Notes, Warnings, Cautions Flashcards
EMIF - 2 Warnings
W: Flying with greater than 110% torque with one engine inoperative may result in unrecoverable decay of Nr in the event of a dual-engine failure.
W: With engine anti-ice on, up to 18% torque available is lost. Torque may be reduced as much as 49% with improperly operating engine inlet anti-ice valves.
Engine High Side Failure in Flight - 3 Notes
N: Ng does not pass through the EDECU and is a highly reliable signal.
N: Torque signal may be erratic or drop off for high side conditions driven by EDECU failure.
N: With high collective settings, Nr may increase slowly, making high-side failure confirmation difficult.
Engine Torque or TGT Spiking/Fluctuations - 1 warning, 1 note
W: PCL movement during engine fluctuations may precipitate an engine failure.
N: Maintaining a low power setting when moving the PCL will minimize the Nr decay rate if the malfunctioning engine fails.
Abort Start - 1 Caution
C: During aborted starts, failure to immediately stop fuel flow may result in engine over temperature.
Engine Air Restart - 1 warning, 1 caution, 1 note
W: if APU is unavailable, and a crossbleed start is necessary, maximum torque available will be reduced during the start sequence. Depending on operating conditions, level flight may not be possible.
C: Receiving engine Ng less than 24% prior to advancing PCL to IDLE may result in a hot start.
N: Failure to ensure AIR SOURCE ECS/ START switch is in ENG prior to crossbleed start will result in a failed engine start.
Ground Resonance/Unusual Vibrations on Deck - 2 warnings, 2 cautions
W: Ground resonance can occur rapidly (within 3 seconds), and produce violent lateral, vertical, and circular vibrations, resulting in difficulty reaching the PCLs, pilot induced oscillations and possible dynamic rollover.
W: Failure to ensure that ground personnel are clear of the rotor arc and aircraft is free from the deck or chains may result in loss of aircraft or ground personnel.
C: Application of the rotor brake may aggravate lead/lag tendencies and cause a mechanical failure.
C: Continued operations with unusual on deck vibrations may result in rotor system damage or mechanical failures.
Main Transmission Malfunction - 2 warnings, 2 notes
W: Possible indication of main transmission imminent failure may include: yawning attitude excursions with no control input, an increase in power required for a fixed collective setting, failure of a main generator or hydraulic pump, increased noise, increased vibration levels, or abnormal fumes in the cabin.
W: Operation of the main gearbox with no oil pressure may result in loss of tail rotor drive.
N: A minimum power airspeed and low altitude flight profile (80 feet 80 KIAS) permits a quick flare prior to ditching.
N: A loss of all main transmission lubricating oil may result in unreliable temperature indications from the main transmission temperature gauge and temperature sensor (caution).
Tail/Intermediate Transmission Malfunction - 2 warnings, 2 notes
W: Possible indications of tail rotor imminent failure may include tail/intermediate transmission cautions accompanied by strong medium-frequency vibrations and/or hot metal fumes or any other associated indications.
W: High power settings require maximum performance of the tail rotor drive system and may precipitate ultimate drive failure.
N: Transiting at an altitude sufficient to enter an autorotation is recommended.
N: An INT XMSN OIL HOT or TAIL XMSN OIL HOT caution occurring simultaneously with a WCA MISCOMPARE alert may be an indication of a mission computer/backup computer card failure.
Tail Rotor Quadrant Caution - 1 Note
N: Removing hydraulic power with a single tail rotor cable failure will disconnect the other cable.
Loss of Tail Rotor Control - 4 warnings, 1 note
W: Servo hardcovers in the yaw channel may result in loss of tail rotor control.
W: After touchdown, rapid reduction of collective or PCLs may cause excessive and uncontrollable yaw rates.
W: if an uncontrolled right yaw develops at too low of an airspeed, loss of wave off capability may result. Increasing collective may increase the yaw to unrecoverable rates. Performing Loss of Tail Rotor Drive (Altitude and Airspeed Not Sufficient to Establish Autorotation) procedure may be required.
W: If the tail rotor control cables are damaged, the hydraulic transients associated with switching the TAIL SERVO switch from NORM to BKUP may cause catastrophic damage to the tail rotor controls.
N: A momentary uncommanded right yaw will occur when the tail rotor servo switches from normal to backup in a hover. The rate and magnitude will primarily depend on power required and wind direction and magnitude.
1 Primary Servo or #1 Transfer Module Leak - 1 warning
Failure to ensure BACKYP HYD PUMP switch is in AUTO or ON position prior to landing with a #1 RSVR LOW or #1 HYD PUMP caution present will result in a loss of tail rotor directional control when the WOW switch is activated.
2 Primary Servo or #2 Transfer Module Leak - 1 caution
C: Landing with the BACKUP HUD PUMP switch in OFF position with a #2 HYD PUMP caution will result in loss of pilot assist servos when the WOW switch is activated.
Boost Servo Hardover - 1 note
N: Up to 75 pounds of left pedal force will be required when hovering with boost servos off with starboard crosswinds. This value is significantly reduced with port crosswinds.
Stab Auto Mode Failure - 3 warnings, 1 note
W: The stabilator may fail without illumination of the associated caution and aural warning tone. Initial indication of failure may be an uncommanded pitch change during accelerated or decelerated flight.
W: If accelerated flight is continued with the stabilator in the full down position, longitudinal control will be lost.
W: A combination of high airspeed/low altitude coupled with a runaway down stabilator will necessitate immediate pilot action to maintain control of the aircraft.
N: In manual mode, the following are not recommended:
Swimmer deployments lower than 15’ AGL
Night takeoffs, approaches and landings
Auto approaches to a hover
Simulated emergency procedures, including practice autos
Flight in known IMC
Electrical Power/Dual Gen Failure - 2 warnings, 2 notes
W: Loss of electrical power to the engine will result in engine anti-ice activation regardless of ENG ANTI-ICE or DE-ICE MASTER switch position, reducing maximum torque available by up to 18%. With a malfunctioning inlet anti-ice valve, torque available can be reduced by as much as 49%.
W: Exceeding airspeed versus stabilator angle limits may result in unrecoverable pitch angles.
N: The capability of slewing the stabilator is retained via the DC essential bus using battery power. Travel is limited to 35 degrees if full down or 30 degrees if full up when a power failure occurs.
N: The stabilator position indicator will be inoperative with no power to the ac essential bus.
