Topic 1: FP (1951-64) Flashcards

1
Q

6

Describe Britain’s foreign policy in 1951

A
  • Churchill’s ‘Three Great Circles’
  • Founding member of NATO in 1949
  • non-white dominions allowed into Commonwealth after 1945
  • ‘Special relationship’ to ideologically combat Soviet Union
  • Overstretched military - prescence in over 40 countries, despite financial constraints
  • Self-determination successively denied despite nationalist consensus rising
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2
Q

5

Describe earlier British disinterest in Europe

A
  • Churchill supported USE - but envisaged Britain as sponsor
  • Britain did not join the ‘six’ of ECSC at Treaty of Paris 1951
  • France’s rejection of EDC confirmed Churchill’s doubts over supranational European army
  • Messina Talks failed - Treaty of Rome 1957 led to EEC formation without Britain
  • EFTA formation in 1960
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3
Q

5

Describe the ECSC formation

A
  • Formed at Treaty of Paris 1951, based off Schuman Plan 1950 (between France and West Germany only)
  • Single market for coal and steel, with no customs duties
  • Established political institutions such as the council of ministers, court of justice and parliamentary assembly
  • Fears from left about free-market principles of bloc harming workers’s rights - Hebert Morrisson ‘the Durham Miners won’t wear it’
  • Atlee regarded Commonwealth trade links more important

Six - West Germany, France, Italy and Benelux

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4
Q

6

Describe the Messina Talks

A
  • Talks of extension of ECSC to transport and atomic energy
  • Britain sent ‘Spaak Committee’ to steer events, but not join
  • Failed - agreements developed in detail and EEC launched with Treaty of Rome 1957
  • Eden claimed he was ‘bored’ by talks
  • Treasury fearful of losing economic sovreignty
  • Britain lost opportunity to shape organisation
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5
Q

4

Describe the EFTA

A
  • Trade pact of 7 nations (e.g. Austria, Denmark, Portugal)
  • Moderate growth compared to EEC
  • Few economic advanatges to britain as it was the group’s largest member by far
  • in 60s, British trade with EEC higher than trade with EFTA

formed in 1960, agreed in 1959

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6
Q

2

Describe EEC application and rejection (1951-64)

A
  • Macmillan applied in 1961
  • De Gaulle vetoed entry in 1963
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7
Q

5

Describe how economic factors led to EEC application in 1961

A
  • 1961 - for first time exports to comparatively dynamic Europe greater than Commonwealth
  • Britain only large economy in EFTA
  • Balance of payments crisis and lower growth in 1957
  • by 1958, West Germany had overtaken Britain as an exporter of manufactured goods
  • Federation of British Industry became more receptive - hoped access to large-scale market would boost industrial production
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8
Q

5 (inc Suez and decolonisation)

Describe how the fall of the empire led to EEC application in 1961

A
  • The Suez Crisis and rapid decolonisation in Africa had hampered Britain’s international reputation and thus global influence
  • UN GA had voted to denounce Britain as an international aggressor by 64 votes to 5 following invasion of Egypt (1956)
  • Fall of empire had become inevitable, also due to economic factors - so membership of EEC was seen as new way to maintain leading influence in global affairs
  • EEC, with its supranationalism, would become an essential political powerhouse over the next decades
  • Also weakened trade links to former Empire countries meant new economic relationships needed
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9
Q

5

Describe how other FP factors led to EEC application in 1961

A
  • Rising cold war tensions (e.g. Soviet invasion Hungary 1956)
  • US supported British influence to thwart communist spread - Macmillan keen to please Kennedy
  • Macmillan’s Grand Design (1960)
  • Britain could not influence EEC-decision making through EFTA, had to join main bloc
  • Blue Streak abandoned in 1960, American Polaris missiles would support UK
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10
Q

3

Describe how political factors led to EEC application in 1961

A
  • Macmillan attempted to appease softer members of party - e.g. promotion of two ministers
  • Deepen Lab divisions - adopted official anti-EEC stance at 1962 conference, despite lack of consensus on issue
  • Broadsheet papers voiced support in early 60s
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11
Q

