John Greco, ‘Justification is Not Internal’ Flashcards
What is the main thesis of John Greco’s “Justification Is Not Internal”?
Greco argues that internalism about epistemic justification is false in all interesting forms. Instead, all significant kinds of epistemic evaluation are externalist—they rely on external factors like accuracy, reliability, and belief formation history (etiology), not just internal perspective.
How does Greco define internalism in epistemology?
Internalism is the view that the epistemic status of a belief (e.g. justification, rationality) is entirely determined by internal factors—i.e., factors that are either part of the believer’s mental life or accessible via reflection.
What is externalism in contrast?
Externalism denies internalism. It holds that some factors relevant to justification are external to the subject’s mental life—such as the belief’s reliability or its causal history.
What are two common interpretations of “internal to a person’s perspective”?
- Privileged access view – A factor is internal if one can know about it through reflection alone.
- Mental life view – A factor is internal if it is part of one’s current mental states (e.g. beliefs, experiences, thoughts).
What does Greco argue about different types of internalism?
That none of them are successful at explaining important epistemic evaluations—especially justification. Even subjective appropriateness (like responsibility or rationality) cannot be fully captured using internal factors alone.
How does Greco approach the internalism/externalism debate?
By separating two kinds of epistemic evaluations:
- Objective: Whether beliefs accurately reflect reality (truth, reliability).
- Subjective: Whether beliefs are held responsibly, given the subject’s perspective.
Greco argues that both types of evaluation involve external factors, thus undermining internalism even for subjective justification.
What is the internalist claim about epistemic responsibility?
That epistemic justification = epistemic responsibility, and that responsibility is wholly determined by internal factors.
How does Greco refute this internalist claim about epistemic responsibility?
He uses cases where prior negligence affects current justification, even if the current perspective is innocent. For instance:
Maria Case: She now believes Dean Martin is Italian from memory but originally accepted it based on a stereotype. She’s not fully responsible, hence not fully justified.
Moral analogy: Just like moral blame can depend on past actions, epistemic responsibility depends on belief formation history (etiology), which is external.
Like Perspectives, Like Justification
What is the internalist intuition here?
A: If two people have identical internal perspectives, they should have the same justification (e.g., Descartes and his evil demon twin).
How does Greco challenge this?
A: By emphasizing that belief formation method matters. Two people may arrive at the same internal state—one via responsible reasoning, the other via carelessness or wishful thinking. Their justification differs, despite internal similarity.
Q: What is the skeptical concern internalists try to avoid?
Q: How does Greco flip this concern?
Q: What is the skeptical concern internalists try to avoid?
A: That we can’t know perceptual or inductive beliefs are justified unless we first know our methods are reliable—which seems circular.
Q: How does Greco flip this concern?
A: He argues internalism actually guarantees skepticism, because it requires justification for beliefs like “perception is reliable”—which leads to epistemic regress or circularity, just like in Hume’s argument.
What are the two skeptical arguments Greco formalizes?
- Skepticism about perception:
- To justify perceptual beliefs, you must justify the reliability of perception.
- But that relies on perception itself → circular.
- Therefore, perception cannot justify beliefs.
- Skepticism about induction:
- Justifying inductive beliefs requires justifying that the past predicts the future.
- But that uses induction → also circular.
Why does internalism fall prey to these arguments?
- Because internalism says justification must be accessible or part of mental life
- but beliefs about the reliability of evidence are empirical and external
- So justification under internalism demands an impossible regress.
What is the structure of Greco’s general argument in Section 3?
- Epistemic evaluations are of two kinds: objective (truth-oriented) and subjective (responsibility-oriented).
- Both involve external factors:
Objective → truth, reliability, causal connection.
Subjective → belief formation history, intention, responsibility.
- Therefore, no important epistemic evaluation is purely internal.
What is Greco’s conclusion?
That all interesting or philosophically significant epistemic norms are externalist—internalism only yields trivial, artificial, or unimportant evaluations.
What analogy does Greco use to show internalism’s unimportance?
Moral evaluation: Just like we care about why a person acted and whether their actions are good (not just that they align with their personal norms), we care about why beliefs are formed and how they relate to truth—not just internal consistency.
What is a “time-slice” evaluation and why is it problematic?
It’s evaluating a belief based solely on a subject’s internal state at a given moment, ignoring how it was formed. Greco argues these are unimportant because they omit the very features (truth, reliability, responsibility) that matter.
Why does Greco argue that externalism better supports epistemic normativity?
Because it accommodates:
- Truth (are beliefs accurate?),
- Reliability (do methods tend to produce truth?),
- Responsibility (was belief formation epistemically careful?).
These are crucial for evaluating beliefs in scientific practice, everyday life, and philosophy. Internalist criteria miss these.
What is the ultimate claim Greco defends?
Internalism fails to account for epistemic justification in any interesting sense. To make sense of normativity in epistemology, we must adopt an externalist framework that evaluates beliefs in light of their origin, reliability, and truth connection.
