NWC Flashcards
EMIF
W
W
1.
W: flying with greater than 110% torque with one engine inop may result in unrecoverable decay of Nr in the event or a dual engine failure.
2. 3. 4.
W: With engine anti-ice on up to 18% torque available is lost. Torque may be reduced as much as 49% with improperly operating engine inlet anti-ice valves.
5. 6
Engine high-side failure in flight
C
N
C: If an Np overspeed condition is reached (120%) the overspeed system will flame out the engine and the auto-ignition system will relight the engine. If Nr is not controlled and Np accelerates back to 120 the overspeed system will flame out the engine again and the auto-ignition system will reset the igniter 5-second timer. The Np overspeed/auto-ignition system will continue cycling until Np/Nr is controlled. A yaw kick may be experienced each time the engine relights.
N: With high collective settings, Nr may increase slowly, making high-side failure confirmation difficult. Reducingf collective will reveal incresing Nr and verify high-side failure.
Engine Low-side failure
C
C: When an engine is manually controlled with the PCL in lockout, the engine response is much faster and the TGT limiting system is inop. Care must be taken to prevent exceeding TGT limits and keeping NR and Np in their operating ranges; however the Np overspeed system will still be operative.
Engine torque or TGT spiking/fluctuations
W
W: PCL movement during engine fluctuations may precipitate and engine failure. Consider performing APU emergency start procedure prior to manipulating the PCL. Maintaining a low power setting when moving the PCL will minimize the Nr decay rate if the malfuntioning engine fails.
Compressor Stall
C
C: If the Ng decay relight feature attempts to relight the engine, subsequent compressor stalls may occur and damage the engine. A yaw kick may be experienced each time the engine relights. The engine must be manually shut down.
Engine High-speed shaft failure
N C
N: The engine Np sensor is unreliable with Np< 20%. For this reason any DRVSHFT FAIL should be acknowledged and ignored when Np< 20%. no maintenance action is required
C: Following a high-speed shaft failure, the engine will overspeed, the Np overspeed system will flame out the engine, and the auto-ignition system will activate the relight feature. The engine Np governor will eventually bring Np down toward 100%. The engine must be manually shut down to prevent further damage.
Abort Start
C
C: During aborted starts, failure to immediately stop fuel flow may result in engine overtemperature.
Engine Air Restart
C N W
C: For a crossbleed start, the donor engine should indicate the maximum Ng safely obtainable. Receiving engine Ng less than 24% prior to advancing PCL to idle may result in a hot start.
N: Either a single or dual engine restart may be attempted following dual engine failure. Decision should be based on applicability of respective start envelopes and considerations of longer time to idle when executing a dual engine restart
W: If APU is unavailable and a crossbleed start is necessary, maximum torque available will be reduced during the start sequence. Depending on operating conditions level flight may not be possible. Ensure air source ECS/Start switch is placed to ENG for crossbleed starts.
Unusual Vibrations on Deck
C
C: Application of the rotor brake may aggravate lead/lag tendencies and cause a mechanical failure.
Main Transmission Malfunction
W
W: Possible indications of main transmission imminent failure may include: yaw attitude excursions with no control input, an increase in power required for a fixed collective setting, failure of a main generator or hydraulic pump, increased noise, increased vibration levels, or abnormal fumes in the cabin.
Tail/Intermediate Transmission malfuntion
W
W
W: High power settings require maximum performance of the tail rotor drive system and may precipitate ultimate drive failure.
W: Consideration should be given to transiting at an altitude sufficient to enter an autorotation and performing the applicable steps of the immediate landing/ditching emergency procedure.
Input Chip
N
N: Consideration should be given to returning the engine PCL to fly for a landing
Loss of Tail rotor drive sufficient
AUTO
W
W: Altitude hold will remain engaged unless deselected. If the collective trim release button is not depressed, the AFCS will attempt to maintain aircraft altitude through the collective trim servo. AFCS commanded collective movement can result in an accelerated yaw rate.
Loss of Tail rotor drive insufficient
C
C: Altitude may have to be adjusted based on rate of yaw and/or turn.
