Eliminative Materialism (mind) Flashcards
3 features of folk-psychology ( + def)
=use all of this when explaining FP
=Folk psychology is our common sense understanding of the mind.
1) Ordinary understanding of mind
= Develops among people without any special education, and distinct from a scientific understanding.
2) Posit existence of inner mental state
= For example, intentional states (intentionality) and phenomenal
properties (can account for qualia).
3) It uses theoretical concepts to explain and predict human beh.
= We can use ordinary concepts, for example free will, to explain why people do what they do. (personal explanation)
Churchland’s reasons why he believes folk-psychology is false. + issue
1) Poor explanatory power
= How much does it explain? Not a lot; it cannot explain mental illness, memory, perception, why we dream etc. (neuroscience can)
2) Lack of progress
= No progress since ancient greeks; whereas neuroscience grows in its explanations.
3) Difficulty of commensurability
= We cannot make folk-psychology coherent with scientific theories (ie the central concept of intentionality).
- ie use to think germs were passed on by ‘bad air’ (folk-psychology) but this has been abandoned since the development of a more scientific germ theory.
4) Other ‘folk’ explanations have been eliminated
=19th century -> caloric fluid responsible for objects getting hotter and heavier
-> was tested to be false, heat is kinetic energy of molecules caused by motion>fluid causes heat
-> therefore, eliminated caloric fluid as it could not explain properly ; same will occur with ms (taken over by neuroscience).
PeopleLikeDarkOreos
X Paul Churchland’s reasons rely on faith and hope. How does he undoubtably know that neuroscience will solve all these problems? Just because it, so far, seems to grow in explanation does not mean it will forever (could decline).
what is elimintavism / eliminative materialism + what do they claim
= Some or all statements about mental states are false given that folk-psychology’s account of mind is radically mistaken. Therefore must define things in scientific terms like neuroscience >folk-psychology.
- Some or all mental states that folk-psychology claims exists do not exist.
- Mental concepts we use do not actually exist as things ontologically distinct to the brain. There are no minds to be reduced.
elimination vs ontological reduction?
An ontological reductionreduces one entity to another (identifies two properties as actually being the same)
-> but it is not correct to say caloric acid is an ontological reduction of heat as they are not the same
= best explanation is to eliminate it and say it doesn’t exist at all.
what does it mean to be an eliminativist about smt?
=to get rid of something completely
eg an atheist is an eliminativist about God
MBIT vs EM
MBIT -> ms exist and are ontologically reducible to brain states
EM -> ms do not exist, so no phenomena needs to be reduced.
MBIT-> sees folk psychology/ordinary language about the mind as making meaningful and true claims.
EM > sees folk psychology/ordinary language about the mind will be shown to be false by neuroscience.
Behaviourism vs EM
= Both try and explain the language we use but they understand it diff.
EM : Folk psychology/ordinary language about mind is mistaken/false.
Ryle’s Soft beh : can talk about the mind using ordinary language in meaningful ways. (Behavioural dispositions)
Hempel’s Hard beh: can talk about the mind using language of physics.
= EM disagrees only in that the mind is not a thing that can be meaningfully spoken about as it does not exist.
issue w/EM : certainty about the existence of our ms (Descartes)
- Science is always open to doubt but Descartes demonstrates smt which is not open to doubt; the existence of our mind.
P1: Through introspection I know that my mind and me exist. I have direct awareness of them.
P2: This knowledge survives radical doubt (ie evil demon) which leaves the claim of science open to doubt.
C1: Therefore, any claims supported by science/EM cannot cast doubt over the knowledge of my mind or my ms.
- Descartes argues we exist as a thinking thing (cogito -> survives 3 waves of doubt so i think therefore i exist).
- This is a deductive arg, so if true, is certain
- We can reject for certain the claim that ms do not exist
How could an EM respond to the issue that we have certainty about the existence of our ms
- Descartes misunderstand eliminativism.
- The claim is NOT that we believe there is nothing at all - we do not deny the existence of psychological phenomena.
- We accept these occur but doubt folk psychology is the best explanation of their nature.
- It is incorrect to say there is a mind behind the phenomena’s -> neuroscience will show it is just the result of a working brain.
= EM doesn’t have an issue with psychological phenomena’s rather FP’s explanation of psychological phenomena’s.
issue w/EM : FP has good predictive and explanatory power (best hypothesis)
1) FP has good explanatory power; explained human behaviour successfully> Isn’t intended to explain the complexity of the biological brain (neurons, sleep, mental illness etc). Neuroscience is not very good at explaining why people do the things they do. For example cannot explain freewill so FP is better.
2) There has been a great deal of development; Ancient Greeks didn’t have a concept of a subconscious mind, but we do now (Freud). We also understand character changes over time, when they use to understand character as being more fixed.
3) Coherence with science is more complicated; While science cannot explain the idea of intentionality, we cannot eliminate it from FP as it is good at explaining human behavior, so we need to find a way to make it commensurable; perhaps science needs to change some fundamental assumptions. (weakest arg for FP)
Churchland’s response to the issue of EM that FP is the best hypothesis
1-> Explanatory power; we need to know how human behavior relates to the rest of mental life. Not clear on how FP links with neuroscience (cannot be both).
2-> Developments; these are relatively superficial and still far less powerful than those in neuroscience.
3-> Commensurability/coherency; The challenge of explaining how physical states can have intentionality remains.
Objection of EM: self-refuting
P1: According to FP, belief is a mental state.
P2: EM asserts that FP is false.
P3: Assertions are expressions of beliefs.
C1: Therefore EM believes that FP is false.
C2: Therefore EM believes that belief is not a genuine mental state.
P4: C2 involves a logical contradiction.
C3: Therefore EMS self refuting.
= The argument states EM cannot be articulated as to do so as a logical contradiction. To process theory, one must believe it, but this uses FP to argue that FP is false. Therefore, by EM believing that FP is false, EM is using FP to give its claim; self refuting.
Paul Churchland’s response to EM being self-refuting
- The argument begs the question (Assumes what it is trying to prove).
-> It only works if one assumes that FP is true (eg P1: belief is a ms).
-> We have good reason to think that it isn’t, so it isn’t an effective objection.
FP’s response to Churchland about beg the question (+ churchlands response)
-> FP is not an empirical theory it is a condition of intelligibility that makes thinking/experience possible.
-> We need FP to make sense of the world around us - it is necessary (has to be true, eliminating/opposite of FP is a logical contradiction).
-> As such, it is reducible and cannot be demonstrated to be false; it’s explanatory power doesn’t matter.
RR-> unfalsifiable; meaningless if not empirical
Qualia objection against EM (only use in essays)
+ RESPONSE
1) ZOMBIE ARG:
- philosophical zombies: physically identical duplicates of humans that lack consciousness
- EM as a physicalist theory: claims that some or all statements about mental states are false given that folk-psychology’s account of mind is radically mistaken. Therefore must define things in scientific terms like neuroscience (physicalist theory; all that exists is matter)
- conceivable -> metaphysically possible (phenomenal properties not physical nor supervene on physical properties)
-phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to physical properties
- Cannot account for qualia (intrinsic phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible. They are non-intentional, subjective aspects of conscious experience).
PHYSICALISM IS FALSE
R-> qualia doesn’t exist (ask dan)
