PSY331 - Studies Flashcards
Nezlek, J. B., Vansteelandt, K., Van Mechelen: Appraisal-Emotion Relationships in Daily Life
are appraisal-emotion relationships posited by Smith + Lazarus the dominant relationships? to what extent do such relationships vary across individuals?
Nezlek, J. B., Vansteelandt, K., Van Mechelen: Appraisal-Emotion Relationships in Daily Life
supported Smith and Lazarus’s (1993) contention that certain appraisal-emotion relationships stronger than others. Appraisals of Other-Blame led to feelings of anger, appraisals of Self-Blame led to feelings of guilt,
Nezlek, J. B., Vansteelandt, K., Van Mechelen: Appraisal-Emotion Relationships in Daily Life
appraisal may be associated with more than one emotional response
dominant relationships betw certain appraisals + emotions are complemented by weaker but meaningful cross relationships between other appraisal-emotion associations
Nezlek, J. B., Vansteelandt, K., Van Mechelen: Appraisal-Emotion Relationships in Daily Life
invariant relationships betw emotions + central appraisals
ppl may differ in what specific emotional experiences mean to them
Nezlek, J. B., Vansteelandt, K., Van Mechelen: Appraisal-Emotion Relationships in Daily Life
Indiv differences in appraisal-emotion relationships reflect indiv differences in emotional reactivity/sensitivity to situational cues + may reveal how much individual’s appraisal of circumstances contributes to emotional experience.
Nezlek, J. B., Vansteelandt, K., Van Mechelen: Appraisal-Emotion Relationships in Daily Life
strength of appraisal-emotion relationships may indicate how reactive individuals are toward psychologically meaningful elements
Nezlek, J. B., Vansteelandt, K., Van Mechelen: Appraisal-Emotion Relationships in Daily Life
indivs can react differently toward emotional-eliciting appraisals + they suggest that appraisal theories should consider this source of variability in explaining variability in emotional responding
Oatley, K., & Johnson-Laird, P. (1987): Towards a Cognitive Theory of Emotions
emotions have important cognitive functions: part of a management system to co-ordinate each individual’s multiple plans + goals under constraints of time and other limited resources
Oatley, K., & Johnson-Laird, P. (1987): Towards a Cognitive Theory of Emotions
function of emotions in modular nervous systems, occurrence of emotions at significant junctures of plans influenced by multiple goals
Oatley, K., & Johnson-Laird, P. (1987): Towards a Cognitive Theory of Emotions
emotion modes enable 1 priority to be exchanged for another in system of multiple goals + maintain priority until it is satisfied/abandoned
Emotion signals provide specific communication system which can invoke actions of some processors + switch others off
Oatley, K., & Johnson-Laird, P. (1987): Towards a Cognitive Theory of Emotions
emotion signal propagates globally through system to set it into one of a small number of emotion modes
biological solution to problem of how to plan + carry out action aimed at satisfying multiple goals in environments which are not perfectly predictable
Oatley, K., & Johnson-Laird, P. (1987): Towards a Cognitive Theory of Emotions
form of internal communication that sets cognitive processors into 1 of a small number of characteristic modes
cognitive evaluation of situations that create junctures contributes to phenomenology of emotional experience. emotions form of external communication, important in adjustment of social relations,
Lindquist, K. A., Satpute, A. B., & Gendron, M: Does Language Do More Than Communicate Emotion?
language constitute emotion by cohering sensations into specific perceptions of “anger,” “disgust,” “fear,” + other emotion categories
Lindquist, K. A., Satpute, A. B., & Gendron, M: Does Language Do More Than Communicate Emotion?
predicted by constructionist approach, which suggests emotions occur when sensations categorized using emotion category knowledge supported by language
Lindquist, K. A., Satpute, A. B., & Gendron, M: Does Language Do More Than Communicate Emotion?
help regulate emotion by reducing uncertainty of sensations in the world or body—once a person knows what sensations mean, he or she can do something about them.
Lindquist, K. A., Satpute, A. B., & Gendron, M: Does Language Do More Than Communicate Emotion?
shape how ppl make meaning of their body states and, perhaps, how they regulate their emotions.
