19 - coordination and communication Flashcards
1
Q
Cooper et al 1992
recap
A
- subjects groups in cohorts of 11
- payoffs in points
- each player plays 2 player game against every other player in the cohort, repeated in 2nd phase
- already looked at non-communication treatment
- now look at communication treatment
2
Q
what is the exerimental design of
Cooper et al 1992
A
- get subjects to play 2 games - SCG, CCG
- 3 communication treatments
3
Q
what are the 3 communication treatments
cooper
A
- no communication - players simultaenously + independently choose strategies
- one-way communication
- one player sends message of what the intend to play - two way communication
- each player sends what they intend to play
4
Q
what is the SCG
simple cood game
A
- 2 NE
- R,R is preferred by both players but is risky
5
Q
what is CCG
complex
A
L,L and C,C are NE
C,C pareto dominates L,L
R,R pareto dominant - but not NE - incentive to switch to get higher payoff
6
Q
will the communication help
A
- stated plans - not commitments
- no replies
- no scope to make supporting arguments/appeals
- point to where they might go
- but may not be believed by receiver
- sender is not sure that receiver will believe
- 2 way - both know what each others intentions are - more certainty?
7
Q
results of SCG
amongst the 3 treatments
A
- no communication
- pareto inferior L,L nearly always played - one way
- R,R played 53% of time
- inferior is still played
- disequilibrium in cases
* of the messages 144 R - only 60% followed by R,R - two way
- R,R played 91% of cases
- all messages are R,R
8
Q
what can we infer from SCG one way results
A
- one way communication can help reach the preferred e - but is not perfect
- not the case that commincation is believed so people after R message R,R not always reached
- some people also still sent L messages - why? - after L message L,L almost always reached
- 2 way increases belief and confidence - more likely to reach coordination
9
Q
what are the results from CCG
A
- no communication
- pareto inferior most common, but also high disequilibrium - one way
- C,C played 67%
- inferior and disequilibrium still present
- majority of R messages were not followed through
- C messages were common and helpful - two way
- C,C reach 30%
- inferior and disequilibrium widespread
- few C,C messages but almost all followed through
- R messages common but followed by (L,L)
* C messages only help if both send
10
Q
take away from
Cooper et al 1992
A
- communication raises frequency of pareto superior equilibrium in both games - relative to no communication
- 2 way communication helps more in SCG than CCG compared to 1 way
11
Q
Brandt & Cooper 2006
A
corporate turnaround with communication
- each firm 4 employees, 5 possible actions of effort
* communication from manager - external voice
12
Q
what were BC communication conditions
subject manager
A
- no communication
- manager only informs employees of bonus rate at start of each round - one way
- manager sends verbal message to all employees - two way
- manager sends verbal message to all employees and employee can send a message to manager when communicating their effort level
- free form messages - non-binding
13
Q
BC
results
by treatment
A
- no communication
- lowest average minimum effort in firm - one way
- increases average relative to no communication - two way
- biggest increase in average
14
Q
key takeaway from
BC
A
- communication can act as coordinating device
- positive effect of communication on minimum effort in firm - especially 2 way
15
Q
BC
analysis on message content
A
- most effective strat: explicitly request high effort, point out mutual benefits
