Substance Dualism (mind)

Question 1

-Intentionality

Answer 1

Intentionality is the quality of certain mental states which directs them beyond themselves and to the world. They are about something other than themselves. For example, you cannot just have fear, belief or hope, you have to believe, fear or have hope about something.

EG ‘I believe it is raining’ -> ‘Rain’ is something out in the world which my belief is directed towards.

Question 2

Qualia + its properties

Answer 2

Qualia are the ‘feelings’ or experience we have.
They are intrinsic phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible. They are non-intentional, subjective aspects of conscious experience.
- ie experiencing the colour of red is not the same as something being red.
QUALIA ARE SUBJECTIVE

what it feels like to be conscious (ie what it feels like to be tickled)
Qualia are
- subjective
- known via introspection
- infallible/cannot be mistaken (if you feel pain; you know you are in pain)
- ineffable/ cannot be described )ie cannot explain to a blind man what the colour red is like)
- intrinsic
-private

Question 3

Substance

Answer 3

Smt that depends on nothing else for it’s existence.
- It is ontologically basic -> substances are the things from which everything else is made and sustained.
-A substance exists independently form other substances.

Question 4

Descartes’ wax and cogito example leading to knowledge arg

Answer 4

We know our mind better than the physical (our body). Physical can be doubted as sense data is deceiving (wax) as the devil can deceive (cogito) but we must know our mind exists as a rational intuition (our mind is indubitable).

Knowledge arg:
P1: Body can be doubted (wax).
P2: Mind cannot be doubted (cogito).
P3: Leibniz law
C: Mind and body are distinct substances.

Question 5

Leibniz’ Law (aka Identity of Indiscernibles)

Answer 5

A = B iff
i) whatever can be said of A
ii) can also be said of B

= So, for two objects to be the same, they must share all their properties.

Question 6

Substance Dualism def

Answer 6

Explains the irreducibility of mental states claiming that our minds are ontologically distinct substances to our physical bodies.

So, we are composed of two separate substances - one mental (non-extended and indivisible), one physical (extended and divisible) - with different properties, both of which can exist independently of each other but are not linked.

Question 7

2 features of mental states

Answer 7

Mental states are either intentional (they are about, or represent something) or phenomenal (they are subjective experience - qualia).

Question 8

What are ‘phenomenal’ properties?

Answer 8

Phenomenal properties are also known as “qualia”. Qualia are intrinsic phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible. They are non-intentional, subjective aspects of conscious experience.

Question 9

Indivisibility argument ( for SD )

Answer 9

P1: The body has parts and can be divided ( I can conceive of physical bodies being divided).// Res extensa
P2: The mind is singular and I cannot conceive of it being divided. It is not extended. (res cogitans) -> Descartes uses the example of introspection. When you look into your own mind you cannot detect there are any parts to divide.
P3: By Leibniz’s law for two things to be the same they must share all their properties.
C: The mind and body cannot be identical, they are ontologically distinct substances (minds aren’t bodies).

Question 10

Conceivability argument ( for SD )

Answer 10

(P1) I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mind existing without my extended physical body existing.
(P2) Anything that I can clearly and distinctly conceive of is metaphysically possible
(C1) Therefore, my mind existing without my extended physical body is metaphysically possible.
(P3) If it is metaphysically possible for X to exist without Y then X is not identical to Y. (Leibniz’s law)
(C) Therefore, my mind is not identical with my extended physical body (nor is it identical with any part of the physical world).

Question 11

unextended vs extended

Answer 11

unextended -> doesn’t exist in space/ non physical
extended -> does exists in space/ physical

Question 12

Response to the indivisibility argument (against SD)

Answer 12

1) The mind is divisible
-Neuroscience -> A treatment of epilepsy involves cutting the corpus callosum which severs the link between the two hemispheres. This results in two streams of consciousness in the same person. Therefore, if consciousness can literally be divided when the brain is divided, the mind is divisible, just like our body.
RESPONSE FROM DESCARTES -> The mind is separate not split

2) Not everything physical is divisible
- Physical states of the body (ie being wet) cannot be divided by are not non-physical substances.
(WEAK )RESPONSE -> We know that anything Physics tells us ends up being disproved, if physics tells us wetness cannot be divided, in a couple of decades we may be able to

Question 13

Why would empiricists argue that the mind without the body is not conceivable? (problems of interaction)

Answer 13

Ayer’s
-Substance dualism claims that mind is a non-physical substance. This means the mind cannot be detected by empirical means - according to Ayer’s VP, Descartes claim it is meaningless/nonsense.
- Breaks the law of physics, something cannot come from nothing.

Hume’s
-Humes would say that there is no empirical evidence of a causal link.
-> mind is unobservable
-> the idea that the body is caused to move by a mind is also unobservable
> therefore, we can only observe physical things.

Question 14

What is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible : Against the Conceivability Argument

2 arguments

Answer 14

1) Someone who is not familiar with the theorem could easily conceive of a right angle triangle with sides that did not fit Pythagoras’ equation (ie A2 + B2 NOT = C2).
So, maybe conceivability is not a good guide for what is possible. It is conceptually possible, not metaphysically.

x human ignorance -> just because you can conceive the opposite does not make it correct. So, the fact that you can conceive of something in two different ways (mental/physical) does not entail you are thinking of two different things. It could be the same thing understood differently ( eg 2 mountains, 2 tribes acc is 1 mountain from 2 diff sides).

