LEC7: Counterinsurgency & Irregular Warfare Flashcards

1
Q

What is Irregular Warfare?

A

What characterizes this form of war is the asymmetrical relationship between the war participants

This asymmetry is both of a conceptual nature, since non-state and state actors face each other as opponents, and of a material nature, since irregular forces usually have far fewer resources than their state opponents. (Riemann 2020)

Examples:
1. Insurgency
2. Terrorism
3. Other irregular activities
a. Criminality
b. Disorder
3. Piracy

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2
Q

What is Insurgency?

A

nsurgency can be seen as a tactic of warfare - where it is often used synonymously with guerrilla — or alternatively, it is seen as a type of strategy to conduct war

Insurgency is a term used to describe a violent, armed rebellion by small, lightly armed groups, often referred to as insurgents. These groups typically use guerrilla warfare tactics to oppose a larger authority. The key feature of an insurgency is its asymmetric nature, where small irregular forces face a large, well-equipped, regular military force. It’s essentially a form of revolt that doesn’t reach the proportions of an organized revolution.

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3
Q

What is Insurgency as a Tactic?

A

When conceptualising insurgency as a tactic, the activity is aimed at striking the opponent where they least expect it. Avoid the enemys strengths and concentrate on their weaknesses

The state (or incumbents) fields regular troops and is able to control urban and accessible terrain; while seeking to militarily engage its opponents in peripheral and rugged terrain; challengers (rebels or insurgents) hide and rely on harassment and surprise. Such wars often turn into wars of attrition, with insurgents seeking to win by not losing while imposing unbearable costs on their opponent

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4
Q

What is Insurgency as a strategy?

A

Mao Zedong is generally credited as the “father” of this development. The strategic approach to insurgency can currently be found in the American Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24, which defines the concept as

An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict … [in other words] an organized protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control (US Army and Marine Corps 2007: 2)

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5
Q

What are Mao Zhedongs 3 phases of Insurgency?

A

Phase 1 – Strategic Defense:
The first phase’s main focus is the masses’ political mobilisation. People’s political consciousness is heightened in order to actively involve them in the revolutionary struggle. This phase is characterized by avoiding fights. Attacks are tactical in nature in situations where the insurgents have local numerical superiority to weaken enemy forces.

Phase 2 – Stalemate:
In this phase, the protracted struggle to weaken the enemy’s physical and moral strength begins. Government and local officials are killed or forced to leave the area. By neutralizing the government ‘s presence in rural areas, the population can be enlisted to support the uprising. This support must flow into the development of conventional forces in order to enable the transition to the insurgents own strategic offensive.

Phase 3 – Strategic Offensive:
The final phase is the endgame of the conflict. In this, the insurgents switch from defensive guerrilla warfare to an offensive war of movement with the aim of completely destroying the government force

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6
Q

Who was Che Guevara and his form of Guerillia?

A

“Che” Guevara
Focoism – small nucleus
Contrary to Mao’s instructions, a revolutionary movement can be successful even without a provisional organization. This idea was based on his experience during the victorious uprising in Cuba (1958–1959). Guevara drew three key lessons from this.

Can the forces of the people achieve victory in a war against a regular army;

One does not always have to wait until all the conditions for a revolution have ripened; the leadership of the uprising can create such conditions themselves;

The armed struggle in the poorly developed countries of the Latin American continent must be carried out mainly in agricultural areas. (Heuser 2013, p. 136

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7
Q

Who is Marighella and his form of guerilla?

A

Marighella
Urban Guerilla
Where Mao and Guevara placed emphasis on the rural areas (especially the peasant population) Marighella developed a theory of insurgency that focused on countries with large cities
Influenced later left-wing terrorist groups such as the Baader-Meinhoff Group/Red Army Factio

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8
Q

What are the key dimensions for insurgency?

A
  1. Time
    Time is the most important element for a successful insurgency, as it is generally a tactic of attrition

Given enough time, an insurgent group can organize, break the will of the enemy, and build a conventional force capable of seizing control of the state.

“When it comes to time, Henry Kissinger’s famous saying applies: ‘The guerrilla fighter wins if he doesn’t lose’ - he has time on his side. “The regular army [on the other hand] loses if it doesn’t win.” (Heuser 2013, p. 128)

  1. Space
    Insurgents often operate in difficult terrain (e.g. mountains, jungles and swamps), which they use to tactical advantage.
    The size of the state’s territory also offers advantages, as state troops often do not have the resources to control the entire territory. Insurgents can retreat into uncontrolled areas and attack again when the odds are in their favor. (Riemann 2020)
  2. Legitimacy
    insurgents require internal or external support for a successful insurgency. To do this, insurgents need a convincing narrative for their uprising in order to legitimize the use of violence
  3. Support
    Without internal or external support, few insurgencies are successful. Insurgents need weapons, ammunition, food and new recruits. In addition, they need information about the whereabouts and activities of government troops.
    However, support is inextricably linked to the legitimacy of the organization. Violence that is carried out without a comprehensible political purpose is rarely accepted by the population. There is general agreement that substantial support from the population is necessary to successfully compensate for the resources available to the state.
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9
Q

What make insurgencies successful?

