. (i.e. denuclearize by this date, or we will impose sanctions)
To effectively coerce, you need to understand what is important to your opponent. Before the nuclear age, coercion depended on military superiority. However, now it is about the power to hurt regardless of who is victorious. Thus a weaker actor can coerce a more powerful actor to act if his pain threshold is low enough.
Thomas C. Schelling
Arms and Influence
Deterrence
One of two of Schelling’s two broad concepts under the diplomacy of violence. The other is compellence
Deterrence discourages an opponent from action by threatening punishment.
Deterrence involves “setting the stage – by announcement, by rigging the tripwire, by incurring the obligation/commitment
Tends to be indefinite in its timing. (i.e. if you cross the line we will shoot – whenever that happens)
Robust deterrence requires one to get into a position where he or she cannot fail to act as promised (threatened). This often means relinquishing the initiative to the other side, limiting one’s own options and making intentions clear to potential enemies.
Thomas C. Schelling
Arms and Influence
Compellence vs. Deterrence - What’s more difficult?
Many scholars believe that it is more difficult to compel than to deter.
- Deterrence is less provocative because the deterring state need only set the stage for action. It incurs little cost by making the threat. Indeed, costly actions are precisely what deterrence is supposed to prevent. Compellence, on the other hand, requires some form of costly action or a commitment to act.
- Deterrence facilitates “saving face”: The state that is the target of compellence may fear for its reputation if it complies with a threat. The targets of deterrent threats find it easier to “save face” because they do not have to act to comply. They can simply stay put and pretend that the deterrent threat had no impact on their behavior.
- States are complex entities: forcing states to act is difficult because states are large, complex bureaucracies. They move more slowly than individuals, and slowness may be confused with reluctance to comply.
Robert A. Pape
“Bombing to Win”
Why is the question Pape addresses especially important?
As we have discussed with Clausewitz, war is an extension of policy, and the threat of war (coercion) is often one of the main instruments of diplomacy.
By understanding the means by which threats of coercion can be made effective, you stand to capitalize on your use of military force in pursuit of policy objectives without wasting undue resources or lives
Robert A. Pape
“Bombing to Win”
How does Pape’s analysis reflect on Schelling?
It argues with Schelling’s assertion that coercion by punishment is effective precisely because coercion requires some force to be held in reserve as a threat of escalation
Paper would counter that not enough force can be brought to bear as punishment to effectively coerce, so by limiting yourself even further you are choose an fundamentally ineffective strategy
Mainly - he criticizes the temptation to sub airpower for military action on the ground (as a means to force the adversary to the table)
Robert A. Pape
“Bombing to Win”
Do air campaigns since Pape published confirm or contradict his argument?
The main campaign held up as a counterexample to Pape is in Kosovo, where a war was fought entirely using air power.
Pape’s use of examples of denial as in support of ground forces cannot be applied to Kosovo, suggesting perhaps an exception to his rule [but I don’t have enough information to make an adequate comparison];
- 1999 no action on the ground, only air power
- only war in history with winning side suffering zero causalities
Otherwise, decapitation efforts in Iraq did not pan out as hoped (supporting Pape’s argument) and effective use of air power came in support of ground forces (more support of denial)
Robert A. Pape
“Bombing to Win”
Main Argument
Two main types of coercion, Punishment and Denial; and coercion by denial is the only demonstrably effective method of coercion to date.
3 Main Points:
1. Punishment tries to raise the cost or risk to civilian populations to exploit casualty sensitivities
- Denial operations by “using military means to prevent the target from attaining its political objectives or territorial goals”
- Air Power campaigns have two subsets: risk and decapitation.
- Risk is simply graduated coercion by punishment (Pape argues therefore it is more ineffective than punishment)
- Decapitation is an attempt to eliminate the ruling party and allow the chaos to destabilize the military or government (Pape argues that decapitation is extremely hard to execute, and won’t provide the destabilizing effects it desires to)
Example: Coercion by punishment, such as strategic bombing in WW2, appeared to have little effect on the enemy capitulating; however, interdiction campaigns in support of ground forces had noticeable effect on the course of engagements
Scott D. Sagan
The Limits of Safety
High Reliability Theory (HRT)
HRT is one of two theories of accident occurrence in organization.
HRT says specific management and design decisions can produce reliable and safe organizations. Four conditions must exist:
- Political elites and organizational leaders place a high priority on safety and reliability
- Redundancy (duplication and overlap) can produce high reliability despite the existence of unreliable parts
Examples include redundant command and control systems to prevent accidental or inadvertent escalation - Error rates are reduced through organizational culture and high levels of training. Personnel must be socialized into a common organizational culture of reliability so they are centralized through this culture while acting in a decentralized fashion in order to maintain maximum flexibility.
- Organizational learning must take place through a trial-and-error process, supplemented by anticipation and training.
Scott D. Sagan
The Limits of Safety
Normal Accidents Theory (NAT)
NAT is one of two theories of accident occurrence in organization.
Normal Accidents Theory says accidents will happen in every organization.
Organizations will have multiple, conflicting, political objectives, and while the leadership focus on safety can have a positive effect, but high level leadership may not have significant effects on the entirety of complex organizations
Significant pressure to increase production rates in hazardous industries usually trumps safety mechanisms that would reduce output.
Differences can exist between organizational leadership and political leadership
High level political elites may not have nuanced understanding of the roles of lower level workers to sufficiently influence safety mechanisms
Redundancy can increase the likelihood of accidents (levels of redundancy can cause organizational managers to increase operational production, thereby negating the risk-mitigating attributes of redundancy.) Redundancy also increases a systems interactional complexity and coupling, which can cause smaller accidents to unravel into larger crises quickly.
Military-like high reliability culture is anti-democratic. Training is not always possible. Simultaneous centralization and decentralization is impossible.
Learning is limited by bounded rationality (limited information and time to make decisions) and politics.
Scott D. Sagan
The Limits of Safety
How close did the Cuban missile crisis come to turning out disastrously?
What difference would such an alternative result have made in the history of the world?
High Reliability Theory
High level support for safety improvement was clearly evident throughout the crisis. Secretary McNamara was notoriously detailed oriented to the point of micro-management of certain military aspects.
Multiple redundant systems were involved to prevent the inadvertent or accidental use of a nuclear weapons.
Redundant command, control, and communication systems
New ballistic missile warning systems, electronic locking devices
Tightened safety-related operational procedures
The Training and professionalism of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) during the crisis was lauded by high level political leadership.
All signs of a strong “culture of reliability” appear to be present in all major US military commands involved in nuclear alert operations
Indicators that the likelihood of an accident would actually decrease during a crisis because all technical operators and organizational leadership would be at a heightened sense of seriousness.
Normal Accidents Theory – predicts exactly the opposite outcome as HRT, namely that nuclear alert operations during the Cuban Missile Crisis should have been extremely dangerous.
System Complexity – Hundreds of thousands of military personnel controlled over 25,000 nuclear weapons deployed on military bases or vessels/aircraft around the world.
Tight Coupling – US nuclear operations consisted of very rapid warning and response timelines; invariant bomber, tanker, and missile launch sequences; intricate communication and coordination between the various commands responsible. (Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) – name for the US nuclear war plan, indicative of the tight coupling.
Scott D. Sagan
The Limits of Safety
How might unplanned accidents affect chances of war or peace in the 21st century?
The danger of inadvertent escalation can not be underestimated
(need to add more here)
