Lord, Defeating the Externalist's Demons Flashcards
Internalism about Rationality
The view that the rational status of an agent’s reactions (beliefs, actions, etc.) depends solely on non-factive internal states—states the agent can be in even if their contents are false.
Externalism about Rationality
The view that rationality depends (at least partly) on external factors—like objective normative reasons or the reliability of belief-forming processes.
Normative Reason
A fact or truth that counts in favor of a belief or action. For externalists, these are what rationalize responses.
Possessed Reason
A normative reason an agent has epistemic access to—usually via knowledge or some other epistemic relation.
The New Evil Demon Problem (NEDP)
Challenges externalist theories: if Pam (a systematically deceived agent) has identical internal states to Sam (a veridical agent), how can externalists account for both being equally rational?
Same Status Thesis
The claim that Sam and Pam are both rational—regardless of the fact that only Sam’s beliefs track truth.
Same Degree Thesis
The stronger claim that Sam and Pam are equally rational—that there’s no difference in the degree of rationality despite external differences.
Reasons Rationalize
Beliefs are rational because they are supported by normative reasons (facts).
Reasons Factivity
Only true propositions can count as reasons. This implies that radically deceived agents lack the reasons available to veridical agents.
Different Rationalizers
Lord’s view: Sam and Pam do not share the same rationalizers because they don’t have the same access to true reasons.
LORD’S SOLUTION TO THE NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM
Key Move: Appearance Facts as Reasons
Pam knows how things appear to her. Even if she’s deceived, she possesses the fact that it appears that p. These appearance facts are true and count as possessed reasons.
Always Knows Thesis
Ceteris paribus, every time an agent perceives p, they know that it appears as if p. This allows deceived agents to possess at least one true fact to support their belief.
Relative Weight of Reasons
Rationality depends on how the reasons for a belief weigh against the reasons against it. Pam and Sam may have different reasons, but if the relative weight is the same, then their rationality is equal.
Overdetermination Insight
Sam’s rationality is overdetermined—she has more reasons, but Pam has enough. Overdetermination doesn’t mean Sam is more rational.
THREE RELATED PROBLEMS
- Knowledge from Falsehood Problem
- Non-Veridical Perception Problem (Schroeder)
- Rational Action from False Belief (Happy vs. Deceived Bernie)
Knowledge from Falsehood Problem
Example: Fritz believes he won’t be late because he thinks it’s 2:58 (false), but still plausibly knows he’s not late. Externalists must explain how knowledge arises even when a false belief plays a role.
Non-Veridical Perception Problem (Schroeder)
How can beliefs based on hallucinations be rationalized, if the perceptual content is false and Reasons Factivity is true?
Rational Action from False Belief (Happy vs. Deceived Bernie)
Both act on the belief that their drink is a gin and tonic, but one is correct and the other is deceived. Why are both actions rational?
LORD’S ANSWERS TO THESE PROBLEMS
Nearby Truths Strategy
/ In each case, agents possess true facts (e.g., how things appear, what reliable sources indicate) that can serve as rationalizers, even if the original belief is based on falsehood.
Perspectival Parity
/ Non-factive duplicates (like Sam and Pam) will possess equivalent internal states, and thus access to appearance facts. These are sufficient for rationality, even if external reality differs.
Focus on Ex Post Rationality
Goes beyond ex ante rational support to ask: are the beliefs based on the right reasons? Externalists must explain how agents like Pam are properly connected to the reasons that support their beliefs.
Problem of Basing
Pam seems to base her belief on a falsehood (e.g., “my textbook says X”), which isn’t a reason. So how can she be said to base her belief on a true, rationalizing fact?
Foundational Belief Tension
If Pam’s belief isn’t based on a rational belief like “it appears that X,” then it’s not foundational. But it’s also not inferential. So how is it based?
LORD’S SOLUTION: UNINFERENTIAL BASING
Uninferential Basing
/ A middle ground between inferential and non-inferential basing. A belief can be sustained by a new reason without being re-formed or inferred. The disposition to revise a belief when the new reason is defeated is key.
Examples
Lottery Case: Max continues to believe Richard is rich, but the reason changes—from “he won the lottery” to “he made smart investments.”
Red Widget Case: Max still believes the widget is red, but now based on the owner’s testimony, not how it looks under red lighting.
Application to Pam
/ Pam believes “Wiles proved Fermat’s theorem” because it appears that a reputable source says so. If that appearance is defeated, she drops the belief. This shows her belief is sustained by the appearance fact.
