Functionalism ( mind )

Question 1

What is functionalism ? (3 marks)

Answer 1

= All mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised.

Question 2

What is a function?

Answer 2

= The operation of a system of inputs and outputs
(any functional state can be described in terms of what causes it and what is caused)

Question 3

What is the difference between a ‘Functional’ and ‘Compositional’ definition + link to functionalism

Answer 3

-Functional: tells us what something does
(eg eyes provide sight)

-Compositional: tells us what something is made out of (eg carbon chauvinism: things made from carbon are living)

= Functionalism aims to describe the mind using a functional definition, stating that mental states are sufficiently complex so as to be a system of inputs and outputs.
(what the mind does> what the mind is made of)

Question 4

What is the difference between how MBIT and functionalism define the mind?

Answer 4

MBIT attempts to give a compositional definition, ontologically reducing mental states to brain states.

Functionalism does not ontologically reduce mental states to brain states. It CAN account for multiple realisability.
- mind as ‘software’ operating on ‘hardware’(functional def)

Question 5

Is a functionalist a dualist or a physicalist?

Answer 5

BOTH (but they tend to be physicalists)

Question 6

Putnam’s claims on the mind (computational)
-> software/hardware analogy

Answer 6

= Putnam claims that mental states can be explained in terms of a machine table.

machine table: lists all the possible inputs and outputs of a system whereby we can move from different states given certain inputs.

• mental states/mind: software
• hardware: brain
  = The mind is like a program which runs on the hardware of the brain.

= THEREFORE, mental states are machine states specified in terms of their input, output and relations to other internal states by a deterministic/probabilistic machine table.

SO….anything that is capable of receiving inputs and giving outputs has a mind!!

Question 7

example of an input, output which would suggest a mind

Answer 7

Input -> toe collides with table, c-fibres fire
Mental state -> pain
Output -> crying out ‘ouch/ feeling upset and cross

Question 7

Carbon Chauvinism

Answer 7

=The view that only carbon based life forms such as humans can have minds.
If we define a mind by what it does (functional def) then minds are not limited to carbon life forms, but could be found in computers.

Question 8

How does functionalism solve the issue of multiple realisability for MBIT?

Answer 8

MBIT -> ms can only be realised by specific physical properties. This denies that animals with different brain structures could have minds.

Functionalism -> Does not make any claims as to what constitutes a mind, only that it functions as a mind. Therefore, minds can be realised in any object that fulfils a functional role of a mind.

Takes a functional rather than a compositional definition of ms

Question 9

how is functionalism ‘too liberal’? (con) + response

Answer 9

Functionalism is too willing to ascribe intelligence to just about anything that fulfils the relevant functional role.
We can describe the function of a light switch or thermostat in terms of inputs and outputs in a machine table BUT do they really have minds?

Response: Turing Test
= Alan Turing claimed that if a human interrogator asks AI and a human a question and is unable to tell which is which, it has a mind.
A machine that fools the human passes the test and is said to be thinking.
Therefore, the light switch and thermostat cannot have minds as they cannot deceive the human.

Question 10

How does Functionalism solve the circularity issue of behaviourism

Answer 10

Behaviourism -> We can get a full account of mental states from statements about beh. However, we need to refer to other ms to explain some ms (eg Dan’s fear of snakes is understood by his belief that snakes are dangerous).
Therefore, we cannot get a full account of ms from statements about beh alone.

Functionalism -> (does not analytically reduce language of physics/behavioural dispositions). It avoids circularity by explicitly recognising that mental states will cause and be caused by other mental states.
- ‘mental states’ = inner states that have causal power.
If believing it will rain is regarded as a machine state, it will not be regarded as a disposition to take one’s umbrella after looking at the weather report, but rather as a disposition to take one’s umbrella if one looks at the weather report and is in the state of wanting to stay dry.

Question 11

Does functionalism solve the follow dualist issues…
1) problem of other minds
2) location problem
3) problem of interaction

Answer 11

1) problem of other minds -> can identify a mind by observing inputs and outputs.
2) location problem -> it does not make sense to ask where a function is
3) problem of interaction -> there are no distinct substances/properties which need to interact.

Question 12

Qualia
-> why intrinsic
-> why non-intentional

Answer 12

=Intrinsic phenomenal features of mental states that are introspectively accessible.
-> subjective (the properties of ‘what it is like’ to undergo the ms in question). For many, qualia would be defined as the intrinsic/ non-representational properties of ms.

a. Intrinsic : Qualia cannot be analysed in terms of anything else (ie what causes them).

b. Non-intentional : A representational property cannot be intrinsic. Smt representational can do so accurately or not (eg a good or bad likeness in a painting), but to discuss thing in this term, is to analyse it in terms of smt else. My qualia of the colour red is just my experience and nothing more!

