Lecture 12 Flashcards
Redistributions of power destabilise existing int. rules and institutions
Mearsheimer 94/95
Great powers create international rules and institutions in order to
maintain or increase their share of world power.
* Redistributions of power weaken the foundations of existing international
rules and institutions…. and often lead to war.
* New great powers create new rules and institutions.
Redistributions of power dont necessarily destabilize existing int. rules and institutions
Keohane 1984
Hegemons (great powers) create int’l order (rules on trade, etc.) that
benefits them, and use their power to maintain it.
* Wise hegemons create int’l order that also provides public goods (benefits
accessible to all).
* As hegemon declines, other states fear loss of public goods, so they invest
in maintaining existing rules and institutions.
Rising powers seek recognition and voice
Zala & Newman 2018
Argument: The difficulty of adapting int’l order to rising powers depends on
what these states are contesting & demanding.
Question: How are rising powers challenging int’l order?
* Normative contestation: content of int’l rules, kind of order they support
* Representational contestation: who gets to set and oversee int’l rules
Method: study language used in summits of BRICS leaders
Finding: China and Russia often accept basic int’l norms while contesting
representation – they are more focused on great power status & multipolar
decision-making than on normative change
Rising powers favour hybrid int. order
Stephen 2014
States’ behaviour is shaped by the character of global capitalism.
* When economic growth required territorial gain conflict over territory.
* Now, economic growth via integration in world economy conflict over
management of the world economy.
Rising powers’ dilemma:
* Increased dependence on world economy support for status quo.
* Statist forms of development tension with liberal principles of free
market and individual rights.
* Result: Rising powers pursue a hybrid order: more transnational
integration but based on less liberal principles.
China pursues hybrid strategy on int. order
ten Brink, Graaff & Parmar 2020
Factors shaping China’s strategy on int’l order:
* National development via global market integration.
* State-directed capitalism around the nexus of business and the
Communist party-state.
Result:
* China is pursuing a hybrid strategy, combining adaptation, confrontation,
and building alternative institutions.
* Strategy varies across issue-areas.
Chinese is challenging some aspects of liberal int’l order
China favours a new int. order, consistent with its ruling ideology
Wallace & Weiss 2021
China’s approach to int’l order depends on CCP ideology:
(1) state over markets, (2) state interests over individual rights,
(3) rule by law, not rule of law, (4) ethnic nationalism, not civic nationalism.
So, China favours an international order that…
* prioritizes state sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference;
* enables states to protect citizens from market forces;
* limits the priority of individual rights.
China isnt commited to liberal int. institutional order
Dai & Renn 2016 - reading
A statistical study of commitment to the int’l institutional order (IIO)
* China accepts treaties that create broad multilateral principles but resists
additional protocols that create more concrete or demanding obligations.
* China is less embedded in IIO than other P-5 states, BRICS, Japan, Korea
* China and Russia are less embedded in human rights institutions than
other P-5 or other BRICS
US approach to liberal int. order reflects strategic calculations
Dai 2020
Focuses on US challenge to liberal int’l order, especially under Trump.
* US accepted the costs of collective security, economic openness, and
democracy promotion when necessary for Cold War goals.
* After Cold War, costs were harder to justify.
* US approach to int’l order is now more conditional:
* Support where US retains dominant power (IMF, NATO)
* Challenge where US has lost power (WTO, democracy promotion)
Crisis of liberal internationalism is due to loss of legitimacy and social purpose within western states, not to redistributions of power between states
Ikenberry 2018
Growth of ‘liberal international order’ created by US and based on
economic openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation, and
democratic solidarity.
* After WW2, included US, Western Europe, Japan.
* After Cold War, states in East Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and
Africa adopted democracy and capitalism.
* In recent decades: Neoliberalism economic inequality far-right
populism and nationalism in EU and US rejection of liberal int’l order.
Classic study of power transition
Thucydides
On war between Athens and Sparta, 431-404 BC
Argument: Dominant state (Sparta) used force against a
rising state (Athens) to stop it from gaining more power.
“What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear
this caused in Sparta.”
“The Athenians made their Empire more and more strong… [until] Athenian
strength attained a peak plain for all to see and the Athenians began to
encroach upon Sparta’s allies. It was at this point that Sparta felt the position
to be no longer tolerable and decided by starting the present war to employ
all her energies in attacking and if possible destroying the power of Athens.”
Power transition theory
Organski 1958
Uneven rates of economic growth ‘power transitions’ in world politics.
During power transitions, two factors determine a state’s preference for war
vs. peace: (1) position in the int’l distribution of power; (2) satisfaction with
current int’l order.
Hypotheses:
1. Satisfied states don’t challenge
the dominant state.
2. Weak, unsatisfied states don’t challenge
the dominant state.
3. Strong, unsatisfied states challenge the dominant state war.
Power transitions are always conflictual
Mearsheimer 2001
Assumptions:
* The threat of war is always present in international politics.
* Anarchy insecurity all states prefer to dominate their neighbours.
* Only some states (‘great powers’) achieve a dominant position.
Expectations:
* As rising states approach ‘great power’ status, they become more
aggressive.
* Dominant states use force to resist rising states
Rising state’s choice of strategy dependso n its calculation of power and threats
Itzkowitz Shifrinson 2020
Rising states may choose to cooperate with or challenge a declining great
power.
This choice depends on rising state’s calculation of power and threats, not on
interdependence or ideology.
* Cooperate: When rising power can use cooperation with declining great
power to offset threats from other great powers.
* Challenge: When rising power doesn’t face threats from other great
powers, or cooperation with declining great power won’t help it overcome
these threats.
Example:
* After WW2, rising US cooperated with declining UK to offset rising USSR.
Power transitions depend on regime type
Lemke & Reed 1996
Tests the ‘democratic peace’ thesis (regime type matters, democracies
don’t fight each other) in the context of power transitions.
* Finding: Power transitions involving two democracies are more likely to be
settled peacefully than power transitions involving other types of regimes.
* Illustration:
1890-1910, dominant power UK (democracy) faced two rising powers:
– USA (democracy) peaceful transition
– Germany (non-democracy) war
Biopolarity and nuclear weapons both reduce risk of war during power transitions
Waltz 1979
Multipolar distributions of power tend to be unstable, with high risk of war.
* Uncertainty about alliances and war outcomes willingness to take risks.
* Bipolar distributions of power tend to be stable, with low risk of war.
* Clear balance of power low expectation of gain low risk of war.
* Small states seek security by allying with a great power, but have little
impact on the overall balance.
Kenneth Waltz (1990). Nuclear Myths and Political Realities. Amer Pol Sci Rev 84:3
* Nuclear weapons consequences of war are predictable low risk of war
