Physicalism; Behaviourism (metaphysics Of Mind) Flashcards
Physicalism def
-> what does this mean for substance dualism
->how is consciousness explained
Aka materialism
= Everything is physical or supervenes upon the physical
-IF correct, dualism fails as the mind is not ontologically distinct from the physical.
INSTEAD : there is a relationship of supervenience between the mental and physical.
Therefore, physicalism aims to show consciousness (ms) can be explained purely in physical terms
Supervenience
(Supervene : a dependence relationship). -> Mental properties depend upon physical properties and the way the world is physically determines the nature of mental states.
Mona Lisa example:
There are physical properties of the Mona Lisa (paint, colour etc).
There are aesthetic properties of the Mona Lisa (beauty, elegance etc).
The aesthetic properties supervene on the physical properties because if the physical properties change (ie we add more paint) the aesthetic properties change.
= Therefore, mental properties supervene upon the physical properties. Ie -> if our brain changes (PHYS) so does our mind (MENTAL) as the mind supervenes on the brain (but never the other way around).
Strengths of Physicalism/Behaviourism
=It is compatible with science and science is successful.
Defines mental states as behaviours which are empirical. This makes the mind observable so it can be investigated scientifically.
1) Evolution -> conscious states began to evolve when the physical did.
2) Dementia -> neural structures linked to some behavioural incapacities (ie neural structures changed which led to memory issues)
3) Drugs -> mental states are altered by physical ones.
4) Avoids Dualist issues (problem of interaction /other minds)
Behavioursim
Mental states are analytically reducible to behaviours.
-> physicalist theory:; everything is physical or supervenes on the physical
Hard Behvaiourism (Hempel)
= Mental states are ALWAYS analytically reducible to the language of physics (physical stuff)
-> eg blood pressure rising is not a behaviour but could indicate ms of anger
- For a statement to have meaning, mental states must be known through empirical measures known as conditions of verifiability (a statement is only meaningful if it is empirical/observations we can make to check its truth).
=We need to be able to say what the conditions of verification are for a statement to have meaning.
So, psychological statements like “Bob is angry” are meaningful but only if we know how to verify them (ie via behaviour)
For example, we can know someone is angry if they show behaviour as such… yelling, raised blood pressure, clenched fists etc.
Conclusions of hard behviourism (Hempel)
- Statements only have meaning if they can be checked through condition of verification (the physical/beh observations we can make to check its truth ).
- Two statements will have the same meaning if they are both true/false under the same conditions of verification (ie ‘yelling’ and slamming fists on table are both conditions of anger, so mean the same).
analytical reduction vs ontological reduction
AR-> Shows that language of one term can be broken down into the language of another term without loss of meaning /reduces the meaning of language (ie from mental states -> beh)
OR-> reduces the nature of things (ie from mental states to brain states).//showing that beings or entities of one kind are in reality, the same as entities in another kind.
monism
a theory where there is only one kind of substance (matter)
ie physicalism/behaviourism
Soft Behaviourism (Ryle)
Ryle rejects the idea of verification, or claim that psychological statements can be translated without loss of meaning into statements which refer to behaviour.
INSTEAD -> Mental states can be analytically reduced to behavioural dispositions (the tendency to feel + do certain things in certain circumstances).
Ryle thinks we can use ordinary language to describe behaviour>rather than Hempel’s physical descriptions.
IE “Libby is thirsty” does not mean she needs to be displaying the behaviour of seeking a drink to know this ms; rather she is disposed to seek a drink and so if the opportunity arose she would.
- The dispositional analysis of a mental state must include a series of antecedent conditions (comes before) expressed as a hypothetical proposition to capture the potential behaviour a disposition may lead to.
hypo prop = “If…then…”
FOR EXAMPLE -> “You are thirsty” = “If you were in the right circumstances, then you would drink”.
= THEREFORE mental states, according to SB, refer to not only actual behaviour observed but the potential behaviour.
Hard beh vs Soft beh
HARD
= mental states are always analytically reducible to the language of physics (physical stuff)
-> eg blood pressure rising is not a behaviour but could indicate ms of anger
- empirical / there are a set of conditions under which psychological statements can be verified. (without loss of meaning).
