TA-MCD Flashcards
What are the 2 major effects of a Radiological Accident?
- Surface contamination
a) Agriculture, food chain, pollution - Personal Injury
a) Radiation injuries
What is the major threat to the population after a reactor accident?
- Radioactive fallout from the discharge flume
The extent to which the contamination spreads depends upon which factors?
Amount released, height of release, wind speed and direction Core Damage
- Fission product activity that exceeds TS
- Fuel is no longer in original geometry
- Major portion of the core cannot be operated for its design cycle length
What is the most likely event to cause core damage?
Inadequate Core Cooling
LOSP
Describe core damage threshold
- Onset of gross cladding failure and core geometry
Will core damage occur if safety limits are not exceeded?
- If safety limits are not exceeded, core damage should not occur
Definition of Safety Limits
a) Limits to ensure fuel design limits are not exceeded
Definition of Limiting Safety System Settings (LSSS)
a) Limiting safety System Settings
(1) Automatic action setpoints
(2) RPS for fuel clad and reactor pressure boundaries
Definition of Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO)
a) Limiting Condition for Operation
b) Minimum acceptable levels of system performance necessary to ensure safe startup and operation of the plant
c) RAS will be required action to ensure safety if LCO is violated
Radioactive material barriers to prevent release
- Fuel pellet
- Cladding
- Moderator
- RPV / Piping
- Primary Containment
- Secondary Containment
Safety Limits and Basis
- <685# or <10% flow, maintain <24% power
a) 14.7 to 800# crit power at minimum flow >50% power
b) Margin built in - > 685# and >10%, maintain MCPR>1.07
a) 95% probability at 95% confidence transition boiling will not occur - RWL shall be > the TOAF (155”)
a) Core covered to remove decay heat - <1325# in the steam dome
a) 1250# + 10% = 1375#
b) 1325# at the dome ensures bottom of head is <1375#
Basis for Power Distribution LCO
- Normal operation and abnormal transients to maintain fuel cladding integrity (expected parameter change)
- Postulated accidents to maintain core geometry
- LHGR
- MCPR
Probilistic Risk Assessment Purpose
- Realistic evaluation are most likely to cause core damage, and how often
a) Hazards
b) Initiating Events
c) Frequency
d) Probability of failure
e) Core damage freq, large early release freq, and Offsite Dose Consequence
Five most probable core damage events listed in the PRA
- LOSP – equipment failure (all others are operator error)
- Loss of PSW
- Loss of DC Bus
- MSIV Closure
- Turbine Trip
What is the Worst Case Scenario regarding core damage scenarios?
- Loss of RPV Makeup
- Loss of DHR
- ATWS
Mitigating risk is a __________
J. Mitigating Risk is a 10 CFR “LEGAL requirement”
Chernobyl Accident
A. Describe the test being performed
- To determine the length of time that the turbine would supply power at near rated voltage on a turbine trip
- # 8 TG was to power 4 recirc pumps and 2 feed pumps
- EDG would come on at 3 minutes
Chernobyl Accident
B. Describe the sequence of events
- 0100 – power reduction to 700MW
- 13:05 - #8 TG is supplying required pumps for test
- 14:00 – ECCS systems disconnected per test
- The power reduction was paused due to load dispatcher
- Night shift turnover
- 23:10 – Downpower resumed
- 01:00 – power is too low because Xe, withdrew to 6/8 rods in (req 30)
- 01:03 – added recirc pumps to raise power, exceeded max flow – Tsat
- 01:19 – can’t control pressure and level, bypassing auto SCRAMs, shut TBV
- 01:22 – rods are less than 6, no manual or auto SCRAM
- 01:23 – initiate test, TSV shut, pressure goes up, flow does down, more voids, more reactivity, more explosion
- 320000MWth (100 times normal) – core geometry damaged, no rods in
- Manual scram caused rupturing fuel tubes and thermal explosion
Chernobyl Accident
C. Describe the procedural violations
- Reduced power <22% (unstable)
- Reduced power below test requirements
- Too much recirc flow
- Overrode SCRAM functions
- Overrode ECCS
Chernobyl Accident
D. Describe lack of management controls and inadequate safety review
- No oversight
- Test conducted by junior electrical engineer
- Not adequate safety review
Chernobyl Accident
E. Describe the consequences
- 31 died immediately
- 29/35 died of rapid responders
- 4.3 miles of the plant was 54 REM
TMI Accident
A. Basic Events that lead to a loss of all feedwater
- Misposition of Emergency Feed Water block valve
2. Operator error prevented 2nd High Pressure Makeup pump
TMI Accident
B. Reason why the operators at TMI believed the ERV closed after the initial pressure transient
- Indication of ERV is based on signal to open the valve
- Same as at Hatch, not based on valve position
- Pressure was low enough to have valve reseat
- Masked tailpipe high temperature due to known leakby
TMI Accident
C. Describe the release path from the core
- 200gpm from the ERV – about 1” a minute at Hatch
- Reactor Coolant Drain Tank to Aux Building Waste Tank
