Mind-Brain Identity Theory (mind) Flashcards
What do MBIT claim
- make an ontological reduction that all mental states are identical to brain states (although all ‘mental states’ and ‘brain states’ are not synonymous/analytical reduction)
- Eg rain, sleet, snow and hail are all forms of precipitation, but they are all not identical with each other
-> a physicalist theory: everything is physical or supervenes on the physical
Mind Brain TYPE identity claims…
- Every mental ‘type’ of thing is a physical ‘type’ of thing.
- Each mental state isidentical to a type of neural process in the brain.
- Every mental state can be found to be directly correlated to some physical state in the brain.
eg a thought is a particular neuron firing
Analytical vs ontological reduction?
AR -> the language of one term can be reduced or broken down into the language of another term without loss of meaning.
(eg purple -> violet, lilac, indigo. lavender mean all the same/synonymous even if they’re not referring to the same thing).
OR-> reduces the nature of things// showing that beings or entities of one kind are in reality, the same as entities in another kind.
ie mental states -> brain states
How does a MBIT theorist understand a mental state like “being in pain”?
-Refers to pain receptors firing. But ‘pain’ and ‘pain receptors’ are not synonymous.
-MBIT would not say the state of being in pain and C fibres firing mean the same thing, we understand both concepts differently.
- When ‘I am in pain’ I am not referring to C fibres, and I don’t need to know about C fibres to know what pain is, so it is not an analytical reduction.
Difference between correlation and identity
Correlation -> occurs when two separate things occur or exist alongside one another (eg having taste buds is correlated with having a tongue but they are not the same thing)
Identity -> MBIT makes a stronger claim than just saying mental states are correlated with physical states, it is saying they are identical to each other (ie the brain is the mind).
-> supported by Phineas Gage (brain changed so did mind)
nomological dangler
Something that cannot be accounted for by normal laws. Therefore if physicalism is true mental states would be ‘nomological danglers’. (as the mind is not physical)
How does MBIT solve dualist arg (2)
Problem of interaction -> no problem since mind and brain are identical (both physical). It makes sense that whne the brain changes so does our mind.
Problem of other minds -> no problem since minds and brains are identical, so if there is an observable brain (ie MRI) then there is a mind.
Putnam’s objection of Multiple Realisability of Mental States
MR= the same mental property can be explained by diff physical properties
-MBIT claims that for every mental state there is a unique physical / chemical state of the brain.
-But if we can find a ms which can be applied to more than one bs (eg an animal with different brain states), then it cannot be true that there is a unique brain state for every mental state.
-Mental properties are not identical to physical properties as the same mental property can be related to (or supervene on) different physical properties
EXAMPLE:
If we take the mental state ‘being in pain’, we know Humans and other animals experience pain. However, a dog’s brain is different from a human’s brain. Therefore it doesn’t seem to be true that mental states are identical to brain states given that very different physical brains can give rise to the same mental state.
FORMAL ARG:
P1: Each type of mental state is multiply realisable through more than one distinct type of physical state.
P2: If each type of mental state is multiply realizable through more than one distinct type of physical state, then it cannot be identical to any specific type of physical state.
C1: No type of mental state is identical to any specific type of physical state.
P3: According to type identity theory, each type of mental state is identical to a specific type of physical state.
C2: Therefore MBTIT fails.
Dualist argument against MBTIT (indivisibility)
= The mind cannot be identical to the brain because the mind is not divisible while the brain is. By Leibniz’ Law they cannot be identical as they have different properties.
Dualist argument against MBTIT (conceivability)
= It is conceivable for the mind to exist without the body, as it is conceivable it is metaphysically possible use to LL mind and body have distinct properties and therefore are not identical.
-> basically saying mental states can exist without brain states so they cannot be identical
P1: It is conceivable that, for any type of mental state, someone has a particular type of mental state without having the brain state with which MBTIT claims is identical
P2: What is conceivable is metaphysically possible.
C1: Therefore, it is metaphysically possible for any type of mental state to exist in the absence of a brain state, with which MBTIT claims are identical.
P3: If one thing can exist in the absence of another, they cannot be the same.
C2: Therefore, mental states cannot exist as brain states.
Leibniz’s Location Problem (issue for MBTypeIT) + responses
P1: If mental states are identical to brain states, then they must share all their properties.
P2. Brain states have a precise spatial location, and stand in spatial relations to both other spatial locations and other physical objects (i can empirically observe neurons in the brain).
P3. Mental states are not located in space, at least in the same way. (when I experience a shade of red, I should be able to locate this mental state in the brain - according to MBTIT)
C1: But I cannot as mental states do not have the same location as brain states.
C2: Therefore, mental states are not brain states and MBTIT fails.
Response :
= Maybe it is not that mental states do not exist in the brain, rather neuroscience has not evolved enough for us to observe them.
Response against:
= That is a weak response you are putting faith that mental states have a location over empirical evidence that shows there is not.
