Property Dualism (mind)

Question 1

Substance Dualism vs Property Dualism

Answer 1

SD : claims there are distinct substances (non/physical and material) and that all mental properties are nonphysical. Mind and ms can exist in absence of physical substances.

PD: one substance (physical matter) which has 2 properties (mental/physical). ms are nonphysical states of physical substances.

Question 2

How does PD solve issues with SD and physicalism

Answer 2

issue: SD/physicalism cannot explain how physical substances give rise to consciousness (qualia/intentionality)

PD: bridges the gap as there are two distinct properties (mental and physical) but are both physical substances

Question 3

Supervenience

Answer 3

Supervene: a dependence relationship
-Mental properties depend upon physical properties and the way the world is physically determines the nature of mental states.
- mental properties supervene on physical properties (ie if our physical brain changes, so does out mental state) BUT the brain does not supervene on the mind.
-EG cannot change aesthetic props of a painting without changing physical properties.

Question 4

What does PD claim?

Answer 4

There are at least some mental props that are neither reducible to, nor superviene upon physical props.

Only one substance ; matter (physical)

2 distinct types of property exist:
a) physical; at least ones that are reducible to/supervene upon them
b) mental; nonphysical neither reducible nor supervenient to

Question 5

Define Qualia

Answer 5

= Intrinsic phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible. They are non-intentional, subjective aspects of conscious experience.
- . What it’s like to feel an experience.
- ie experiencing the colour of red is not the same as something being red.

Question 6

How does PD use Jackson’s K arg to challenge Physicalism?

Answer 6

P1: Mary knows all physical facts about colour before her release.
P2: Mary learnt new knowledge of non physical facts about colour on her release (qualia).
P3: Non physical facts are facts about non physical phenomenal properties.
C2: Therefore there are non physical property so physicalism is false

Question 7

ISSUE W/PD -> The ability knowledge arg

Answer 7

• Ability k : knowing how to do something
• Mary doesn’t learn a new ‘fact’ about colour. Instead, she has learnt how to recognize the color red.
  ( In the same way one wouldn’t learn a new ‘fact’ about riding a bike they would develop a new ability instead).

implications for K arg = The case of Mary is not something which counts against physicalism as it could Mary does know all facts about colour and later being able to recognize a colour doesn’t count as a fact. Therefore she gains no new propositional knowledge instead she gains ability knowledge as she is able to recognize physical properties that she had complete propositional knowledge about therefore doesn’t disprove physicalism.

Question 8

ISSUE W/PD -> The Acquaintance knowledge arg

Answer 8

• Acquaintance: knowledge gained via experience.
• Mary has gained acquaintance knowledge as she now has direct experience of colour rather than propositional knowledge like facts.

implications for K arg = Being acquainted with colour does not count as a new fact so she gains no new proposition or knowledge. She becomes acquainted for the first time with physical properties that she already had complete propositional knowledge about. I thought doesn’t disprove physicalism.

Question 9

ISSUE W/PD -> The ‘New knowledge’ / Old fact arg

Answer 9

We can know the same fact in multiple ways; a toddler learns what a triangle is (3 sided shape) but learns new things as they get older (EG 180 degrees equals interior angles)
= none of these new pieces of knowledge change the fact that the they knew what a triangle is.

• Mary gains a new concept of red but all along she knew what the colour red was. Didn’t learn a new fact about the world but a new perspective of the same fact (she had knowledge of physical concepts of red and now phenomenal concepts of red). She has not learnt a new fact, just added to what she already knew.

Question 10

How might a PD respond to the ability / acquaintance responses?

Answer 10

Not only ability/acquaintance k Mary gains: When she leaves, she gains knowledge of the following proposition…
“This is what it is like for people outside the black and white room to see red”.

Question 11

What is a philosophical zombie

Answer 11

Physically identical to the human, being (i.e. has all the same physical properties), but lacks consciousness (ie mental states).

Question 12

Philosophical arguments of property dualism (David Chalmers)
-> zombie arg

Answer 12

P1: It is conceivable that there are philosophical zombies.
P2: What is conceivable is metaphysically possible.
C1: Therefore, a philosophical zombie is metaphysically possible.
P3: If it is metaphysically possible that philosophical zombies exist, then phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical, nor supervene on physical properties, according to LL.
C2: If phenomenal properties are distinct from physical properties, then phenomenal properties cannot be reducible to physical properties.
C3: Therefore, physicalism is false/PD is true.

= If phenomenal mental states were identical to certain physical properties, it would not be metaphysically possible for something with those physical properties to exist without phenomenal mental states. Philosophical zombies are conceivable, and so are metaphysically possible. Therefore, at least some features of mental states are not identical to physical properties/functions. Physicalism is false and those features are nonphysical phenomenal properties.

Question 13

A philosophical zombie is not conceivable (issue against PD) + Chalmers response

Answer 13

P1: A philosophical zombie is a physical duplicate of a person without phenomenal consciousness
P2: A physical duplicate is a functional duplicate.
C1: Therefore, a zombie is a functional and physical duplicate of a person, but without phenomenal consciousness.
P3: Phenomenal properties are physical properties, realising particular functional roles.
P4: A physical and functional duplicate of a person with consciousness cannot both have and lack phenomenal consciousness.
C3: Therefore, philosophical zombies are not conceivable.

