What is Knowledge (epistemology)

Question 1

3 main types of knowledge + examples

Answer 1

Ability (procedural) knowledge-> knowing how
Eg “I know how to ride a bike”

Acquaintance Knowledge -> knowing of (via exp)
Eg “I know what an apple tastes like”

Propositional (factual) knowledge -> knowing that some claim is true/false
Eg “I know the capital of England is London”

Question 2

Zagzebski’s two reasons why propositional knowledge is discussed more

Answer 2

1) how humans communicate knowledge to each other
2) easier to explain

= propositional knowledge, as are the true or false (truth-apt).
= to have propositional knowledge is to be linked with reality in some way

Question 3

Zagzebski’s nature of definition (real definitions vs contingent definitions)

Answer 3

1) Real definition -> fixed properties which define them (necessary truths)
EG -> water (always, H2O)

2) Contingent definition -> Can have alternative conditions depending on context.
EG-> rich (use in comparing wealth) OR a large plant (depends where it is, which are the plant it has been compared to).

= Zagzebski questions whether we have a real definition of knowledge.

Question 4

Zagzebski’s 4 things that we should avoid in definitions

Answer 4

1) Ad hoc -> means “for this special purpose” so it is a definition which is overly specific to a particular problem” (EG PA: “ a bird is an animal that can fly” PB : “ what about mosquitoes?” PA : “ okay, a bird is an animal that can fly, which isn’t a mosquito”)

2) Negative -> a definition that says something isn’t, rather than what it is.
(EG a good act is one that isn’t wrong)

3) Circular -> using the same terms and definitions (EG justice as when a just act occurs)

4) Obscure -> using terms that are more complicated than the one being defined
(EG Chewing is the act of mastication)

Question 5

Distinction between ‘true opinion’ and ‘knowledge’ (tripartite context)

Answer 5

true opinion -> can be luckily correct
knowledge -> good reason (a justification) to why you hold a certain belief

Question 6

Plato’s definition of knowledge (tripartite)

Answer 6

= Knowledge is a JTB -> = belief, truth and justification are the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge.

S knows that P iff
i. P is true
ii. S believed
iii. S’s belief that P is true is justified

Example: Is this knowledge?
1) No truth
“I know there is a tree at the bottom of my road” = belief
My belief is justified because I have lived in the same house for years and the tree has always been there, other people see the tree. It is also true as if we went now, the tree would be there (or via satellite).

However… if the tree got cut down but I still believed the tree was there, and had justification as I saw it 3 minutes ago (justification) this would not be knowledge as it is not TRUE.

2) No justification
= A jury (correctly so) convicts someone as guilty with little evidence (no justification). Unlikely to call this knowledge , as they are just luckily correct.

Question 7

JTB criticism: the conditions are not individually necessary

-Truth as a necessary component of knowledge (can we have knowledge without truth)

Answer 7

How do we define truth?

1)Coherence theory of truth -> Something can be considered to be true if it is coherent with the current understanding of the world at the time (if it coheres with other propositions). IF NOT = FALSE

2)Correspondence theory of truth -> Something can only be true if the belief actually corresponds to reality (if it represents the world). IF NOT = FALSE

Is truth a necessary component of knowledge?
= If you believe the coherence theory is correct, then you can at least say that we may have some false beliefs that we currently accept as knowledge, but could be proven false in time.
For example, a cavewoman believes earth is flat-> justified (all evidence at the time proves her as justified) but false belief (this view fits the coherence theory>correspondence) as over time, science has proved her wrong.

Therefore, truth is not a necessary component of knowledge. As we still have knowledge without truth.

Question 8

JTB criticism: the conditions are not individually necessary

• Belief as a necessary component of knowledge

Answer 8

It is possible to have knowledge without belief . For example, Albert is asked “When did Queen Elizabeth I die?”. Albert does not think he knows the answer, but answers correctly. Therefore, one does not have to have belief to have knowledge. Albert knew the answer, but did not know he did. Thus, belief is not a necessary component of knowledge, as Albert still as knowledge.
(he could however had got lucky, or knew it subconsciously)

Question 9

JTB criticism: the conditions are not individually necessary

-Justification as a necessary component of knowledge

Answer 9

EXAMPLE:
- A mathematician working on a problem, subconsciously, has a ‘flash of insight’ which leads her to the solution. In this case, she cannot provide a justification.
= This is an example of knowledge as the mathematician is an expert in her field and has solved the problem correctly. The fact that she , at present, cannot provide the justification for a certain step should not mean that she does not have knowledge.

= Justification is a pointless definition as we all hold views that, under intense questioning, we would run out of justification for. Therefore, it is enough to say that a person has knowledge if they have a belief of something and it is true. Thus, justification is not a necessary component of knowledge.

Question 10

What does the argument that the conditions are not individually necessary (against JTB) claim?