Question 13

Functionalism on Qualia (biggest ignorance)

Answer 13

• Functionalism struggles to account for qualia. If you think that ms can be fully defined in terms of functional roles, then you deny the existence of qualia. If you think ms can only be understood by experiencing them, then there is something missing from the functionalist account of mind.

Question 14

‘inverted qualia’ what is it?

Answer 14

Someone who sees an inverted spectrum of colours. Every time we see blue, they see red. However, if someone did experience things in this way, there would be no change in how they function - we would both agree the sky is blue (but what they call blue is my experience of red). This implies there is more to mind then function.

Question 15

Inverted Qualia arg

Answer 15

P1: It is conceivable that two functionally identical beings could have inverted qualia with respect to each other (eg experience diff colours).
P2: One being with inverted qualia would always act in the same way as the other - they would say all the same sentences, pick out all the same objects given the same request.
P3: If smt is conceivable it is logically possible
C1: Therefore, this ‘inversion scenario’ = log poss, then phenomenal props are not functional props.
C2: Therefore, phenomenal properties are not functional properties and so functionalism is not a complete account of the mind.

Question 16

Functionalism’s response to the ‘inverted qualia’ arg

Answer 16

• There would be minor functional differences between the 2 ppl who have diff phenomenal exp (colour blindness has a functional effect - they get confused in a way someone who is not colour blind doesn’t).
• Secondly, there is no empirical evidence from neuroscience that identical brain functioning gives rise to diff conscious experience. It is a poor empirical hypothesis since it proposed that there are empirical diff that are empirically undetectable. Science does not proceed by supposing undetectable facts. Therefore, not scientific.

Question 17

Block’s China Brain (against functionalism)

Answer 17

= China thought experiment -> explains a setup that is functionally identical to a brain but is clearly not the same thing.

The representation:
- population of china = millions of neurons
- 2 way radios = neurons firing
- people either receive inputs or give outputs = the functional role of the brain (as a series of inp/outp)
…Functionalism would claim the china brain (as a whole) would have mental states due to their functional roles.

For example, given the appropriate inputs (being stabbed) the china brain would be able to feel pain (a ms)

BUT…
- shows how 2 functional duplicates can differ mentally.
a) individual human: has qualia
b) population of china: does not
SO, functionalism fails as functional roles (inputs and outputs) are not sufficient for constituting a mind.

Question 18

Functionalism’s response to Ned Block’s China Thought Experiment
+ counter responses

Answer 18

1) Possibility of a ‘hive mind’
- Although functionalism cannot account for qualia, the objection still shows how functionalism can realise mental states.
- Functionalism: we can use functional roles (inputs/outputs) to show we have ms.
- The individual : performs simple functional roles that produces the appearance of a complex intelligence from the whole population.
- So the functional role of the individual realises the mental state of ‘intelligence’ for the whole.
R-> okay, but still cannot account for qualia which is a huge part in understanding our mind.

2) A functional duplicate is not physically possible
- Block argues: can conceive of a ‘china mind’ which is a functional duplicate of the brain.
- BUT… there are essential physical props (eg specific structure of the brain) which is required to produce certain elements of conscious activity.
- The analogy is too reductionist.

R-> must accept physicalism is true, so can use criticisms of physicalism (eg multiple realizability +carbon chauvinism) and so strengths of functionalism are lost,

Question 19

The knowledge arg/ Mary’s arg (against functionalism)

Answer 19

P1: If functionalism is true, having complete knowledge of all the functional facts about colour perception would be complete of all the mental facts involved in colour perception.
P2: Mary knows all the functional facts involved in colour perception.
P3: When Mary sees colour, she learns a new fact; what it’s like to experience red (qualia).
P4: If Mary learns a new fact, not all mental facts can be functional facts (since she already knows all these).
C1: Therefore, not all mental facts are functional facts. -> there are non functional facts about human colour vision.
C2: Therefore, functionalism is false. (or at least an incomplete account of mind)

Question 20

John Searle’s Chinese Room (against functionalism)
-> NOTE: not on spec but should use in an essay!!!!

Answer 20

= A man is locked in an enclosed toom with a postal slot which symbols are sent through (input) and sent out (output). The man is English so knows no Chinese.
In the room, there is a book of instructions which tells him how to manipulate the symbols but it is not a direct translation.
By following these, it would seem to a Chinese speaker posting questions into the slot and receiving the correct answers back, that the man knows and understands Chinese.

= This system would pas the Turing Test, but the man does not understand the meaning of the symbols, so his convo does not possess intentionality; so does not mean anything and isnt about anything. He is simply following rules (syntax).
- Searle claims this undermines the idea that we can understand the mind purely in functional terms. Part of having a mind is understand the meaning of what we are doing. This is smt a purely functional device cannot achieve (only have syntax NOT semantics).

Question 21

mental realisability def

Answer 21

= a single mental kind (property, state, event) can be realized by many distinct physical kinds