Week 5 Flashcards
Skeptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the Understanding - Two Types of Knowledge - Hume
Relations of Ideas – Logical and mathematical truths that are necessarily true (e.g., “2+2=4”).
Matters of Fact – Knowledge based on experience (e.g., “The sun will rise tomorrow”).
How Do We Know Matters of Fact? -Hume
Through cause and effect—we infer things about the world based on past experiences.
The Problem of Causation - Hume
- Cause and effect relationships are not logically necessary like mathematical truths.
- We only learn them through experience.
- Example: A person who has never seen fire cannot deduce that it will produce heat.
The Principle of Induction - Hume
- Induction is the process of assuming that the future will resemble the past.
- Example: We assume the sun will rise tomorrow because it always has.
- Problem: There is no logical reason why past experiences should guarantee future events.
The Problem of Justifying Induction - Hume
What is Hume’s challenge to induction?
- We believe in induction because it has worked in the past.
- But this is circular reasoning—we use induction to justify induction!
- There is no rational basis for expecting the future to resemble the past.
The Example of the Billiard Balls - Hume
How does Hume use billiard balls to illustrate the problem of causation?
- Suppose we see one billiard ball hit another.
- We assume the second ball will move—but this is based on habit, not logical necessity.
- It is conceivable that the second ball might not move at all!
Why We Assume Causal Relationships - Hume
If causation is not logically necessary, why do we believe in it?
- Custom and Habit—our minds form associations between events because they consistently occur together.
- Psychological Expectation—we anticipate outcomes because we’ve seen them before, not because we reason them out.
The Role of Custom and Habit - Hume
What does Hume say is the foundation of human reasoning about experience?
- Custom—our minds naturally expect certain outcomes based on past experiences.
Example: We expect food to be nourishing because it always has been.
Skeptical Solution of These Doubts
- Hume’s Skeptical Conclusion
What is Hume’s conclusion about human reasoning?
- We cannot rationally prove that the future will resemble the past.
- We believe in causation and induction only because of habit, not reason.
Hume’s Example of a Newborn Child
How does Hume’s example of a newborn child support his argument?
- A newborn does not know that fire burns or that food satisfies hunger.
- Only experience and habit teach these things—not reason.
The Practical Implications of Hume’s Skepticism
If our beliefs about cause and effect are based on habit, does that mean we should reject them?
- No—Hume argues that we must rely on custom to function.
- Skepticism doesn’t mean we should abandon common sense; it just means we recognize its limits.
Why Science Still Works Despite Hume’s Skepticism
If induction is not rationally justified, does that undermine science?
- No, because science depends on observation and habit, which are reliable in practice, even if they lack ultimate rational justification.
The Difference Between Philosophers and Ordinary People - Hume
What does Hume say is the difference between philosophers and ordinary people regarding causation?
- Ordinary people trust experience without questioning it.
- Philosophers recognize that induction is not rationally justified but still necessary for daily life.
The Limits of Human Knowledge - Hume
What does Hume argue about the limits of human understanding?
- We cannot know the ultimate causes of things.
- We must be humble in our reasoning and accept that certainty is impossible beyond immediate experience.
Final Takeaway - Hume
Hume’s Argument in Simple Terms:
- We assume the future will resemble the past, but there’s no logical reason why it must.
- We only believe in cause and effect because habit makes us expect certain outcomes.
- Even though this is not rationally justified, it is practically necessary for human life.
The Traditional Problem of Induction - Goodman
Q: What was David Hume’s original problem of induction?
A: Hume argued that we cannot justify inductive reasoning (i.e., predicting future events based on past experiences) because there is no logical necessity connecting past and future occurrences.
Hume’s Skepticism About Causal Reasoning - Goodman
Q: Why does Hume doubt our ability to establish cause and effect?
A: Cause and effect relationships are not derived from pure reason but from habit; we assume regularities because of repeated observations, but we have no rational justification for expecting them to hold in the future.