Answer 10

We can still have knowledge even if one of the three criteria’s is missing. (argues against Plato)

Question 11

Was Gettier for or against Plato’s JTB?

Answer 11

Against . He showed that the conditions are NOT collectively sufficient (ie you can have JTB without it being knowledge).

Question 12

What is a Gettier Case + examples

Answer 12

A situation where we can have justified true beliefs that do not count as knowledge.

EG 1: Smith + Jones
-Smith and Jones are both competing for the same job.
1) Belief : Smith believed that the person who will get the job would have 10 coins in their pocket.
2) Justification: Smith was told by a colleague that Jones would get the job. Jones also has 10 coins in his pocket as Smith heard him counting earlier on.
3) True: Yes, the person who gets the job does have 10 coins in their pocket (Smith didn’t know he also had 10 coins in his pocket).
= Smith ends up getting the job, he has a JTB but it is not knowledge.

Question 13

Zagzebski’s critique of Gettier cases (two pieces of luck)

Answer 13

1) bad luck -> he was wrong that Jones will get the job (but was a justified assumption based on the evidence)
2) good luck -> he himself had 10 coins but did not realize, and got the job, which made his original belief true

Question 14

Infallibilism (alternative to tripartite view)

Answer 14

• Gettier cases rely on luck. One way to remove this element is to require justification to be so strong that the truth is guaranteed (in other words cannot be doubted). JTB + certainty

Infallibilism = impossible to be wrong/doubted
Infallibilism states that…
1) we should only count as knowledge those things which we CANNOT RATIONALLY DOUBT. EG 2 + 2 = 4, Relations of ideas etc.
2) difference between FEELING certain and a belief being infallible (i feel certain that the external world is real vs all bachelors are unmarried males).
= In Gettier cases the conclusions, although justified, are not certain/infallible - they are possible to doubt, so do not fit the infallibilist def of knowledge

Question 15

Criticisms of Infallibilism as a good def of knowledge

Answer 15

1) Goes against out intuition that we know a lot of things
= If we accepted the infallibilist’s def of knowledge, we would claim to know very little - perhaps some logical truths I’m some facts about our minds, such as the sensations we experience.

/ incoherent with science: But most of our claims about the world, history, science and so on, would only be classed as beliefs.

Question 16

No false lemmas’ (alternative to tripartite view)
-> Gettier’s lemmas

Answer 16

JTB + No falsehood or faulty steps in reasoning
- In Gettier’s first example the false lemma was that Jones will get the job after hearing the receptionist say so.

Therefore, copes well with Gettier’s example as it says because the justification has a faulty step in reasoning, it cannot count as knowledge. Therefore, need JTB + no falsehood.

Question 17

Criticism of No False Lemmas

Answer 17

1) Goldman’s Fake Barn County:
- Henry is driving in the countryside with his son
- Henry is identifying objects outside ‘that’s a cow’ etc
- Last mentioned object is a barn, which indeed it is
- Henry is reliable as he sees it in full view, has good eyesight and enough time to view the object
- Given this info we would say that Henry KNOWS that the object is a barn?

-But, if given additional info, that unknown to Henry, the district is full of paper mache barns, which look exactly like real barns from the road. However, with luck, this happens to be the only real barn. Given this info, we would be strongly inclined to withdraw the claim that Henry knows the object is a barn.

=Similar to Gettier cases as it is an example of a JTB that we would be reluctant to call knowledge. BUT different, as there were no false steps in reasoning here (lemmas).

2) Zagzebski’s Virus
- A doctor has good evidence that her patient is suffering from Virus X.
- Because the patient is experiencing the symptoms of Virus X + the test results show she has it.
- However, in this case, the patient is suffering from virus Y.
- The doctors belief that the patient is presently suffering from virus X is false, but it is justified and undefeated by any evidence accessible to her.
- BUT the patient also has virus X, but at a stage where it is too early to show up in tests (so her belief was luckily true).
= Here, there are no false lemmas -> she believes the patient has virus X and she does. However there is a hidden false belief this is that the test results symptoms are caused by virus X.

Question 18

sufficient vs necessary conditions

Answer 18

Necessary -> Something you need in order to have the thing in question.
-> EG Water is a necessary condition of rain. You cannot have rain without water. But water alone is not enough to guarantee rain. Therefore, water is a necessary but not sufficient condition of rain.

Sufficient conditions -> When met, mean that you will always have the thing in question.
-> EG rain is a sufficient condition for water as when there is rain, there is water. But rain is not necessary as when there is water there isn’t always rain.

Question 19

Reliabilism (alternative to tripartite view)

Answer 19

Reliabilism replaces the justification, via a ‘reliable process’.

reliable process -> external process to a person holding a certain belief (one that generates more truths than falsehoods).
justification -> internal process (they provide reason/evidence for belief themselves, eg ‘i saw it with my own eyes’).