- ABWT overflows to AB Sump, and release to environment
TMI Accident
D. What plant conditions caused the reactor coolant pumps to vibrate
- Cavitation due to saturation conditions
TMI Accident
E. What caused the operators to believe the reactor was supercritical
- Voids in the core caused SRNI to read high
- Chemistry sample of low boron concentration
- Diluted by condensing steam therefore not indicative of actual coolant
TMI Accident
F. What made the operators to finally realize the ERV was open and a LOCA was occurring
- Identified by a new arrival into the CR
TMI Accident
G. Discuss the conditions surrounding the hydrogen burn which occurred inside the primary containment
- ERV block valve opened to reduce pressure, releasing H2 to RB
- 28# pressure spike due to burn
TMI Accident
H. Basic consequences of TMI, including the amount of core damage, area evacuation, and radiation exposures to personnel
- Melted UO2 at 5100F
- 30000 of 37000 fuel rods shattered or melted
- 450kg of H2 produced via Zircaloy reaction
- 100,000,000 curies released from fuel
- 10,000,000 curies released to environment
- 20 curies of Iodine released
- Highest offsite dosimeter read 277 mrem
- 4200 pregnant women and children mandatory evac
- 144000 people evacuated themselves
TMI Accident
I. Describe the behavior of the incore and excore instrumentation systems during the accident
- Incore temperatures had to be read by voltmeter due to offscale
- Excore Source Range detectors responded to voids as uppowers
TMI Accident
J. Describe the four fundamental causes of the accident at TMI
- Equipment operated in degraded conditions for extended periods of time
- Plant indications were discounted and considered faulty, leading to misrepresenting of symptoms and not taking corrective actions
- Event Based EOPs and Abnormals
- Training and Qualification of operators was inadequate
TMI / Chernobyl Lessons Learned
A. Given a description of the TMI and Chernobyl accidents, Discuss the areas where plant and performance improvements were made based on lessons learned.
1. TMI
a) Mitigating Core Damage Training
b) Thermodynamics Training
c) Natural Circulation Principles of Operation
d) Effects of rapid pressure drop on systems operating at saturation or slightly subcooled.
e) Drywell temperature may have an adverse effect on heated reference leg level instruments
f) Effects of a throttling process across a valve
g) Common reference level for RPV level
h) Redundant instrumentation and uses
i) Necessity of operators to systematically analyze plant conditions
j) Do not make operational decisions based on a single plant parameter
k) Don’t dismiss a parameter just because it is not clearly understood
l) Don’t dismiss nuisance alarms
m) STA
n) Don’t override ESF system unless you are sure that the ESF will cause unsafe condition
o) Don’t secure an automatic function unless it is clearly understood that it is not operating properly
p) Don’t stop both trains of a safety system SCARY!!
q) The need for redundant containment pressure indication in the control room
r) Hydrogen Control should be minimized by inert containment
s) Diverse containment isolation
t) Airborne iodine concentrations within the facility must have equipment, training and procedures
u) High range noble gas effluent monitors recommended
v) Human factors design review of control rooms were conducted
w) Shift manning changes and hour restrictions
x) SPDS
y) Emergency Plans should be upgraded to include radiological events
z) Establishment of the TSC
aa) Establishment of the EOF
TMI / Chernobyl Lessons Learned
A. Given a description of the TMI and Chernobyl accidents, Discuss the areas where plant and performance improvements were made based on lessons learned.
2. Chernobyl
a) Overall management control of plant evolutions must be maintained
b) Procedures for the conduct of special tests, including test procedures, must be reviewed for effects on nuclear safety and approved
c) Tests should include initial conditions, predictions of how the test should proceed and respond, acceptance criteria, test termination and abandonment criteria, provisions to returning the plant to safe operating conditions, and safety analysis as applicable
d) Operators should be fully briefed, or else terminated
e) Strict adherence to safety requirements
f) Operator training on reactor behavior including radioactivity effects and transient and accident analysis. Understand safety consequences of improperly operating control rods, bypassing safety circuits, and operation in abnormal configurations
g) Misoperation of reactivity controls can place plant in unanalyzed condition
h) Mitigating Core Damage Training for assessing and containing a damaged reactor
i) Loss of containment resulted in contamination spread across the world
j) Maintain Containment Integrity!
k) PR – use measurements and units that the public will recognize
TMI / Chernobyl Lessons Learned
A. Given a description of the TMI and Chernobyl accidents, Discuss the areas where plant and performance improvements were made based on lessons learned.