Loss of tail rotor control
W N
W W W W
W: Servo hardovers in the yaw channel may result in loss of tail rotor control. Consideration should be given to securing the SAS/BOOST and/or TRIM as necessary
N: A momentary uncommanded right yaw will occur when the tail rotor servo switches from normal to backup in a hover. The rate and magnitude will primarily depend on power required and wind direction and magnitude
W: Following the appearance of the #1 tail rtr servo caustion without the associated backup pump on and #2 tail rtr servo on advisories. the aircraft will demonstrate normal yaw responses in flight regimes that do not require excessive tail rotor performance; however, at slower airspeeds below approximately 40 KIAS, more pronounced effects of loss of tail rotor control may become more apparent.
W: After touchdown, rapid reduction of collective or PCL’s may cause excessive and uncontrollable yaw rates.
W: If an uncontrolled right yaw develops at too low of an airspeed, loss of waveoff capability may result. Increasing collective may increase the yaw to unrecoverable rates. Performing loss of tail rotor drive may be required.
W: If the tail rotor control cables are damaged, the hydraulic transients associated with switching the tail rotor servo from NORM to Backup may cause catastrophic damage to the tail rotor controls.
1 Primary Servo or #1 transfer module leak
N
W
N: Be prepared for loss of tail rotor control.
W: Failure to ensure Backup Hyd Pump switch is in Auto or on position prior to landing with a #1 RSVR LOW or #1 Hyd Pump caution present will result in loss of tail rotor directional control when the weight on wheels switch is activated.
2 Primary Servo or #2 transfer module leak
N
N
N: Failure to ensure Backup Hyd Pump switch is in Auto or on position prior to landing with a #2 Hyd Pump caution present will result in loss of pilot assist servos when the weight on wheels switch is activated.
N: Be prepared for loss of the pilot assist servos.
AFCS Degraded
N
N: If the AFCS degraded caution appears during a night/IMC coupled hover or automatic approach, consideration may be given to continuing hover/approach if not disoriented or unstable.
Stabilator Auto Mode Failure
Wx6
W: It is possible for the stabilator to fail without illumination of the stab caution and aural warning. In this case, the first indication of failure will be an uncommanded pitch change.
W: Reengagement of the automatic mode after a shutdown results in the automatic mode operating for 1 second. If a hardover signal to one actuator was the cause of the initial shutdown, and reengagement is attempted, the actuator will move before another disengagement is commanded. In this case, subsequent reengagement shall not be attempted since it may result in additional stabilator movement. If acceleration is continued with the stabilator in the full down position, longitudinal control will be lost. The stabilator shall be slewed to 0* as airspeed increases above 40 KIAS.
W: With large fixed stabilator angles, reduction in collective pitch results in increased aft cyclic requirements. Collective reduction during recovery from a trailing edge down stabilator flight condition should be minimal. If the stabilator becomes fixed at or near 0*, nose high attitudes may occur at slow speed.
W: A combination of high airspeed/low altitude coupled with a runaway stabilator will necessitate immediat pilot action to maintain control of the aircraft. Primary consideration is to disengage the automatic mode by activatin manual mode slewing as required.
W: At high airspeeds, immediate recognition and flight control input are essential to avoid an unrecoverable attitude. It is essential for the PNAC to slew the stabilator to 0* immediately to gain control of the aircraft. If acceleration is continued with the stabilator in the full down position, longitudinal control will be lost.
W: Without stabilator auto mode, careful aircrew coordination to manually slew the stabilator is required to avoid undesirable and potentially dangerous flight regimes and/or aircraft attitudes.
Electrical power failure/Dual Generator Failure N N W N
N: The capability of slewing the stabilator is retained via the dc essential bus using battery power. Travel is limited to 35* if full down 30* if full up when a power failure occurs
N: Loss of electrical power to the engine will result in engine anti-ice activation regardless of engine anti-ice or de-ice master switch position, reducing max torque available by up to 18%. With a malfunctioning inlet anti-ice valve, torque available can be reduced by as much as 49%
W: Ensure airspeed versus stabilator angle limits are not exceeded. Stabilator automatic mode is inop
N: The stabilator position indicator will be inop with no power to the ac essential bus, Attempt to check visually.