How Does Goodman Modify Hume’s Problem?
Q: What does Goodman believe about the traditional problem of induction?
A: Goodman argues that the traditional problem of induction (how to justify induction) has been solved or dissolved—but a new, deeper issue remains: Why do some patterns count as valid inductive inferences while others do not?
The “New Riddle” of Induction - What is Goodman’s “New Riddle of Induction”?
What key question does Goodman raise?
- Why do we accept some inductive generalizations as legitimate (e.g., “All emeralds are green”) but reject others that seem structurally similar (e.g., “All emeralds are grue”)?
The “Grue” Paradox - Goodman
An object is grue if it is:
Green before time t
Blue after time t
- What problem does the “grue” example reveal?
- If we accept induction for “All emeralds are green,” we should also accept induction for “All emeralds are grue”—but that would mean we should expect emeralds to turn blue after time t, which contradicts our common sense expectations.
The Problem of Lawlike vs. Accidental Generalizations - Goodman
What distinction does Goodman introduce to address this issue?
- He argues that some generalizations are lawlike (scientifically valid) while others are accidental—but we don’t yet have a clear rule for distinguishing them.
The Failure of Traditional Solutions - Why Can’t We Solve This Problem with More Evidence = Goodman
Why doesn’t simply observing more emeralds solve the problem?
- More observations of green emeralds also confirm “All emeralds are grue” just as much as they confirm “All emeralds are green.”
- The problem is not a lack of data but a failure to define what counts as a legitimate inductive rule.
Why Can’t We Solve the Problem with a “Uniformity of Nature” Principle? - Goodman
Can we just assume that nature is uniform?
- No, because the definition of uniformity depends on which predicates we consider legitimate.
- If we consider “green” fundamental, then emeralds staying green is natural.
- If we consider “grue” fundamental, then emeralds turning blue is natural.
- The problem is deciding which predicates are “natural.”
Why Can’t We Solve the Problem Syntactically? - Goodman
Can we just say that lawlike hypotheses use “purely qualitative” terms?
- No, because what counts as “qualitative” is relative.
- If we define “green” first, then “grue” is complex.
- If we define “grue” first, then “green” is complex.
- There is no objective, language-independent reason to prefer one over the other.
The Challenge of Defining “Lawlike” Hypotheses - Lawlike vs. Accidental Generalizations - Goodman
What is the key difference between lawlike and accidental generalizations?
- Lawlike generalizations (e.g., “All copper conducts electricity”) support predictions and are used in science.
- Accidental generalizations (e.g., “All people in this room are third sons”) do not support predictions.
The Role of Projectibility - Goodman
What is “projectibility” and why is it important?
- Projectible predicates allow us to make valid predictions.
- Non-projectible predicates do not.
- The problem: We don’t have a clear rule for deciding which predicates are projectible.
The Problem of Confirmation Theory - Goodman
Why does this problem threaten confirmation theory?
- Traditional confirmation theory assumes that positive instances confirm a hypothesis (e.g., more green emeralds confirm “All emeralds are green”).
- But the same positive instances also confirm “All emeralds are grue.”
- Without a way to distinguish good and bad predicates, confirmation theory fails.
The Broader Implications of Goodman’s Argument - Why Does This Matter Beyond Induction?
What larger philosophical issue does the “new riddle of induction” expose?
- It shows that our ability to generalize from experience depends on deep assumptions about what kinds of categories are legitimate—assumptions we have yet to fully justify.
What Does This Mean for Scientific Theories? - Goodman
How does this challenge the foundations of science?
- Science relies on inductive reasoning, but Goodman’s argument suggests we have no clear rule for why some inductions are valid and others are not.
Final Takeaway - Goodman
- Goodman’s “New Riddle of Induction” is one of the deepest challenges in epistemology.
- Hume asked whether induction is rationally justified.
- Goodman asks why some inductions seem legitimate while others do not.
The challenge remains unsolved: - How do we decide which generalizations are “lawlike” and which are not?