3. Industry Chages
a) Increased communication between Nuclear Utilities
b) Davis Besse very similair event to TMI 1.5 years prior
c) Transient did not damage fuel or equipment
d) Lessons learned were not shared with other utilities
e) Had the TMI operators been informed of the ERV failing open, TMI might have been relatively minor transient.
f) Many different forms of communication now commonplace (SOERs, NRC Bulletins)
g) At time of event procedures were event oriented. Operators had to recognize the transient and take action from memory
h) Procedures changed to be symptom oriented. Operators now treat the symptoms of the transient.
i) Early power plant designs concentrated on safety related equipment combating accidents
j) After the TMI accident, more emphasis is placed on the role of the operator in nuclear safety.
k) Indications available in control rooms are improved to assist the operator in recognizing “symptoms” of transient.
l) Much more simulator training is now required to obtain and maintain a license to operate a Reactor.
m) Topics such as “Team Training” and “Transient Analysis” are now seen in operator training.
n) An extensive task analysis has also been performed for most nuclear plant personnel by INPO.
o) Training for plant personnel is now task “oriented.”
p) NUREG - 0737 contains many changes in the design of power plants such as better Containment Isolation dependability, Post Accident Sampling, accident monitoring and control room habitability systems.
q) Since TMI accident, STA has provided an extra set of eyes to SS.
r) The STA independently assesses plant conditions and advises the SM/SS
s) TMI and Chernobyl were not the only accidents to happen in the nuclear industry but both events taught valuable lessons.
t) TMI pointed out many inadequacies in the industry, and as a result, the utilities made numerous changes to insure an event like this does not happen again.
u) Training improved, especially in plant fundamentals and AB’s and EOPs.
v) Installing belief in trusting plant indications
w) Understanding NI response under accident conditions.
x) ECCS systems should be allowed to perform function unless absolutely certain will cause unsafe plant condition
y) Containment radiation and hydrogen detection monitors were upgraded to indicate higher concentrations that occur during accident conditions.
z) Procedures were changed from event based to symptom based so that the exact cause of the event does not have to be known to start to combat the situation
aa) Overall management control of plant evolutions must be established and maintained.
bb) Safety measures and controls must be in place and should not be overridden without careful consideration and review and only with management approval
cc) Test procedures should include initial conditions, predictions of how the test should proceed and expected response, acceptance criteria, test termination and abandonment criteria, provisions for returning the plant to normal operating or shutdown conditions, and safety analysis as appropriate.
dd) Misoperation of reactivity controls can place the plant in an unanalyzed condition, compromising safety, as well as being an outright violation of procedure
Fukushima Daiichi
A. Describe the event that triggered the SCRAMS
EARTHQUAKE!
- RPS scrams on seismic events
- 9.0 Richter Scale – 112 miles off the coast
Fukushima Daiichi
B. Describe the event that triggered LOSP
EARTHQUAKE!
- Seismic Acceleration instrument
- Tsunami caused loss of emergency power
- Exceeded height and horizonal “g-force” design bases
Fukushima Daiichi
C. Describe Reactor Pressure Control systems operated during Extended Station Blackout
- U1 - Isolation Condenser was the only form of pressure control
- U2 – Relief Valves and RCIC
- U3 – Relief Valves and RCIC
Fukushima Daiichi
D. Worst case effects of a prolonged lack of DHR on cladding
- Zirconium Water reaction creates Hydrogen Gas - explosion
Fukushima Daiichi
E. State the threat to the Reactor Building that can be posed by cladding oxidation compounded by excessive Containment Pressure
- Explosion from H2 accumulation
Fukushima Daiichi
F. Highest Total Radiation Dose received by an operator
- 67.8 REM
Recognizing Core Damage
A. DESCRIBE the term core damage.
- Failure of the fuel clad integrity to the extent that any of the following conditions exist:
a) Fission product activity in coolant > TS
b) Fuel no longer in original geometry
c) Major portion of the core cannot be operated for entire cycle
IMPORTANT
Recognizing Core Damage
B. DESCRIBE the three basic mechanisms which could cause core damage in a BWR.
-
IMPORTANT*
1. Severe overheating due to inadequate core cooling
2. Rupture due to strain
3. Rupture due to overpressure due to FP gas buildup
Recognizing Core Damage
C. DESCRIBE what two factors determine how much of the fuel cladding reacts with the steam during a LOCA.
- Length of time clad uncovered
2. Heat available for reaction
Recognizing Core Damage
D. DESCRIBE the goal of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems following a LOCA.
- Plant designed to handle Worst Case LOCA without operator action until after 10 minutes
- If ECCS works properly, the cladding will remain intact to retain pellets for easily coolable array following a LOCA
- Peak cladding Temp of 2200F and max oxidation of 17%
Recognizing Core Damage
E. DESCRIBE why the potential for fuel failure exists as the Core Spray system attempts to reflood the core following a large LOCA.