3

Describe evidence of political changes that led to EEC application in 1961

A
  • 1957 - Macmillan appointed two pro-European ministers to treasury and board of trade
  • Promoted europhile Ted Heath and gave him responsibilities for examining the potential impact of joining EEC
  • Grand Design
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12
Q

2

What was Macmillan’s Grand Design memo (1960)

A
  • sought to consolidate Western solidarity in face of rising Communist forces
  • inc British entry to EEC as component
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13
Q

7

Describe how De Gaulle led to EEC rejection in 1963

A
  • Vetoed application in 1963
  • Long-held resentment
  • Unconvinced by half-hearted entry (right-wing Con MPs and Lab opposition)
  • Creation of EFTA showed that Britain was not fully committed to European project
  • Suspicions over ‘special relationship’
  • Intended to keep France as main force in EEC - ‘five hens and one cockerel’ speech
  • Delayed negotations for 2 years to achieve securer veto position
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14
Q

5

Describe how American influence led to EEC rejection in 1963

A
  • ‘Special relationship’ - undue foreign influence
  • EEC intended to be Western counterforce to US
  • In obtaining Polaris Missiles from USA at Nassau Talks, UK had confirmed dependency on US
  • Macmillan’s 1960 Grand Design had set out his plan to maintain American relationship, while simultaneously drawing EFTA and EEC together
  • Macmillan asked Kennedy for help to persuade De Gaulle
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15
Q

6

Describe how Britain’s lacklustre application led to EEC rejection in 1963

A
  • Messina Talks - Butler ’bored’
  • Spaak Committee - limit European integration
  • Creation of EFTA
  • Britain overconfident in application - determined to safeguard national interest relating to America and Commonwealth - govt felt Europe need Britain more than Britain needed Europe
  • Right-wing Con MPs opposed to EEC application due to CAP and supranationalism
  • Talks became deadlocked over issues of CAP and Commonwealth trade

lack of consensus - which convinced De Gaulle to veto application

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16
Q

4

Describe how Commonwealth relations led EEC rejection in 1963

A
  • Rejected in 1955 to prevent damage to Commonwealth economies - instinct to protect their economies for fear of fall to Communism in the Cold War amid collapse of the British Empire
  • Most Commonwelath nations wary that prospective British entry would damage their exports
  • EFTA and Commonwealth had preferential claims and trade privileges e.g. priviledges of lamb exports from NZ would’ve been blocked by EEC rules
  • Commonwealth African nations rejected socialy negotiated offer to become associated members of EEC in 1962
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17
Q

4

How did CAP work?

A
  • Worked by:
    • restricting agricultural imports
    • setting a common target price for agricultural produce
    • thereby guaranteeing farmers’ incomes
  • Largely based on French ideas
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18
Q

7

Describe how CAP led to EEC rejection in 1963

A
  • Britain would have to accept CAP if it joined the EEC
  • Threatened to restrict cheap agricultural imports from Commonwealth which kept down cost of living
  • Weaken Commonwealth trade links
  • CAP would be costly to fund
  • Little benefit to Britain as it had small agricultural sector
  • Sig opposition from right-wing Con MPs
  • Rather than reform CAP within EEC, Britain was determined to gain reassurances about its operation before its entry - led to long delay in entry talks
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19
Q

5

What were the consequences of EEC rejection in 1963?

A
  • Public humiliation at home and abroad
  • Personal blow to Macmillan, who resigned later that year
  • Some in Whitehall relieved that uncertainty was over, but Britain’s dilemma continue
  • EEC continued to thrive and outstrip British exports and productivity
  • It was clear that Britain would have to reapply, though with reduced bargaining power
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20
Q

2

Describe Heathcoat-Amory’s attitude towards Europe

A
  • CX 1958-60
  • Concerned over loss of economic sovereignty
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21
Q

6

Describe the Korean War

A
  • 1950-1953
  • In 1950, forces from North Korea (supported by the Soviet Union and China) invaded the South
  • The UN condemned the action and sent UN forces to combat the invasion
  • 20 countries supplied troops with Britain sending the second largest amount (90k soldiers)
  • A ceasefire was agreed in 1953 - Korea would be split into communist North and non-communist South
  • Over 1k British troops died
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22
Q