2) The masked man fallacy:
P1: ik Batman is a caped crusader
P2: ik Bruce Wayne is a playboy millionaire
C: Batman is not Bruce Wayne
= Descartes uses similar reasoning which is also fallacious as P1 + P2 = true, but the C is not. He has an incomplete concept of body and mind, so is conceiving them as different substances when metaphysically they are the same.

Question 15

Descartes response to what is conceivable not being metaphysically possible

Answer 15

Descartes would argue his idea of mind and body is different to the triangle example as it is clear and distinct. Descartes say mind and body could not be mixed up in the same way as Batman and Bruce Wayne or Pythagoras.

Question 16

What does a Dualist believe?

Answer 16

That mental properties are irreducible to physical properties. Therefore, we can never fully explain our consciousness.

Question 17

What is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world (against conceivability arg)

Answer 17

Even if we can conceive of mind and body as distinct substances, Descartes has not proven it impossible that they are part of the same substance. Therefore, Descartes must prove that it is impossible the mind is a property of physical substances for his view to be accepted.

Question 18

The problem of interaction (conceptual)

Answer 18

= given the two concepts, how could they possibly interact?

P1: it is inconceivable for one object to move another without contact
P2: if it is inconceivable, it is impossible for one object to move another without contact
P3: for two objects to be in contact with one another they must both be extended (physical)
P4: the mind is not extended
P5: the body is extended (so cannot be ‘in contact’ with the mind)
C1: it is impossible for a non-extended mind to move (interact with) an extended body.
C2: substance dualism is false.

Question 19

The Problem of Interaction (evidential/empirical)

Answer 19

Law of conservation of energy: energy cannot be created or destroyed, only transferred from one thing to another (where does the ‘energy’ of the mind come from? )

P1: by the law of conservation of energy, the total amount of energy in the universe (a closed system) remains constant
P2: any non-physical to physical causation would have to involve an addition of energy to the physical world
C1: non-physical to physical causation is not empirically possible
C2: SD is false.

Question 20

Problem of other minds (against SD)

Answer 20

I know i exist (Descartes cogito).
I cannot know the minds of others, so i cannot know they exist (solipsism).
= if Descartes is right, i can only know my mind for certain, not others.
THEREFORE…
Everyone else could be either a….
1) philosophical zombies: a physical duplicate of a person lacking consciousness (a mind).
2) Super-Spartans: someone trained to not show any physical or behavioural signs of mental states (not even brain processes!). Ie they may feel pain when they stub their toe, but they show no outward signs of pain (not even a wince)

Question 21

The two responses to the problem of other mind

Answer 21

Mills argument from analogy
Russells best hypothesis

Question 22

Mills argument from analogy (against the problem of other minds) + issues

Answer 22

P1: I know that when I stub my toe I experience pain so I often yelp in agony.
P2: I know when I have seen other people stub their toe they have also yelped in agony.
P3: By analogy, other people yelping in agony must mean they are also in pain.
P4: There are many other similarities between mine and other’s behaviour.
C1: Therefore, from these similarities I can know by analogy that other mind’s exist.

Issues:
counter examples -> those that stub their toe and do not yelp. Mill would claim they are not in pain when they may be (not empirical can never know)
-> inductive (conc is not guaranteed). Not strong inductive as the conc rests on a single case (my mind). Could we draw the conclusion that ppl unlike me don’t have minds? What about robots?

Question 23

Russell’s best hypothesis (against the problem of other minds) + issue/response

Answer 23

P1: Either minds exist or only my mind exists (solipsism)
P2: I cannot prove this claim is true or false.
C1: Therefore, I have to treat them as hypotheses.
P3: The hypothesis that other minds exist is better.
C2: Therefore, other minds exist.

Issue: only a hypothesis so cannot know for certain, could be wrong (inductive asw)
Strength: Abductive argument (inference to the best explanation) so there is no other argument that can be more strongly argued.

Question 24

Responses to the empirical problem of interaction (Descartes)

Answer 24

Responses:
1) Descartes’ pineal gland:
-> The mind doesn’t immediately affect the whole body or brain, just a small part - the pineal gland.
- ISSUE: the pineal gland is physical/ extended. Descartes has only identified a location, he has not explained how the causation occurs

2) Leibniz’ Pre establish Harmony:
-> Leibniz agreed with Descartes that the mind could not possibly interact with the body but he explains why it SEEMS that way…God made the world in such a way that events occurring to the body occur to the mind. It appears as though mind goes along with body, they operate in parallel but don’t causally interact!

Question 25

Ryle’s ‘category mistake’ argument (against sd)

Answer 25

Category mistake -> assigning a concept to a logical category to which it wouldn’t belong (eg to assign numbers to the category of things which have weight). Its a logical/semantic mistake.

= Ryle states the sd is making a category mistake in assigning the concept of ‘mind’ to the category of ‘thing’/‘substance’.
The mind is not an object over and above the body, so it makes no sense to assume we can talk meaningfully about something that is non-physical and not empirical. Therefore, the term mind does not refer to a separately existing identity.