R-> He will question whether we have a complete analysis of consciousness which we do not.

Question 14

ISSUE PD ; What is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible

Answer 14

• whether or not smt is CONCEIVABLE : is determined by a priori reflection on concepts involved
• whether or not a smt is METAPHYSICALLY POSSIBLE : depends on the nature of things involved. The nature of things are sometimes discovered a posteriori (meaning sometimes they show what is conceivable is not metaphysically possible)

Eg It is conceivable that water is not H2O, but it is not metaphysically possible as water is H20.

Therefore, even if philosophical zombies are conceivable, it doesn’t follow that they are metaphysically possible; it may still be the case that mental properties, such as qualia, are identical (or reducible to) physical properties.

Question 15

Issue PD: what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world

Answer 15

= Just because philosophical zombies could exist in some possible world, why should we feel that this applies to our world? People conceive of certain theories all the time that are metaphysically possible, but science proves wrong, e.g. caloric acid. Therefore, property dualism has to do more than show philosophical, they need to show they could actually exist which they fail to do so.

Question 16

logical/physical/metaphysical possibility distinction

Answer 16

Logical -> what is possible without contradiction (large scope)

Physical -> what is possible in this world, given the laws of nature (middle scope)

Metaphysical-> what is possible in another world (even if not possible in our world) unless identity is a necessary relation

Question 17

Explain epiphenomenalism

Answer 17

= Something we can observe happening that does not have any causal impact.
‘epi’ - above (above smt observed to happen)

-> In this case, physical states can cause mental states but mental states cannot cause physical ones (they are inert).
-> Epiphenomenalism dualism if a version of property dualism

EG:
-The steam from a train is superfluous (causally inert). It does not help the train in anyway move/function.
- Similarly, our mental states from the physical brain are like the steam that appears from a train, they exist but cannot cause something to happen.

Question 18

What is the difference between epiphenomenalist dualism and interactionist dualism?

Answer 18

I -> Mental and physical properties, interact with one another-they are related in the cause of manner (SD) (eg ms can cause physical states; I raise my arm because I want to)

E-> Mental and physical properties do not interact with one another/ no causal relationship. (The physical world is a closed system; only physical can cause the physical).

Question 19

Introspective self-knowledge arg against epiphenomenalism (weaker obj) + response

Answer 19

Introspective self k-> knowledge about someone’s own mind and no one else’s, acquired through direct/immediate experience/awareness and so non-inferential.

P1: If epiphenomenalism is true, qualia have no causal effects.
P2: If qualia have no causal effects, then knowledge of mental states is impossible.
P3: But knowledge of mental states is possible (ie I can know I am in pain).
C1: Epiphenomenalism is false.

-> If EP is true, I cannot possibly know I am in pain as my pain (ms) does not cause anything. Therefore, it would be impossible for my pain to cause me to believe (and so know) that I am in pain. -> but we do know when we are in pain!

R-> Phenomenal properties (qualia) have no causal effect. We have the qualia of pain, and know we are in pain, but that knowledge is not of a result of the qualia, but a result of the physical changes in the brain.

Question 20

Phenomenology of our mental life (against ED)

Answer 20

= Argues that epiphenomenalism if counter-intuitive

Phenomenology: The philosophical and sometimes scientific study of consciousness and the objects of direct experience.
-> It appeals to the idea that when we study our experience, it really seems like our mental states have a causal effect (intuitive)

It really feels like when I decide to raise my arm, and then my arm goes up, that my mental state caused that physical state.
Therefore, it is odd and counter-intuitive to think epiphenomenalism is true as my belief that my mental states have a causal impact is in fact mistaken.

-> eg If I am hungry, I grab a snack. It appears that my mental state (hunger) had a causal impact (grabbing a snack).

Question 21

Hume’s response to Phenomenology of our mental life (for ED)

Answer 21

We cannot experience causation, we only experience two things…
1) the decision to raise my arm as a mental state
2) the feeling of my arm being raised

We don’t actually experience and causal link between them, so we cannot be certain the (1) caused (2).

When we study our experience (ie engage in phenomenology) this causal impact we think is there, is actually nowhere to be found.

Question 22

Natural selection/Evolution arg against ED

Answer 22

P1: Organisms with mental states have ultimately evolved from creatures that lack them and this is a result of natural selection.
P2: For natural selection to select a feature, it must be causally potent (ie its presence/absence bestows different causal powers on the organism that has it).
C1: Therefore, mental states have causal power.
P3: According to ED, mental states have no causal powers.
C2: Epiphenomenalism is false (as evolution is true).

= Natural selection selects those traits conductive to survival. If ms have evolved, they should be conductive to survival.
But ED claims ms have no effects and so cannot aid survival.
- This is absurd as we obviously do ( ie sensation of pain benefits an organisms survival by causing it not to go near the source of pain again).