4

Describe the effects of the Korean War

A
  • Demonstrated Britain’s willingness to continue as a major world power despite economic constraints
  • Made it clear the US was the greater power
  • Giastkell suggested perscription charges to account for costs -> Bevan divisions
  • In Jan 1951, planned expenditure of defence spending rose from 8% to 14% of GDP
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23
Q

4

Describe Suez Canal importance to Britain

A
  • Vital trading route linking Mediterranean and Middle East
  • Suez Canal Company one of Britain’s most important strategic assets
  • By 1950s, was used by hundreds of tankers each month, carrying oil to industrialised Europe
  • British air and naval bases along Canal Zone had placed Soviet Union within range of military action by West
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24
Q

5

List the causes of the Suez Crisis

A
  • British Imperalist attitudes
  • Actions of Eden
  • Actions of Nasser
  • Rise of Arab Nationalism
  • The Cold War
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25
Q

5

Describe how British Imperalist attitudes caused the Suez Crisis

A
  • Egypt = former British colony (not in empire however)
  • Despite draining wealth and resources in WW2, there had been no re-assessment of British FP
  • Successive govts determined to preserve Britain’s status as major power
  • Growing rift between Britain and Egypt - came to dominate British planning despite warnings from America
  • Battle of ideals between leaders
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26
Q

3

Describe how the actions of Eden caused the Suez Crisis

A
  • Eden had been involved with troop withdrawal as FS in 1936, so had a personal interest (the agreement had been to remove all British troops by 1956 in return for Britain’s right of re-entry if the canal was threatened by war)
  • Held traditional imperialist views and belief of inflated world status - disliked Nasser and Egyptian nationalism
  • After reminiscences to appeasement, Eden, who likened Nasser to Mussolini or Hitler, would not make concessions
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27
Q

4

Describe the Baghdad Pact 1955

A
  • Eden’s Middle Eastern strategy was to forge friendships with Iraq, Jordan and other Middle-Eastern allies
  • Formalised in the Baghdad Pact 1955
  • Pact was a treaty to consolidate Britain’s oil supplies
  • Meant to exclude soviet interest from Middle East
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28
Q

5

Describe how the actions of Nasser caused the Suez Crisis

A
  • Reformer and moderniser - intolerant of British imperialism and stalwart of Egyptian nationalism
  • US and Britain withdrew financial support from Nasser’s most important development project, the Aswan High Dam
  • Nasser established closer links with USSR (especially Czechoslovakia who supplied him with military equipment)
  • Hostile to Baghdad Pact 1955
  • USA cancelled economic aid after Nasser’s Egypt recognised Communist China in 1956
29
Q

4

Describe how the the rise of Arab/Egyptian nationalism caused the Suez Crisis

A
  • Rise of Arab nationalism correlated to anti-British sentiment
  • Situation aggravated by defeat in Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49 and Britian withdrawal from Palestine in 1948 (allowed Israel to form)
  • Nasser/Egypt = de facto leader of Arab opposition to Israel’ secretion
  • Vision of pan-Arab alliance seemed aimed at Israel, an American ally

maybe roll into one with Nasser

30
Q

5

Describe how the Cold War caused the Suez Crisis

A
  • US withdrawal of Aswan High Dam funding (essential for electricity/irrigation) intended to reduce soviet relations - backfired
  • June 1956, the Soviets offered Nasser $1.12 billion at 2% interest for the construction of the dam
  • Two superpowers of Cold War pitted against each other by Nasser
  • With Israel being an ally, the Soviets backing for Arab nationalism encouraged joint British/French/Israeli action
  • Reduction in British forces aggravated this balance between Soviets and West
31
Q

6

Describe how the build-up to the Suez Crisis 1956

A
  • Con Party hawks formed Suez Group (40-50 Con MPs)
  • Egypt Committeee (inc Macmillan) - goal to topple Nasser regime
  • British troops withdraw from Egypt as planned
  • US and UK withdraw financial aid to Aswan High Dam project
  • Suez Canal is nationalised by Egypt to fund the Aswan High Dam
  • UK ask Nasser to withdraw in return for shares in the canal company but he rejects
32
Q

2

What did the ‘Suez Group’ claim?