A
  1. the insurgents must represent a cause that is so attractive to the population that they renounce their loyalty to the government or occupying power. Cause can be political (e.g. national liberation), socio-economic (e.g. improvement of economic opportunities, etc.) or other (e.g. religious).
  2. a large area of land with difficult terrain (mountains, swamps, forests), lengthy borders, a moderate climate and a large but scattered population
  3. a political system with a weak government, high levels of corruption, an inefficient administration, a less loyal, numerically weak police force and a demotivated, poorly equipped army.
  4. support from outside is potentially very important, be it through material aid (financing, supplies, armament, military advice), the provision of retreat areas beyond the borders or moral-ideological support (propaganda
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10
Q

What is COIN?

A

Counter Insurgency

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11
Q

What are the elements of COIN?

A

Contrary to a purely military response to conflict, counterinsurgency operations include social, political, economic and even psychological efforts.
Counterinsurgency comes in various forms, but to simplify these can be grouped in ‘enemy-centric’ or ‘population-centric’ approaches.
The former denotes operations with a strong ‘kinetic’ element and an emphasis on killing, harming and annihilating the insurgents (‘the enemy’).
The latter involves a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic elements targeting the population with an aim to win them over

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12
Q

What is an Enemy Centric COIN approach?

A

This strategy assumes that an insurgency can be ended if the insurgents lose the will or ability to wage armed struggle.

This is to be achieved primarily by neutralizing a large number of insurgents. The options here range from killing over capturing to driving the insurgents out of the conflict area. (by Krshiwoblozki 2015)

In extreme cases, this can also lead to draconian measures against the civilian population, including forcible relocation, ethnic cleansing and genocide, as it is often difficult for the counterinsurgent to distinguish between civilians and insurgents. (Hughes 2011_

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13
Q

What is the Population Centric approach to COIN?

A

Population centric

The government is trying to win the loyalty or at least the consent of the population.

This is to be achieved by withdrawing the populations support for the insurgents, e.g. through the protection of the civilian population, modernization measures and political reforms.

Furthermore, this counterinsurgency approach relies on an understanding of the cultural and social specifics in the conflict region so that the civilian population does not perceive the counterinsurgency fighters as illegitimate occupiers who want to bring about cultural and social changes. (Heuser 2013

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14
Q

What is the UK Hearts & Mind COIN strategy?

A

Hearts: the population must be convinced that the success of their government is in their long-term interests.

Minds: the population must be convinced that the government is actually going to win, and it will permanently protect their interests

DOES NOT MEAN TO BE “NICE” TO PEOPLE OR NOT TO USE VIOLENCE

‘there is no known way of doing counterinsurgency without inflicting casualties on the enemy: there is always a lot of killing, one way or another’ (Kilcullen 2006c: 3)

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15
Q

What is the US style of COIN Thompson

A

US Style - Thompson
*Clear political aim;
*The government must function in accordance with the law;
*The government must have an overall plan;
*The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas;
*The government must secure its base area first

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16
Q

What is the French GALULA COIN approach?

A

Support of the population is necessary;
Support is gained through an active minority;
Support from the population is conditional;
Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential;

17
Q

What is the centre of gravity in COIN?

A

The People
War Amongst the People

“no act of force will ever be decisive”

the aim of modern conflicts is to win the will of the people

force is only part of the solution to modern conflicts; they require complex political and military solutions, which will subdue but not necessarily permanently end the conflic

18
Q

What are the elements of Modern COIN

A

Modern COIN
Mix of Enemy and Population Centric approaches
‘armed social work’
Key turning point wars in Afghanistan and Ira

19
Q

What are the Kilcullen 3 pillars?

A

3 pillars – Security, Political and Economic - rest on Information – goal to transfer control at some point and withdra

20
Q

Where lay the origins of COIN?

A

The origins of COIN
Counterinsurgency operations have long been an essential aspect of colonization.

Developing relative stability in a country whose population resisted foreign rule or intervention required developing a multipronged strategy.

Imperialists would never have the advantage of numbers—instead, a combination of selective military force, greatly expanded police forces, cooperation with local authorities, and a deluge of self-congratulatory propaganda was the best means for establishing control over a territor

21
Q

Is COIN Gendered?

A

today’s advocates of population-centric counterinsurgency … present it as the ‘soft option’ (Khalili 2011)

This coding … has a particularly gendered character

I use gender here not to stand in for ‘women’ but as a set of relations which - intertwined in complex ways with class, ‘race and geopolitical location - determine the meaning of … „masculine“ and „feminine“ (Khalili 2011

22
Q

What is the COIN boomerang effect?

A

The Boomerang Effect
From “over there” to “here”
governments that develop repressive techniques to control colonial territories will eventually deploy those same techniques domestically against their own citizens.
Hannah Arendt – The Origins of Totalitarianism

23
Q

Is COIN death?

A

20 years of ”COIN” failure in Afghanistan

Return of Great Power competition and the possibility of industrial “regular” war

COIN was more of a narrative than an empirical concept (Smith & Jones 2015)