- behaviour is a set of physical processes
- propositions about the mind can be reduced to statements about physics.
SOFT
= It is not always possible to fully translate mental states into physical ones without loss of meaning; mental states are reduced to behavioural dispositions (the tendency to feel certain things in certain circumstances).
- we can use ordinary language to talk about the mind and behaviour
- can use potential beh to explain ms via dispositions
Strength of behaviourism: solves dualist issues
1) Problem of interaction…
SD-> Mind and body are ontologically distinct substances; one is mental, one is physical. So, if they are distinct substances , with different properties (ie extended/unextended) then how do they interact? (is the mind a mysterious cloud above the body?).
Behaviorism denies mind and body are distinct substances; it is a physicalist theory (only matter/physical exists).
Instead, mental states can be known through observable behaviours> unobservable immaterial substances in causal interaction w/ the body.
Therefore, the issue of how they can interact dissolves.
2) Problem of other minds …
SD-> if minds were private and non physical we could not establish their existence( leading to solipsism).
Behaviourism -> mental states can be known by empirical means so we can know other minds exits through observing their behaviours/ behavioural dispositions, so can talk meaningfully about other minds
Dualist arguments against behaviourism (indivisibility + conceivability arg)
=leave out of an essay
INDIVISIBILITY
- Behavioursim denies Descartes’ clear + distinct ideas about matter and mind -> only one substance; matter as all meaningful statements about ms can be empirically identified via beh.
- Substance dualism argues that the mind and body must be separate substances as they have distinct properties. Leibniz’ Law -> A=B iff whatever can be said of A, can be said of B.
- MIND : unextended and indIvisible
- BODY : extended and divisible
= THEREFORE, Mind and body are not identical and so are ontologically distinct substances.
CONCEIVABILITY
- Behaviourism denies Descartes clear and distinct ideas about matter and mind; we cannot conceive of them being distinct.
- SD says we can cos we can.
(Weak objections)
Dualist arguments against behaviourism (qualia)
-> most convincing
= Beh ignores the phenomenal features of the mind, which are required for a proper theory of mind. For example, our mental states always have intentionality (are about smt)
Qualia: the ‘feelings’ or experience we have.
They are intrinsic phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible.
Eg Jackson’s knowledge argument
P1: Mary knows all the physical facts about seeing colours before being released from her black in the white room.
P2: On being released, she learns new facts about seeing colours.
C1: Therefore, when she sees colour for the first time, she is gaining new knowledge.
C2: Despite knowing all the physical facts, there are additional facts about the universe. Therefore, there are phenomenal properties that are non-empirical/non-physical.
Link to behaviourism…
If physicalism is false, and Mary knows all the behavioural facts about seeing colours, but gains knowledge, then having behaviour is not sufficient for describing mental states.
Asymmetry between self knowledge and knowledge of others mental states (issue with behaviourism)
Self-knowledge:
- direct and non inferential (acquired by introspection)
- certain (impossible to doubt)
- infallible (can never be wrong about your own mind)
- incorrigible (no one can correct you on your claims about your mind)
- transparency (nothing about ones mind that one does not know)
- possible
Knowledge of others mental states:
- indirect and uncertain
- fallible
- corrigible
- non- transparency
- impossible
Therefore, if behaviourism is true, there should be no asymmetry. This is a particular issue for hard behaviourism as soft, behaviourism claims that we can still find out about others mental states by asking (however this is a weak a response as ppl can lie).
DoClubsInIrelandTakePennys
The distinctness of mental states from behaviour (issue for behaviourism)+ ryles response
Perfect actors:
People display behaviours that do not correlate with their mental state (ie someone may scream in apparent fear but they are actually actors who are happy)
= If a person displays a behaviour but does not have the corresponding mental state then Behaviour is not sufficient for mental states
Super Spartans:
People who have the mental state, but do not show it via their behaviour (ie I may be in pain when I stub my toe but I do not yelp or wail)
= If we can still claim they have a mental state, Behaviour is not necessary for mental states
Therefore, behaviourism is neither necessary or sufficient for mental states.
Response: perfect actors are not normal people, their dispositions are that they do not show the corresponding beh
