Feldman, Justification is Internal Flashcards
What is the main thesis of Richard Feldman’s “Justification Is Internal”?
Feldman argues that epistemic justification depends solely on internal factors, like a person’s evidence or reasons. These are mental states (e.g., beliefs, experiences), not external facts. Justification, though not sufficient for knowledge, is still a crucial internalist component of it.
How does Feldman define internalism?
Internalism is the view that epistemic facts (like justification) are determined solely by internal factors—the things within one’s mental life, such as beliefs, memories, and experiences.
What does Feldman mean by internal factors?
Internal factors include mental states—what a person is aware of or has access to reflectively (like perceptual experiences, beliefs, memories). If two people are identical in these respects, they must be identical in epistemic status.
What is externalism in epistemology, according to Feldman?
Externalism holds that epistemic status depends (at least partly) on external factors, such as causal connections, reliability, or how beliefs were formed—factors that may not be accessible from within the subject’s perspective.
What are examples of externalist theories?
- Causal Theory (e.g., Armstrong): Knowledge is true belief caused in the right way.
- Reliabilism (e.g., Goldman): Justified belief = belief formed by reliable processes (like perception), regardless of the subject’s awareness of their reliability.
How does Feldman distinguish justification from knowledge?
Justification is a necessary but not sufficient condition for knowledge. Knowledge also requires truth and often an additional external factor (e.g., no defeater, or causal connection), especially in light of Gettier cases.
How do internalists treat the Gettier problem?
Internalists accept that justified true belief isn’t sufficient for knowledge. They often add an external condition—like no defeater or proper basing—to deal with these cases.
What is well-foundedness, and how does it relate to internalism?
A belief is well-founded if it is not only supported by good reasons (justified), but also held on the basis of those reasons. Internalists say justification is internal, but some forms of well-foundedness (due to causal history) may not be fully internal.
Does Feldman say all epistemic evaluations are internal?
No—he admits that knowledge, defeaters, and maybe well-foundedness involve external factors. However, justification—the internalist core—does not.
What are examples of “interesting” internalist evaluations Feldman provides?
- Consistency of beliefs: A logical, internal relationship.
- Ability to identify reasons for belief: A mental capability.
- Having good reasons: Independent of how the belief was formed. These evaluations are all internalist and epistemically meaningful.
What is Feldman’s response to Greco’s claim that all interesting epistemic evaluations are externalist?
He rejects it, arguing that evaluations like having good reasons, consistency, and the ability to identify reasons are internal and important for reflective, discursive knowledge.
Why are good reasons still important even if knowledge doesn’t require them in every case?
Because skepticism (especially Cartesian/Humean skepticism) is concerned with whether we have good reasons for our beliefs, not just whether those beliefs are reliably formed.
What is discursive or reflective knowledge, and how does it relate to internalism?
It’s knowledge that involves thinking, reasoning, and reflection. Feldman claims that this kind of knowledge requires internal justification, even if “animal knowledge” or simple reliable responses do not.
What is the significance of Gettier cases in Feldman’s argument?
They show that justified true belief is not enough for knowledge. Internalists accept this and add external components (e.g., no defeaters) to their models without abandoning the central internalist idea that justification is internal.
How does the Gettier example about the Ford illustrate the need for something more than justification?
Even if someone has excellent internal reasons for believing their neighbor owns a Ford, if the belief is true by accident or deception, it lacks knowledge—justifying the need for an added external condition (like no defeaters).
Is epistemic responsibility internalist or externalist?
It can be seen as externalist when defined deontologically (based on past actions or belief formation). However, Feldman separates this from justification, which he argues is still internal, based on current reasons.
How does Feldman respond to historical or forgotten evidence objections (e.g., Maria case)?
He gives two replies:
Reply 1: Maria is justified now because her memory gives her good reason, and no contrary reason exists.
Reply 2: If past internal states matter, internalism can include past internal factors, preserving the internalist framework.
What is Feldman’s final defense of internalism?
Internalism is vindicated because:
Justification is an internal matter, grounded in mental states like reasons and evidence.
Even if knowledge involves additional external conditions, justification remains a crucial, necessary, and interesting internalist component of epistemology.
Does Feldman reject externalism entirely?
No—he allows that knowledge might require external features. But he maintains that justification itself is internal, and that internalist evaluations remain central to epistemology.
