Week 4 Flashcards
Introduction to Epistemic Akrasia - Horowitz
- Epistemic akrasia occurs when a person believes P while also believing that their evidence does not support P
What is the Non-Akrasia Constraint?
- The principle that it is never rational to believe P while also believing that one’s evidence does not support P.
Why is epistemic akrasia compared to practical akrasia?
- Just as practical akrasia involves acting against one’s best judgment, epistemic akrasia involves believing something while also believing that one’s evidence does not support it.
Higher-Order Evidence and the Challenge to Non-Akrasia - Horowitz
What is higher-order evidence (HOE)?
- Evidence about the quality of one’s reasoning process rather than direct evidence about a proposition itself.
Why does higher-order evidence challenge the Non-Akrasia Constraint?
- Cases of misleading higher-order evidence suggest that one can rationally believe P while also rationally believing that one’s evidence does not support P.
What is an example of misleading higher-order evidence?
- A detective (Sam) solves a case but is told by a reliable source that his late-night reasoning is usually flawed. This higher-order evidence suggests that Sam’s belief in his conclusion is unreliable.
The Sleepy Detective Case - Horowitz
What happens in the Sleepy Detective example?
- Sam carefully examines the evidence and rationally concludes that Lucy is the thief.
- His partner, Alex, reminds him that his late-night reasoning is usually flawed.
- Sam trusts Alex and thus believes: “My evidence probably does not support Lucy’s guilt.”
- This leads to epistemic akrasia: Sam believes both “Lucy is guilty” and “My evidence does not support that Lucy is guilty.”
What are the possible epistemic responses to Sleepy Detective?
- Steadfast View – Sam should maintain confidence in Lucy’s guilt, ignoring the higher-order evidence.
Conciliatory View – Sam should significantly reduce confidence in Lucy’s guilt. - Level-Splitting View – Sam should continue to believe Lucy is guilty while also believing that his evidence does not support that belief (allowing epistemic akrasia).
What is the problem with the Level-Splitting View?
- It suggests that rational agents can believe something while simultaneously believing that their belief is not supported—which seems irrational and unstable.
Arguments Against Level-Splitting and Epistemic Akrasia - Horowitz
What are the main problems with Level-Splitting views?
- Moore’s Paradox – Believing “P, but my evidence does not support P” feels deeply irrational, similar to saying, “It is raining, but I don’t believe it is raining.”
- Problematic Reasoning – If Sam truly believes his evidence is unreliable, he should not be confident in his belief.
- Bad Betting Behavior – If Sam had to bet on whether Lucy is guilty, he would behave incoherently, offering contradictory odds depending on whether he considers P or his evidence for P.
How does Sleepy Detective highlight the irrationality of epistemic akrasia?
- If Sam acknowledges that his reasoning is unreliable, he should doubt his conclusion rather than hold both beliefs.
- It leads to an unstable belief state—Sam cannot rationally act on a belief that he simultaneously considers unjustified.
high-order defeat and rationality - Horowitz
What is higher-order defeat?
- The phenomenon where learning that one has misinterpreted evidence should weaken one’s confidence in a belief.
Why do Level-Splitters reject higher-order defeat?
- They claim that one can maintain a belief even when one has evidence that their belief is not rationally supported.
How does Horowitz argue against Level-Splitting?
- Higher-order evidence should impact our beliefs just as first-order evidence does.
- Ignoring higher-order evidence leads to incoherent reasoning.
- Rational belief must align with what one thinks one’s evidence supports.
Bootstrapping and the Long-Term Problem - Horowitz
What is the bootstrapping problem for epistemic akrasia?
- If epistemic akrasia is rational, one could bootstrap confidence in their own reliability by simply accumulating lucky guesses.
How does a long sequence of Sleepy Detective cases highlight this issue?
- Suppose Sam repeatedly gets cases right despite believing that his reasoning is unreliable.
- He might conclude: “Since I keep getting the right answer, my reasoning must actually be reliable.”
- This is bootstrapping—rationalizing one’s reliability based on past success without independent confirmation.
Why is bootstrapping a problem?
- It allows someone to rationalize an unreliable method based on outcomes rather than correct reasoning.
- If epistemic akrasia were rational, then this flawed reasoning would also be rational, which is problematic.
Possible Exceptions to Non-Akrasia: The Dartboard Case - Horowitz
What is the Dartboard case?
- You throw a dart at a grid-marked dartboard.
- Your perception is slightly unreliable, so while you think it landed at (3,3), you also believe it could have landed at (3,2), (2,3), etc.
- You rationally distribute credence across multiple possible locations.
- This creates an apparent case of epistemic akrasia, since you believe:
“The dart landed at (3,3).”
