Lackey, Learning from Words Flashcards
What is the central aim of Lackey’s “Learning from Words”?
Lackey aims to challenge the Belief View of Testimony (BVT)—the dominant view in the epistemology of testimony—which holds that beliefs, not statements, are the primary bearers of epistemic significance. She argues that statements, not beliefs, are what transmit knowledge, warrant, and justification in testimonial exchanges.
What is the Belief View of Testimony (BVT)?
The view that:
- Testimony is fundamentally about transferring beliefs;
- The epistemic status of a testimonial belief depends on the epistemic status of the speaker’s belief;
- Statements are merely vehicles for expressing beliefs.
What are the three main components of the BVT according to Lackey?
- Epistemic Transmission: A speaker transmits their belief and its epistemic properties (justification, knowledge, etc.) to a hearer.
- Statements lack epistemic significance: Only beliefs matter epistemically.
- Sincerity is necessary: If a speaker doesn’t believe what they say, then there’s nothing to learn.
What is TEP-N (Necessity Thesis)?
A hearer can gain warrant/justification/knowledge via testimony only if the speaker’s belief has that epistemic property.
What is TEP-S (Sufficiency Thesis)?
If a speaker has warrant/justification/knowledge, and the hearer forms a belief based on the content of that testimony and has no defeaters, then the hearer inherits that epistemic status.
What is the case of CONSISTENT LIAR?
Bertha, due to brain lesions, always misidentifies animals (e.g., sees a deer, believes it’s a horse) but then lies and reports the correct animal consistently. Her statements are truth-conducive, even though her beliefs are not.
What does this case show? - consistent liar
That hearers can gain warranted belief or knowledge from a speaker’s false or unjustified belief, as long as the statement is reliable. Hence, TEP-N is false, and statements, not beliefs, matter.
What is the case of COMPULSIVELY TRUSTING?
Bill always trusts Jill, no matter what—even if overwhelming evidence suggests she’s lying. In one case, Jill truthfully testifies that she saw an orca, but Bill’s belief isn’t justified because of his evidential insensitivity.
What does this case show? - the guy who always trusts
That a speaker’s knowledge isn’t sufficient for a hearer’s warranted belief—TEP-S is false.
What is the case of ALMOST A LIAR?
Jill truthfully reports seeing an orca, but she would have lied if she hadn’t seen one. Phil believes her testimony, but his belief is not safe or sensitive—thus, not knowledge.
What does this reinforce? - sometimes a liar
That truthful and justified speaker belief is not sufficient for hearer knowledge or justification, further undermining TEP-S.
CRITIQUE OF THE BVT
Q: What does Lackey conclude about the BVT overall?
That each of its key components (epistemic transmission, speaker belief as central, sincerity as necessary) are false. Cases show we can learn from speakers who do not believe, and speakers can be truthful yet unreliable.
What is the Statement View of Testimony (SVT)?
A framework where statements, not beliefs, are the primary epistemic units in testimony. Testimony can generate new epistemic status in a hearer (i.e., not just transmit what the speaker has).
What is RS-N (Reliability of Statement – Necessity)?
A hearer’s belief is justified/warranted/known only if the speaker’s statement is truth-conducive, e.g., reliable, sensitive, or safe.
Can testimonial knowledge be generated (not just transmitted)?
Yes. SVT allows that testimony can be a generative source of knowledge—not merely a conveyor of it. This contradicts Plantinga’s “water rises no higher than its source” view.
Is sincerity necessary for testimonial knowledge?
No. As shown in CONSISTENT LIAR, insincere speakers can produce knowledge in hearers, if their statements are reliably connected to truth.
Is speaker belief necessary?
No. Hearers can form knowledge or warranted beliefs even if the speaker doesn’t believe what they say (e.g., court perjury, irony, or sarcasm).
Are statements epistemically significant?
Yes. They carry epistemic properties (like reliability, safety, sensitivity), and can produce warranted belief in the hearer independently of speaker belief
What are the two kinds of defeaters in testimony?
- Psychological defeaters – doubts or beliefs the hearer actually has.
- Normative defeaters – doubts or beliefs the hearer should have given the evidence.
How do defeaters affect testimonial knowledge?
If a hearer has undefeated defeaters, their belief cannot be justified or known, even if the statement is reliable and sincere.
What are the main implications of Lackey’s paper?
Testimony is not about beliefs being transmitted.
We can learn from statements, even false beliefs or insincere speakers.
Testimony can be a generative source of knowledge.
A speaker’s statement reliability, not their sincerity or belief, is the core epistemic factor.
Why is SVT superior to BVT?
Because it accommodates non-ideal cases (lying, self-doubt, misbelief) and explains how hearers can gain knowledge or justification without requiring perfect epistemic conditions in speakers.
