Cohen's - Justification and Truth Flashcards
What is the central problem Stewart Cohen explores in “Justification and Truth”?
Cohen investigates the conceptual connection between justification and truth, a central issue in epistemology. While knowledge is traditionally defined as justified true belief, Cohen questions what kind of connection (if any) epistemic justification has to the actual truth of a belief—beyond the trivial connection that believing P implies believing P is true. He explores various theories and argues that many fail to capture this connection adequately.
How does the Cartesian view understand the relationship between justification and truth?
The Cartesian (Descartes-inspired) view holds that justification logically entails truth. That is, if C justifies belief B for subject S, then C must entail that B is true. In other words, justified beliefs cannot be false under this view. This leads to skepticism, since we can always conceive of skeptical scenarios (e.g., evil demon worlds) where all apparent justifiers are compatible with falsehood.
Why is the Cartesian view widely rejected?
Because it leads to global skepticism. Descartes’ own evil demon argument shows that no set of plausible justifiers (C) can guarantee truth. Therefore, if justification requires truth-entailment, very few (if any) of our beliefs are justified.
What is fallibilism, and how does it contrast with the Cartesian view?
Fallibilism allows that justified beliefs may be false. It rejects the idea that justification guarantees truth, which avoids the skeptical consequences of Cartesianism.
What is Reliabilism’s account of the justification-truth connection?
Reliabilism (especially Alvin Goldman’s version) defines justification in terms of truth-conducive processes. A belief is justified if it results from a reliable cognitive process, i.e., one that tends to produce true beliefs more often than not. Reliability is thus a probabilistic, not logical, connection to truth.
How does Cohen use the evil demon scenario to challenge Reliabilism?
Cohen argues that in an evil demon world, all cognitive processes are unreliable, yet the agent has no reason to believe this. Despite being misled, the agent’s beliefs are based on evidence, good reasoning, and apparent perception—the same as in our world. Therefore, they seem justified, even though they are produced by unreliable processes. This shows that reliability is not necessary for justification.
What fundamental point does Cohen derive from this challenge?
Justification should be understood normatively—it depends on whether a subject’s belief is appropriate to the evidence available to them, not on whether the belief-forming process is actually reliable in some objective sense.
How does Cohen reinterpret justification in normative terms?
Cohen claims that epistemic justification involves responsible belief formation: if a subject forms a belief based on good reasoning, appropriate evidence, and has no contrary reasons, they are not epistemically blameworthy, even if the belief is false. This reflects a normative standard of epistemic responsibility rather than a truth-frequency outcome.
What is the role of “epistemic responsibility” in Cohen’s critique of Reliabilism?
Epistemic responsibility emphasizes that subjects should be evaluated based on what they could reasonably know or believe given their circumstances. A subject who uses sound reasoning and good evidence is justified, even if misled by factors beyond their awareness.
What is the subjective (doxastic) account of justification’s link to truth?
Instead of requiring that justification objectively leads to truth, this account claims that if S is justified in believing B, then S must believe that some conditions C make B probably true. This approach is compatible with coherence theories of justification, where justification arises from the mutual support of beliefs in a system aimed at truth.
How does Lehrer’s coherence theory exemplify the subjective connection?
Lehrer argues that a belief is justified if it fits coherently within a system of beliefs that are accepted for the purpose of seeking truth and avoiding error. This system supports B probabilistically and comparatively (it must be more probable than alternatives).
What is Cohen’s main criticism of the subjective/doxastic model of justification?
It relies on an intellectualist model, where justification requires that the subject explicitly or dispositionally believes that certain conditions make B likely true. Cohen argues that in many cases (especially perception), people do not hold such meta-beliefs, and requiring them leads to skepticism or implausible assumptions about unconscious/dispositional beliefs.
Why is dispositional belief problematic in the intellectualist model?
Dispositional belief (e.g., the subject would assent to the belief if prompted) is too weak to explain actual justification. If someone discovers a reason only after reflection, that reason can’t justify the original belief they formed before discovering it.
How do Foundationalist theories (e.g., Chisholm, Pollock) handle the truth connection?
They rely only on the trivial connection—S is justified in believing P only if S is justified in believing P is true. They do not posit a deeper link between justification conditions and truth.
What is a major weakness in Foundationalist theories according to Cohen?
They lack explanatory power. Foundationalist theories offer lists of epistemic principles (e.g., if S is appeared to redly, S is prima facie justified in believing there is something red), but they don’t explain why those conditions justify beliefs. They fail to unify the principles under a general account.
What is a Type I defeater? Give an example.
A reason to believe that the proposition is false.
Example: “S is in a room with no red objects” defeats S’s belief that there is something red.
What is a Type II defeater? Give an example.
A reason to believe that the evidence does not reliably indicate truth, even if it doesn’t show the belief is false.
Example: “There’s a red light in the room” defeats the belief that something is red based on a red appearance.
Why are Type II defeaters a problem for Foundationalist theories?
These theories don’t posit any substantive link between justification and truth. So they can’t explain why defeating the evidential connection (without proving the belief false) undermines justification.
COHEN’S DILEMMA
Q: What is the central dilemma Cohen outlines for theories of justification?
Theories that include a robust truth-connection (like Reliabilism or intellectualism) are often too strong and lead to skepticism or require implausible assumptions. Theories that exclude such connections (like Foundationalism) are too weak and lack explanatory resources, especially in accounting for defeaters.
FINAL TAKEAWAYS
Q: What is Cohen’s final stance on the justification-truth connection?
Cohen believes a non-trivial connection must exist, but current models fail to adequately capture it. Either we must formulate a better version of the truth-connection or accept foundational principles as brute facts—though the latter comes at a theoretical cost.