“My evidence supports that it landed somewhere nearby, but not necessarily (3,3).”
Why does Horowitz argue that Dartboard does not justify Level-Splitting?
- Unlike Sleepy Detective, Dartboard is an instance of rational uncertainty about evidence itself.
- In Dartboard, the evidence is falsity-guiding, meaning it naturally leads to some degree of epistemic akrasia.
- In Sleepy Detective, the evidence is truth-guiding, meaning that epistemic akrasia is not justifiable.
How does Dartboard reinforce the Conciliatory View?
- In typical cases (like Sleepy Detective), evidence is truth-guiding, and belief should adjust accordingly.
- Only in rare cases (like Dartboard), where evidence is inherently misleading, does epistemic akrasia seem rationally unavoidable.
Final Verdict: Should We Accept Epistemic Akrasia - Horowitz
What is Horowitz’s final stance on epistemic akrasia?
- In most cases, epistemic akrasia is irrational because it leads to incoherent reasoning and bad epistemic behavior.
- The Non-Akrasia Constraint is generally valid, but exceptions (like Dartboard) may exist in cases of systematic evidence distortion.
- Level-Splitting views fail because they require ignoring higher-order evidence, which is an important part of rational belief revision.
The Core Question: Evolution and Moral Objectivity - Street
- The Fundamental Issue:
What is the central philosophical question in Does Anything Really Matter?
- Street asks whether moral values exist independently of human perception (mind-independent) or whether they are shaped by human attitudes and evolutionary forces (mind-dependent).
The Evolutionary Challenge to Morality:
What is the core challenge evolution presents to moral realism?
- If our deepest moral beliefs are shaped by evolution for survival rather than truth, then we have no reason to think they are true in an objective sense.
Evolution and Common Moral Beliefs:
What are some moral beliefs that seem universal across cultures and time?
- Life is preferable to death.
Health is better than sickness.
Helping one’s children is good.
Cheaters should be punished.
Altruism is to be admired.
These beliefs feel intuitively right, but evolution may explain why we hold them.
The Genealogical Argument: When Learning a Belief’s Origins Matters - Street
The Two Effects of Learning a Belief’s Origins:
What are the two ways learning the origins of a belief can affect its credibility?
- Undermining Genealogy – If a belief’s origins are disconnected from truth, we should doubt it.
Vindicating Genealogy – If a belief’s origins track truth, we have more reason to trust it.
Example of an Undermining Genealogy:
What is an example of learning a belief’s origins and then doubting it?
- If you believe Rutherford B. Hayes was the 20th U.S. president, but then learn a hypnotist implanted this belief in you, you should suspend belief.
Example of a Vindicating Genealogy:
What is an example of learning a belief’s origins and then trusting it more?
- If you suspect someone is dangerous, later realize they match the face of a known criminal, your belief is strengthened.
Applying the Genealogical Test to Moral Values:
How does the genealogical test apply to moral beliefs shaped by evolution?
- If moral beliefs evolved simply because they helped ancestors survive, not because they are true, then moral objectivity is undermined.
The Mind-Dependent vs. Mind-Independent Debate - Street
What Is a Mind-Independent Theory of Morality?:
What does it mean for moral truths to be mind-independent?
- They exist objectively, independent of human beliefs or attitudes (e.g., “murder is wrong” would be true even if no one thought so).
What Is a Mind-Dependent Theory of Morality?
What does it mean for moral truths to be mind-dependent?
- Morality is created by human attitudes; things are valuable only because we take them to be.
Why Evolution Undermines Mind-Independent Morality
Why does evolution challenge the idea that moral truths exist independently?
- Evolution shapes our values based on survival, not objective moral truth, making it unlikely that our moral beliefs correspond to independent truths.
Why Evolution Does Not Undermine Mind-Dependent Morality
Why is mind-dependent morality not undermined by evolution?
- If moral truths depend on human attitudes, there is no external truth to be “off-track” from. Evolution just explains how our moral framework formed.
Street’s Conclusion: The Case for Mind-Dependent Morality - Street
The Radical Consequences of Accepting Evolution & Mind-Independent Morality
If moral truths are independent but evolution shaped our values, what follows?
- We would have no reason to think our moral beliefs are true, leading to global moral skepticism—the idea that we have no idea how to live.
Why Rejecting Mind-Independent Morality Is Preferable
Why does Street think we should reject mind-independent morality instead?
- It is more reasonable to revise our theory of morality than to conclude we have no way of knowing how to live.
The Practical Outcome: Morality Still Matters
Does Street think morality becomes meaningless if it’s mind-dependent?
- No. Even if values are not objectively real, they still matter to us, and we can act on them meaningfully.