= We should only grant the status of knowledge to those beliefs that have been formed by reliable cognitive processes- that are highly likely to result in a true belief - such as seeing things up close, arithmetic and reading from a trustworthy source.

Question 20

Reliabilism (alternative to tripartite view)
-> examples of a reliable way of getting true beliefs
-> examples of an unreliable way of getting true beliefs

Answer 20

RELIABLE:
- reliable figures from authority - professors, testimony from experts etc
- reliable sources; good eyesight; memory etc

UNRELIABLE:
- conspiracy theories
- guesswork

Question 21

Criticisms of Reliabilism

Answer 21

1) Lottery ticket example
- Poppy has bought a lottery ticket. Before numbers are drawn she says ‘I know I have not won’. We may want to say this is not knowledge as the numbers were yet to be drawn.
- However, a reliabilist would claim that she does have knowledge as the odds are in her favour; Poppy would be correct 99.9% of the time and therefore is a reliable process.
However, we would not want to agree that she truly knew the answer in advance.

OR ZAGZEBSKIS VIRUS X

2) Accounts for BIV scenarios
- Hold up a pen. Do you believe it is there?

• JTB : your belief in the pen is justified in both BIV and normal world as the evidence is the same. But in the BIV world, it is not true. This seems right. If the experience is exactly the same your belief is justified in both worlds.
• Reliabilism: In the normal world your pen belief is produced by a reliable process. But in the BIV world the belief is not produced by a reliable process - even though the experience and cognitive processes are identical.
  But, given the experience is the same, don’t we want to say that the belief is equally justified in both worlds? The criticism is that in replacing the concept of ‘justification’ with ‘reliably produced’.

THEREFORE… reliabilism does not give an adequate account of the relationship between our beliefs and our justifications

Question 22

Zagzebski Virtue Epistemology (+ link to Gettier)

Answer 22

IV + T + B

Knowledge = belief arising from one of intellectual virtues.

Zagzebski understanding of an intellectually virtuous person:
1) We must be motivated to hold true beliefs
2) The type of thing an intellectually virtuous person would do. (circular)
3) Success is formed from a true belief that has acted in accordance with the first two components
= EG a good student: they do the types of things that are good virtuous person would do (i.e. ask questions when they lack understanding, get knowledge from reliable sources, organised, work hard etc).

LINK TO GETTIER
-> Smith’s action is not one of intellectual virtue as the belief arose from luck and not the actions that Smith undertook. Therefore, he does not have knowledge.

Question 23

Sosa’s ‘Triple A’ (virtue epistemology)
-> stronger than Zagzebski

Answer 23

Accuracy ->a shot is accurate if it hits the target (even if luckily so) = a belief is accurate if it is TRUE.

Adroitness -> a shot is skilful (even if it misses). = a belief is skillful if its one formed by an intellectual virtue (even if not true).

Aptness -> a shot that is accurate because it was adroit (skillful).
= No luck involved. An apt belief is one that is true because it was formed with intellectual virtue.

LINK TO GETTIER:
-> Accuracy as Smith’s belief was true
-> NOT ADROIT as he did not gain anything skillfully (luck)
->NOT APT as it was luck that he also had 10 coins in his pocket

Question 24

Criticisms of Virtue Epistemology (zagzebski and sosa)

Answer 24

1) Too narrow / motivation not needed (zagzebski)
- Would we say animals and infants are motivated or skilful in finding truth? Often they are acting on instinct rather than intention. Similarly, if I come to knowledge but am not motivated to do so, doesnt take away from the fact I know it (eg my philosophy work)

2) Circular (zagzebski)
Second component -> what an intellectually virtuous person would do

3) Is VE an accurate reflection of knowledge (Sosa)
It doesn’t provide a real definition of knowledge, only a contingent one. It describes more the process of how best to get knowledge, not what it essentially is

Question 25

Have we found a real def of knowledge?

Answer 25

It seems the best we can do is a contingent (not true in all possible worlds) definition of knowledge, this doesn’t mean a real definition of knowledge is impossible, just that we haven’t established one yet.

Question 26

Ziff’s ‘a cheetah can outrun a man’ phrase in relation to ‘knowledge is a JTB’

Answer 26

The fact that we can find exceptions to the rule’ a cheetah cannot out run a man ‘ (ie a disabled cheetah vs Usain Bolt) does not make the claim false. It is a contingent truth (not true in all possible worlds) .If we are happy to accept the act of knowledge as contingent, then maybe Gettier cases, fake barns etc do not need to convince us that JTB is a bad definition of knowledge. It works in the vast majority of cases, and Gettier cases are obscure and maybe do not have enough to reject JTB as a useful definition of knowledge.

Question 27

What are the RESPONSES to the issues of the Tripartite view?

Answer 27

Infallibilism
No false lemmas
Reliabilism
Virtue epistemology