Lindquist, K. A., Satpute, A. B., & Gendron, M: Does Language Do More Than Communicate Emotion?
constructionist views: plays a constitutive role in emotion by interacting with sensory information from the body + world during the actual formation of discrete emotions
Lindquist, K. A., Satpute, A. B., & Gendron, M: Does Language Do More Than Communicate Emotion?
Brain regions that are consistently involved in language and speech have also shown reliable increases in activity across studies of emotional experiences and perceptions
Ekman, P., & Cordaro, D. (2011): What is meant by calling emotions basic.
discrete, can be distinguished fundamentally
evolved through adaptation to our surroundings
prompts us in a direction that, in the course of our evolution, has done better than other solutions
Ekman, P., & Cordaro, D. (2011): What is meant by calling emotions basic.
ontogenetic contribution, the product of social learning, very impactful early in life but with continuing contributions over the life course
Ekman, P., & Cordaro, D. (2011): What is meant by calling emotions basic.
- Distinctive universal signals
- Distinctive physiology
- Automatic appraisal
- Distinctive universals in antecedent events
- Presence in other primates
Ekman, P., & Cordaro, D. (2011): What is meant by calling emotions basic.
- Capable of quick onset
- Can be of brief duration
- Unbidden occurrence
- Distinctive thoughts, memories, and images
- Distinctive subjective experience
Ekman, P., & Cordaro, D. (2011): What is meant by calling emotions basic.
- Refractory period filters info available to what supports the emotion
- Target of emotion unconstrained
- emotion can be enacted in either a constructive or destructive fashion
Ekman, P., & Cordaro, D. (2011): What is meant by calling emotions basic.
Anger: response to interference with our pursuit of a goal we care about
Fear: response to the threat of harm, physical or psycho- logical. Fear activates impulses to freeze or flee
Ekman, P., & Cordaro, D. (2011): What is meant by calling emotions basic.
Surprise: response to sudden unexpected event. briefest emotion.
Sadness: response to loss of an object/person to which you are very attached.
Ekman, P., & Cordaro, D. (2011): What is meant by calling emotions basic.
Disgust: repulsion by the sight, smell, or taste of something
Contempt: feeling morally superior to another person.
Happiness: feelings that are enjoyed, that are sought by the person.
Ekman, P., & Cordaro, D. (2011): What is meant by calling emotions basic.
discrete physiological responses to fundamental life situations that have been useful in our ancestral environment. responses are universally shared within our species
not learned from our culture or environment, but rather they are prewired responses
Ekman, P., & Cordaro, D. (2011): What is meant by calling emotions basic.
archetypal expressions for basic emotions are all universally recognized and, at least visually, are all universally distinguishable
Fontaine, J. R. J., Scherer, K. R., Roesch, E. B., & Ellsworth, P. C. (2007). The world of emotions is not two-dimensional
dimensions are evaluation-pleasantness, potency-control, activation-arousal, and unpredictability
Fontaine, J. R. J., Scherer, K. R., Roesch, E. B., & Ellsworth, P. C. (2007). The world of emotions is not two-dimensional
identified on the basis of applicability of 144 features representing the six components of emotions: (a) appraisals of events, (b) psycho-physiological changes, (c) motor expressions, (d) action tendencies, (e) subjective experiences, and (f) emotion regulation
Fontaine, J. R. J., Scherer, K. R., Roesch, E. B., & Ellsworth, P. C. (2007). The world of emotions is not two-dimensional
recovered same 3 dimensions from very precise analysis of meaning of emotion terms, as rated on 144 specific criteria that most current emotion theorists explicitly assume are centrally relevant to the domain of emotions.
Fontaine, J. R. J., Scherer, K. R., Roesch, E. B., & Ellsworth, P. C. (2007). The world of emotions is not two-dimensional
unpredictability, seems necessary to allow a satisfactory differentiation of emotions reflecting an urgent reaction to a novel stimulus or an unfamiliar situation.
