Topic 1: FP (1951-64) Flashcards
1
Q
6
Describe Britain’s foreign policy in 1951
A
- Churchill’s ‘Three Great Circles’
- Founding member of NATO in 1949
- non-white dominions allowed into Commonwealth after 1945
- ‘Special relationship’ to ideologically combat Soviet Union
- Overstretched military - prescence in over 40 countries, despite financial constraints
- Self-determination successively denied despite nationalist consensus rising
2
Q
5
Describe earlier British disinterest in Europe
A
- Churchill supported USE - but envisaged Britain as sponsor
- Britain did not join the ‘six’ of ECSC at Treaty of Paris 1951
- France’s rejection of EDC confirmed Churchill’s doubts over supranational European army
- Messina Talks failed - Treaty of Rome 1957 led to EEC formation without Britain
- EFTA formation in 1960
3
Q
5
Describe the ECSC formation
A
- Formed at Treaty of Paris 1951, based off Schuman Plan 1950 (between France and West Germany only)
- Single market for coal and steel, with no customs duties
- Established political institutions such as the council of ministers, court of justice and parliamentary assembly
- Fears from left about free-market principles of bloc harming workers’s rights - Hebert Morrisson ‘the Durham Miners won’t wear it’
- Atlee regarded Commonwealth trade links more important
Six - West Germany, France, Italy and Benelux
4
Q
6
Describe the Messina Talks
A
- Talks of extension of ECSC to transport and atomic energy
- Britain sent ‘Spaak Committee’ to steer events, but not join
- Failed - agreements developed in detail and EEC launched with Treaty of Rome 1957
- Eden claimed he was ‘bored’ by talks
- Treasury fearful of losing economic sovreignty
- Britain lost opportunity to shape organisation
5
Q
4
Describe the EFTA
A
- Trade pact of 7 nations (e.g. Austria, Denmark, Portugal)
- Moderate growth compared to EEC
- Few economic advanatges to britain as it was the group’s largest member by far
- in 60s, British trade with EEC higher than trade with EFTA
formed in 1960, agreed in 1959
6
Q
2
Describe EEC application and rejection (1951-64)
A
- Macmillan applied in 1961
- De Gaulle vetoed entry in 1963
7
Q
5
Describe how economic factors led to EEC application in 1961
A
- 1961 - for first time exports to comparatively dynamic Europe greater than Commonwealth
- Britain only large economy in EFTA
- Balance of payments crisis and lower growth in 1957
- by 1958, West Germany had overtaken Britain as an exporter of manufactured goods
- Federation of British Industry became more receptive - hoped access to large-scale market would boost industrial production
8
Q
5 (inc Suez and decolonisation)
Describe how the fall of the empire led to EEC application in 1961
A
- The Suez Crisis and rapid decolonisation in Africa had hampered Britain’s international reputation and thus global influence
- UN GA had voted to denounce Britain as an international aggressor by 64 votes to 5 following invasion of Egypt (1956)
- Fall of empire had become inevitable, also due to economic factors - so membership of EEC was seen as new way to maintain leading influence in global affairs
- EEC, with its supranationalism, would become an essential political powerhouse over the next decades
- Also weakened trade links to former Empire countries meant new economic relationships needed
9
Q
5
Describe how other FP factors led to EEC application in 1961
A
- Rising cold war tensions (e.g. Soviet invasion Hungary 1956)
- US supported British influence to thwart communist spread - Macmillan keen to please Kennedy
- Macmillan’s Grand Design (1960)
- Britain could not influence EEC-decision making through EFTA, had to join main bloc
- Blue Streak abandoned in 1960, American Polaris missiles would support UK