Study Questions & Thought Experiments - Street
Undermining and Vindicating Genealogies
- Give one example of a belief that might be undermined by its origins and one that might be vindicated.
Evolutionary Explanation of Moral Values
- Explain how evolution can account for beliefs like “we should care for our children” or “cheaters should be punished.”
Mind-Dependence vs. Objectivity Debate
- Can you think of an example where moral truth seems objective? Does Street’s argument change your view?
The Dilemma of Evolution and Morality
- If moral beliefs evolved for survival, does that mean they are false? Why or why not?
Final Summary of Street’s Argument
- Evolution explains why we have certain moral beliefs.
- If morality were objectively real (mind-independent), evolution would undermine our ability to know moral truths.
- The better solution is to accept that morality is mind-dependent—it is shaped by human attitudes rather than existing independently.
- Even though morality is mind-dependent, it still matters deeply to us and guides how we live.
The Evolutionary Challenge to Mind-Independent Morality - Street
What question does Section 4 aim to answer?
- Whether evolution would have shaped humans to recognize mind-independent moral truths, if such truths existed.
Mind-Independent Moral Truths Defined
What are mind-independent moral truths?
- These are moral truths that exist objectively, regardless of human beliefs or attitudes (e.g., “murder is wrong” is true even if no one believes it).
The Argument Against Evolution Tracking Objective Morality
Why does evolution not necessarily shape us to track mind-independent moral truths?
- Evolution favors traits that enhance survival and reproduction, not necessarily those that lead to truth.
Moral beliefs could be shaped by evolutionary utility rather than their correctness. If moral truths were objective, evolution would have needed to align with them by coincidence.
The Problem with Moral Realism (Mind-Independent Morality)
What problem does evolution pose for moral realism?
- If moral truths exist objectively but our moral instincts evolved purely for survival, we have no reason to think our moral beliefs align with the true moral order.
Example: Why Do We Value Survival and Cooperation?
What evolutionary explanation does Street give for why we value survival and cooperation?
- Our ancestors who valued survival passed on more genes.
Groups that valued cooperation and punished cheaters survived longer.
These values feel like moral truths, but they might just be adaptations.
The “Hypnosis Analogy” for Evolution and Morality
How does Street use a hypnosis analogy to undermine moral realism?
- Imagine a hypnotist implants a false belief in you (e.g., that Rutherford B. Hayes was the 20th U.S. president).
If you learn your belief was implanted arbitrarily, you should doubt it.
Similarly, if evolution implanted our moral beliefs for survival reasons, not because they track objective truths, we should doubt them too.
The Skeptical Conclusion if We Accept Moral Realism
What happens if we accept both moral realism and evolution?
- We are left with moral skepticism—the idea that we have no reason to trust our moral beliefs at all.
The Case for Mind-Dependent Morality
The Alternative to Moral Realism: Mind-Dependent Morality
What is mind-dependent morality?
- Moral values are not objectively real; they exist because we create them through our evaluative attitudes.
- Why Mind-Dependent Morality Survives the Evolutionary Challenge
Q: Why doesn’t evolution undermine mind-dependent morality?
A: Unlike moral realism, mind-dependent morality does not require an independent moral truth.
Instead, morality is based on human values, and evolution simply explains where those values come from.
This means that even though our moral beliefs evolved, they still matter because we take them to matter. - Evolution & Moral Truths: The Mind-Dependent View
Q: How does a mind-dependent view explain the moral beliefs evolution gave us?
A: Evolution shaped our basic values (e.g., caring for our children) because they helped us survive.
These values become moral truths because we take them to be important. - The Key Advantage of Mind-Dependent Morality
Q: What is the biggest advantage of accepting mind-dependent morality?
A: It avoids the skepticism problem that moral realism faces.
We don’t need to worry whether our evolved moral instincts match independent moral truths, because morality is constructed from those very instincts. - The “Revising Our View” Argument
Q: How does Street justify rejecting moral realism instead of rejecting our moral beliefs?
A: If moral realism leads to skepticism, it is more reasonable to reject moral realism than to abandon all moral beliefs. The best explanation of our moral beliefs is that they are shaped by evolution and made true by our valuing them. - The “Chocolate Example” of Mind-Dependent Value
Q: How does Street use chocolate to illustrate mind-dependent value?
A: Chocolate is valuable because we like it, not because it has some intrinsic goodness.
Similarly, kindness or fairness is valuable because we care about them, not because they exist as objective truths. - The Final Conclusion: Does Anything Really Matter?
Q: If morality is mind-dependent, does anything really matter?
A: Yes, things matter—but only because we make them matter.
Nothing has value independently, but as long as beings exist who take things to matter, then morality is real in a practical sense.