- Assume CS delayed, Clad temps rise until 2/3 of core in dryout, then CS injects
- Removes Radiation Heat to steam, Radiation Heat to water droplets, Convection Heat on water droplet impingement
- Shattering of the clad as the quench front moves down the core
Recognizing Core Damage
F. DESCRIBE how the fuel cladding can rupture during a LOCA even if cladding temperature is maintained well below 2200°F.
- Four Major Release Mechanisms
a) Gap Release
b) Meltdown Release
c) Oxidation Release
d) Vaporization Release - Rise in Ductility
a) Cladding can balloon and Rupture
Recognizing Core Damage
G. DESCRIBE how activation products are introduced in the reactor coolant during normal operations.
- Oxygen produced N-16
2. Corrosion products
Recognizing Core Damage
H. DESCRIBE how fission products are introduced into the reactor coolant during normal operations.
- Direct Recoil
a) Uranium within .003 cm of coolant channel - Cladding effects
IMPORTANT
Recognizing Core Damage
I. DESCRIBE the following fission product release mechanisms during a core damage event.
1. a. Gap Release
-
IMPORTANT*
a) Gases in the fuel pin through hole or rupture
b) pressure in the fuel pin > Rx Pressure
c) Release rate goes up as Temp goes up
IMPORTANT
Recognizing Core Damage
I. DESCRIBE the following fission product release mechanisms during a core damage event.
2. b. Meltdown Release
-
IMPORTANT*
a) Gases in the pellets are released as fuel melts
b) Can bubble up through molten core, arriving in upper internals
IMPORTANT
Recognizing Core Damage
I. DESCRIBE the following fission product release mechanisms during a core damage event.
3. c. Oxidation Release
-
IMPORTANT*
a) Steam explosions when molten core hits water at bottom of vessel
b) Aerosol fuel scattered in atmosphere causes excessive oxidation
c) Liberates a ton of FP gases – may rupture vessel
IMPORTANT
Recognizing Core Damage
I. DESCRIBE the following fission product release mechanisms during a core damage event.
4. d. Vaporization Release
-
IMPORTANT*
a) Molten Core reacts with concrete at bottom of Drywell
b) Gases produced through explosions after RPV melts
Recognizing Core Damage
J. DESCRIBE the general conditions inside the core during meltdowns.
- Steam - Hydrogen mixture with FP / Core material vapors and aerosols
- Highest powered portions of the core have melted and dripped into the lower portions of the core
- Some fuel may still be intact and needs cooling
IMPORTANT
Recognizing Core Damage
K. DESCRIBE how the operator can use the Neutron Monitoring System and the Control Rods to obtain an indirect indication of gross core damage.
-
IMPORTANT*
1. Inability to insert detectors
2. Inability to insert control rods
3. Radiation levels rise in reactor building
Core Cooling and Reactivity Control
A. DESCRIBE adequate core cooling.
- Heat removal from the reactor sufficient to prevent rupturing the fuel load
IMPORTANT
Core Cooling and Reactivity Control
B. DESCRIBE four acceptable methods of assuring Adequate Core Cooling.
-
IMPORTANT*
1. Core submergence
2. Steam cooling with injection
3. Steam cooling without injection
4. Spray Cooling
a) 4250gpm when >-207”
Core Cooling and Reactivity Control
C. DESCRIBE how to verify core submergence.
- RWL > TAF = -155”
2. RPV flooding has been determined in the Main Steam Lines
Core Cooling and Reactivity Control
D. DESCRIBE how to verify proper steam cooling with injection.
- RWL > -180”
2. <1500F or Emergency Depressurize Vessel
IMPORTANT
Core Cooling and Reactivity Control
E. DESCRIBE how to verify proper steam cooling without injection.
- IMPORTANT*
- 195” is the minimum zero injection RWL
- RWL > -195”
- <1800F or ED the RPV
Core Cooling and Reactivity Control
F. DESCRIBE the sources of heat found in a reactor after shutdown.
- Sensible Heat
a) Heat stored in coolant, vessel walls, internals - Decay Heat
a) Generated by delayed neutron fission and the decay of fission products
b) After 1 second, normal cooling has removed 80% of decay heat
c) Total decay heat in the core 10 seconds after a SCRAM is 6%