10
Q
3
Describe how political factors led to EEC application in 1961
A
- Macmillan attempted to appease softer members of party - e.g. promotion of two ministers
- Deepen Lab divisions - adopted official anti-EEC stance at 1962 conference, despite lack of consensus on issue
- Broadsheet papers voiced support in early 60s
11
Q
3
Describe evidence of political changes that led to EEC application in 1961
A
- 1957 - Macmillan appointed two pro-European ministers to treasury and board of trade
- Promoted europhile Ted Heath and gave him responsibilities for examining the potential impact of joining EEC
- Grand Design
12
Q
2
What was Macmillan’s Grand Design memo (1960)
A
- sought to consolidate Western solidarity in face of rising Communist forces
- inc British entry to EEC as component
13
Q
7
Describe how De Gaulle led to EEC rejection in 1963
A
- Vetoed application in 1963
- Long-held resentment
- Unconvinced by half-hearted entry (right-wing Con MPs and Lab opposition)
- Creation of EFTA showed that Britain was not fully committed to European project
- Suspicions over ‘special relationship’
- Intended to keep France as main force in EEC - ‘five hens and one cockerel’ speech
- Delayed negotations for 2 years to achieve securer veto position
14
Q
5
Describe how American influence led to EEC rejection in 1963
A
- ‘Special relationship’ - undue foreign influence
- EEC intended to be Western counterforce to US
- In obtaining Polaris Missiles from USA at Nassau Talks, UK had confirmed dependency on US
- Macmillan’s 1960 Grand Design had set out his plan to maintain American relationship, while simultaneously drawing EFTA and EEC together
- Macmillan asked Kennedy for help to persuade De Gaulle
15
Q
6
Describe how Britain’s lacklustre application led to EEC rejection in 1963
A
- Messina Talks - Butler ’bored’
- Spaak Committee - limit European integration
- Creation of EFTA
- Britain overconfident in application - determined to safeguard national interest relating to America and Commonwealth - govt felt Europe need Britain more than Britain needed Europe
- Right-wing Con MPs opposed to EEC application due to CAP and supranationalism
- Talks became deadlocked over issues of CAP and Commonwealth trade
lack of consensus - which convinced De Gaulle to veto application
16
Q
4
Describe how Commonwealth relations led EEC rejection in 1963
A
- Rejected in 1955 to prevent damage to Commonwealth economies - instinct to protect their economies for fear of fall to Communism in the Cold War amid collapse of the British Empire
- Most Commonwelath nations wary that prospective British entry would damage their exports
- EFTA and Commonwealth had preferential claims and trade privileges e.g. priviledges of lamb exports from NZ would’ve been blocked by EEC rules
- Commonwealth African nations rejected socialy negotiated offer to become associated members of EEC in 1962
17
Q
4
How did CAP work?
A
- Worked by:
- restricting agricultural imports
- setting a common target price for agricultural produce
- thereby guaranteeing farmers’ incomes
- Largely based on French ideas
18
Q
7
Describe how CAP led to EEC rejection in 1963
A
- Britain would have to accept CAP if it joined the EEC
- Threatened to restrict cheap agricultural imports from Commonwealth which kept down cost of living
- Weaken Commonwealth trade links
- CAP would be costly to fund
- Little benefit to Britain as it had small agricultural sector
- Sig opposition from right-wing Con MPs
- Rather than reform CAP within EEC, Britain was determined to gain reassurances about its operation before its entry - led to long delay in entry talks
19
Q
5
What were the consequences of EEC rejection in 1963?
