James Pryor, ‘The Skeptic and the Dogmatist’ Flashcards
Skepticism (about the external world)
The view that perceptual experiences cannot justify beliefs about the external world, because such beliefs are always defeasible and could be based on deception (e.g., evil demon scenario).
Fallibilism
The epistemological view that knowledge or justified belief does not require certainty; one can know things even if the justification is defeasible.
Ambitious Anti-Skeptical Project
Attempts to refute skepticism using only premises the skeptic would accept. Generally considered unpromising.
Modest Anti-Skeptical Project
Aims to show we can justifiably believe things like “there is a hand” without using only skeptic-approved premises—focused on satisfying ourselves, not convincing the skeptic
G.E. Moore’s First Anti-Skeptical Idea
The belief “there is a hand” is more certain than the skeptical premises meant to disprove it.
G.E. Moore’s Second Anti-Skeptical Idea
One can know things (e.g., that one has hands) without being able to prove them—knowledge doesn’t require argument or proof the skeptic would accept.
Moore’s Proof of the External World
Here is one hand, and here is another; hence, there are external objects.” Rejected by skeptics as question-begging.
Dogmatism (about perceptual justification)
The view that if it perceptually seems to you as if p is true, then you have immediate, prima facie justification for believing p—without needing further justification or argument.
Dogmatism (about perceptual knowledge)
Extends the above to claim that this perceptual justification can suffice for knowledge
Key Feature of Dogmatism
Justification arises merely from having the experience; no background beliefs or introspective awareness of the experience are needed.
Difference from Other Fallibilisms
Other fallibilists think perceptual knowledge requires non-question-begging evidence; dogmatists reject this.
Evil Demon Hypothesis
A skeptical scenario where all perceptual experiences are false appearances created by an evil demon.
Standard Skeptical Argument (1–3)
(1) You can’t know you’re not being deceived by an evil demon.
(2) To know about the world, you must know you’re not deceived.
(3) Therefore, you can’t know anything about the external world.
Pryor’s Improved Skeptical Argument (5–9)
Uses epistemic priority rather than simple closure. Suggests knowledge of not being deceived must come before knowledge from perception.
SPK (Skeptical Principle about Knowledge)
To know p on the basis of experiences E, you must antecedently know that any “bad” alternative (e.g., being deceived) is false, in a non-question-begging way.
SPJ (Skeptical Principle about Justification)
Analogous to SPK but for justification: you must have antecedent justification (not relying on p) to rule out skeptical hypotheses.
Epistemic Priority
Your justification for believing p is prior to justification for q if it doesn’t rest on justification for q. Important in detecting question-begging.
Prima Facie Justification
A defeasible form of justification that can be undermined but is sufficient unless defeated.
Defeaters
Evidence that undercuts or rebuts your justification (e.g., evidence that you’re dreaming or hallucinating).
Immediate Justification
Justification that does not rely on any other beliefs; based solely on the perceptual experience itself.
Not All Perceptual Beliefs Are Basic
Some require background beliefs (e.g., “This is a Honda Accord”); others (e.g., “There is something solid here”) are more basic and immediate
Perceptually Basic Proposition
A proposition your experience represents directly (not via inference from other perceived propositions).
Relevant Alternatives Theory
You must rule out only relevant skeptical scenarios, not all possible ones.
Coherentism
Justification comes from mutual support among beliefs—not a linear foundational structure.
