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Behaviour > 20 - payoff irrelevant cues > Flashcards

20 - payoff irrelevant cues Flashcards

1
Q

Schellings hypothesis

A
  • in pure cood games - payoff irrelevant cues make some strategies salient - draws attentions to some ways of coordination
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2
Q

what is a pure coordination game

A

games where players are indifferent between equilibrium and indifferent between disequilibrium

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3
Q

what is a payoff irrelevant cue
in mixed motive cood game

A
  • can help coordination in mixed motive game
  • where it is important to reach an agreement
  • players have opposing interests
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4
Q

Isoni et al (2013)

aim

A

do payoff irrelevant cues help make some ways of coordinating more focal in bargaining over division of resources

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5
Q

why study mixed motive coordination games

A
  • division requires agreement
  • opposed interests over which agreement
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6
Q

what is the bargaining table game

A
  • 2 player one shot game
  • each player has a coloured base square
  • disks in the table that have numerical value in them
  • any player can claim any disk regardless of location/value
  • no communication
  • claims made independently
  • agreement - no disk claimed by both
  • if there is agreement - each player gets value of disks they claimed
  • gets 0 if they both choose the same disk
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7
Q

what are the key features of the bargaining table games

A
  1. disks = valuable objects to divide between players
  2. payoff irrelevant cues = disk locations - observable to both
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8
Q

what are the 2 potential sources of inefficiency

A
  1. failure to agree - both get 0 if both claim the same disk
  2. failure to claim all disks - not claimed = wasted payoffs
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9
Q

Isoni et al 2013
experimental design

A
  • no communication
  • subjects play 24 different bargaining table games in randomly selected pairs
  • fixed pairs
  • games differ in number of disks, value of disks, location of disks
  • players randomly get payoff from 1 of the selected 24 games they play
  • each game = one shot game
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10
Q

describe what game 1 is

A
  • 2 disks on the table - one close to red player, the other close to blue player
  • any player can claim any of the disks/both/neither
  • opposed interest over the coordination equilibria (5,6) and (6,5)
  • how will they coordinate - will they use
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11
Q

what is aim of
Isoni

A

will subjects payoff irrelevant cues from rule of proximity - to help coordinate between who gets the 6 and 5 payoff

  • help them coordinate on agreement ?
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12
Q

how can you apply Schelling hypothesis to the Isoni study

A
  • predicts that players will use the rule of proximity to determine how to divide the disks between them - to coordinate on agreement
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13
Q

what is the rule of proximity

how can this rule be applied to the game

A
  • each player only claim the disk that is nearer to their base than to the other
  • efficient way to make the split
  • coordinate
  • use of disk location to coordinate
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14
Q

describe what game 3 is

how is it different to game 1

A

same as game 1 - same payoffs - choosing between splitting the 5 and 6

  • but rule of proximity does not apply - 5 and 6 equally distanced from both players
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15
Q

what does Schelling view suggest will happen in game 3 compared to game 1

A

players less likely to agree in G3 than in G1

players will earn less on average in G3 - unable to coordinate

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16
Q

what do Isoni calculate

between the pairings

A
  1. agreement rate = proportion of all pairings with agreements
    - agree/games played
  2. earnings efficiency index = average combined payoffs achieved / total payoffs on table (proportion of available earnings that subjects receive between them)
17
Q

Isoni

comparing G1 and G3
results

A

G1 has higher earnings efficiency percentage = subjects receive a higher proportion of earnings in the game where rule of proximity applies
- favoured player earns more on average than unfavoured player

G3
no favoured player

  • having proximitity rule = some efficiency gain
18
Q

describe what game 17 is
how is it different to game 1 and 3

A
  • introduces more disks of same value
  • total value of disks is still 11 (before it was choice between 5 and 6)
  • now value spread across more disks (sum of 6 surrounding red, sum of 5 surrounding blue)
  • proximity rule applies
19
Q

what is game 19

A

same as game 17 - but all in straight line
- proximity rule doesnt apply

20
Q

results between game 17 and 19

A

game 17 compared to 19
* higher agreement rate = 62%
* higher earnings efficiency
* favoured red earns more on average than blue

game 19
* no favoured player
* low agreement rate
* low earnings efficiency

> the proximity rule give substantial efficient

21
Q

main takeaway from
Isoni
no communication

what do locations affect?

A
  • locations do not affect disk values or available options

but they do affect:
* likelihood of agreement
* earnings efficiency
* relative earnings

22
Q

what is the driving mechanism behind the Isoni study

A

rule of proximity - visual display
* most salient guide to division
- helps both players coordinate

  • even less favoured player has reason to follow the cue - otherwise would get 0
23
Q

what is earnings efficiency

A

the proportion of available earnings that subjects receive between them

24
Q

what is the communication design
Isoni et al (2014)

  • limited communication
A
  • use bargaining tables
  • 90 seconds of communication
  • get to view the claims of their partner, and ‘accept’ their claims or not
  • game ends if both players ‘accept’ or 90 seconds ends
25
Q

what were the potential effects of communication

A
  1. less likely disks will be unclaimed
  2. less likely that both players claim the same disk
  3. less likely that location will drive decisions, maybe fairness instead
26
Q

Isoni
communication 2014
findings

  • is the rule of proximity used
A
  • more results that are efficiency - less unclaimed and less where they are claimed by both
  • majority achieved 6,5 or 5,6 split
  • rule of proximity not used when goes against fairness - generates inequality
  • rule of proximity used when deciding how to split the disks fairly - whoever is closer to the 6 gets 6 and the other gets 5

Behaviour (26 decks)

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