Topic 6: Modern War: Constraints, Conditions, Conduct Flashcards
Niccolò Machiavelli
“Money is Not the Sinews of War, Although It Is Generally So Considered”
Main Argument
Main argument: Good soldiers, not gold, insure success in war. Money is a secondary necessity, which good soldiers overcome; No amount of gold can buy victory but good soldiers can win gold.
Key takeaways:
Money is a necessity for war, but it is a secondary concern. You can’t win a war with only money
The three things needed to win war are: lots of good troops, sagacious commanders, and good fortune
Those who believe that you can buy a good defense are wrong. If you have only lots of money and no strong defenses others will be enticed to steal it from you, thus making war more likely not less.
Money, or lack thereof, can still be a reason to go to war but it is not the deciding factor in the outcome of that war
Niccolò Machiavelli
“Money is Not the Sinews of War, Although It Is Generally So Considered”
Is the aim of profit a motive for war or a constraint against it?
Machiavelli argues that it is a constraint against it
Niccolò Machiavelli
“Money is Not the Sinews of War, Although It Is Generally So Considered”
Is Machiavelli logically wrong?
Machiavelli is not necessarily wrong, in that you do need strong forces to win in battle. However, his argument is quite narrow and overlooks the fact that you need funds to maintain an army and it is unlikely you can even build an army to begin with without funds to feed, clothe and arm them.
Obviously, both funds and soldiers are needed to fight and to win, the relative importance of each and the interconnectedness (need soldiers to get money, need money to get soldiers) makes it difficult to firmly separate the two and say you need one more than the other.
Other considerations: modern warfare increasingly technical and therefore expensive. Whether war fighting itself is profitable or not.
Alan S. Milward
“War as Policy”
Main Argument
Main argument: War as an economically viable policy decision rather than an irrational and costly choice.
Key takeaways:
War is an important stimulus to technological development in many industries (shipbuilding, machine tools…)
Because of economic advancements the absolute scale of cost and deadliness of war is higher than it’s ever been, but there are still circumstances when the profits of war can still justify its cost
For axis powers WWI had been an economic disaster (heavy losses, acute inflation, social unrest, economic readjustment) believed another major war would have impact of short stocking boom and then worldwide depression and unemployment
But the opposite happened; after 1945 major economies experienced a remarkable period of stability and economic growth
Economic experience of war is not universally bad or good, but quite mixed. Government strategic and economic policies will determine where war will be economically profitable or no.
Example:
WWII, both German and Japanese decisions to go to war was based on expected tangible economic gain from the war. In particular, wanted to attain autarky (complete independence and no reliance on others for their economic well-being). Furthermore, he argues that in the early years of the war Germany actually increased its wealth through the occupation of France. Meanwhile, ironically the US thought war would be an economic disaster, but their economy profited from WWII.
Alan S. Milward
“War as Policy”
Are the rationales for war described by Milward forever outmoded?
Economic gain remains a motive for war. The specific rationales for war described by Milward is mainly around securing an economic sphere of influence. Preservation of state capitalism needed territorial expansion and destruction of communist state.
The desire for territorial control is considered by many to be out-modeled and there is no longer the communist model to balance against, however modern examples such as Russia in Crimea and Ukraine could be used to make the argument that it remains relevant.
Michael Howard
“War in European History”
Main Argument and Three Eras
Main Argument:
There have been three eras of warfare over history due to economic and political changes and technological advancements that have led to military strategy and tactical changes in how wars are fought.
The three eras:
1. 17th Century: Professional armies
- Gains in wealth so states were able to pay soldiers. Once soldiers were paid they can professionalize. There were also technological advancements: muskets and trenches
- This also meant more discipline in the control of movement, control of fire, and self-control.
This was an era of limited wars with limited objectives.
- Late 18th Century: Revolutionary armies
- Wars move from limited to total
- Division and specialization of armies, flexible use of field artillery, infantry can be detached and sent on separate missions
- French revolution and Napoleonic wars
- Related to enlightenment era: people gain more distaste towards the military
- Technology and tactics: rifling and percussion cap enable weapons to be fired from cover. More difficult - 19th Century: National armies
- Create sense of nations to give people something to fight for – greater engagement of people in the conduct of war
emergence of professional officer class - general staff, managers and engineers
- Railroad and telegram enable greater communication
Examples: Creation of a General Staff in Prussia-Von Moltke (disciple of Clausewitz)-provided institution for conscription, creation of strategic railways, mobilization techniques.
Michael Howard
“War in European History”
What are the main trends in the evolution of warfare described by Howard?
Wars of the professionals: (Limited wars with limited objectives. Professional military with a culture distinct from civilians, discipline, centralized states and bureaucracies)
to Wars of the revolution: (War becomes total: a conflict of both armies and populations. War truly becomes the extension of politics by other means harnesses national emotions and energies to the war effort. Division and specialization of armies, flexible use of field artillery, infantry can be detached and sent on separate mission)
to Wars of the nations: (Absolute war with unlimited aims and unlimited means. War becomes a matter of scientific calculation, administrative planning, and professional expertise)
Michael Howard
“War in European History”
Which developments have enduring implications?
Bureaucratic and administrative developments of the state – developing professional officer corps, military education, and technology developments
Relationship to other authors:
Clausewitz lived during era of wars of revolution wars. Saw that war was not discrete activities but expressions of state policy, thus the implementation of that policy by other means. Clausewitz also predicted the rise of absolute war in wars of nations
Michael Howard
“War in European History”
How has the rough balance of advantage between attack and defense evolved over centuries?