#1 or #2 fuel fltr bypass or press caution W
W: Intermittent appearance of a fuel press caution may be an indication of air leaking into the fuel supply lines, which could cause momentary fluctuation in engine power or flameout.
1 and #2 fuel fltr bypass or press caution
W
W N
W: Intermittent appearance of a fuel press caution may be an indication of air leaking into the fuel supply lines, which could cause momentary fluctuation in engine power or flameout.
W: Be prepared for dual engine failure. Recommended airspeed is 80KIAS to minimize Nr droop should dual engine failure occur
N: Consideration should be given to performing applicable steps of the immediate landing/ditching emergency procedure.
External Engine fire
N
N: HF transmissions, sunlight filtered through smoke, haze, water, or at sunrise or sunset may trigger the fire detectors and cause a false fire indication.
APU Fire
N
N: HF transmissions, sunlight filtered through smoke, haze, water, or at sunrise or sunset may trigger the fire detectors and cause a false fire indication.
Cockpit fire/ cabin fire
W W W C N
W
W: Severity of the fire and conditions present will dictate whether an immediate landing/ditching is required.
W: Vapors from the portable fire extinguisher agent, although not poisonous, can cause asphyxiation by displacement of oxygen in a confined space. The cabin should be ventilated as soon as practical
W: It may not be advisable to secure all electrical power, thus losing AFCS, ICS and flight instruments prior to achieving VMC or landing/ditching.
C: If source of fire is unknown, consideration should be given to securing mission power immediately when securing unnecessary electrical equipment to prevent system damage.
N: Consideration should be given to selecting DIAG page in order to identify failing components.
W: Loss of electrical power to the engine will result in engine anti-ice activation regardless of engine anti-ice or de-ice master switch position, reducing max torque available by up to 18%. With a malfunctioning inlet anti-ice valve, torque available can be reduced by as much as 49%
Immediate Landing/Ditching
W
C W W
W: Stores jettisoned at descent rates greater than those listed in the NATIP have not been tested. Aircraft/Rotor system impact from jettisoned stores may be possible
1 2 3 4 5
C: Time permitting, consideration should be given to executing APU emergency start procedure to maintain electrical and hydraulic power upon rotor disengagement.
6
W: After actuation the position of the emergency jettison window lever may cause snagging of personal survival gear impeding egress. Time permitting, reset jettison handle to the aft position prior to egress.
7 8 9 10 11
W: Failure to remain strapped in aircraft until all violent motion or in-russhing water stops may result in injury or incapacitation.
Underwater egress
Wx5
W: The downward stroke of the seat will change the frame of reference needed for egress. Extended handles, windows, and controls will not be located in the same relative position. Keep legs clear from under seat area. Downward travel of seat may cause injury or entrapment.
W: Do not inflate LPU until outside helicopter
W: Water pressure may prevent opening the emergency egress windows until the cabin fills with water. The windows should be jettisoned prior to water entry to optimize the ability of the crew to safely egress.
W: Failure to disconnect ICS cord can impede egress. Personal gear may snag during egress, notably on collectives, flir HCU’s parking brake and rast release handles, PCLs/fuel selectors fire t handles or extended emergency jettison window handles
W: If entanglement or disorientation delays egress, hold onto a reference point with one hand. Using the other hand, place the emergency breathing device second stage regulator in you mouth, clear ware from you mouthpiece, and continue with egress
Dual EGI Failure
N
N: Do not initiate a manual or auto test via the diag page for troubleshooting. It will cause the EGI to freeze and require maintenance to remove the batteries to clear the problem.
Tail rotor quadrant
C
If the helicopter is shutdown and/or hydraulic power is removed with one tail rotor cable failure, disconnect of the other tail rotor cable will occur when force from the boost servo cannot react against control cable quadrant spring tension. The quadrant spring will displace the cable and servo piston enough to unlatch the quadrant cable.