Fontaine, J. R. J., Scherer, K. R., Roesch, E. B., & Ellsworth, P. C. (2007). The world of emotions is not two-dimensional
potency-control dimension is of particular interest for emotion research. Its meaning is not limited to social and interpersonal experiences of dominance and submissiveness
Else-Quest, N., Higgins, A., Allison, C., & Morton, L. C. (2012). Gender differences in self-conscious emotional experience
Guilt (d 0.27) + shame (d 0.29) displayed small gender differences, whereas embarrassment (d 0.08), authentic pride (d 0.01) + hubristic pride (d 0.09) showed gender similarities
Else-Quest, N., Higgins, A., Allison, C., & Morton, L. C. (2012). Gender differences in self-conscious emotional experience
gender differences in shame and guilt were significant only for White samples or samples with unspecified ethnicity
larger gender gaps in shame with trait (vs. state) scales, and in guilt and shame with situation- and scenario-based (vs. adjective- + statement-based) items, consistent with predictions that such scales and items tend to tap into global, nonspecific assessments of the self and thus reflect self-stereotyping and gender role assimilative effects
Else-Quest, N., Higgins, A., Allison, C., & Morton, L. C. (2012). Gender differences in self-conscious emotional experience
blanket stereotypes about women’s greater emotionality are inaccurate
situation- and scenario-based measures of SCE + measures of trait (or proneness to) SCE may tap into gender stereotypes of these emotions, thus exaggerating gender differences
Else-Quest, N., Higgins, A., Allison, C., & Morton, L. C. (2012). Gender differences in self-conscious emotional experience
largest gender differences in shame + guilt were in the emotional domains of the body, sex, food or eating, emotional expression + environmental issues
gender difference in embarrassment is that, like guilt + shame, it is small + favors women, except in studies that assess embarrassment about environmental issues
Else-Quest, N., Higgins, A., Allison, C., & Morton, L. C. (2012). Gender differences in self-conscious emotional experience
women reported greater guilt about sex; this is consistent with sexual double standard, which permits casual sex for men but not for women
Else-Quest, N., Higgins, A., Allison, C., & Morton, L. C. (2012). Gender differences in self-conscious emotional experience
women have focused on issues of self-objectification, disor- dered eating + sexual functioning
gender diff in shame favored men, but the gender gap in guilt favored women
contributes to the evidence that some gender stereotypes of emotion are accurate but others are not
Else-Quest, N., Higgins, A., Allison, C., & Morton, L. C. (2012). Gender differences in self-conscious emotional experience
early gender differences in child temperament elicit different socialization patterns of girls and boys, which in turn magnify preexisting gender differences in trait emotion.
Hill, S. E., DelPriore, D. J., & Vaughan, P. W. (2011). The cognitive consequences of envy: Attention, memory, and self-regulatory depletion.
individuals primed with envy better attended to + more accurately recalled info about fictitious peers than did a control group
Envy elicited by targets predicts attention + later memory for information about them. effects cannot be accounted for by admiration or changes in negative affect or arousal elicited by the targets
Hill, S. E., DelPriore, D. J., & Vaughan, P. W. (2011). The cognitive consequences of envy: Attention, memory, and self-regulatory depletion.
greater memory for envied—but not neutral—targets leads to diminished perseverance on difficult anagram task
experimentally activating envy increased attention to + memory for information about same-sex targets.
Hill, S. E., DelPriore, D. J., & Vaughan, P. W. (2011). The cognitive consequences of envy: Attention, memory, and self-regulatory depletion.
correctly recall more information about the targets even after controlling for longer examination time
envy may adaptively tuned cognitive dimension.
Hill, S. E., DelPriore, D. J., & Vaughan, P. W. (2011). The cognitive consequences of envy: Attention, memory, and self-regulatory depletion.
spent more time examining fictitious interviews with targets toward whom they reported feeling most envious
able to correctly recall greatest proportion of info from interviews with most envied targets, even after controlling for the amount of time spent looking at interviews
Hill, S. E., DelPriore, D. J., & Vaughan, P. W. (2011). The cognitive consequences of envy: Attention, memory, and self-regulatory depletion.
envy increases attunement to + memory for relevant social targets + driven by experienced envy rather than by the process of social comparisons, more generally, or by the other’s advantage in the absence of envy.