A
  • Suez Canal was an international asset in great peril and essential to global trade.
  • Should not be held by incompetent Egyptian administrators
33
Q

4

Describe British involvment in the Suez

A
  • Sèvres Protocol
  • Israeli forces invaded on 31 Oct; British 5-6 Nov
  • UK and France bombed Cairo suburbs and Port Said with 1k Egyptian casualties (started 31 Oct)
  • 20 miles of Canal Zone captured
34
Q

3

Describe the Sèvres Protocol

A
  • Israel would invade (despite official Israeli FP being not to take individual military action for fear of diplomatic isolation)
  • Created pre-text for Anglo-French invasion
  • Deliberate collusion with Israel - Eden would deny this in HoC
35
Q

4

Why did Eden come to the conclusion to withdraw from Suez invasion?

A
  • Huge rift in Anglo-American relations
  • Political pressure at time
  • Threat of a catastrophic run on pound as 15% of Britain’s dollar reserves evaporated through American pressure
  • Prospective deficit of £564m for 1957-58 following run on reserves
36
Q

2

How did the Suez Crisis come to an end?

A
  • Ceasefire agreed on 7 Nov following economic and political pressure
  • Britain conceded defeat in favour of UN multinational peacekeeping force
37
Q

5

Describe opposition to the Suez Crisis

A
  • Eisenhower strongly against military action - wary of impending election
  • About 30 Tory MPs were critical of invasion - key figure was RAB, but kept this private from the press
  • Public was initially swayed by press to move in favour of decisive action - became more divided as weeks passed
  • 4 Nov: fierce debate in HoC, law not war demonstrations
  • Former hawk, Macmillan (Chancellor) warned of economic peril
38
Q

3

Describe the immediate public reaction to the Suez Crisis

A
  • Anti-American public sentiment
  • Public attitudes soured as weeks went by
  • ‘Law not War’ protests
39
Q

3

Describe the international reaction to the Suez Crisis

A
  • UN General Assembly denounced Britain as international aggressor and military action condemned by 64 votes to 5
  • Even Commonwealth was not supportive, with India siding with Egypt
  • Canal was to remain closed until reopening in April 1957, under Egyptian control where Briton’s would pay toll charges
40
Q

5

Describe the main consequences of the Suez Crisis

A
  • Political e.g. Eden’s resignation
  • Economic
  • FP
  • Empire dwindling
  • Cold War ramifications e.g. Soviet action
41
Q

5

Describe the short-term impact of the Suez Crisis

A
  • Strained US/France/Commonwealth relations
  • Resignation of Eden
  • UK shown to be weak economically and militarily (e.g. run on pound)
  • Reduction of oil exports to Western Europe caused fuel rationing
  • Strengthened position of Nasser - United Arab Republic set up in 1958 (Syria ceded 1961)
42
Q

3

Describe the political impact of the Suez Crisis

A
  • Hawkish members lost stature - except hawk-turned-dove Macmillan who united party
  • 4 Nov, Gaistkell appeared on TV to condemn Eden and call for him to resign
  • Eden resigned on 7 Jan 1957 on grounds of ‘ill health’
43
Q

4

Describe the long-term impact of the Suez Crisis

A
  • Abandonment of imperalism as FP - preference for nuclear deterrent
  • Arab nations depend more on the USSR for aid
  • Globalisation of Cold War conflict: MENA (Soviet) vs Israel (US)
  • Deflected attention from Soviet invasion of Hungary - made Western objections to this appear hypocritical
44
Q