Wars of the professionals: Battles were so destructive, and professional soldiers so difficult to replace, that generals avoided them as much as their feudal predecessors. Concerned mainly with siege-craft (improvements in fortress design).
Wars of the revolution: Napoleon’s tactics were attaque à outrance. Fortresses were impregnable, but higher degree of mobility and sub-division of armies means that battles simply flowed around them.
Wars of the nations: Massive increases in firepower make offense more costly than defense. Mistakes of WWI compound this difficulty (clinging to Napoleonic tactics), but once the new implications have been grasped stormtrooper tactics are adopted by the Allies and the trench stalemate is broken.
Alfred Thayer Mahan
“Commerce Destroying and Blockade”
Main Argument
Main argument:
A strong navy can use a commercial blockade to attack the commerce of a nation and effectively cripple it
Key takeaways:
- Definition: Commercial blockade – preventing merchant vessels from entering or exiting the ports. the primary object of seizing property being immediate injury to the enemy’s fighting power
- Commerce is integral to war – nations able to turn exports and imports into economic power
- Says it is not only legitimate, but also effective, to disorganize adversary’s financial system by offensive attack
- Mahan likes offense - maritime states are vulnerable because they can be blockaded and starved out
- Commanding the sea brings dominance; command of trade lanes, command of who receives what, command of critical means of waging war, affects communications too
- This is not a military operation in the narrowest sense. In that it does not necessarily involve fighting or capturing the blockaded harbor.
- Requires a great navy that has overbearing power on the sea, able to control the seas, not just attack individual ships
Examples:
- United States Navy used a commercial blockage against confederacy during the Civil War, dealing a decisive blow. Confederacy unable to do the same to the north because didn’t have strong enough navy.
- War of 1812 – blockade ports to strangle economy, crippling economy cripples army,
Alfred Thayer Mahan
“Commerce Destroying and Blockade”
How can naval forces affect a nation’s economy?
Is this logic antiquated or just in remission as the global balance of power evolves?
- By preventing merchant vessels from entering or exiting the ports. the primary object of seizing property being immediate injury to the enemy’s fighting power
- Disagrees with Machiavelli, sees money and substantial credit as the sinews of war. Without money the resistance of the enemy will die.
- Given the dramatic increase in ocean-borne commerce in the 20th century, it’s more likely that this logic is just in remission.
Geoffrey Till
“Naval Power”
Main Argument
Main argument:
The underlying doctrine of naval strategy remains consistent but technology affects the platforms through which naval strategy is implemented.
Response to Mahan. Point that total naval supremacy is no longer needed to have effective naval force.
Runs through history of naval power, and the technological innovations over time that have caused changes in the strategy needed for naval warfare
Unless some technological development suddenly erodes the relevance of the ocean for military logistics and international trade, being able to control what happens above the water is going to remain important.
Examples:
- Mere presence of german battleship Tirpitz in Norway meant Britian had to divert resources away from other areas to protect ships going to Russia, even though the Tirpitz mostly did nothing.
- Recent wars with a significant naval component: Arab-Israeli wars in 67 adn73, Vietnam war, indo-pakistan war 1971, Turkish invasion of Cyprus 1974, falklands war 1982, Iran Iraq war
Geoffrey Till
“Naval Power”
How does the evolution of technology affect naval strategy?
How similar or different are conditions in the 20th and 21st centuries that affect relevance of naval power?
Oscillating effect of technological move and countermove things have stayed more or less where they were. New tech provides not just problems but eventually solutions. Changes in relative power of naval forces during these oscillations.
Throughout history, naval aims have remained the same.
Nations want to defend their trade routes, hamper the trade routes of their enemies, project power over the oceans and prevent power from being projected toward them. But have been shifts in defense/attack balance based on changes in technology
Technological advancements have shifted relevance of naval power towards submarines and aviation but ships remain crucial.
Michael O’Hanlon
“The Science of War”
Main Argument
Main argument:
Logistics are crucial to successful military operations, with key elements of transportation assets, base network, support assets needed to create logistical capability that allows operations abroad
Key takeaways:
- Logistics critical to any war fighting effort, without transportation, bases and support units, combat units can’t do anything
- What separates US army from others is ability to deploy, operate and sustain itself abroad indefinitely
- Logistics requires a lot of people, twice as many soldiers dedicated to general support missions as to main combat formations, plus tens of thousands of contractors - Transportation: to move combat forces promptly and efficiently even if infrastructure is lacking
- Move intercontinentally through airlift and sealift, use depends on speed, payload, dependability/availability
- Bottlenecks often develop at ports and airfields where limited space for loading etc can slow deployment - Base network: to carry out deployment and receive forces once they are deployed
- Major bases crucial for creating a global base network to facilitate large scale military deployments and major regional operations
- Bases used for combat bases, ports for ships, logistical hubs, ground force bases maintaining presence for deterrence or alliances. - Support assets: to provide fuel, food, water, ammunition, equipment, medical care and other services
- Fuel, munitions, base support assets are very heavy
Examples:
1. Just preparing a schedule for the military transport of combat units to Iraq in 2003 took thousands of people. For Operation Desert Storm moved half a million people, more that 100,000 vehicles, 10 mil tons of supplies
Michael O’Hanlon
“The Science of War”
Why is logistics at least as important as strategy and tactics?
Tactics depend on logistics, and even strategy can be constrained by it.
Logistics critical to any war fighting effort, without transportation, bases and support units, combat units can’t do anything