Hill, S. E., DelPriore, D. J., & Vaughan, P. W. (2011). The cognitive consequences of envy: Attention, memory, and self-regulatory depletion.
women were increasingly envious of targets as they became more physically attractive
physical attractiveness is more strongly tied to reproductive capacity, superiority in this domain provides a greater advantage
Hill, S. E., DelPriore, D. J., & Vaughan, P. W. (2011). The cognitive consequences of envy: Attention, memory, and self-regulatory depletion.
both men + women became increasingly envious of targets as they became wealthier, fungible nature of money
envy experienced in response to specific targets predicts attention to and memory for those targets
Hill, S. E., DelPriore, D. J., & Vaughan, P. W. (2011). The cognitive consequences of envy: Attention, memory, and self-regulatory depletion.
experiencing envy may cognitively depleting indiv who exhibited greater memory for high-envy target—but not those who did not—spent less time persevering on anagram-solving task in the face of repeated failure
Hill, S. E., DelPriore, D. J., & Vaughan, P. W. (2011). The cognitive consequences of envy: Attention, memory, and self-regulatory depletion.
increases the automatic cognitive processing associated with attention + memory for information about social targets; for those individuals whose cognitions are captured by advantaged others, envy may render them less able or willing to engage in more deliberate processing, such as that which is required for acts of determination + personal volition
Hill, S. E., DelPriore, D. J., & Vaughan, P. W. (2011). The cognitive consequences of envy: Attention, memory, and self-regulatory depletion.
effects are due to changes in envy and cannot be accounted for by changes in admiration, negative affect and arousal, or the process of making upward social comparisons in general.
Masuda, T., Ellsworth, P. C., Mesquita, B., Leu, J., Tanida, S., & Van, d. V. (2008). Placing the face in context: Cultural difference in the perception of facial emotion
in judging people’s emotions from their facial expressions, Japanese, more than Westerners, incorporate information from the social context.
Masuda, T., Ellsworth, P. C., Mesquita, B., Leu, J., Tanida, S., & Van, d. V. (2008). Placing the face in context: Cultural difference in the perception of facial emotion
surrounding people’s emotions influenced Japanese but not Westerners’ perceptions of the central person
differences reflect differences in attention, as indicated by eye-tracking data (Study 2): Japanese looked at the surrounding people more than did Westerners.
Masuda, T., Ellsworth, P. C., Mesquita, B., Leu, J., Tanida, S., & Van, d. V. (2008). Placing the face in context: Cultural difference in the perception of facial emotion
East–West differences in contextual sensitivity generalize to social contexts, suggesting that Westerners see emotions as individual feelings, whereas Japanese see them as inseparable from the feelings of the group.
Masuda, T., Ellsworth, P. C., Mesquita, B., Leu, J., Tanida, S., & Van, d. V. (2008). Placing the face in context: Cultural difference in the perception of facial emotion
Study 1 generally supports the idea that Japanese are less narrowly focused than Americans in judging other people’s feelings. Japanese gauge what “everybody in the situation” is feeling and include information about other people’s feelings in their judgment of the central person’s emotion, whereas Americans focus narrowly on the central person’s expression, ignoring infor- mation about the others.
Masuda, T., Ellsworth, P. C., Mesquita, B., Leu, J., Tanida, S., & Van, d. V. (2008). Placing the face in context: Cultural difference in the perception of facial emotion
American perceptions of emotion are relatively unaffected by variations in the expressions of anyone except the person they are focused on. In contrast, Japanese rated the level of the target emotion shown in the central figure higher when the emotions expressed by the others were congruent than when they were incongruent.
Japanese take note of the emotions of the background figures when making emotion judgments, whereas Americans do so to a much lesser extent.
Masuda, T., Ellsworth, P. C., Mesquita, B., Leu, J., Tanida, S., & Van, d. V. (2008). Placing the face in context: Cultural difference in the perception of facial emotion
whether people show assimilation effects or contrast effects is a function of their mindset during the process: an interpretation mindset versus a comparison mindset.