A
- Public humiliation at home and abroad
- Personal blow to Macmillan, who resigned later that year
- Some in Whitehall relieved that uncertainty was over, but Britain’s dilemma continue
- EEC continued to thrive and outstrip British exports and productivity
- It was clear that Britain would have to reapply, though with reduced bargaining power
20
Q
2
Describe Heathcoat-Amory’s attitude towards Europe
A
- CX 1958-60
- Concerned over loss of economic sovereignty
21
Q
6
Describe the Korean War
A
- 1950-1953
- In 1950, forces from North Korea (supported by the Soviet Union and China) invaded the South
- The UN condemned the action and sent UN forces to combat the invasion
- 20 countries supplied troops with Britain sending the second largest amount (90k soldiers)
- A ceasefire was agreed in 1953 - Korea would be split into communist North and non-communist South
- Over 1k British troops died
22
Q
4
Describe the effects of the Korean War
A
- Demonstrated Britain’s willingness to continue as a major world power despite economic constraints
- Made it clear the US was the greater power
- Giastkell suggested perscription charges to account for costs -> Bevan divisions
- In Jan 1951, planned expenditure of defence spending rose from 8% to 14% of GDP
23
Q
4
Describe Suez Canal importance to Britain
A
- Vital trading route linking Mediterranean and Middle East
- Suez Canal Company one of Britain’s most important strategic assets
- By 1950s, was used by hundreds of tankers each month, carrying oil to industrialised Europe
- British air and naval bases along Canal Zone had placed Soviet Union within range of military action by West
24
Q
5
List the causes of the Suez Crisis
A
- British Imperalist attitudes
- Actions of Eden
- Actions of Nasser
- Rise of Arab Nationalism
- The Cold War
25
Q
5
Describe how British Imperalist attitudes caused the Suez Crisis
A
- Egypt = former British colony (not in empire however)
- Despite draining wealth and resources in WW2, there had been no re-assessment of British FP
- Successive govts determined to preserve Britain’s status as major power
- Growing rift between Britain and Egypt - came to dominate British planning despite warnings from America
- Battle of ideals between leaders
26
Q
3
Describe how the actions of Eden caused the Suez Crisis
A
- Eden had been involved with troop withdrawal as FS in 1936, so had a personal interest (the agreement had been to remove all British troops by 1956 in return for Britain’s right of re-entry if the canal was threatened by war)
- Held traditional imperialist views and belief of inflated world status - disliked Nasser and Egyptian nationalism
- After reminiscences to appeasement, Eden, who likened Nasser to Mussolini or Hitler, would not make concessions
27
Q
4
Describe the Baghdad Pact 1955
A
- Eden’s Middle Eastern strategy was to forge friendships with Iraq, Jordan and other Middle-Eastern allies
- Formalised in the Baghdad Pact 1955
- Pact was a treaty to consolidate Britain’s oil supplies
- Meant to exclude soviet interest from Middle East
28
Q
5
Describe how the actions of Nasser caused the Suez Crisis
A
- Reformer and moderniser - intolerant of British imperialism and stalwart of Egyptian nationalism
- US and Britain withdrew financial support from Nasser’s most important development project, the Aswan High Dam
- Nasser established closer links with USSR (especially Czechoslovakia who supplied him with military equipment)
- Hostile to Baghdad Pact 1955
- USA cancelled economic aid after Nasser’s Egypt recognised Communist China in 1956
29
Q
4
Describe how the the rise of Arab/Egyptian nationalism caused the Suez Crisis
A
- Rise of Arab nationalism correlated to anti-British sentiment
- Situation aggravated by defeat in Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49 and Britian withdrawal from Palestine in 1948 (allowed Israel to form)
- Nasser/Egypt = de facto leader of Arab opposition to Israel’ secretion
- Vision of pan-Arab alliance seemed aimed at Israel, an American ally
maybe roll into one with Nasser
30
Q
5
Describe how the Cold War caused the Suez Crisis
A
- US withdrawal of Aswan High Dam funding (essential for electricity/irrigation) intended to reduce soviet relations - backfired
- June 1956, the Soviets offered Nasser $1.12 billion at 2% interest for the construction of the dam
- Two superpowers of Cold War pitted against each other by Nasser
- With Israel being an ally, the Soviets backing for Arab nationalism encouraged joint British/French/Israeli action
- Reduction in British forces aggravated this balance between Soviets and West
31
Q
6
Describe how the build-up to the Suez Crisis 1956
A
- Con Party hawks formed Suez Group (40-50 Con MPs)
- Egypt Committeee (inc Macmillan) - goal to topple Nasser regime
- British troops withdraw from Egypt as planned
- US and UK withdraw financial aid to Aswan High Dam project
- Suez Canal is nationalised by Egypt to fund the Aswan High Dam
- UK ask Nasser to withdraw in return for shares in the canal company but he rejects
32
Q
2
What did the ‘Suez Group’ claim?