5

Describe evidence of change in British FP during and after the Suez Crisis

A
  • Vital alliance of US and NATO ignored - warnings from Eisenhower not headed
  • Lack of professionalism from experienced Eden - rash military action
  • International condemnation - 64 votes to 5
  • Exisiting agreements with Arab states put at risk - Iraq called for British expulsion from Baghdad Pact
  • Britiain applied to EEC in 1961 (strong committment to Europe)

conventional approach that Suez marked end of Empire

45
Q

4

Describe evidence of continuity in British FP during and after the Suez Crisis

A
  • Continuation of nuclear strategy - given higher importance
  • ‘Three interlocking circles’ policy continued
  • ‘Special relationship’ with US repaired - Macmillan forged close relationships with Eisenhower/JFK
  • Britain remained Commonwealth leader
46
Q

6

Describe evidence that Suez caused a decline in Britian’s status as a world power

A
  • Cutback in overseas comittment - after 1957, British military personnel halved
  • After rift from USA, FS Selwyn-Lloyd suggested pooling of resources with Europeans to become third nuclear force - Britian could no longer work alone
  • Defence spending cut back from 10% of GDP (mid-1950s) to 6% (1964) - nuclear deterrent cheaper substitute for imperialism
  • Contribution to NATO cut by ⅓
  • USA joined Baghdad Pact in 1959 - showed British position diminished from leader to subordinate
  • Defence Sec Thorneycroft declared Britain a ‘bystander’ in Cuban Missile Crisis 1962
47
Q

6

Describe evidence that Suez DID NOT cause a decline in Britain’s status as a world power

A
  • Reduction in overseas comittment due to weak sterling exacerbating balance of payments, rather than Suez backlash
  • Macmillan normalised relations with Egypt - did not seek remedies from Suez Canal Company
  • In 1958, british paratroopers landed in Jordan to protect its stability during attempted coup, with US support
  • Macmillan increased statesman powers with Bermuda Conference 1957 and a 1959 visit to Moscow
  • ‘Winds of Change’
  • 1957, IRBM stationing on British soil (see below)
48
Q

5

Describe how Britain’s involvement in the Cold War increased tensions (1951-56)

A
  • 1952, Britain tests first atomic bomb named the ‘Hurricane’ - 3rd nation to do so
  • 1953, Bermuda talks (Three Power Conference) - Eisenhower impatient with Churchill
  • US refused to participate in Churchill’s ‘non-event summit’ - fear of serving ‘soviet propaganda mill’
  • 1956, Khrushchev and Bulgarin’s visit to Britain overshadowed by the ‘Crabb Incident’
  • Suez Crisis 1956 - Egypt placed firmly on Soviet side
49
Q

3

Describe the 1952 Bermuda talks

A
  • China (backers of NK) had broken Korean ceasefire
  • US suggested they would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons
  • Alarmed Britain and Churchill
50
Q

3

What was the ‘Crabb incident’?

A
  • Accusations of Crabb, a British spy, was surveilling Khrushchev’s ship.
  • Crabb had gone missing
  • Khrushchev angrily halted negotiations
51
Q

2

Describe how Britain’s involvement in the Cold War increased tensions (1957-64)

A
  • 1957 Bermuda meeting between Eisenhower and Macmillan - US downplayed sentimental attachment and spoke of relationship based on practicality
  • 1960, Macmillan’s dream global Paris Summit finally happens but mood is poisoned by the U2 spy plane incident
52
Q

3

Describe how Britain’s involvement in the Cold War decreased tensions (1951-56)

A
  • 1954, Geneva Conference has British chairman - de-escalated tensions (e.g. 17th parallel division in Vietnam)
  • 1955, British and Soviet warships exchange visits - Britain could act as mediator
  • Eden helps dictate NATO framework for W German rearmament - prevents fear of German militarism
53
Q

1

What was the Geneva Summit 1954?

A

Representatives from 5 UN permanent members came together to resolve several problems related to Asia e.g. Vietnam tensions and Korea (51-53)

54
Q

2

Describe the 1955 British and Soviet warship courtesy visit

A
  • British and Soviet warships exchange visits
  • 6 Russian warships on official visit to Britain
55
Q

3

Describe how Britain’s involvement in the Cold War decreased tensions (1957-64)

A
  • Macmillan displays statesman credentials with visit to Moscow in 1959
  • 1963 Test Ban Treaty - Britain one of 3 signatories (along with US/USSR)
  • 1964, Douglas-Home refuses to send British troops to support the US in Vietnam
56
Q

1

What were the terms of the Test Ban Treaty 1963?

