12 - Conditional cooperation + strategy method

Question 2

are contributions in repeated public goods games

Answer 2

driven by preferences and beliefs

Question 3

what 2 things do we have to account for when examining preferences

Answer 3

1. why behaviour change over time = decay
2. why some people free ride from beginning - heterogeneity between subjects

Question 4

main paper

Answer 4

Fischbacher, Gachter & Quercia

Question 5

what 2 experiments do FGQ use

Answer 5

1. P exeriment
2. C experiment

Question 6

what to FGQ suggest causes the decay

Answer 6

disappointed expectations of people that want to cooperate but only if others do
- when they see people contributing less, they decrease their contributions too

• i only contribute if someone else does too

Question 7

what is the P experiment

Answer 7

implements a strategy method that uses a contribution table to get peoples preferences for different levels of contribution by other players

• specify the contribution level for every possible value of the average value of every member of the group - fill in table
• classifies each person by preference type according to how they fill in the table = preferences dont change

Question 8

why do we need the P experiment

Answer 8

categorizes people into their preference type
- differences between people

Question 9

what kind of person are you according to the preference table

Answer 9

1. fill in all 0 = freerider
2. fill in all max contribution = unconditional cooperator
3. conditional cooperator = contributions are positive with average contributions
4. perfect conditional cooperator = you contribute the average level - always perfectly match

Question 10

so why would people not always perfectly act on their preferences?

Answer 10

due to changes in beliefs

Question 11

p exeriment one shot game

Answer 11

• player announce strategy for transformed 1 shot game when they are the last person to move, they know the average contribution of the group

Question 12

what was the C experiment

Answer 12

• standard VCM
  elicitation of beliefs round by round
• have to say what you expect the other people in the group will contribute on average in each round - if you guess right you get an award

Question 13

what is the incentive to answer the contributions table truthfully

Answer 13

1 person from each group randomly chosen to play their strategy in the table for each round
- table effects payoffs

Question 14

what was the findings of the P experiment

Answer 14

• the average conditional cooperator is not perfect - slightly undercut the average
• most common preference is conditional cooperator
• 20% are freeriders
• for this groups - people do want to cooperate but less than everyone else

Question 15

c experiment findings

repeated VCM

Answer 15

usual decay
beliefs about the contributions of others decay too

• the average subjects contributions are a little below the average of all subjects beliefs

Question 16

how did the predict subjects behaviour in C experiment

Answer 16

used each subjects strategy from P exepriment and stated belief in C experiment

to predict their behaviour - what they actually did in C experiment rounds
- do they act as a good predictor

Question 17

what have we learnt from the P and C experiment

Answer 17

P = what they want to do at each average contribution level

C = what they are expecting overs to do on average

Question 18

how accurate were the predictions

for free riders
for cc

Answer 18

free riders
- 80% of predictions accurate

cc
- large majority are in the range that predicts accurately

Question 19

what are the implications of accurate predictions

Answer 19

• stable preferences and changing beliefs explains why contributions decay
• because people always want to contribute less than average
• and when they think others contribute less they will too

Question 20

what is the evidence that suggests that strategic moves from free riders

Answer 20

p exepriment - suggests free riders should never contribute

• C experiment - see that they do contribute a little in the first rounds = strategic motivation

tendency for free riders to contribute in the early rounds and then not in later rounds
- strategic move

• when the C experiment is a one shot game - free riders dont contribute at all

Question 21

main results of FGQ

Answer 21

1. most people cc
2. imperfect cc - undercut
3. freeriders show strategic motive - want to contribute only in repeated games
4. generally, people play their predicted moves, based on what their beliefs of what others played

Question 22

can cooperation be sustained

Answer 22

no downward spiral
- imperfect cc + freeriders