A
- Suez Canal was an international asset in great peril and essential to global trade.
- Should not be held by incompetent Egyptian administrators
33
Q
4
Describe British involvment in the Suez
A
- Sèvres Protocol
- Israeli forces invaded on 31 Oct; British 5-6 Nov
- UK and France bombed Cairo suburbs and Port Said with 1k Egyptian casualties (started 31 Oct)
- 20 miles of Canal Zone captured
34
Q
3
Describe the Sèvres Protocol
A
- Israel would invade (despite official Israeli FP being not to take individual military action for fear of diplomatic isolation)
- Created pre-text for Anglo-French invasion
- Deliberate collusion with Israel - Eden would deny this in HoC
35
Q
4
Why did Eden come to the conclusion to withdraw from Suez invasion?
A
- Huge rift in Anglo-American relations
- Political pressure at time
- Threat of a catastrophic run on pound as 15% of Britain’s dollar reserves evaporated through American pressure
- Prospective deficit of £564m for 1957-58 following run on reserves
36
Q
2
How did the Suez Crisis come to an end?
A
- Ceasefire agreed on 7 Nov following economic and political pressure
- Britain conceded defeat in favour of UN multinational peacekeeping force
37
Q
5
Describe opposition to the Suez Crisis
A
- Eisenhower strongly against military action - wary of impending election
- About 30 Tory MPs were critical of invasion - key figure was RAB, but kept this private from the press
- Public was initially swayed by press to move in favour of decisive action - became more divided as weeks passed
- 4 Nov: fierce debate in HoC, law not war demonstrations
- Former hawk, Macmillan (Chancellor) warned of economic peril
38
Q
3
Describe the immediate public reaction to the Suez Crisis
A
- Anti-American public sentiment
- Public attitudes soured as weeks went by
- ‘Law not War’ protests
39
Q
3
Describe the international reaction to the Suez Crisis
A
- UN General Assembly denounced Britain as international aggressor and military action condemned by 64 votes to 5
- Even Commonwealth was not supportive, with India siding with Egypt
- Canal was to remain closed until reopening in April 1957, under Egyptian control where Briton’s would pay toll charges
40
Q
5
Describe the main consequences of the Suez Crisis
A
- Political e.g. Eden’s resignation
- Economic
- FP
- Empire dwindling
- Cold War ramifications e.g. Soviet action
41
Q
5
Describe the short-term impact of the Suez Crisis
A
- Strained US/France/Commonwealth relations
- Resignation of Eden
- UK shown to be weak economically and militarily (e.g. run on pound)
- Reduction of oil exports to Western Europe caused fuel rationing
- Strengthened position of Nasser - United Arab Republic set up in 1958 (Syria ceded 1961)
42
Q
3
Describe the political impact of the Suez Crisis
A
- Hawkish members lost stature - except hawk-turned-dove Macmillan who united party
- 4 Nov, Gaistkell appeared on TV to condemn Eden and call for him to resign
- Eden resigned on 7 Jan 1957 on grounds of ‘ill health’
43
Q
4
Describe the long-term impact of the Suez Crisis
A
- Abandonment of imperalism as FP - preference for nuclear deterrent
- Arab nations depend more on the USSR for aid
- Globalisation of Cold War conflict: MENA (Soviet) vs Israel (US)
- Deflected attention from Soviet invasion of Hungary - made Western objections to this appear hypocritical
44
Q
5
Describe evidence of change in British FP during and after the Suez Crisis
A
- Vital alliance of US and NATO ignored - warnings from Eisenhower not headed
- Lack of professionalism from experienced Eden - rash military action
- International condemnation - 64 votes to 5
- Exisiting agreements with Arab states put at risk - Iraq called for British expulsion from Baghdad Pact
- Britiain applied to EEC in 1961 (strong committment to Europe)
conventional approach that Suez marked end of Empire
45
Q
4