A

Banned surface tests, but not those underground

57
Q

4

Describe the 1964 Douglas-Home/LBJ meeting in Washington

A
  • LBJ lacked fraternity JFK had felt for Britain
  • Tension over Britain’s decision not to block sale of British Leyland buses to Cuba
  • Advice to LBJ stated that special relationship was valuable, but not pre-eminent, to USA
  • Uk treated as subordinate
58
Q

3

Describe debates for the nuclear deterrent (1951-64)

A
  • Deterrent re-established Britain’s status - preferable to overstretched imperialism (esp post-Suez)
  • 1957, Project E- Macmillan agreed to stationing of 60 American IRBMs on British soil - both powers’ consent before weapons launch
  • Source of strength for US-UK relationships
59
Q

4

Describe debates against the nuclear deterrent (1951-64)

A
  • CND (formed 1957) campaign became most prominent campaign group (esp among young/mc) e.g. 8000 in Alderston march 1958
  • Strain on finances
  • Lab opp
  • Nuclear insurance arg weak - Soviets developing WOM at much faster pace
60
Q

3

Describe events in Britain’s nuclear deterrent policy 1951-64

A
  • 1958 UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement - sharing of nuclear weapons info and allowed supply of weapons to UK
  • Britain’s own Blue Streak Project abandoned in 1960
  • 1962 Nassau talks with JFK (Polaris Sales Agreement 1963) - US would supply UK with Polaris missiles

would allow Britain to maintain its ‘independent’ deterrent

61
Q

1

What was Britain’s ‘independent’ nuclear deterrent?

A

Britain had its own nuclear deterrent (not necessarily self-made) so it can decide how to use them itself

really a conceptual understanding

62
Q

6

Describe the reasons for the rise of nationalism in the colonies (1951-58)

A
  • Impact of WW2 - conscripted pops promised greater independence
  • Economic constraints
  • Rapid urbanisation of colonies → greater social mobility → greater demands for political autonomy
  • Influence of Soviet Union propaganda
  • Aggravation caused by arrival of new gen of colonial administrators
  • Post-war shift in global power balance

May be supplementary info

63
Q

4

Describe how changing trade caused rapid decolonisation after 1959

A
  • FO insistent on imperialism
  • Treasury of view that external investment caused domestic damage
  • British businesses increasingly looking to trade with USA/Europe rather than Empire
  • Britain’s unsuccessful attempt to join the EEC in 1961 was indicative of this - sig departure from previous imperialism policy
64
Q

3

Describe how changing cold war considerations caused rapid decolonisation after 1959

A
  • Essential to keep ex-colonies under British, rather than communist, influence through Commonwealth membership
  • Holding onto colonies risked military rebellion
  • Newly independent members would have voice in UN which could support Britain
65
Q

2

Describe how reduced British influence in Commonwealth caused rapid decolonisation after 1959

A
  • Appointment of Macleod as Colonial Secretary in 1959 sped up decolonisation
  • SA attitudes
66
Q

4

Describe attitudes towards South Africa from 1959

A
  • ‘Winds of change’ + soft diplomatic pressure did not soften hardline racism of SA govt
  • Macmillan refused withdrawal of investment in SA and Canada’s calls for SA expulsion from Commonwealth
  • Campaign for SA expulsion by newly-independent black states joining Commonwealth succeeded in 1961
  • Highlighted Britain’s limited ability to exercise political influence over its own group
67
Q

5

Describe the ‘Winds of Change’ speech

A
  • 1960, Macmillan speech to SA parliament
  • watershed moment for African black nationalism/independence movement
  • Clearly signalled that Con govt would not stand in way of such movements - resignation to new status
  • Change in atttude towards apartheid
  • First time govt had accepted that the Empire was in its last days

White supremacist govt outraged and apartheid would continue for 30yrs

68
Q

2

Describe the South African reaction to the ‘Winds of Change’ speech

A
  • White supremacist govt outraged and apartheid would continue for 30yrs
  • Marked beginning of SA’s international isolation