Lecture 8

Question 1

Functions of IGO’s

Answer 1

o Forums, instruments, actors
 Contradiction IGO’s
* Sometimes IGO’s are forums, sometimes instruments and sometimes as actors

Question 2

International regimes

Answer 2

o Rules, decision-making procedures and organizations that govern behaviour within a region or issue-area
 Usually involve formal treaty and/or formal IGO, not necessarily

Question 3

Examples of international regimes

Answer 3

 Antarctica regime
* Antarctic treaty and 200 other agreements
* Since 2014, secretariat in Buenos Aires
 Ozone regime
* Montreal protocol and Vienna convention
* Multilateral fund

Question 4

IGO’s and international regimes

Answer 4

o Single IGO may be active in multiple regimes
 UN in int. human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, int. refugee regime and many more
o Single regime may include multiple IGOs
 Nuclear non-proliferation regime includes
* Int. atomic energy agency, London suppliers group and UN SC

Question 5

IGO’s differ in various ways

Answer 5

Membership, function, formality, decisionmaking

Question 6

Membership differences IGO’s

Answer 6

 Limited – open to states with a given character (regional/cultural/whatever)
* OPEC, EU
 Universal – open to all states
* UN

Question 7

Function differences IGO’s

Answer 7

Issue area, geographic space, promoting particular culture or set of values or mixed, to govern an issue area within geographic space

Question 8

Decision making

Answer 8

 Intergovernmental = IO policies are made collectively by member states
* Consensus
o Unanimity – every member has veto but can abstain
o Consensus minus one – to prevent veto by single state
* Majority
o 50% plus one
o Super majority, more than 50% plus one
o Weighted majority, based on size or contribution
* Mixed
o Some have veto, others don’t
o No veto plus majority
 Supranational = IO policies are made by an executive, legislative, or judicial body that operates without (direct) control by member-states

Question 9

What factors shape design, creation and reform of IGO’s

Answer 9

 Shared interests, power, shared normative aims, past choices

Question 10

Shared interests Keohane 1982

Answer 10

 Keohane 1982
 Interdependence exposes states to external risks and creates opportunities to achieve joint gains (states have to be aware of this)
 Int. institutions help states to manage interdependence through mutually beneficial agreements
 Which IO design will states demand (read support)
* Demand for various IO designs “will vary directly with desirability of agreements to states and with ability of each design actually to facilitate making of agreements” (p. 152)

Question 11

Shared interests and IO design; hypotheses

Answer 11

 Koremones et al 2001
 States design international institutions in order to overcome cooperation problems and achieve joint gains
 Assumptions
* States shared interests shape design of institutions
* States behave rationally, they compare costs and benefits of alternative IO designs
 Argument; nature of cooperation -> choices on institutional design

Question 12

Power (shaping IGO’s)

Answer 12

 Gruber 2000
 Strong states promote institutions that maximise self interest
 Weak states accept these institutions when rejecting them would be more costly
 When new great powers emerge, the create and impose new rules (or IGOs)

Question 13

Normative aims and IO design

Answer 13

 Ruggie 1982
 Design of int. institutions is shaped by shared normative aims of states that create them, not just by state power or shared interests
 Post ww2
* Govts wanted an int. economic order that would advance social welfare
* Result; int. institutions were designed to balance growth via tariff reductions and welfare via domestic social protections – embedded liberalism
 Post cold war
* Govts wanted an int. economic order that would maximise economic growth
* Result; WTO was designed to promote tariff reductions and to limit ability of govts to adopt social protections – neo liberalism

Question 14

Past choices and IO re-design

Answer 14

 Hanrieder 2014
 Past decisions on IO design shape current options and decisions
 Example; existing IO rules may enable member states to resist radical re-design, even when facing strong functional incentives for change
 Result; 2 irrational responses to functional incentive for IO change
* Layering; IO gains new functions despite not fulfilling old functions. Example, int. labour org adopts new conventions even though many old conventions aren’t ratified or implemented
* Drift; IO isn’t updated so it survives but becomes less effective.

Question 15

Informal intergovernmental orgs

Answer 15

 Vabulas and Snidal 2013
 IIGO example
* Proliferation security initiative
* 107 states
* Shared goal; to prohibit illicit transfer of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials to and form states and non-state actors
* No legal status or permanent staff
* Military and law enforcement personnel from PSI states convene periodically for training exercises

Question 16

When do states prefer IIGO vs FIGO?

Answer 16

It depends on functional efficiency
“States opt for… IIGOs when the advantages of lower sovereignty and
negotiation costs, flexibility and speed outweigh the need for enforcement,
commitment, consensus, and bureaucratic centralization.” (219)
It depends on power
* Status quo states are likely to prefer FIGOs (to lock in their power & policy
preferences).
* Rising states are likely to prefer IIGOs (to avoid binding commitments that
they may regret later, when they’re stronger).
* Rising states won’t challenge FIGOs (they’re hard & costly to reform) until
the gap between institutionalized power and actual power is large.
* As rising states gain power, they are likely to challenge or create new
IIGOs, which are easier & cheaper to reform than FIGOs.