Describe evidence of continuity in British FP during and after the Suez Crisis
A
- Continuation of nuclear strategy - given higher importance
- ‘Three interlocking circles’ policy continued
- ‘Special relationship’ with US repaired - Macmillan forged close relationships with Eisenhower/JFK
- Britain remained Commonwealth leader
46
Q
6
Describe evidence that Suez caused a decline in Britian’s status as a world power
A
- Cutback in overseas comittment - after 1957, British military personnel halved
- After rift from USA, FS Selwyn-Lloyd suggested pooling of resources with Europeans to become third nuclear force - Britian could no longer work alone
- Defence spending cut back from 10% of GDP (mid-1950s) to 6% (1964) - nuclear deterrent cheaper substitute for imperialism
- Contribution to NATO cut by ⅓
- USA joined Baghdad Pact in 1959 - showed British position diminished from leader to subordinate
- Defence Sec Thorneycroft declared Britain a ‘bystander’ in Cuban Missile Crisis 1962
47
Q
6
Describe evidence that Suez DID NOT cause a decline in Britain’s status as a world power
A
- Reduction in overseas comittment due to weak sterling exacerbating balance of payments, rather than Suez backlash
- Macmillan normalised relations with Egypt - did not seek remedies from Suez Canal Company
- In 1958, british paratroopers landed in Jordan to protect its stability during attempted coup, with US support
- Macmillan increased statesman powers with Bermuda Conference 1957 and a 1959 visit to Moscow
- ‘Winds of Change’
- 1957, IRBM stationing on British soil (see below)
48
Q
5
Describe how Britain’s involvement in the Cold War increased tensions (1951-56)
A
- 1952, Britain tests first atomic bomb named the ‘Hurricane’ - 3rd nation to do so
- 1953, Bermuda talks (Three Power Conference) - Eisenhower impatient with Churchill
- US refused to participate in Churchill’s ‘non-event summit’ - fear of serving ‘soviet propaganda mill’
- 1956, Khrushchev and Bulgarin’s visit to Britain overshadowed by the ‘Crabb Incident’
- Suez Crisis 1956 - Egypt placed firmly on Soviet side
49
Q
3
Describe the 1952 Bermuda talks
A
- China (backers of NK) had broken Korean ceasefire
- US suggested they would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons
- Alarmed Britain and Churchill
50
Q
3
What was the ‘Crabb incident’?
A
- Accusations of Crabb, a British spy, was surveilling Khrushchev’s ship.
- Crabb had gone missing
- Khrushchev angrily halted negotiations
51
Q
2
Describe how Britain’s involvement in the Cold War increased tensions (1957-64)
A
- 1957 Bermuda meeting between Eisenhower and Macmillan - US downplayed sentimental attachment and spoke of relationship based on practicality
- 1960, Macmillan’s dream global Paris Summit finally happens but mood is poisoned by the U2 spy plane incident
52
Q
3
Describe how Britain’s involvement in the Cold War decreased tensions (1951-56)
A
- 1954, Geneva Conference has British chairman - de-escalated tensions (e.g. 17th parallel division in Vietnam)
- 1955, British and Soviet warships exchange visits - Britain could act as mediator
- Eden helps dictate NATO framework for W German rearmament - prevents fear of German militarism
53
Q
1
What was the Geneva Summit 1954?
A
Representatives from 5 UN permanent members came together to resolve several problems related to Asia e.g. Vietnam tensions and Korea (51-53)
54
Q
2
Describe the 1955 British and Soviet warship courtesy visit
A
- British and Soviet warships exchange visits
- 6 Russian warships on official visit to Britain
55
Q
3
Describe how Britain’s involvement in the Cold War decreased tensions (1957-64)
A
- Macmillan displays statesman credentials with visit to Moscow in 1959
- 1963 Test Ban Treaty - Britain one of 3 signatories (along with US/USSR)
- 1964, Douglas-Home refuses to send British troops to support the US in Vietnam
56
Q
1
What were the terms of the Test Ban Treaty 1963?