Masuda, T., Ellsworth, P. C., Mesquita, B., Leu, J., Tanida, S., & Van, d. V. (2008). Placing the face in context: Cultural difference in the perception of facial emotion
assimilation effects. In this mode of information processing, the target object and the priming object are categorized as in the same domain, and so the priming object is easily incorporated into the judgment of the target object. In contrast, the comparison mindset facilitates contrast effects. In this mode of information processing, the target object is treated as a different category from that of the priming object,
Masuda, T., Ellsworth, P. C., Mesquita, B., Leu, J., Tanida, S., & Van, d. V. (2008). Placing the face in context: Cultural difference in the perception of facial emotion
moderate expressions of the background figures may have induced the Japanese participants to interpret the background figures as the same category as target figure and facilitated assimilation effects, whereas Western participants were insensitive to contextual information and showed neither assimilation nor contrast effects.
Masuda, T., Ellsworth, P. C., Mesquita, B., Leu, J., Tanida, S., & Van, d. V. (2008). Placing the face in context: Cultural difference in the perception of facial emotion
demonstrates that the Japanese are differentially sensitive to contextual factors in a wide range of nonsocial situations, situations involving fish in a pond, inanimate objects in a landscape, and the rod and frame task
Masuda, T., Ellsworth, P. C., Mesquita, B., Leu, J., Tanida, S., & Van, d. V. (2008). Placing the face in context: Cultural difference in the perception of facial emotion
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Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2008): The automaticity of emotion recognition
how quickly perceivers could recognize expressions of anger, contempt, disgust, embarrassment, fear, happiness, pride, sadness, shame, and surprise; (b) whether accuracy is improved when perceivers deliberate about each expression’s meaning (vs. respond as quickly as possible); and
Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2008): The automaticity of emotion recognition
(c) whether accurate recognition can occur under cognitive load. Across both studies, perceivers quickly and efficiently (i.e., under cognitive load) recognized most emotion expressions, including the self-conscious emotions of pride, embarrass- ment, and shame.
Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2008): The automaticity of emotion recognition
with the exception of contempt, emotion expressions can be accurately recognized when participants are forced to respond quickly and under cognitive load.
Accuracy rates for anger, disgust, fear, happiness, pride, sadness, and surprise were significantly greater than chance in the fast and cognitive load conditions
Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2008): The automaticity of emotion recognition
accuracy rates were higher for anger, fear, pride, and sadness in the deliberated versus fast condition and higher for fear, sadness, and surprise in the deliberated versus cognitive load condition. However, with the exception of fear, these differences were not particularly large, and combined with the finding that each of these emotions can be recognized accu- rately under speeded and distracted conditions, they do not indicate that recognition of these emotions requires complex cognitive processes
Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2008): The automaticity of emotion recognition
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Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2008): The automaticity of emotion recognition
false alarms were fairly low, but there were several exceptions. In particular, pride expressions were fairly frequently mislabeled as happiness, but the fact that this mistake occurred across conditions suggests that it was not a result of speeded or distracted processing. Furthermore, overall false alarm rates for the pride expression were markedly low; excluding happiness false alarms, pride was incorrectly labeled as other emotions only 6%
Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2008): The automaticity of emotion recognition
fear might be perceived quickly and automatically, but its urgent message (“danger!”) may be a distracting source of interference that inhibits categorization
happiness was recognized most quickly and accurately and had the lowest false alarm rate, whereas pride was not significantly more quickly recognized than fear or any other negative emotion.
Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2008): The automaticity of emotion recognition
embarrassment and shame were recognized equally as well regardless of whether participants responded quickly, deliberated, or were distracted by a cognitive load
Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2008): The automaticity of emotion recognition
overall, emotion expressions can be accurately recognized and discriminated from each other very quickly (i.e., within 600 ms), and under cognitive load
even while cognitively taxed, participants accurately recognized most emotions and accurately rejected most false suggestions.
Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2008): The automaticity of emotion recognition
contempt was not recognized better than chance in any condition, suggesting that its expression is difficult to recognize even when cognitive resources are directly allocated to the task.
Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2008): The automaticity of emotion recognition
participants see anger, disgust, fear, and sadness expressions, rather than immediately reach a conscious understanding of the expression and press the correct key, their cognitive resources may be immediately allocated to a more important task: finding the source of the threat