A
Banned surface tests, but not those underground
57
Q
4
Describe the 1964 Douglas-Home/LBJ meeting in Washington
A
- LBJ lacked fraternity JFK had felt for Britain
- Tension over Britain’s decision not to block sale of British Leyland buses to Cuba
- Advice to LBJ stated that special relationship was valuable, but not pre-eminent, to USA
- Uk treated as subordinate
58
Q
3
Describe debates for the nuclear deterrent (1951-64)
A
- Deterrent re-established Britain’s status - preferable to overstretched imperialism (esp post-Suez)
- 1957, Project E- Macmillan agreed to stationing of 60 American IRBMs on British soil - both powers’ consent before weapons launch
- Source of strength for US-UK relationships
59
Q
4
Describe debates against the nuclear deterrent (1951-64)
A
- CND (formed 1957) campaign became most prominent campaign group (esp among young/mc) e.g. 8000 in Alderston march 1958
- Strain on finances
- Lab opp
- Nuclear insurance arg weak - Soviets developing WOM at much faster pace
60
Q
3
Describe events in Britain’s nuclear deterrent policy 1951-64
A
- 1958 UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement - sharing of nuclear weapons info and allowed supply of weapons to UK
- Britain’s own Blue Streak Project abandoned in 1960
- 1962 Nassau talks with JFK (Polaris Sales Agreement 1963) - US would supply UK with Polaris missiles
would allow Britain to maintain its ‘independent’ deterrent
61
Q
1
What was Britain’s ‘independent’ nuclear deterrent?
A
Britain had its own nuclear deterrent (not necessarily self-made) so it can decide how to use them itself
really a conceptual understanding
62
Q
6
Describe the reasons for the rise of nationalism in the colonies (1951-58)
A
- Impact of WW2 - conscripted pops promised greater independence
- Economic constraints
- Rapid urbanisation of colonies → greater social mobility → greater demands for political autonomy
- Influence of Soviet Union propaganda
- Aggravation caused by arrival of new gen of colonial administrators
- Post-war shift in global power balance
May be supplementary info
63
Q
4
Describe how changing trade caused rapid decolonisation after 1959
A
- FO insistent on imperialism
- Treasury of view that external investment caused domestic damage
- British businesses increasingly looking to trade with USA/Europe rather than Empire
- Britain’s unsuccessful attempt to join the EEC in 1961 was indicative of this - sig departure from previous imperialism policy
64
Q
3
Describe how changing cold war considerations caused rapid decolonisation after 1959
A
- Essential to keep ex-colonies under British, rather than communist, influence through Commonwealth membership
- Holding onto colonies risked military rebellion
- Newly independent members would have voice in UN which could support Britain
65
Q
2
Describe how reduced British influence in Commonwealth caused rapid decolonisation after 1959
A
- Appointment of Macleod as Colonial Secretary in 1959 sped up decolonisation
- SA attitudes
66
Q
4
Describe attitudes towards South Africa from 1959
A
- ‘Winds of change’ + soft diplomatic pressure did not soften hardline racism of SA govt
- Macmillan refused withdrawal of investment in SA and Canada’s calls for SA expulsion from Commonwealth
- Campaign for SA expulsion by newly-independent black states joining Commonwealth succeeded in 1961
- Highlighted Britain’s limited ability to exercise political influence over its own group
67
Q
5
Describe the ‘Winds of Change’ speech
A
- 1960, Macmillan speech to SA parliament
- watershed moment for African black nationalism/independence movement
- Clearly signalled that Con govt would not stand in way of such movements - resignation to new status
- Change in atttude towards apartheid
- First time govt had accepted that the Empire was in its last days
White supremacist govt outraged and apartheid would continue for 30yrs
68
Q
2
Describe the South African reaction to the ‘Winds of Change’ speech
A
- White supremacist govt outraged and apartheid would continue for 30yrs
- Marked beginning of SA’s international isolation
